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The aim of the study is to obtain an in-depth understanding of smaller tax practice 
in the UK, from the perspective of the tax practitioner.  The practitioner voice, the 
empirical data, was collected via a focus group and semi-structured interviews. 
The thesis investigates how changes in the tax field impact upon smaller tax 
practice and adopts a qualitative, interpretive approach to generate rich 
descriptions of tax practice.  
The study examines the client/practitioner relationship and the practitioner/tax 
authority relationship and also investigates how the practitioner sees their role 
within this tripartite relationship.  The findings suggest that there are a number of 
‘client expectation gaps’ between what clients want and what practitioners can 
achieve in provision of service to them.  These are the ‘expert’, ‘scope’, ‘HMRC’ 
and ‘fee’ gaps.  Gaps between the type of relationship and service practitioners 
desire from HMRC and that which they experience are also identified.  These are 
the ‘relationship’, ‘trust’, ‘systems’ and ‘knowledge’ gaps.  The data also provides 
evidence about positive aspects of the relationship. The study finds that 
practitioners adopt a number of roles to enable management of these gaps and 
to fulfil their responsibilities to both clients and HMRC. The gaps arise as a 
consequence of the dynamic, complex and interdisciplinary tax field in which 
smaller tax practice plays out.  The tax field consists of various actors and is 
overlaid by a number of fields, such as the legal, political, judicial and 
bureaucratic field, of which Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is part. 
Thus by viewing smaller tax practice against the tax field, a deeper understanding 
of tax practice is attained. A theoretical framework, a Bourdieusian lens, with a 
focus upon ‘fields’ is employed to enable this analysis.  
Few studies have examined smaller tax practice, yet it is an important market.  
Smaller tax practice plays an integral role in the tax system, representing 
thousands of taxpayers, including small and medium sized businesses.  Without 
the help of the tax practitioner taxpayers may find it difficult to meet their tax 
obligations, given the complexities in the UK tax system. The findings will be of 
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1.1 Research Questions 
The aim of this research is to achieve an understanding of tax practice in the UK 
smaller tax practitioner context.  The research focuses upon tax practice as 
derived from the accounts and experiences of those working within that 
environment, the tax practitioner themselves.  It is recognised that smaller tax 
practice does not operate within a vacuum, but operates within a much wider tax 
field.  By viewing tax practice from the wider tax field (from the outside, the etic 
domain) this enables deeper understanding and explanations of the empirical 
accounts of the practitioners from within smaller tax practice (the emic domain, 
Lukka and Modell, 2010).   
The tax practitioner is part of a tripartite relationship which consists of themselves, 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the taxpayer (client of the 
practitioner).  The tax practitioner acts as an intermediary between HMRC and 
the taxpayer.  The research highlights the interactions of the client/tax practitioner 
and the tax practitioner/HMRC relationship, and provides detailed examination of 
the practitioner’s role within the middle of this tripartite relationship against the 
context of the fields (such as the legal field, professional field and bureaucratic 
field) which overlay and overlap the tax field.  This study provides an exploration 
of tax practice as a social practice.  
The research follows calls in the literature for additional empirical work which 
focuses on “(1) tax-preparer perceptions of their clients, in general, or on (2) what 
preparers think their clients desire from tax preparation services in particular”, as, 
“…the academic tax literature reveals relatively little about client preparer 
interactions”, Stephenson et al. (2017, p.201), which reflects a view shared by 
many, including Hite and McGill (1992), Gupta (2015), Oats (2012), Van de Rijt 
et al. (2019) and Tan (2014).  From the perspective of the tax 
authority/practitioner relationship, Dabner (2012) calls for the views of smaller 
practitioners in this relationship.  Additionally, Apostol and Pop (2019, p.17) call 
for “more qualitative studies which have largely been absent in tax consultancy 
research” as they have “great potential to explore the rich details of everyday 
practices employed in the consultancy industry”.  Baker (2014, p.281) also 
remarks upon the paucity of qualitative studies “in the tax practitioner setting”. 
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To attain an understanding of tax practice in the UK smaller tax practitioner 
context, in what is a dynamic and frequently changing environment, the following 
overarching research question is to be addressed:  
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
There are three sub questions, each focussing upon an aspect of the tripartite 
relationship (the client, HMRC, and the practitioner themselves – that is their role 
in the middle of this relationship).  The three sub questions are: 
How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in a dynamic 
environment? 
This question provides an examination of the client/practitioner relationship in the 
UK smaller practitioner context from the perspective of the tax practitioner and 
contributes to the empirical literature in respect of client/tax practitioner 
interactions.  A number of gaps in expectation are identified.  The reasons for 
this, and how the practitioner manages these gaps (and hence the client 
relationship) are explored. 
How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
impact upon the practices of tax practitioners? 
The tax practitioner/HMRC relationship has changed considerably in recent 
years, as will be explained in Chapter 2, and as will become evident in the 
empirical evidence.  This question explores these issues and highlights 
interactions between HMRC and the practitioner and details the impact upon the 
practitioner/client relationship and upon the working practices and roles of the tax 
practitioners themselves. 
How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship with 
clients and HMRC? 
This question investigates how the practitioners see their role in the tripartite 
relationship.  The practitioners owe obligations and responsibilities to both HMRC 
and the client, and yet, in the simplest form, the objectives of the taxpayer and 
HMRC are usually at opposite ends of the spectrum (one may want to minimise 
tax, the other maximise it).  There are numerous references to practitioners 
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having, for instance, a “dual duty” (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016, p.2726), “dual 
role” (Tran-Nam el al., 2016, p.58) and “being pulled in different directions” 
(Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2003, p.386) in this relationship.  Practitioners are also 
said to be integral to the operation of the tax system.  But how does the small tax 
practitioner feel about this role, their obligations to clients, HMRC and themselves 
and what are the influences on the practitioner? What roles do they play in 
balancing their responsibilities?  These questions are explored to obtain evidence 
of how tax rules and regulations are put into play in practice (Oats, 2012). 
The above questions are unpacked into smaller objectives in Chapter 4.   
The remainder of this Chapter unfolds as follows.  Section 1.2 explains the 
background and motivation to the research, Section 1.3 gives an overview of the 
research design, followed in Section 1.4 by the contribution offered by the thesis.  
Finally, Section 1.5 explains the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Background and motivation 
Taxation is important and is worthy of research for a number of reasons.  It is an 
important point of “interaction between the state and its citizens” (Gracia and 
Oats, 2012a, p.307).  Taxation has consequences for the economic plans and 
the spending intentions of governments hence the tax system is extremely 
important to a nation.  Taxpayers must fulfil their obligations and pay what is owed 
under the terms of the law.  If they do not, the tax system will not function.  
Taxpayers may however find it difficult to comply with their obligations as tax 
regulations are complex (as discussed in Chapter 2) and they may therefore seek 
the help of a tax practitioner.  Practitioners thus play an important role in enabling 
taxpayers to meet their obligations by acting as intermediaries between the state 
(or tax authorities more particularly) and the taxpayer.  The role of a tax 
practitioner is said to be ‘integral’ to a smooth functioning tax system (Davidson, 
2016; Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016; and Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996) and 
the tax profession is therefore important not just to taxpayers, but the tax system 
alike.  That is, tax practitioners play a key role enabling the tax system to function. 
The numbers of tax practitioners in the UK are many and they represent millions 
of taxpayers who may rely on them for assistance to help them fulfil their tax 
obligations.  HMRC (2020a, p.15) report that  
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an estimated 72,000 agents represent at least 12 million of HMRC’s 
customers, providing tax advice, completing returns, and interacting with 
HMRC on their behalf. Agents are used by 72% of small, 88% of mid-sized, 
and 98% of large businesses. Around 47% of individuals paying through 
self-assessment and about 58% of self-employed individuals use an 
agent.   
These are large numbers.  Additionally, the tax profession is hugely important to 
the to the UK economy.  The National Audit Office (NAO) (2010, p.4) suggested 
that the market for “preparing tax returns” was estimated, at that time, to be worth 
around £2.5billion, and although more recent statistics do not appear to be 
available, this does give an indication of the contribution that the tax profession 
makes to the economy.  
Tax practitioners range from sole traders to those working for large international 
professional firms (such as the Big 41), to those working in the legal profession.  
Some may work for firms which specialise only in tax work (without audit or 
accounting services) or have expertise centralised around one particular tax, or 
provide expertise in relation to a particular tax service such as help for tax 
investigations (the so-called boutique tax firms, Head, 2018).  The services tax 
practitioners offer are discussed in Chapter 2, however they may offer different 
services to different types of taxpayers depending upon their own expertise and 
their target market as the services required by taxpayers will differ.  Global 
organisations such as multinational entities (MNEs) will require different services 
to those required by national small and medium sized entities (SMEs) for 
instance.  Given such large variations in the types of practitioners and services 
required by taxpayers, the market for tax advice is diverse and it has been 
described as fragmented (Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996) and difficult to 
overview (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015; Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 
1996).   One particular aspect of this market however relates to the tax advice 
required by SMEs.  This is an important sector; in the UK, SMEs (defined as those 
with less than 250 employees) represent more than 99% of all firms (with 96% of 
SMES having fewer than 10 employees), (Rhodes and Ward, 2020). SMEs 
account for 60% of private sector jobs and they consequently make a major 
contribution to economic growth and employment (Merchant Savvy, 2020).  
SMEs in particular may grapple with tax regulations (OECD, 2016) and face high 
                                                             
1 These are Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), ErnstYoung (EY), KPMG – not just the largest 
professional services firms in the UK, but worldwide. 
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tax compliance costs (Evans et al., 2014) and may not have tax expertise 
amongst their staff.  Consequently, many outsource tax issues to tax 
practitioners.  The SME market for tax advice is therefore an important one and 
is worthy of research, particularly as Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.305) observe 
“…less scholarly attention [is] paid to national concerns, small taxpayers and their 
advisers”.  Thus this research has focus on the advisers who count SMEs (rather 
than the larger, oft-researched MNEs) amongst their client base; that is the 
smaller practitioner market.   
Given the huge SME market described above, the smaller practitioners that serve 
them are many (being the “high-street accountants and mid-tier accountancy 
firms” (Warmoll, 20152) and they supply important services to this large market.  
Smaller practitioners may also represent individuals and partnerships, alongside 
the SMEs.  As well as helping with compliance obligations and assisting 
taxpayers to navigate the tax system, practitioners ensure that tax reliefs, some 
of which facilitate SME growth, can be claimed by appropriate taxpayers.  Reliefs 
are often available as economic incentives for businesses to invest, as they offer 
tax savings, hence they are important for economic growth and practitioners can 
advise on these matters.   However, little is known about the smaller practitioner 
segment of the tax advice market which serves the thousands of taxpayers who 
may find it difficult to accurately fulfil their tax obligations without assistance.  If 
tax obligations are not met, this of course would have many consequences for 
the collection of tax by the state and the functioning of the tax system in general.  
To contribute to the knowledge of smaller tax practice, and gain an understanding 
of this sector and its role within the tax system, it is important to hear the voices 
of those who work within it, to gain their thoughts, views and experiences about 
their work at the coal face within this particular market.   
Smaller tax practitioners differ from those who work for the Big 4 in a number of 
respects.  Of course the Big 4 organisations are huge concerns with many 
different offices across the globe which employ thousands of people.  Statista 
(2021) suggests that combined, the Big 4 employed just over one million people 
                                                             
2 KPMG announced their intention to act for smaller clients in 2015 and discussions ensued about the 
potential ‘disruption’ to the SME market amongst the practitioners most likely to act for smaller 
companies, see for instance Warmoll (2015).  KPMG withdrew from this market in 2019, see for 
instance, Herbert (2019). 
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in 2020 worldwide. Smaller firms range from sole traders to mid-tier firms which 
employ a few hundred staff, but they cannot compete with the size or spread of 
the Big 4 firms. The client base of the Big 4 may also differ, as may the skills of 
the tax staff employed within them.  There are a number of differences between 
the Big 4 and smaller practices, in terms of their approach to the provision of tax 
advice, as shown in Table 1.1 below: 
Table 1.1 Differences between the Big 4 and the smaller tax practitioner market 
 Big 4 Smaller practitioner 
Price Charge high fees Lower fee profile 
Overheads High Lower 
Global presence Yes No 
Practitioner involved in 
work which is  
Specialist in nature, e.g. 
one specific tax, or a 
specific area of tax. 
More general in nature; 
Likely to advise business 
and owner about multiple 
taxes. 
Skill set of practitioner is 
therefore 
Likely narrower, 
specialist, in depth 
knowledge of particular 
specialism 
Broader (but less depth 
of knowledge) across a 
range of taxes/business 
issues 
Client base:  MNEs amongst others. 
Listed companies. 
Corporations with global 
reach. Some larger 
SMEs. Likely high net 
worth individuals. 
Small business, SMEs, 
owner managed 
businesses,  sole traders 
and other individuals  
Training and support 
and access to tax 
update information 
Extensive and in-house 
formal training. 
Training may be bought 
in/external courses 
attended. Experience 
gained ‘on the job’ 
Access to information 
and resources in-house 
Extensive Limited 
 
This research is therefore not concerned with tax practitioners currently working 
for the larger professional service providers (such as the Big 4), neither does the 
research encompass tax lawyers.  The size of a firm is often reported upon by its 
fee income and in relation to this, firms may be commonly described as being in 
17 
 
the ‘top 10’ or the ‘top 20’3  (of which the Big 4 form part and which incorporate 
larger mid-tier firms); employees of such organisations have also been excluded 
from participation in the research.  
Accordingly, smaller tax practitioners are the participants in this research.  
Participants include sole traders, those who work for firms with just a few 
employees, and those working for firms with 100+ staff.  No participants were 
drawn from any organisation which had an international presence, although some 
participants may have previously worked for the Big 4 or top 10 or top 20 firms.   
The smaller tax practitioner view is fundamental to the study as explained.  
Additionally, the context and environment in which they work must also be 
examined to add further explanation and understanding to the opinions and 
perspectives of the participants.  Tax advice involves an interplay of many 
different social and environmental aspects which impact upon the behaviour of 
those working within that environment.  These different phenomena create a 
dynamic, frequently changing environment in which tax practitioners operate.   
Although the provision of tax advice is thought to be a technical activity (and at 
times it may appear so), it is much more than this.  It can be described as a ‘social 
practice’ (Oats, 2012).  Studies which investigate this perspective and thus 
explicate tax practice as a social (and institutional) practice include Mulligan and 
Oats (2016) who examine the various relationships of US in-house tax 
professionals in the context of the environment in which they operate (through 
the theoretical lenses of institutional work and endogeneity of law); Radcliffe et 
al. (2018) who investigate how tax professionals respond to “changing moral 
boundaries” (p.45) in the corporate tax practice context, from the perspective of 
“professionalization and institutional change” (p.45); and Boll (2014) who adopts 
an actor network theory perspective to examine tax compliance of smaller 
taxpayers in the context of the external environment.   
As Radcliffe et al. (2018, p.46) explain ; 
…tax as a social practice …[highlights]… the ways in which tax behaviour 
is enmeshed with wider organizational, institutional, political and societal 
phenomena…  
                                                             
3 Typically the top 50, or top 100 firms are reported annually, see for instance 




But they also add  
… [this tells] us little about what actors are actually doing on the ground…” 
(Radcliffe et al., 2018, p.46) 
Additionally, as Radcliffe et al. (2018) point out, tax research tends to prioritise 
investigation into either the ‘macro’ environment in which tax practice operates 
(so the “wider organizational, institutional, political and societal phenomena” 
described above), or, the micro level of tax practice itself.  Without the link 
between the two, it is suggested there is some of the picture missing. In other 
words, to address this observation one needs to study ‘actors on the ground’ 
(here the smaller practitioner perspective) against the wider fields and 
environments (the contexts) in which they operate.  Such a view of the practitioner 
and their working environment is explored in this thesis.   Their voices are heard 
to allow examination of the social practice of tax at the micro (emic) perspective.  
This is explored against the backdrop of the wider tax field in which they operate, 
at the macro (etic) perspective.  This will allow examination of how the tax field 
and changes within it affect their practice.  
Finally, the personal experience of working as a tax practitioner in both a large 
professional services firm and in smaller tax practice inspired this research.  The 
contrast between environments was stark.  Work within the large firm was 
restricted to one tax only.  Any questions or problems could be resolved within 
the firm, either at a local or national or international level.  Upon moving to a 
smaller practice, the breadth of knowledge needed increased immeasurably.  
From advising upon one tax in respect of a transaction, suddenly there were at 
least seven different taxes which one needed to contemplate (from income tax to 
national insurance to inheritance tax).  The reason for this was twofold.  Firstly, 
the size of the practice was such that specialism (depth of knowledge of one tax) 
was not feasible, and secondly, the nature of the clients differed.  Businesses 
were often owner-managed, which meant advising both the business and the 
owner, hence the knowledge of many different taxes was needed, as well as an 
appreciation of how the taxes may interact with each other.  Whilst the majority 
of tax compliance work (completion of tax returns for example) was relatively 
straight forward, the tax queries that arose daily were diverse, unique and often 
involved hours of time to investigate and provide an answer.  An answer which in 
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many cases was by no means 100% certain.  The question started to form – why 
is tax practice like this?  Surely someone has had this query before?  Can 
someone not just create a book of every tax question and an appropriate answer 
to save the time of everyone else looking at the same question? That of course 
is impossible as all tax situations and questions are unique to their own 
circumstances, however, this experience was a source of inspiration for the 
thesis.   
In sum, the thesis seeks to understand smaller tax practice and its challenges 
against the wider environment in which it operates. 
1.3 Overview of research design including theoretical 
framework 
Given the research objective and research question, the perspective of the tax 
practitioner is vital to this study.  Their voice needs to be heard.  To understand 
how changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax practitioners 
requires a close examination of social practices in this environment.   A qualitative 
study is therefore undertaken.  The study adopts an interpretive perspective and 
an abductive approach which enables analysis of the links between the empirical 
evidence and the theoretical framework to add meaning and understanding to the 
empirical data generated from the participants. 
In accordance with the research objectives, the methods to acquire the data were 
a focus group, followed by semi-structured interviews.  It should be noted that 
participants for this research were from within the professional field (defined for 
the purposes of this study as; members of, or working for an organisation 
overseen by, a professional body, or with HMRC training) as explained in Chapter 
4.  Practitioners outside the professional field were not included in the sample.   
As tax practice (the emic domain) cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider 
environment (the etic domain) in which it operates, a theoretical lens is required 
which enables examination of smaller tax practice in this context.  A Bourdieusian 
lens, with particular focus upon the concept of ‘field’, is a theoretical framework 
which enables such a link.  The framework is appropriate for examination of 
organisations (here smaller tax practice) (Swartz, 2008) and is suitable for an 
interpretive approach (Malsch et al., 2011), hence it is suitable for use in the 
context of the thesis.  This will enable examination of the smaller practitioner 
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environment as a social practice and thus enable attention to be paid “to the way 
in which everyday tax practices are interwoven with societal, institutional and 
political norms and pressures” Radcliffe et al. (2018, p.46).  As the tax field is 
complex with many “cross disciplinary relationships” (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, 
p.308) a Bourdieusian lens will aid understanding of the impact of such 
relationships.  The tax field is made up of various actors and is overlaid by other 
fields such as the political field, the bureaucratic field and the legal field.  By 
viewing evidence from those inside tax practice at the ground level, against the 
wider tax field, a deeper understanding of tax practice will be attained, as tax 
practice will be shaped by the actions of those within the tax field.   
1.4 Contribution 
The thesis provides a number of contributions. 
It extends knowledge and scholarship around the practice of tax, responding to 
calls for further study into how “tax rules and regulations are put into play” (Oats, 
2012, p.7).  The thesis examines how tax rules are implemented by actors on the 
ground, in the UK smaller tax practitioner context.  Neither the UK context, or the 
smaller tax practitioner market has been widely researched (Gracia and Oats, 
2012a), and thus the thesis adds to the domain literature in this field.  
The study of tax as a social (rather than technical) practice is an 
underrepresented field of study (Oats, 2012).  The thesis contributes to this 
perspective by viewing smaller tax practice against the wider tax field.  The thesis 
explores how tax practitioners balance their client and HMRC responsibilities and 
how they deal with the impact of frequent changes, a dynamic environment and 
uncertainties in order to carry out their work.  Changes at the tax field level may 
be used to explore and understand smaller tax practice and to examine why the 
tax environment is so complex and fluid.  This perspective draws together 
examination of the actors on the ground (smaller tax practice, at the micro level) 
and the broader interdisciplinary tax field (at the macro level) so viewing the 
impact of the different stakeholders in the tax field upon smaller tax practice.  This 
perspective contributes to a gap identified by Radcliffe et al. (2018), who suggest 
that many studies focus upon either the micro or macro context, rather than 
bringing both together, as in this study.  The link between the tax field and the 
actors on the ground is achieved using Bourdieu’s theoretical framework and the 
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concept of “field” in particular.  This enables an appreciation of what is going on 
in the tax field at the macro level, and thus contributes to a deeper understanding 
and knowledge of smaller tax practice at the micro level to explain not just what 
tax practitioners do, but also why they do what they do.  Tax practice is seen to 
be shaped by the tax field in which it operates and indeed tax practice may also 
impact upon the tax field, thus illustrating the social practice of tax. 
Further the tax practitioner voice is underrepresented in existing studies. The 
practitioner perspective about client and tax authority relationships and 
interactions is obtained, thus contributing to knowledge in this respect. In 
particular, the thesis addresses the calls for more research into “client preparer 
interactions”, Stephenson et al. (2017, p.201) and responds to similar calls from 
Hite and McGill (1992), Gupta (2015), Oats (2012), Van de Rijt et al. (2019) and 
Tan (2014).  
The research identifies a number of gaps in expectation between the practitioner 
and the client and between the practitioner and HMRC and, additionally, 
illuminates the roles adopted by practitioners to fulfil their responsibilities as the 
central actor in the tripartite relationship.  These findings contribute to the 
knowledge of tax practice as a whole.   Importantly, the thesis also offers 
additional insight into the functions of smaller tax practitioners and the significant 
roles they play in the operation of the tax system in general.  Additionally, a light 
is shone on how practitioners reconcile complexities to carry out their roles as 
suggested by Bogenschneider (2015) and Picciotto (2007) as there has been little 
explanation, to date, about how this is achieved. The thesis therefore provides 
additional contribution to the scholarship and knowledge about how tax rules are 
implemented on the ground in this respect (Oats, 2012). 
Additionally, whilst this research is not a law thesis, reference to the tax law is 
inevitable.  As will be discussed in Chapter 2, law, as applied to any discipline 
(not just taxation) may at times, be uncertain and add to complexity.  Such 
uncertainty transfers to tax law.  Calls for the effects upon the consequences of 
uncertainty in tax law have been made in the past (Weisbach, 2002).  The thesis 
touches upon the impacts of uncertain law upon smaller tax practice and hence, 
addresses, in small part (given the wide area that tax covers and its 
interdisciplinary nature as a subject) such a call.    
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Finally, from a methodological perspective, the thesis responds to calls for more 
qualitative work in the tax practitioner environment (Apostol and Pop, 2019; 
Baker, 2014).  As will be addressed in Chapter 3, many studies in the tax 
practitioner context adopt a positivist perspective, and few hear the tax 
practitioner voice.  A qualitative approach enables acquisition of the depth and 
richness of the practitioners’ experiences, so as to enable deep understanding of 
smaller tax practice and thus the thesis contributes to scholarship in this respect. 
The thesis will be of interest to the practitioner community, tax authorities and 
policy makers, the professional bodies concerned with taxation (such as those 
representing the accounting, legal and tax profession itself) and scholars. 
1.5 Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides background and context 
to the environment in which tax practice in the UK is currently carried out and 
explains what a tax practitioner is and the roles they have.  Details about the tax 
profession are also presented.  The role of HMRC is highlighted, and current 
issues which impact upon the tax profession are discussed.  As tax practitioners 
advise on law, details of challenges in this respect are also presented. Chapter 3 
provides a review of the literature around the client/practitioner and HMRC 
relationship and the role of the practitioner in the tripartite relationship.  The 
professional identity of the tax practitioner is also addressed.  Chapter 4 provides 
an explanation of the methodological approach, research design, research 
methods and theoretical framework.  Chapters 5 to 7 present the empirical 
findings, based around each of the three research questions.  Chapter 8 provides 
a discussion, linking the empirical findings to the theoretical framework at the 
macro (etic) domain, in order to provide additional understanding of tax practice 






2 Background and context - The practitioner 
environment 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides background and contextual information about tax 
practitioners and the work they undertake, the roles of the professional bodies, 
HMRC as an organisation and the general environment in which the UK based 
smaller tax practitioner works.  
The chapter starts at Section 2 by explaining what a tax practitioner is.  This 
section also presents the reasons why taxpayers seek the help of tax practitioners 
and discusses the services practitioners provide.  The roles of professional 
bodies in the UK (to which practitioners may, or may not belong) are discussed 
in terms of regulation, how they oversee their members and the benefits 
practitioners may obtain from membership in Section 3.  Of course, a large part 
of the practitioner role involves interaction with HMRC.  HMRC as an organisation 
has undergone significant change in recent years as it adapts to changes in the 
environment and responds to pressures to collect more tax and clamp down on 
tax avoidance.  Such changes impact upon both taxpayers and practitioners alike, 
hence a number of current issues are also discussed.  HMRC matters are 
discussed in Section 4.  The complexities in the tax system are highlighted in 
Section 5. Practitioners navigate complex law and the tax system to assist their 
clients and these complexities can be a source of challenge, frustration and 
difficulty for many.  The tax practitioner may therefore find her/himself operating 
under conditions of uncertainty (arising from the different relationships which they 
must manage, as well as complex tax rules and regulation) when seeking to 
resolve issues for clients.  Section 6 explains how various events in the tax field 
have created an element of scepticism about the tax profession and provides an 
examination of the backdrop against which tax practice currently plays out, 
highlighting some additional pressures in the tax practitioner environment. 
Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided in Section 7. 
2.2 The tax practitioner and the taxpayer 
This section explores what a tax practitioner is, why there is demand for their 
services and describes the services the practitioner offers. 
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2.2.1 What is a tax practitioner? 
Tax practitioner, tax adviser, tax intermediary, tax return preparer, tax 
professional, tax agent, tax accountant, tax lawyer: these are all terms which may 
be used to describe individuals who act for clients in respect of taxation matters 
(Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer, 2015).  Other terms may also fall within the tax 
professional remit, such as payroll agents and those employed (or formerly 
employed) by revenue authorities (Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer, 2015).  Brock 
and Russell (2015, p.19) suggest that tax professionals are “…intermediaries or 
knowledge brokers between taxpayers and government tax institutions” and the 
practitioner’s role within this tripartite relationship is explored in Chapter 3.  There 
are a “multiplicity of terms used to describe tax practitioners” (Frecknall-Hughes 
and Kirchler, 2015, p.290) and yet there is no statutory definition of what or whom 
a tax practitioner or adviser is (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015; Gupta, 
2015).  Nevertheless, Devos (2012) undertaking research in respect of the 
Australian tax practitioner does suggest a definition for tax practitioners as shown 
below. Whilst this encompasses the diversity of those within the tax profession 
and is a fair reflection of the situation in the UK too, it is important to note that the 
‘registered tax agents’ relate only to Australia (and not the UK).  International 
comparisons should be made with caution as some countries (here Australia) 
require registration of tax practitioners.  This is not required in other countries, the 
UK included (as further discussed below). 
Self-employed and in-house accountants, tax advisers and registered tax 
agents, tax agent franchises and legal practitioners in the tax area are all 
embraced by the term ‘tax practitioner’. Devos (2012, p.5) definition of tax 
practitioner. 
The term tax practitioner is used throughout the thesis where possible.  
2.2.2 Why do taxpayers seek their help? 
The tax system in the UK is notoriously complex.  Complexity pervades not just 
the tax law (it may be lengthy, unclear, vague, ambiguous, change frequently) but 
also the administration of the system.  Reasons for complexity are highlighted in 
Section 2.5 to illustrate the problems that may arise for some taxpayers and their 




Taxpayers may require help to fulfil their tax obligations, or to understand the tax 
implications of a future transaction.  MacNeil (2009) and Raskolnikov (2015) 
suggest that the act of seeking advice is a response to uncertainty – that is the 
taxpayer does not know how the tax law may apply to their circumstances, or how 
to fulfil their obligations under the tax system.  They may hence seek the help of 
an expert. 
Particular individuals who seek advice are not the focus of this thesis, although 
various studies have been undertaken over time about those who seek tax 
practitioner assistance from a demographic perspective (age, sex, marital status, 
level of education, income levels, employment status) (see for example, Borrego 
et al., 2015; Christian et al., 1993; Collins et al., 1990; Frecknall-Hughes and 
Moizer, 2015).  Not all taxpayers will seek advice, it will depend on their 
circumstances.  However, the reasons for which taxpayers seek advice are 
important in this study, as the tax practitioner is expected to have the knowledge 
to address those particular needs of the taxpayer.  
The motivations for taxpayers to seek assistance have been widely written about, 
although not always from a UK perspective.  Nevertheless, the drivers appear to 
be common amongst countries, and include:  
 to reduce uncertainty in reporting tax affairs correctly;  
 to reduce the risk of audit by authorities;  
 to save compliance costs (particularly for smaller business Evans et al., 
2014) and time (i.e., engage those with the knowledge and ability to help 
with compliance or provide advice required).  In other words, to access tax 
practitioner knowledge which is much greater than that of the taxpayer. 
(Gupta, 2015; HMRC, 2015a) 
 to avoid penalties and interest;  
 to ‘get it right’ and fear of error;  
 inability to understand the law (complex, ambiguous, the language) in 
order to determine tax obligations;  
 to obtain a quicker refund;  




For literature on these matters, see for instance, Brock and Russell (2015), Brody 
and Masselli (1996), Christensen (1992), Christian et al. (1993), Collins et al. 
(1990), Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler (2015), Gupta (2015), Klepper et al. 
(1991), Leviner (2012), Niemirowski and Wearing (2003), Reckers et al. (1991), 
Smith and Kinsey (1987), Tran-Nam et al. (2016).  Additionally, HMRC research 
report (2015a), collected information regarding the motivations of small and mid-
sized businesses for using a tax agent; many of the above reasons were indeed 
listed as motivations. 
Therefore, complexity and uncertainty about the tax system and the tax law 
creates demand for services to assist the taxpayer (Borrego et al., 2015; Cloyd 
and Spilker, 1999; Frecknall-Hughes and McKerchar, 2013; Helleloid, 1989; Hite 
and McGill, 1992; Klepper et al., 1991; McKerchar, 2005; Murphy, 2004).  As a 
result,  
“…professional judgement [that is, rather than taxpayer judgement] is 
often required to interpret the law … and how the law applies to the factual 
situation of the taxpayer” (Kaplan et al., 1988, p.427).  
Professionals are seen as being “conversant” in the relevant law (Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2003, p.376) helping taxpayers have confidence that their tax affairs 
are correctly taken in hand to help resolve uncertainty to pay “no more than the 
law requires” (Tan, 2011, p.74), to submit a timely, compliant tax return (Erard, 
1993, p.163) and meet their tax obligations (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015, 
p.290).  Indeed, as Ansari and Sossin (2017, p.295) indicate, professional 
expertise is therefore required to “resol[ve] complexity for the taxpayer”.  One 
could say therefore that there is transference of the taxpayer’s uncertainties to 
the practitioner (Eustice, 1989; Fogarty and Jones, 2014)  
2.2.3 Functions of the Tax Practitioner 
Given that taxpayers seek the help of practitioners, what tasks do they undertake 
and what does the practitioner actually do?  This may depend upon the size or 
type of firm for which the practitioner works.  Those working for larger firms may 
specialise in a particular area of tax (such as corporate tax, or inheritance tax), 
whereas those working in smaller firms will need a far broader knowledge and 
come across a greater variety of issues.  Additionally, the responsibilities of a tax 
lawyer may differ completely from those working within the broader accounting 
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field.  The role may, in other words, depend upon the context within which the 
individual works.  
It is common to view the responsibilities of a practitioner by the type of activities 
they undertake, such as compliance matters which comprise tax return 
preparation, and filing and payment activities (for example, see Erard, 1993; 
Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer, 2015; Tran-Nam et al., 2016 and; Niemirowski and 
Wearing, 2003) and those which encompass advice on tax minimisation such as 
tax planning.  The use of the practitioner’s knowledge in this respect is explored 
by Klepper et al. (1991) who suggest that their expertise may be used for 
enforcement (compliance) or enabling (tax planning or exploitation of ambiguous 
law) purposes.  Interestingly, Apostol and Pop (2019) include ‘tax planning’ within 
the tax compliance category as they see tax planning to be implementation of tax 
law in accordance with its intent (such as claiming of tax reliefs); they categorise 
other activities (such as searching for loopholes within the law, and taking 
advantage of ambiguous legislation) as tax avoidance.   
Alternatively, responsibilities may be classified by services, such as; preparation 
(and auditing) of accounts and tax returns, and representation of taxpayers 
(Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996; Tran-Nam, 2016); responding to queries from 
tax authorities; providing valuations, and acting as a mediator or negotiator 
between the tax authorities and the client (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015); 
and helping taxpayers avoid errors and deterring them from “…engaging in 
unlawful or overly-aggressive activities” (OECD, 2008, p.14, which engaged in a 
study of the role of tax intermediaries in conjunction with HMRC and others to 
determine the roles played “in tax compliance and the promotion of tax 
minimisation arrangements” (p.5) which perhaps explains the context of this 
quote).  Conversely however, practitioners provide a protection role for the 
taxpayer against overzealous tax authorities (Brock and Russell, 2015).  
Practitioners also act as a conduit of knowledge between the tax authorities and 
the taxpayer (Brock and Russell, 2015), providing details of changes in law or 
new rules and regulations, or advertising tax reliefs or incentives on behalf of 
HMRC such as research and development (R&D) tax reliefs (Hasseldine, et al. 
2011).  Tran-Nam et al. (2016) describe this role as the education of the client. 
The practitioner is therefore, arguably in the business of selling knowledge 
(Gracia and Oats, 2012a) and may be seen as a “knowledge broker” as their 
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knowledge is itself an “economic asset” (Hasseldine et al., 2011, p.27).  Thus 
they act as intermediaries between the tax authorities and the client (Tomasic 
and Pentony, 1991). 
Many practitioners may be members of a professional body.  Details of 
accounting and tax professional bodies, and their main roles are discussed 
below.  Further information about why professions develop, the role of 
professionalism in approaching ones responsibilities and the professional identity 
of the tax practitioner are discussed in Chapter 3.  What follows here gives 
additional context to the working environment of (some) tax practitioners. 
2.3 Tax and Accounting Professional Bodies 
Those working in the UK tax profession may belong to a one or more professional 
bodies in the accounting and tax field – which is described as a “confusing 
plethora” (Freedman and Power, 1992, p.21).  Despite the choice of organisations 
on offer, there is no overall umbrella regulation and it is not obligatory to belong 
to any professional body.  There is no system of registration for tax practitioners 
in the UK (which differs to some other countries) as indicated above.  
2.3.1 Professional bodies   
Many tax practitioners may be qualified accountants and may belong to one of 
the professional accounting bodies, such as the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW, which also hosts a ‘tax faculty’ for 
members, at extra cost); the Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland (ICAS); 
Chartered Accountants Ireland; the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA); or Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT). 
Individuals usually become full members of these bodies after completion of 
examinations and a period of work experience (in practice or industry, depending 
on the institute) which is characteristic of any profession (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.3).  Upon qualification individuals are designated to the professional body and 
are able to call themselves – for instance - Chartered Accountant (ICAEW), 
Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA) and so on. 
Additionally, for tax more specifically, the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) 
and the Association of Taxation Technicians (ATT) are other professional 
organisations.  The CIOT is described as 
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“the leading professional body in the UK for advisers dealing with all 
aspects of taxation… [with the] primary purpose … to promote education 
in taxation with a key aim of achieving a more efficient and less complex 
tax system for all” (CIOT, 2020).  
Again, the organisation sets criteria for membership and upon successful 
completion, the individual becomes a Chartered Tax Adviser (CTA).  This 
organisation also enables international tax practitioners to study for a diploma in 
international tax.  Additionally, the CIOT offers a dual qualification with ICAEW 
and the ATT.  There are also other specialist tax organisations such as the 
Society of Estate and Trust Practitioners (STEP) which is (per the ‘about us’ 
webpage) described as a “global professional association for practitioners who 
specialise in family and inheritance and succession planning” and historically 
there was also an Institute of Indirect Taxation, now merged (since 2013) with the 
CIOT.  
As noted in Section 2.2.1, tax practitioners may also include qualified lawyers, 
solicitors and barristers who may also belong to their own professional 
organisations (and perhaps also to the CIOT) and others may have no 
professional qualifications, nor belong to any professional body, although neither 
lawyers or unqualified individuals are included in this study.  For completeness, 
it should be noted that there are many other accountancy-related professional 
bodies in the UK, such as Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(CIMA) (in the main, the professional body for accountants working within 
industry) and Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) (the 
public sector accounting body).  Whilst these bodies do include some taxation 
studies in their professional qualifications, in the main, practising tax advisers, if 
they do belong to a professional body, are more likely to belong to those noted 
above.  In an international sense there is also the CFE (Confédération Fiscale 
Européenne), which is a type of ‘umbrella’ organisation which includes within it 
“33 national organisations from 26 European States, representing more than 
200,000 tax advisers”.  Representatives within the CFE from the UK include the 
CIOT and the tax faculty of the ICAEW (CFE, 2020). Another body of note, also 
offering a route to professional accountancy qualification is the Association of 




The professional bodies publish professional standards to which members should 
adhere and have regulatory and disciplinary rules in case of breach of standards.  
Firms may be monitored.  There are practical benefits to belonging to such 
organisations for members.  These include access to support, access to 
continuing professional development (CPD) courses and materials, technical 
assistance and ethical guidance.  Careers advice, professional development 
opportunities, job advertisements, access to a journal, or newsletters and access 
to the library of the organisation may also be available.  The professional bodies 
provide current information, updates and advice about changes to tax rules and 
tax law to help members keep their knowledge up to date.  They also provide a 
route for members to have a voice in relation to ongoing consultations, which are 
often frequent and numerous.  For example, at the budget in Spring 2020, the 
government published eleven policy consultations and calls for evidence 
(Norman, 2020).  Additionally, a branch network may exist – that is local ‘arms’ 
of the organisation run events for members, enabling access to an accounting or 
tax community and network.  For an example of this see the CIOT’s local branch 
network programme (CIOT, 2020a) or the ICAEW’S local area information 
(2020F).  A selection of events held at local CIOT branch meetings, from 2017-
2019 are shown in Appendix 10.1.  In addition, a qualification attained via either 
(or both) a tax or accounting body enables the practitioner to advertise this fact, 
and their membership will become visible on the databases held by the 
organisations.  This provides potential clients with a type of hallmark, as this 
suggests practitioners are highly trained individuals who have the support of a 
professional body. Interestingly however HMRC (2015a) research found that 
taxpayers simply assumed their adviser to be professionally qualified, but were 
unlikely to check this is the case. However, as an example, ICAEW (2020) states: 
“Being an ICAEW Chartered Accountant is no ordinary achievement. Your 
premium qualification sets you apart as a member of a highly influential 
and respected professional body, which connects you to a wider global 
community of financial experts”. 
Additionally, the CIOT describes their qualification as the “gold standard” that is 
the mark of a “trusted adviser” (CIOT, 2020b).  To retain membership, individuals 
must pay an annual subscription to each body, and ordinarily declare annual 
compliance with the professional body rules and regulations in terms of CPD, 
ethics and money laundering rules for instance.   
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These benefits may be viewed as a type of capital; to which individuals have 
access by virtue of their membership.  Simply belonging to a professional body 
may confer status (Stringfellow and Thompson, 2014) and respectability to the 
outside world which can be seen to be an intangible benefit of membership - or 
in other words symbolic capital – as membership may confer indirectly an 
indication of quality and good service.  Of course, to become a member in the 
first place, as discussed, one must meet stringent entry requirements.  Success 
in meeting these requirements also enhances the human and cultural capital of 
the individual (Stringfellow and Shaw, 2009), and yet a qualification may also be 
seen as symbolic capital too.   
In sum, in the UK, anyone may set her/himself up to be a tax practitioner, qualified 
or unqualified, experienced in tax matters, or not.  Practitioners may belong to 
more than one professional body, or none.  Research undertaken by Kantar 
Public for HMRC in 2018 indicated that 67% of tax advisers belong to a 
professional body, meaning that, as Smith (2019) and White (2019a) note, one in 
three are unregulated by any professional body.  Interestingly, membership of 
professional bodies appears to increase to 82% if the practitioner employs staff 
(HMRC 2014b) and it was suggested in the same research that ICAEW was the 
professional body to which most participants belonged.  Strangely, none of the 
participants in that particular study (which had a secondary objective of updating 
HMRC about tax agents’ profiles) referred to the CIOT (despite it having over 
19,000 members according to information on the website as at November 2020).   
Taxpayers may incorrectly assume their adviser is professionally qualified per 
HMRC (2015a) research findings, as aforementioned.  Unqualified advisers are 
a source of consternation to those belonging to professional bodies, who 
themselves are regulated by the terms of their membership (Kantar Public 
research for HMRC, 2018).  “Lack of oversight” of non-qualified practitioners was 
a chief concern and various ways were suggested to bring about change.  This 
research is not concerned with ‘unregulated’ practitioners, but this particular 
sector of the market will inevitably affect the field under consideration as they may 
potentially be in competition with practitioners who must fulfil additional 




2.3.2 Role of the professional bodies 
The professional bodies (here the accounting and tax bodies) are self-regulating 
and have their own rules around ethics, conduct, and oversight, as described 
above.  They must guide members about their conduct, particularly in relation to 
tax planning advice. Of course, an individual will have their own disposition and 
approach to their work (which forms part of an individual’s professional identity) 
and the link between the professional body and the individual is discussed in this 
respect in Chapter 3.  Given that professional bodies should act in the public 
interest (also discussed further in Chapter 3) their actions, as well as those of 
individual tax practitioners, have recently come under additional scrutiny, in light 
of aggressive tax avoidance matters, as will be explained in Section 2.6.  If the 
actions of a profession are not deemed robust enough, particularly around the 
issues of what may be viewed as aggressive tax avoidance, there is a risk of a 
“loss of professional freedom and increasing regulation” (Stuebs and Wilkinson, 
2010).  To this end the profession issued the Professional Conduct in Relation to 
Taxation (PCRT) regulations.  These regulations first appeared in 1995, and are 
common to seven professional bodies4.  The regulations have undergone 8 
iterations since, most recently in 2017 (and being digitised in 2019, along with 
publication of additional help sheets), to give stronger focus to the obligations of 
the tax practitioner in terms of tax planning and to help address some of the 
criticisms levied at the tax profession, or as Gammie (2017) states is a response 
“to ministerial concern that the professions are not doing enough to curb tax 
avoidance”.  The latest version includes new standards for “tax planning” and lays 
out the responsibility of the tax practitioner in that respect. 
The PCRT (the full version of which can be seen at CIOT, 2019a) 
 …. sets out the high ethical standards which form the core of the tripartite 
relationship between tax adviser, client and HMRC.   
 responds to the government’s challenge to the professional bodies to take 
a greater lead in setting and enforcing clear professional standards around 
the facilitation and promotion of tax avoidance. 
 has been endorsed by HMRC as an acceptable basis for dealings between 
members and HMRC. 
(ICAEW, 2020a) 
                                                             
4 These professional bodies are: •Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT)•Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA)•Association of Taxation Technicians (ATT)•Chartered Institute of Taxation 
(CIOT)•Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), •Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS)•Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) 
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The standard is not without criticism.  Gammie (2017) argues that it is the 
setters of law who should take more responsibility for tax avoidance, rather 
than leaving it to the preserve of the tax practitioner, as this is not an easy 
issue to resolve. He concludes: 
Ministers may like to think that the professions should take on a greater 
lead and responsibility in relation to tax avoidance, but in fact avoidance 
is a function of the tax laws that ministers promote and that Parliament 
enacts. As the Memorandum of Dissent to the Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Profits and Income noted more than 60 years ago: ‘The 
existence of widespread tax avoidance is evidence that the system, not 
the taxpayer, stands in need of radical reform.’ And the reference to the 
taxpayer could have included a reference to those whose job it is to advise 
taxpayers on their tax obligations, based on a realistic assessment of the 
facts and a credible view of the law. It is for ministers and parliamentarians 
to look to what they do, rather than to look to the professions to relieve 
them of responsibility for the errors and inadequacies of their tax policy 
and tax legislation. 
Of course, the way one views these matters depends very much on personal 
perspective. Gammie is a Queens Counsel (QC), a senior barrister in the tax field, 
which may influence how he sees this issue.  A practitioner’s view is given by 
Dodwell and Parker (2017, p.8), who recognise that practitioners should be 
treated fairly yet there is a need to rule out  
“bad behaviour…while making it clear that taxpayers are entitled to be 
advised on different courses of action with different tax outcomes…the 
ultimate arbiter of the law is the judiciary”.   
This suggests perhaps a fear that ‘acceptable tax planning’ could inadvertently 
be caught up in the guidance (see Fernie, 2016).   However, there is undoubtedly 
a changing attitude towards the acceptability of tax avoidance, which will have an 
impact on all tax practitioners and which is discussed at Section 2.6 below. 
Research was undertaken on behalf of HMRC in 2018 (Kantar Public research 
for HMRC, 2018) into the role of the professional bodies in the regulation of tax 
agents.  Some of their findings are also mentioned above.  The research was to 
investigate the membership (and role) of professional bodies, how their 
regulatory frameworks interact with members, and the relationship between 
HMRC and the profession along with how the profession regulates their 
members.  The study collected the views of senior officials of professional bodies.  
The findings suggested that professional bodies did not see their role to be one 
of regulation, rather that they “saw their role as maintaining and enhancing 
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standards through education, with a review process referred to as ‘practice 
assurance’ or ‘monitoring’” (Kantar Public research for HMRC, 2018, p.4).  As 
highlighted above, a chief concern of the professional bodies related to those 
agents who do not belong to a professional body, and suggestions were made 
as to how to address this issue (which is outside the scope of this thesis). 
2.4 HMRC matters 
HMRC is the body which is responsible for administration of the tax system 
(including collection of tax, and payment for public services and welfare).   
“HMRC’s objectives, as agreed by the government, are to:  
• collect revenues due and bear down on avoidance and evasion;  
• transform tax and payments for its customers; and  
• design and deliver a professional, efficient and engaged organisation”.  
        (NAO, 2020, p.3) 
HMRC do not set tax law – that is the preserve of parliament, but HMRC are 
charged with overseeing that it is complied with.  It may however be the case that 
some tax regulations are introduced in the form of secondary legislation, and in 
this case HMRC do have input to the wording of rules and regulations (see the 
discussion below about Making Tax Digital).   
Clearly as the objectives above show, HMRC wish to transform the collection and 
payment of tax (see Making Tax Digital, at Section 2.4.2 below) and create an 
efficient organisation to serve its “customers” (i.e. taxpayers and perhaps tax 
practitioners?).  In this respect see Section 2.4.3 regarding ongoing 
reorganisation of the service which has implications for this particular objective.  
Despite taxpayers being described as “customers”, HMRC is a service that they 
have to use, that is they cannot choose not to engage or go elsewhere if they are 
not satisfied with the service.  Therefore, the choice of the term ‘customer’ to 
describe taxpayers may itself be debated; for exploration of this and discussion 
about the changing discourse of the tax authorities in respect of “an organisation 
that is predominantly a regulating department” see Tuck et al. (2011, p.357).  
Nevertheless, customer or taxpayer, what can the taxpayer (customer) expect 
from HMRC, and what does HMRC expect from the taxpayer? This relationship 
is represented in the Taxpayers’ Charter.  Of course, if the taxpayer engages a 
practitioner much contact will be routed via the practitioner rather than the 
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taxpayer, so the taxpayer charter could indirectly impact upon the 
practitioner/client and client/tax authority relationship – and HMRC acknowledge 
a gap here (ICAEW, 2020d) as discussed below at Section 2.4.4 ‘HMRC and 
agent engagement’. 
2.4.1 Taxpayers’ charter and HMRC powers 
The Taxpayers’ Charter sets out the responsibilities and obligations of both 
HMRC (bearing in mind the above objectives) and the taxpayer.   
Information on HMRC’s webpages (updated January 2016) explains 
We want to give you a service that is fair, accurate and based on mutual 
trust and respect. We also want to make it as easy as we can for you to 
get things right. 
Changes to the charter itself have recently been proposed arising from various 
parliamentary reports which included examination of HMRC conduct in certain 
situations, including the Independent Loan Charge Review (discussed below) 
Changes are required;  
to set higher expectations of performance during interactions with 
members of the public and ensure that staff are offered training on how to 
deliver it     (Cullinane, cited in Cave, 2020)  
The new wording has yet to be determined, although there continues to be a 
debate about the rights and obligations of HMRC versus those of the taxpayer 
(Bradley, 2020).  HMRC powers have increased in recent years and include, 
amongst others, the ability to charge the taxpayer large penalties and demand 
payment of tax upfront (in case of dispute).  Some suggest that the rights of 
taxpayers have become lost in the pace of change.  See for instance Maas (2018) 
for an in depth consideration of this perspective; Bowler (2018) who writes about 
HMRC powers; and safeguards and the report by the All-Party Parliamentary 
Loan Charge Group (n.d), which is discussed below.  The power appears to have 
shifted in favour of HMRC and this of course has consequences for taxpayers 
and their advisers alike. 
As will be further explained in Section 2.6 HMRC has had recent success in 
tacking tax avoidance cases, success which may have been elusive in the past.  
Three areas of tax avoidance, of note, which may affect the smaller tax 
practitioner market relate to Employee Benefit Trusts; Film Schemes and the so 
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called Loan Charge.  Sympathies with taxpayers taking part in tax avoidance 
arrangements may be few, yet controversy has surrounded some of this success.  
Rangers Football Club employee benefit trust (a tax saving vehicle) was found to 
fail as payments into the trust were reclassified as salary upon which tax would 
be payable (earlier rulings in favour of the taxpayer were overturned by the 
Supreme Court and Scottish Court of Session).  This was a controversial ruling 
per Heaton (2018), as it was felt that the goal posts had been moved about the 
acceptability of employee benefit trusts and their adherence with the tax law.  He 
remarks upon this from the tax practitioner’s perspective as an adviser.  He 
suggests that  
“…plain English legislation and precedent [were] disregarded in order to 
get to a result that the court thinks is the ‘right’ answer”  
and he asks how  
“practitioners [are] supposed to know what the law means, when it can be, 
if not completely disregarded, then at least freely interpreted….”. 
The interpretation of tax law is discussed further below at Section 2.5.3.  
Tax relief offered for investment in films has also been challenged successfully in 
the courts, as HMRC contend that the vehicles in which the funds were invested 
were not actually ‘trading’ and so no tax relief on the investment was due.  Maas 
(2019) provides the background to these schemes and sets out their history.  
HMRC has recently won a court battle with Ingenious Media (see White, 2019b).  
White (2019b), suggests it likely that Ingenious Media will appeal the decision as 
there is over £450million tax at stake.   
Perhaps the most controversial HMRC challenge relates to the so called ‘loan 
charge’, introduced in 2019 (in respect of individuals who had entered into 
‘disguised remuneration arrangements’ to avoid tax and national insurance 
contributions).  The method by which individuals were paid reduced their tax 
liability.  Many low paid taxpayers, who may have been misled or coerced into 
such arrangements, or simply misunderstood what they entailed, have been 
caught up in this (CIOT, 2019). HMRC sought to remedy the underpayments of 
tax which had gone on for years.  Demands for underpaid tax were thus received 
by many.  Demands were retrospective (up to 20 years) and in some instances 
were for large sums of money and caused such distress that some taxpayers took 
their own lives (All-Party Parliamentary Loan Charge Group, n.d.).  The content 
37 
 
and tone of HMRC correspondence was criticised. Consequently, a review was 
undertaken into the approach by HMRC and a number of changes were made.  
A Loan Charge Action Group was set up to provide support.  The group also 
engaged with politicians and the media to raise awareness of the issues.  As a 
result, HMRC were required to shorten the time that they could ‘look back’ to 
calculate underpaid tax, (now to 2010, rather than 1999) and must take note of 
whether or not disclosure was made (by the taxpayer) about participation in the 
scheme (Sweet, 2020).  The issues led to the proposed changes to the 
Taxpayers’ Charter.  
Finally, the tone of correspondence referred to above may be illustrative of a 
‘nudge’. This occurs when the wording of correspondence is designed to 
encourage certain behaviours (Lymer, 2018; McCleod, 2013).  Whilst this can be 
beneficial in some instances, some ‘nudges’ are observed to be “heavy handed”.  
It is suggested that the taxpayer may feel, intimidated, or obliged to act in a certain 
way, and may not be aware that there is, at times, no legal basis for the requests 
made of them by HMRC (Clegg, 2021).  This is further example of HMRC ‘power’, 
albeit perhaps in a more nuanced sense.  
2.4.2 Making Tax Digital (MTD) 
In line with its objectives HMRC has the “aim of becoming one of the most digitally 
advanced tax administrations in the world” (NAO, 2020, p.4) and is currently 
rolling out its “Making Tax Digital” (MTD) programme.  The requirement is for 
taxpayers to move away from paper records to digital record keeping. MTD is 
currently operational (from 1 April 2019) for value added tax (VAT) for those 
businesses which exceed the VAT registration threshold.  The next stage will be 
to roll out MTD for income tax.  A consultation for corporation tax has yet to take 
place.  It seems that there is a mixture of compliance with the MTD rules for VAT. 
ICAEW (2020c) reports HMRC commissioned research which suggests that 
noncompliance with the current MTD VAT rules relates to lack of knowledge by 
taxpayers, with misunderstanding of the word “digital” being one of them, or in 
other words they did not appreciate the meaning of “making tax digital”.  
Additionally, communications about MTD from HMRC were described as vague, 




When income tax MTD comes on stream, four quarterly returns of information 
must be submitted by businesses, followed by a fifth return, to finalise profit for 
the period.  Effectively, a taxpayer’s tax position will be maintained in real time.  
The idea is that mistakes will be minimised and the impact upon tax collected 
should be positive.  This system will replace the single annual tax return. Moore 
(2017) expresses concerns that, if her clients require her to file their tax returns, 
she will have to do this five times per year, rather than the current, one return per 
year, hence the switch in system is causing consternation to practitioners as well 
as taxpayers.   However, the implementation for income tax MTD has been 
delayed until, currently, 2024.  Additionally, ICAEW (2020b) indicates that HMRC 
are yet to issue firm rules around its operation.  Changes such as this will of 
course affect practitioners.  The system will not function without specialist 
software which the practitioner will need to acquire and uncertainty around the 
introduction of MTD may cause additional challenges for practitioners. This is 
recognised by Lemmon (2019) citing Brian Palmer an MTD expert, who suggests 
that the only certainty is that digitalisation will be introduced and thus urges 
practitioners to prepare their clients for that, rather than focus upon MTD per se.  
The method of the introduction of MTD is also not without controversy. Whilst the 
concept of MTD has been enabled via primary legislation, which is subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny, the subsequent ‘rules’ about its operation are to be 
introduced via secondary legislation.  This type of legislation is subject to far less 
scrutiny which some commentators find concerning.  Ross Martin (2020) for 
example suggests that the use of secondary legislation will allow HMRC to make 
rules up as they go along.  She also notes that secondary legislation is difficult to 
track.  Cave (2017a) makes similar points, noting that it will be HMRC who write 
the rules (rather than parliament) and that that “the vital points of how taxpayers 
must comply with MTD won’t be scrutinised”.  This may be further example of 
HMRC having powers some feel they should not have.  The delay in the issue of 
secondary legislation and the rules (as yet unknown) create uncertainties for both 
taxpayer and practitioner – they know something is coming, but not exactly how 
it will play out in practice. 
2.4.3 Customer service 
HMRC has undergone major restructuring in recent years.  Local offices (which 
could be visited by taxpayers if they needed help) are gradually being replaced 
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by 13 large HMRC offices across the country (HMRC, 2019).  This means that 
HMRC will no longer be accessible to local communities in a face to face capacity.  
The aim is to provide a more efficient organisation, and yet, there are already 
problems accessing help remotely via post or telephone, as highlighted by Lovell 
(2016), which may have consequences for taxpayers and tax practitioners alike. 
HMRC as an organisation has challenges in general.  Staff levels have been 
reduced and there is ongoing reorganisation.  Suggestions are that HMRC is 
under resourced - which brings many challenges to the practitioners’ 
environment.  Matters relating to poor levels of service by HMRC regularly feature 
in the press.  Issues such as; unanswered telephone calls; unopened 
correspondence; staff who lack technical knowledge and; the provision of 
incorrect advice (see for instance Lovell, 2016 on accountingweb, who refers to 
downturns and challenges in HMRC service, with staff cut by a third, and office 
closures).  These matters are also reflected in research undertaken for HMRC 
(2014b) in which practitioners remarked upon; the amount of time they wasted 
chasing HMRC about delays (which can prove costly for clients); a request to 
have named contact with specific individuals to help with complex queries and a 
need for access to expert advisers.  A desire for email contact was also 
expressed, although the drawback to this, it was suggested in the report, may be 
to create unreal expectations about how quickly HMRC can respond, given 
resource limitations (which could damage the HMRC/practitioner relationship 
further).  Interestingly, details provided by ICAEW (2021) indicate that general 
email contact is still not available, although email, or online forms, or web chats 
may now be used for certain types of transaction.  Such concerns are echoed by 
Maas (a practitioner with 50+ years of experience) in a speech to the ICAEW tax 
faculty (Maas 2015).  The NAO (2016, p.14) noted a “collapse” in customer 
service in 2014/15, suggesting this occurred as staff were released prior to 
completion of major changes in the service.  A report by the Public Accounts 
Committee (2015) also noted that HMRC does not provide an acceptable or 
consistent level of service to customers.  In terms of more recent published data 
relating to HMRC performance during 2018-19, HMRC still has challenges, with 
the NAO report into the department during this time (2020, p.6) noting a “dip in 
phone and post-performance”, “recruitment challenges” and a diversion of 
resources “towards EU Exit work”.  ICAEW (2020d) suggest that although tax 
40 
 
revenues increased during 2019-20, HMRC struggled to meet customer service 
targets as a result of resource issues and the coronavirus pandemic.  Issues such 
as these will impact upon taxpayers and their advisers alike.  Whilst academic 
literature considers the reasons for reorganisation/reduction in resources in 
HMRC, such as the implementation of ‘lean’ government in terms of cost 
reduction and the impact upon employees and the service provided to the public 
(see for instance, Carter et al., 2011), it does not consider the impact on tax 
practitioners. 
It has already been suggested that HMRC see practitioners as being important 
for the smooth functioning of the tax system.   Therefore, there should be good 
relations between all three parties of the tripartite relationship and particularly 
between HMRC and the practitioner.  HMRC has undertaken various initiatives 
to improve this relationship. 
2.4.4 HMRC and agent engagement 
HMRC (2014a) describes plans for a “tax agent strategy” to “transform” the 
relationship between agents and HMRC.  This includes a number of objectives 
including a desire to understand practitioners and their clients, make it “easier [for 
practitioners] to do business with HMRC and reduce … costs”, and “align HMRC 
and agent processes where possible”.  A commitment to work with agents was 
given, along with greater provision of online services for practitioners.  It should 
be said that it is not easy to track the progress of the “tax agent strategy” from 
2014 to date – however, there is a central webpage from which agents can 
currently access “agent services” (HMRC, 2015b, updated 2019).  This page 
provides links to various services including MTD sign up, HMRC manuals (books 
of instruction to HMRC staff, which cover all taxes), various forms, online 
services, and agents’ news and updates (includes technical issues, reminders of 
deadlines, information about current consultations, guidance, responses to 
queries, a “spotlight” on tax avoidance issues and links to other newsletters and 
information).  See for example HMRC Agent Update 78 (HMRC, 2020c), dated 
June-July 2020.  A number of sources of help and support are also available.   
There are various initiatives relating to tax agents/HMRC interaction, although 
these are not easily identifiable from HMRC webpages.  For instance, Kantar 
Public 2018 research on behalf of HMRC, regarding the role of the professional 
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bodies in the regulation of tax agents, elicited comments from the professional 
bodies about, the Joint Initiative Steering Group (JISG) and the Agent Steering 
Group (ASG).  It is not easy to find information about these groups (perhaps they 
have been superseded?).  The most current initiative appears to be the Issues 
Overview Group (IOG), which is a successor of “Working Together” – a previous 
initiative to engage tax agents.  The purpose of “working together” is given from 
the Working Together (n.d.) website as: 
[Looking] for ways to improve HMRC’s operations for the benefit of tax 
agents, their clients and HMRC. 
The main objectives of Working Together are to: 
 improve communications between HMRC and tax agents 
 identify and clarify widespread issues which can be escalated in real time 
 help HMRC focus on the best way to help tax agents and their clients 
 be open and exchange views on how the tax system works 
The IOG is said to be a “partnership between HMRC and professional bodies of 
the tax world”, which has come into existence since the demise of local working 
together groups following closure of local HMRC offices (Stride, 2018).   The 
core activity of the group remains to bring problems arising at the coalface 
to the attention of HMRC, and where ever possible to achieve solutions or 
work arounds (Stride, 2018).   
Agents belonging to a professional body may join an agent’s forum where they 
can discuss issues with other agents, and items raised therein may be taken up 
by the IOG. Here is not the place to discuss all these initiatives, other than to 
highlight that efforts are being made to engage tax agents.  Interestingly however, 
ICAEW 2020d indicates acknowledgement by HMRC of a gap between its 
“Charter commitments and its performance” in the way “HMRC interacts with 
representatives of taxpayers”.  Hence there is improvement to be made in the 
practitioner/HMRC relationship. 
There are good intentions to engage with the tax profession, yet this is set against 
a backdrop of increasing HMRC powers, not just over taxpayers, but also over 
tax practitioners.  For instance, practitioners must disclose certain tax avoidance 
schemes to HMRC under the disclosure of tax avoidance schemes regulations 
(DOTAS).  Additionally, penalties are now enforced for enablers of defeated tax 
avoidance, the provisions of which target those who enable abusive tax 
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avoidance.  This legislation is included in Schedule 16 Finance (No. 2) [Act] 2017 
and the purpose and provisions of it are explained at HMRC (2018).   
This legislation introduces a penalty for any person who enables the use 
of abusive tax arrangements, which are later, defeated. 
That is, if the arrangements are defeated in a court of law, those involved in 
enabling the taxpayer to take up the arrangements are subject to a penalty.  
These provisions are designed to deter organisations/practitioners from taking 
part in and benefiting (financially) from designing, marketing and facilitating 
“abusive tax arrangements” (HMRC, 2018).  The provisions should work in 
conjunction with the directions/instructions to the practitioner via the PCRT as 
discussed above. The guidance states that “Those who provide clients with 
services in respect of genuine commercial arrangements will not be impacted” 
(HMRC, 2018). 
Further, HMRC have, as already discussed, instigated research into the role of 
the professional bodies (and their regulation of tax agents) (Kantar Public 
research, 2018 for HMRC) and, sought to obtain views about raising standards 
in the tax advice market (HMRC, 2020b).  The latter called for evidence in several 
respects including: 
the scope of the market for tax advice; the characteristics of good and bad 
practice; current government interventions; international models; possible 
approaches to raising standards (HMRC, 2020b) 
These initiatives, whilst well intentioned, may suggest a lack of trust on part of 
HMRC in respect of their view of the tax practitioner market.  This in itself may 
impact upon the HMRC/practitioner relationship.  
The final two sections of this Chapter shed additional light on the working 
environment of tax practitioners.  Section 2.5 examines what makes tax law 
complex, uncertain and difficult to advise on.  Of course, not all transactions will 
be complex, but even what may appear to be a simple matter – such as business 
expenditure – may not be necessarily so. Section 2.6 provides an overview of 
some of the recent events in the wider tax field and highlights the impact upon 
the tax profession more generally. 
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2.5 Complexity – the general context 
It is easy to say that tax in the UK is complex.  It is more difficult to convey what 
this actually means in practice, that is, as it affects the taxpayer, or their adviser 
when trying to implement the tax rules on the ground.  The context of this research 
is the smaller tax practitioner.  However, the context may make little difference – 
complexity is still an issue.  Smaller practitioners will still, at times, be faced with 
unravelling complex situations.  Indeed, Tomasic and Pentony (1991) observed 
that smaller practitioners come under greater pressure from their clients (than 
those representing larger firms) as the clients will often be owner managers and 
have a large stake in the business in which they require advice (so the pressure, 
for the practitioner, should a mistake occur becomes more pronounced). When 
first starting out on this project and discussing the direction of it with various 
individuals, those who were not familiar with the smaller (or general) tax 
practitioner environment, suggested that most of the work the smaller practitioner 
may undertake would be ‘run of the mill’, familiar, routine, compliance type of 
work.  Or, that once one had undertaken, say one company reorganisation (or 
any other more complex piece of tax work) that this would become routine going 
forward.  In other words, what possible difficulties could the practitioner 
encounter? This is a misunderstanding of this market and is not an accurate 
picture of the smaller practitioner environment.  Tomasic and Pentony (1991) 
suggest that a smaller practitioner undertakes more compliance than advisory 
work, but that does not necessarily mean that the work is straightforward. See 
the example topics from the CIOT’s local branch programme between 2017-2019 
as an illustration in the appendix at Section 10.1.  Many attendees at such events 
are likely to be smaller practitioners rather than those from the Big 4 who may 
attend ‘in house’ tax updates.  The range of topics is broad.   
Complexity may perhaps be visualised by referring to the quantity of materials 
available to the tax practitioner.  Websites of the professional bodies include 
reams of taxation materials.  There are various tax specialist commercial entities 
offering tax software, tax databases, or subscription based services (such as 
access to a helpline).  Additionally, tax text books which provide commentary on 
legislation are issued by a number of specialist publishers.  There is an 
abundance of online forums, some of which provide information about the latest 
tax updates, some of which also accept questions submitted by what appear to 
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be both practitioners, as well as taxpayers themselves (see for instance, 
accountingweb and taxationweb to name just two).  There are numerous social 
media forums (for a discussion as to how these are employed by those seeking 
assistance with their tax position see Onu and Oats, 2018).  As to whether the 
responses to tax queries on such forums are actually correct is another issue, but 
these forums perhaps spring up as alternatives to paying for advice.  The HMRC 
website of course contains numerous documents, although it is criticised by Todd 
(Senior Technical Manager, Low Incomes Tax Reform Group in evidence 
provided to the Treasury Sub-Committee, 2018) as far too simplistic which can 
make it unhelpful.  Just taking the documents issued for the March 2020 budget 
as an example (HMRC, 2020d), these included four immediate changes to tax 
law and regulation, 35 links to “Tax information and impact notes”, three other 
related documents, and links to six consultations about changes in policy.  An 
additional link was given to a 180-page document the “Overview of Tax 
Legislation and Rates” as at March 2020 (HMRC, 2020e) the introduction to 
which states, at p.3,  
“This document sets out the detail of each tax policy measure announced 
at Budget 2020.  It is intended for tax practitioners (authors emphasis) 
and others with an interest in tax policy changes, especially those who will 
be involved with consultations both on the policy and draft legislation.” 
In the UK there is at least one budget per year, which introduces the annual 
finance act (there have at times been two).  Practitioners need to keep up with 
frequent change. 
Other HMRC sources of information available via HMRC webpages (accessed 
September 2020) include tax information and impact notes; Revenue and 
Customs briefs (bulletins); leaflets, factsheets and booklets; budget and pre-
budget reports; webinars; and extra-statutory concessions (ESCs). HMRC 
provide access to their own interpretations of the law via Statements of Practice 
– there are over 130.  Access to HMRC manuals (instructions to HMRC staff) are 
also, in the main, publicly available (although certain elements may be redacted).  
There are over 150 HMRC Manuals (which cover different areas of tax).  
Additionally, there are a further 76 manuals relating to Value Added Tax (VAT).  
HMRC manuals, include for example, the Admin Law Manual, the Business 
Income Manual, the Corporate Tax Manual, the Cider Manual, the Diplomatic 
Privileges Manual and so on.  Of course, some of these are very specialist and 
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will not be relevant to all practitioners, but in terms of conveying the breadth and 
depth of tax law, here is just an example.  The tax legislation itself, stands feet 
tall and is one of the longest tax codes in the world (Turnbull-Hall and Thomas, 
2012) and practitioners cannot ignore this.  The following section provides more 
information about the context of tax law and attempts to highlight the reasons why 
all the above materials exist. 
2.5.1 Tax practitioners and tax law 
Tax law is  
“…based on legal precedent, so…requires an element of predicting how 
the tax authorities and ultimately the courts will interpret the legislation that 
has been enacted” (Mazars, 2014, para 11).  
It follows that practitioners will therefore advise on law, whether they are acutely 
conscious of this or not. Picciotto (2007, p.25), referring to MORI research 
undertaken during 2006 implies that many “accountants …rarely look at the [tax] 
legislation itself”.  That is, they may rely on aides to provide answers to tax 
questions, such as commercial tax publications or HMRC guidance mentioned 
above, as opposed to the wording of the legislation itself.  This is an interesting 
finding, for a number of reasons.  Firstly, many accountants will advise on tax 
matters (not just lawyers who are assumed to refer to the law per se) and 
secondly only the tax legislation itself has the force of law.  All guidance, HMRC 
materials and other information or commentary is outside the law and does not 
have legal force (see Burkinshaw and Frecknall-Hughes, 2016 for a discussion). 
If practitioners rely upon wording in guidance documents, they may run into 
difficulties as discussed below.  The participants of the MORI poll described as 
‘in practice’ appear to fall under the ‘accountants’ bracket, yet, within this category 
there will be many different individuals (some may be tax trained, others not and 
so on) so it seems a little broad brush to say that “accountants…rarely look at the 
legislation itself”.   However, this finding needs to be borne in mind when exploring 
how practitioners undertake their work. 
Additionally, the background of the practitioners may affect their approach.  For 
example, are they legally trained, or not (Cloyd and Spilker, 2000; Latham, 
2012)? Different perspectives may be brought to the interpretation of law, 
depending on the angle from which it is viewed (be that an accountant, lawyer, 
judge, academic, taxpayer, tax authority etc. – see Latham (2012), citing 
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Rosenbloom 2009).  This would suggest that how the tax law is managed by 
certain groups will differ – which may include the smaller practitioner too – and 
this may affect the advice given. 
2.5.2 Complex tax law and its consequences 
All law can be vague, ambiguous, grey, unclear, uncertain, indeterminate (there 
being no single right answer to a question) or multiple answers may exist when 
applying the law to the facts (Endicott, 2000; Greenawalt, 2001).  Much is written 
about the language in which law is expressed and the impact upon interpretation 
of it (Bogenschneider, 2015; Burton, 2007; Edgington, 2001; Endicott, 2001; 
Eustice, 1989).  It therefore follows, that these problems will also affect tax law.  
Uncertainty is not a desirable characteristic of any tax system (see Smith, 1776, 
as discussed by Smith and Joyce, 1797), and yet it is inevitable that uncertainties 
will arise in tax law too.  The word “incomprehensible” has been used to describe 
tax law (Ansari and Sossin, 2017 (describing Canadian tax law) and Prebble, 
1994 citing Walker (describing English tax law)).  So how is meaning ultimately 
derived from it? 
Vague and ambiguous language can leave laws open to interpretation.  That is 
language can be “inaccurate”, have “numerous senses” and can create a 
“multitude of doubts” D’amato (1983) citing Joseph Story (1836) as well as lack 
clarity, be conflicting and “unsettled” (MacNeil, 2009, p.70).  The same applies to 
tax law. Or as, Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.308) state: 
Tax laws are not immutable, but rather are fuzzy and open to 
interpretation…[and therefore there is] discretion as to how rules are 
enacted 
The accusations of ‘game playing’ levied at tax practitioners in relation to tax 
avoidance relate to this issue. Tan (2011, p.74) suggests that practitioners create 
their own “credible interpretation” of a law in order to play such a game.  Yet, 
given difficulties to ascertain the meaning of certain tax law, how does this affect 
the taxpayer and the tax practitioner? Taxpayers should not have to guess what 
will happen to them under the terms of the law (Bogenschneider, 2015, referring 
to Stroup, 1984), they should know the tax effect of their proposed transaction 
(D’amato, 1983) and they should know in advance how the law applies to them 
(Gribnau, 2013).  Ideally they (and practitioners) need certainty.  Yet this is not 
always so.  Laws are not always “clear and precise” and may require “constant 
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interpretation” (Edwardsson and Wockelberg, 2013, p.365), a fact agreed by 
Rowland 1995.  Raskolnikov (2015, p.5) suggests legal uncertainty is a “fact of 
life” and Fogarty and Jones (2014, p.287) indicate that the adviser’s role is to 
“absorb” such uncertainty – that is – remove it from the taxpayer, so that the 
practitioner deals with the uncertainty on their behalf.   
There are different ways tax laws may be written.  This affects how rules are 
implemented in practice and so is of relevance to the practitioner. A rules based 
system (such as in the UK, or the US) has many laws and statutes (McBarnet 
and Whelan, 1991).  A principles based system takes a broader view and does 
not dictate a specific rule, but requires an overriding principle to be considered 
against a particular action (Avery Jones, 1996; Freedman, 2010; James, 2010).  
Both systems have advantages and drawbacks.  It is suggested for instance that 
a practitioner requires additional guidance to implement principle based 
legislation as the law itself contains little assistance as to its application (Carby-
Hall, 2002; Freedman, 2010).  It is advocated that the UK has characteristics of 
both types of system (Raz, 1979) as the UK common law system runs in tandem 
with the legislative parliamentary system – in other words, case law is determined 
by application of principles to the underlying legislation by the judiciary.  It follows 
therefore that UK tax practitioners may have to advise on both types of legislation. 
Interpretation of law can be undertaken in various ways.  The literal language 
(meaning) of the law may be taken (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991; Picciotto, 2007; 
Powers, 1976) (as with the Duke of Westminster and Ayrshire Pullman cases, as 
discussed in Section 2.6 below).  Or one may seek to apply the intention of 
parliament (known as purposive interpretation), as tends to now be the case in 
tax avoidance matters as discussed above.  Much has been written about these 
different approaches.  Whilst the detail is not particularly pertinent to this study, 
as tax practitioners may themselves adopt certain ways of seeking the meaning 
of the law on behalf of clients (it is said that they act as translators, Harvey, 2002; 
Mulligan and Oats, 2016 - see Section 3.4.3), it is relevant to briefly consider 
these approaches.  A focus on the literal meaning of words, is said to offer 
taxpayers (or perhaps their advisers) the chance to engage in the ‘game playing’ 
mentioned above.  This is seen to be a unique attribute of taxation law 
(Freedman, 2010; Ginsberg, 1984;  MacNeil, 2009; McBarnet and Whelan, 1991; 
Munroe 1981;  Picciotto, 2007;  Powers, 1976; Prebble, 1994; Weisbach, 1999 a 
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and b) which may result in taxpayers relying on the form of the law and shaping 
their transaction to ‘fit’ into a particular form in order to reduce the tax liability, 
referred to variously as using “cubbyholes” by Kleinbard (1990, p.1320) 
“mapping” and “freezing” by Powers (1976, p.30), or using “foxholes” by Eustice 
(1989, p.20).  With respect to the purposive approach to interpretation, it may be 
difficult to identify the intention (of the drafter or policymaker) behind the law 
(Dodwell and Parker, 2017; Freedman, 2010; Lee, 1999), which could also (as 
with a literal approach) result in “creative compliance” (Freedman, 2010 p.719). 
Nevertheless, interpretation of tax law may not be easy. It has been described as 
an “art” (Edwardsson and Wockelberg, 2013, p.364 quoting F. C. von Savigny 
1853).   
Examples of these matters which are specific to the tax adviser, provide 
additional context to the tax practitioner environment and type of work they do 
and hence are relevant to this particular study.  Ginsberg (1990) and Snape 
(2015) refer to the “seemingly innocuous question” (Snape, 2015, p.157) about 
where the line is drawn between business and non-business expense.  This will 
be a common issue not just for taxpayers but also for the practitioners who advise 
them.   The tax treatment of a transaction can depend on how something is 
defined, and there can be a fine line which separates one transaction from 
another.  Common examples include equity/debt, capital/revenue (see for 
instance the doubt that may arise over the replacement of a damaged roof, 
Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015) capital profit/income, trading profits, 
employed/self-employed and loan/lease.  These distinctions are not as clear as 
they might be.  The variances are important as the tax treatments (and hence the 
tax payable) differ. 
Many have explored why tax law is so complex.  The reasons for (and sources 
of) complexity are important as they impact upon the tax field in which the tax 
practitioner operates.  These may include: 
 Equity.  Exemptions and reliefs are incorporated into law for equitable 
purposes and numerous different rules may be required for fairness, so to 
distinguish between taxpayers (D’amato, 1983; Eustice, 1989; Freedman, 
2007; Thuronyi, 1996). Reliefs are also used as economic incentives (for 
example R&D) and have political connotations.  There are numerous 
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reliefs in the UK which have been the subject of various reports (see for 
instance the National Audit Office (NAO) (2014) and the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) (2014).  It is suggested reliefs may pave the way for tax 
avoidance, but there appears to be little appetite to reduce the number in 
existence. 
 Badly drafted law (Weisbach, 1999a and b) 
 Language of law.  This may also include the absence of a definition for 
certain words, which leave them open to interpretation – such as, in the 
tax context - “substantial”, “reasonable”, “capital”, “material”, “partnership”, 
“corporation” (D’amato, 1983; Endicott, 2001; Raskolnikov, 2015; 
Weisbach, 1999a, 1999b and 2002) and ‘due’ and ‘ordinary’ (D’amato, 
1983) and even the word “income” – see for example Snape (2015). See 
also James and Wallschutzky (1997) for a discussion about the use of 
language in rewritten tax law; Salter (2010) mentions syntax problems; 
Thuronyi (1996) refers to poorly written law. 
 Tax law is used for multiple purposes.  This affects the drafting and design 
of law as tax law seeks to achieve multiple objectives – such as raising 
revenue, administering welfare, implementation of economic policy, and 
influences over the behaviour of taxpayers (Eustice,1989; Freedman, 
2003, 2010; Hickman, 2014; James and Wallschutzky, 1997; Kay, 1990; 
Karlinsky and Koch, 1987; King, 2008) 
 Length – the UK has one of the longest tax codes in the world, amounting 
to thousands of pages (Turnbull-Hall and Thomas, 2012) 
 Anti-avoidance provisions.  These are often bolted on to existing (already 
complex) legislation which results in an increase in length and additional 
complexity (Chittenden and Foster, 2009; James and Wallschutzky, 1997; 
Weisbach 1999b) 
 Those creating tax law (politicians and policy makers in a role of 
governance) may lack, or undervalue, the need for technical tax 
knowledge, which may create a gap between those who are responsible 
for tax policy and those who have to implement it.  There may be a 
disconnect between what the law says, or does not say, and its 




 A disjointed approach to the tax system in general (Bowler, 2010). 
 Frequent change, and the UK system of issuing an annual finance act 
(Chittenden and Foster, 2009; Salter, 2010; see also McKerchar, 2005 in 
the Australian context) 
 Lack of time for consultation.  This may result in policy changes and U-
turns, which add to difficulty (Freedman 2007) 
 “…the common law approach, the increasing sophistication of commerce, 
the desire for certainty, the need for legislation to prevent avoidance, the 
courts, political tinkering, the parliamentary process, parliamentary 
counsel, the lack of time – in other words our whole legal culture” (Avery 
Jones 1996, p.64). 
 
The above issues, combined with the difficulties of interpretation pose challenges 
for tax practitioners.  Not least they need to keep up to date with changes.  This 
challenge has been viewed from the perspective of the corporate taxpayer 
(Hasseldine et al., 2011) and in house tax departments (Porter, 1999).  Yet in 
terms of how such complexities impact the tax practitioner specifically, one may 
draw only on overseas studies. McKerchar (2005) discovered practitioners in 
Australia felt overwhelmed with the volume of material, and frequent changes in 
income tax law.   Tax complexity in the US was discovered to create the possibility 
of errors, and high costs of compliance (Burton and Karlinsky, 2016).  In Portugal 
49.5% of Portuguese practitioners admitted to unintentional error (Borrego et al., 
2017).  In Australia Tran-Nam et al. (2016) examined how cumulative tax changes 
affected the relationship between tax practitioners and clients, finding 
consequential increases in costs and time incurred by practitioners, and an 
opposing reduction in certainty of advice.  Additionally, different dimensions of 
complexity were identified by Portuguese practitioners regarding the Portuguese 
fiscal system (Borrego et al.,2015).  Likewise, complexity from the perspective of 
a US tax lawyer is discussed by Zelenak (2014). It is suggested that even 
experienced professionals find tax law difficult to understand and that an outright 
answer may never be found (Zelenak, 2014, Prebble, 1994).  Additionally, 
Prebble (1994) cites, at p.382, David Walker, editor of The Oxford Companion to 
English Law who compares tax law with other forms of law: 
“More than any other branch of municipal law, tax law is open to the 
reproach of being utterly incomprehensible by the individuals affected, and 
even frequently by their legal advisers. The enormous complexity of the 
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rules of law on each kind of tax gives rise to an enormous volume of 
dispute and argument… 
Whilst the complexity of the tax law and the tax system in the UK is the subject 
of various articles (Avery Jones, 1996; Freedman, 2010; Hyde, 2015; James, 
2007; Mumford, 2015; Oats and Morris, 2015; Office of Tax Simplification, 2011; 
Snape, 2015 and; Turnbull-Hall and Thomas, 2012), the UK tax practitioner 
perspective on the problems of managing frequent change, uncertainty in law, 
and interpretation difficulties is lacking in the literature.   Some smaller 
practitioners may not be concerned by this, if they are those who refer to the 
guidance around the law.  Others however may have to deal with a far broader 
scope in terms of complexity than those working for large professional service 
firms who may be able to specialise in one particular tax. 
2.5.3 Managing understanding of law  
The above section attempts to explain the challenges practitioners face in coping 
with legal uncertainty, complexity, and application (or interpretation) of the law. 
Clearly challenges are experienced in the day to day work of some tax 
professionals, however, despite the difficulties highlighted, claims are made that 
the tax community must deal with complexity, as, of course if they did not, they 
could not do their job (Bogenschneider, 2015; Picciotto, 2007).  It may be the 
case that practitioners have to reach a position with which they are comfortable 
(as opposed to finding the absolute answer) as Picciotto (2007) observes; 
individuals may legitimately have different interpretations of rules.  
What does this mean in practice? Wide-ranging research into a tax transaction is 
often needed.   Eustice (1989, p.19) writes that, at times, tax practitioners may 
find that despite extensive research they may not achieve success in the search 
for understanding.  The suggestion is they may “give up” trying to work out exactly 
what will happen in relation to a transaction.    In contrast to this McKerchar (2005) 
observes that practitioners may undertake extra research to bolster technical 
abilities and knowledge.  Therefore, it may take an inordinate amount of time to 
research a tax issue, and this has implications for the time and costs incurred and 
the advice given (Eustice, 1989; Roberts et al., 1972).  This latter point was 
observed in research by Fogarty and Jones (2014) who found that taxpayers 
were happy to pay the practitioner for what they know, but less happy to pay for 
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what the practitioner needs to learn (i.e. the research into the tax issue). Even in 
today’s technological world which, theoretically has made the research of tax 
problems easier, time and cost to establish the knowledge needed to advise 
clients, is, in some circumstances, prohibitive (Fogarty and Jones, 2014).  It may 
also be the case that the practitioner does not charge the full fee incurred 
(McKerchar, 2005).  There is a trade-off.  More research and more comfort for 
the practitioner is attained by spending time on an issue even if the client is not 
charged for it, versus less research and a lower fee for the client, but which may 
leave the practitioner with doubts.    Interestingly, this may reflect the smaller 
practitioner environment more so than the larger professional firm environment.  
Smaller (accounting) practitioners were found to regularly work more hours than 
they charged for and were said to recognise their own limitations – that is they 
have less technical expertise than those in larger firms (Stringfellow et al., 2015).  
Given their client base they will also need a broader knowledge as discussed. 
Nevertheless, practitioners are expected to translate legalities.  But how is this 
achieved?  Extra-statutory guidance may be one source of assistance used by 
practitioners to support their position, such as that available on HMRC webpages. 
Tax practitioners, therefore, may refer to both the law and ‘non-law’ to advise their 
clients (as also observed by Tomasic and Pentony, 1991, see also Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.2).  Freedman and Vella (2011, p.113) note that “[a]t present this 
guidance is completely outside the legislative system as it is not contained in 
secondary legislation but is simply issued by HMRC”.  Using guidance to offer 
advice may mean reliance on material that is not legally binding and is based on 
HMRC’s own view of the law.  This may encourage the taxpayer to pay tax 
according to HMRC’s interpretation (as the taxpayer may trust HMRC to have the 
‘correct’ view of the law).  Yet much HMRC guidance is accompanied by a caveat 
that the taxpayer should not necessarily rely on the guidance given (Freedman 
and Vella, 2011).  As guidance is outside the law, this perhaps is understandable, 
but it does beg the question as to the purpose of guidance in the first place.  
Further difficulties for the taxpayer and tax practitioner arise when changes take 
place: old guidance is removed from HMRC websites and previous versions of 
HMRC manuals disappear, making it impossible to track the changes made 
(Cave, 2017b; De Cogan, 2011; Freedman and Vella, 2011). Hart (2017) cites a 
case where guidance used to support the tax position submitted for a client had 
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been removed when the practitioner went back to refer to it (upon receipt of an 
audit letter from HMRC).  When issues such as these arise, trust between the tax 
authorities and the practitioner can be damaged, which is vital for the smooth 
operation of the tax system (Bober, 2012; De Cogan, 2011). Comments arising 
in TAXGUIDE 3/13 (ICAEW 2013) suggest that better management of the 
changes to HMRC guidance is needed.   
Additionally, Cave (2017a) observed, that new property tax anti-avoidance 
legislation was subsequently clarified by 64 pages of guidance.  She observes 
that this is not appropriate given some of the issues described above.   
This is not the first time that anti-avoidance legislation has been 
introduced, which throws a wide net over large population of taxpayers, 
but subsequent HMRC guidance “clarifies” the scope to narrow the effect 
to the intended targets. 
She observes that the courts will not take HMRC guidance into account in any 
judgement.  Practitioners should thus be aware of these matters if relying upon 
guidance when advising clients.  Perversely, guidance may add complexity rather 
than alleviate it, as it too is subject to caveats and practical problems. 
The final section of the chapter takes a much broader view of the current tax 
environment and adds a deeper macro perspective.  The practitioner must work 
with HMRC, and complex law in order to carry out their roles for their clients as 
discussed throughout this chapter, yet their profession is currently viewed with 
scepticism, which may affect the practitioners’ relationships with clients and 
HMRC alike.  This wider perspective thus adds additional context to the 
practitioner’s role and is discussed in Section 2.6 below. 
2.6 The tax environment and its impact upon the tax 
profession 
The tax profession as a whole has come under scrutiny in recent years from the 
international community, governments, politicians, the public and the media, just 
to name a few interested factions.  At an international level, the way that global 
corporations trade and the way that they calculate their taxes, has been open to 
increasing enquiry.  Large corporations have been accused of not paying their 
fair share of taxes and being involved in aggressive tax avoidance schemes.  
Companies such as Facebook, Google, Starbucks and Amazon, amongst others, 
have been the target of such accusations and drew public protest (see Barford 
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and Holt, 2013; McVeigh et al., 2012).  No doubt in many cases, corporations will 
claim they have operated within the law in seeking to minimise their tax payments.  
Yet, corporations may have sought professional advice to enable this.  
Practitioners and the tax profession are thus seen as instrumental to these 
practices and the roles they play have also been under the spotlight (de Widt et 
al., 2016).    It is suggested that there has been an “erosion of taxpayer respect 
for the tax system” (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016, p.2736) and the role of 
practitioners in what may be perceived to be non-compliance is seen as a 
problem (Borrego et al., 2017 and Dodwell and Parker, 2017).  Some suggest 
that there has been a “decline in tax advisor professionalism” (Dzienkowski and 
Peroni 2016, p.2724) and changing moral boundaries need management 
(Radcliffe et al., 2018).  The ethics of tax practice and tax practitioners have thus 
been questioned. 
This thesis is not about tax avoidance, or about what is a ‘fair share’ of taxation.  
Aspects about tax planning and tax avoidance may inevitably arise as the thesis 
unfolds, but the focus is not about tax avoidance per se.  Indeed, to focus upon 
this would require a detailed discussion as to what tax avoidance is (or is not) 
which would not be a simple question to address, given the “fuzzy” boundaries 
which exist in tax regulation (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.308). For details of 
different perspectives about tax avoidance, see Hashimzade and Epifantseva 
(2017).  Nevertheless, the environment in which the practitioner works has 
changed in recent years.  Tax practice in general and the work of a tax practitioner 
is often viewed with scepticism and the reason for this may be attributed, in large 
part, to tax avoidance issues.  Despite the fact that there is a huge market and 
range of tax practitioners, as discussed in Section 1.2, not all will be concerned 
with the tax avoidance practices which may be reported in the media, however 
such publicity may affect attitudes towards the tax practitioner market in general. 
Often, the Big 4 and international tax lawyers are criticised for their role in global 
tax avoidance practices, yet, challenges to practices at an international level will 
ultimately have an impact upon domestic tax matters.  The effects at a global 
level filter down and affect the working practices of many local tax practitioners.  
In the UK context, given the requirement for HMRC to collect more tax since the 
financial crisis in 2008 there has been increasing focus on tax avoidance issues.  
Westminster has hosted various House of Commons Public Accounts (PAC) 
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meetings to discuss several tax avoidance related issues, both at a domestic and 
international level5.  The Covid 19 crisis may have further impact here.   
Various domestic tax avoidance issues have been tackled by HMRC in recent 
years and not all are the preserve of Big 4 international firms, indeed, some 
schemes may be marketed by small online ‘boutique’ firms (HMRC, 2021).  
Nevertheless, some tax avoidance schemes affect the smaller practitioner market 
too, including, by way of example: employee benefit trusts, film schemes and 
arrangements regarding remuneration (the ‘loan charge’), which are discussed at 
Section 2.4.1 above.  Historically, HMRC did not fare well when challenging tax 
avoidance, particularly in the courts. Broadly, as long as the taxpayer complied 
with the literal wording of the law, this was acceptable, even if resulting in loss of 
tax to the exchequer, see for example McLaughlin (2000) and the cases of 
Ayrshire Pullman Services and Duke of Westminster.  Today, however, it is often 
the case that the intention of the law is considered, as well as the literal wording, 
and as a result HMRC has had success in tax avoidance cases in recent years 
as discussed in Section 2.4.1. which is further illustrative of change in the tax 
practitioner environment.   
The role of practitioners in advising taxpayers about tax avoidance and their 
ethical conduct has been open to question as said.  However, despite the 
criticisms levied at practitioners, or the “army of clever accountants”, some, 
particularly in the profession, believe this to be “an inaccurate portrayal of the 
majority of tax advisers” with the suggestion that some practitioners act outside 
a professional body “remit” (Mazars, 2014).  As to the role of professional bodies, 
see Section 2.3. Clearly there will be different opinions about the tax profession 
depending upon one’s outlook.  This was highlighted in Addison and Mueller’s 
(2015) research which reviewed the transcript of a PAC meeting about tax 
avoidance. It was shown that the language and discourse and metaphor used 
(and hence opinion towards the Big Four’s role which was under discussion) 
depended upon the perspective of the person speaking. Their analysis “brought 
out very clearly directly competing rhetorical framings” (p.1279) as those from Big 
Four attempted to “defend themselves discursively” (p.1283).  Some of this 
                                                             
5 See here for details of the different sessions 
https://old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-
committee/taxation/ [accessed 14 January 2020] 
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debate and “framing” may of course link into the debate about what ‘tax 
avoidance’ is (or is not) which is not considered within this thesis, however it is 
not surprising that views from those within the profession and those outside it 
may differ.  Despite Addison and Mueller’s focus upon the Big Four, the debate 
spills over into the tax profession more generally as lines between acceptable 
and unacceptable tax avoidance (or planning) become blurred (Fernie, 2016) and 
thus may affect how a practitioner undertakes the work they are asked to do. 
The scepticism surrounding the practice of some practitioners, does not just affect 
public opinion towards the tax profession.  HMRC, as an organisation has 
undertaken various consultations into the role of the tax profession, including for 
example, Kantar Public (2018) research for HMRC about the Role of Professional 
Bodies in the Regulation of Tax Agents and, most recently, a call for evidence 
was made about raising standards in the tax advice market (HMRC, 2020).  
HMRC and agent (practitioner) engagement is discussed at Section 2.4.4.  Such 
consultations may also have impact upon the tax practitioners who are the subject 
of this research and are examples of further shifts in the relationship between tax 
practitioners and the tax authorities.  As there are tens of thousands of tax 
practitioners in the UK, there will of course be differences in work practices (and 
standards) amongst this population.  However, not all practitioners will be 
involved with what is seen as unacceptable tax avoidance (Mazars, 2014), 
despite the fact that some may.   
This focus upon tax avoidance practices may detract from the other important 
roles that tax practitioners play.  Tax practitioners are instrumental to the tax 
system – a role which attracts far less attention. Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.311) 
cite HMRC (2009) who recognised that  
“[t] he overwhelming majority of tax agents advise their clients 
appropriately and calculate the right amount of tax…if this were not the 
case, the tax system, as we know it would simply not function. 
This view compares favourably with Mazar’s (2014) opinion, that is, to portray all 
advisers as being instrumental in tax avoidance, is an inaccurate picture.  The 
role of the tax practitioner within the tax system is important and this will be 
explored further in Chapter 3.  Nevertheless, some practitioners (of whatever size 
and type) may feel their profession is tarnished by the negative publicity 
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surrounding such matters, which creates new challenges in the tax practitioner 
working environment.   
2.7 Summary 
The above discussion provides broad context to the tax practitioners’ roles and 
working environment and begins to build up a picture of the tax field in which they 
operate.   
A practitioner must manage relationships with the tax authorities.  As discussed, 
there have been structural changes at HMRC, increasing digitalisation, resource 
issues and increases in HMRC powers.  These matters create a challenge for the 
practitioner, the unrepresented taxpayer and HMRC alike and they provide the 
backdrop to the context in which the practitioner/HMRC relationship currently 
plays out. 
The participants in this research have professional backgrounds – that is they are 
qualified via a professional body, or work for an organisation under the umbrella 
of such a body, or they are professionally trained in other respects, such as 
former HMRC employees.  The professional bodies and their roles in relation to 
their direction to members, and the benefits of belonging to such a body are also 
discussed. 
The functions of tax practitioners described at Section 2.2.3 help illustrate their 
roles as intermediary between HMRC and the taxpayer.  Practitioners enable 
implementation of the tax rules (tax law) on the ground.  They are at the coal face, 
so to speak, and this chapter provides context to the challenges they face which 
arise from the environment in which they work.  The practitioners’ roles, at times, 
are met with scepticism given the spotlight on the role of tax practitioners in the 
facilitation of tax avoidance.  Both tax practitioners and the professional bodies 
to which they belong have thus been the subject of increasing attention in recent 
years.  Nevertheless, demand for the services of practitioners, driven by the 
complexities discussed, remains high, despite a shift in perception about the work 
tax practitioners do.  There are thousands of tax practitioners in the tax market, 
and they represent a significant number of taxpayers. 
The discussion is not limited to the smaller practitioner market or context alone 
as there is often little distinction made between the different types of practitioner.  
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However,  of those that do make such observations,  Evans et al. (2014) suggest 
that smaller businesses seek assistance to save compliance costs by appointing 
an adviser (and smaller businesses may seek the assistance of a smaller, more 
local tax practitioner rather than a Big 4 organisation);  Tomasic and Pentony 
(1991) suggest that smaller practitioners face greater pressure from owner-
managed businesses given the owner’s large stake and interest in the businesses 
on which they advise, and they suggest that smaller practitioners undertake more 
compliance, than advisory work; additionally, practitioners in smaller accountancy 
practices (although the findings are transferable to the tax profession) were found 
to regularly work more hours than they charge for, and recognised their 
limitations, that is, they have less technical expertise than those in larger firms 
(Stringfellow et al., 2015).   These distinctions help provide additional context for 
the objective of the study, which is to understand smaller tax practice.  However, 
there are few observations, from the literature, which provide a demarcation 
between the tax practitioner market in general and those who operate in the 
smaller tax practitioner field. 
Chapter 3, explores the academic literature regarding the tax practitioner 
relationships with the client (taxpayer) and with HMRC and examines the 













3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
Tax practitioner research is plentiful.  That which explores why a tax practitioner 
may be needed, along with an explanation of the type of work they do is discussed 
in Chapter 2 as it provides context and background to the thesis.  This chapter 
presents a review of extant literature about the client/practitioner relationship, the 
practitioner/HMRC relationship and explores the practitioner’s role within this 
tripartite relationship. 
The chapter unfolds as follows: 
Firstly, the practitioner/client relationship literature is discussed in Section 3.2.  
This is followed in Section 3.3 by a review of literature around the practitioner/tax 
administration relationship.  The position of the practitioner and the roles they 
play within this tripartite relationship is explored in Section 3.4.  The practitioner 
role ‘in the middle’ between HMRC and the client is set against the context of the 
individual’s professional identity (how the individual sees himself/herself and 
conducts themselves), hence matters of the tax professional and professional 
identity are also examined in Sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.5.  Additionally, as the 
participants to this research come under the remit of a professional body, ethics 
and knowledge are important to the practitioner and may impact upon their 
relationships.  These matters are also discussed in Sections 3.4.6 to 3.4.8.  
Finally, the chapter is summarised in Section 3.5. 
3.2 The practitioner/client relationship 
There is a rather disparate mix of research which explores the client/tax 
practitioner relationship – both from a participant perspective (i.e. who takes part 
in the research) and from a topic perspective (i.e. what is the objective of the 
research).    A large proportion of research of this nature is undertaken in an 
experimental, quantitative manner.  Table 3.1 provides a summary of these 
aspects, along with the country in which the research takes place; many studies 
relate to the overseas context.  In the main, these studies provide insight into the 
qualities sought from a tax practitioner/client relationship and include 
perspectives from both the client and practitioner side of the relationship. 
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Additionally, studies which assess how certain influences (such as client 
preferences, or client importance) affect the decision making of the practitioner 
are also relevant to the client/practitioner relationship.  These studies are drawn, 
in the main, from the judgement and decision making (JDM) literature, much of 
which is derived from the United States. This literature draws on psychology and 
behavioural economics theory (Trotman, 1998) and frequently includes 
experimental (often scenario based) research, which asks participants for their 
response to an imagined situation.  This type of research is approached with 
positivistic assumptions, and so differs from the perspective adopted in this 
thesis.  However, it does shine a light on various assumptions about a tax 
practitioner’s behaviour, and is an alternative way of examining the 
practitioner/client relationships, considering, in particular, factors which affect 
decision making (Roberts, 1998).   
The discussion begins with research which has focus upon the tax compliance of 
the taxpayer, which is plentiful and yet leaves aside the fact that a tax practitioner 
may play a role in the compliance process.  This is followed by a closer look at 
studies which examine the client/practitioner relationship and those from the JDM 
literature. 
3.2.1 Tax compliance 
There is a large body of research into how and why taxpayers comply with their 
tax obligations, but this does not necessarily focus on the client/practitioner 
relationship, notwithstanding that the practitioner may play a role in the 
compliance process on behalf of their clients (CFE, 2014; Niemirowski and 
Wearing, 2003).  This includes, for instance, literature from the psychology field, 
which examines the psychological contract and the reason why individuals pay 
their taxes (see for example, Alm et al., 2012; Feld and Frey, 2007).  Braithwaite 
and Wenzel (2008) view taxpayers from a ‘consumer’ and ‘citizen’ perspective 
and discuss how various relationships with the tax authorities and other 
stakeholders enables voluntary compliance (see also Tan and Braithwaite, 2018).  
Taxpayer identities are also explored by Wenzel (2007).  The role of responsive 
regulation (see the HMRC relationship at Section 3.3.2) and incentives for 
individuals to pay taxes is discussed by Braithwaite (2007) and Feld and Frey 
(2007).  The voice of the taxpayer is also heard in relation to how individuals may 
express their discontent with tax authorities (described as motivational postures) 
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as discussed by Braithwaite et al. (2007) and Braithwaite and Wenzel (2008). 
These works investigate why taxpayers comply with their tax obligations and/or 
examine how taxpayers see themselves in this context.  The practitioner does not 
feature prominently in these discussions.   
3.2.2 Features of the tax practitioner/client relationship 




Table 3.1 Tax practitioner and the client relationship literature 
 
Author Topic/research question From the perspective of Method Used Country 
Gupta (2015) Perceptions of satisfaction of 
clients towards tax practitioners 
and assessment of competences 
Client Survey/quantitative New Zealand 
Hite and McGill 
(1992) 
Taxpayers preferences for 
aggressive or conservative 
advice from practitioners 
Client Questionnaire/quantitative United States 
Sakurai and 
Braithwaite (2003) 
Qualities taxpayers seek in tax 
practitioners 
Client Survey/quantitative Australia 
Tan et al. (2016) Why smaller businesses commit 
to their tax adviser 
Client Survey/quantitative New Zealand 
Van de Rijt et al. 
(2019) 
Willingness of corporate 
taxpayers to share knowledge 
with tax practitioners 
Client  Survey/quantitative United Kingdom 
Christensen (1992) Client and tax practitioners 
perspectives about service 
quality 
Client and practitioner 
(large firms) 
Survey/quantitative  United States 
Stephenson et al. 
(2017) 
Expectation gap between clients  
motivations to hire tax 
Client and practitioner 
(smaller firms) 
Survey/quantitative United States 
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preparers and the tax preparers 
perceptions of the motivations 
Fogarty and Jones 
(2014)* 
How tax practitioners manage 
clients and help government 
collect tax revenue 
Practitioner (from firms of 
various size) 
Interview/qualitative United States 
Tran-Nam et al. 
(2016) 
How tax changes impact on the 
role of tax practitioners in 
assisting clients to comply with 
tax obligations 
Practitioner (from firms of 
various size) 
Survey/quantitative Australia 
Apostol and Pop 
(2019)* 
Interplay of commercial and 
ethical logic within a developing 
tax consultancy 





Roles of tax practitioners in 
advocacy for clients and roles in 
tax system 
Practitioner (including 
lawyers) from firms of 
various size and revenue 
authority 
Interview/qualitative Australia 
Hasseldine et al. 
(2011)* 
Management of tax knowledge 
in the context of corporate 
entities, advisers and HMRC 
Practitioner (from firms of 
various size) client and 
revenue authority 
Interview/qualitative United Kingdom 
 
*also features in respect of the HMRC relationship and/or the practitioner’s role in the tripartite relationship 
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The studies shown at Table 3.1 elicit a number of findings around the 
client/practitioner relationship.  Christensen (1992) and Stephenson et al. (2017) 
draw out a number of gaps in expectation between both parties in the relationship.  
Stephenson et al. (2017) found that taxpayers approach tax practitioners for 
assistance for entirely different reasons to those the practitioners expected.  The 
(smaller) tax practitioner in this study believed clients approached them to save 
time, although protection from the tax authority, legal compliance and the desire 
to save money featured in the reasons given by clients.  Contrarily, participants 
in Fogarty and Jones (2014) and Apostol and Pop’s (2019) research did identify 
that they, as practitioners, provide peace of mind and reassurance to the taxpayer 
which is more in line with Stephenson et al’s. (2017) client participant 
expectations.  A knowledge of the client is important as it helps a practitioner offer 
a tailored service so perhaps it may be expected that the practitioner understands 
why their help is sought.  The findings of Stephenson et al. (2017, p.226) are 
therefore slightly at odds with their observation that a smaller practitioner is more 
“sensitive to their client’s desires than other types of preparers” (given an in-depth 
knowledge of their client) as these desires are presumably driven by the reasons 
(motivations) for which they have chosen to access the help of a tax practitioner.  
Other gaps in expectation relate to tax planning advice.  Christensen (1992) found 
clients expected more advice in this respect.  This suggests that tax practitioners 
are reactive, rather than proactive in this particular role as suggested by Tomasic 
and Pentony (1991), although this may depend upon the adviser and the firm they 
work within.  Practitioner participants in Hasseldine et al.’s (2011) study (about 
management of tax knowledge) recognised that clients expected them to respond 
quickly to changes in their (the client) situation, in order to maintain their credibility 
as adviser to the company.  Hence a reactive approach here would also be seen 
as poor service.  
Additionally, if the practitioner and client have different views about tax planning, 
this may cause tension in the client/practitioner relationship as it follows that the 
risk appetite of the advised and the adviser differs (this is also discussed in the 
JDM context at Section 3.2.3 below).  Sakuari and Braithwaite (2003) and Tan et 
al. (2016), in their client facing research, suggest that clients seek a practitioner 
who can match their tax planning aspirations (that is one with a more aggressive, 
or conservative outlook as appropriate) as this will satisfy both parties of the 
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relationship.  Hite and Mcgill (1992) however found no evidence that US 
taxpayers sought aggressive tax advice, favouring instead conservative advice 
from practitioners.  
Interestingly, Hasseldine et al. (2011) found that there was a reluctance amongst 
some clients to take up the suggestions of their practitioner to make claims for 
R&D tax reliefs to reduce their tax payments.  That is, the tax planning suggested 
by the practitioner was not wanted. This was thought to be owing to concerns that 
HMRC may request information relating to the claim, which may create taxpayer 
anxiety.  Such issues were also noted by the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) 
(2014), although Kitt (2014) suggests that the cost of implementation of the 
advice may also be prohibitive.  This is an example where the risk appetite of 
both parties do not match, even though R&D reliefs are not part of an aggressive 
avoidance scheme.  Interestingly, Parnaby (2009) found evidence of a similar 
issue in a study of financial planners and the provision of personal financial 
planning advice.  Whilst this is not tax related per se, the relationship of 
client/financial planner is similar to that of tax practitioner/client and the research 
obtained the practitioners’ views which, as seen above, are somewhat less 
explored than those of the client view. Parnaby (2009) also found that clients may 
challenge the planner’s expertise, based on knowledge gained from their own 
research from ‘google’ or elsewhere.  This resulted in differences (gaps) in points 
of view between the planner and the client and thus the risk appetite of the two 
parties may also differ in this context, as with the tax practitioner/client 
relationship. 
Practitioners also try to protect clients (and themselves) from what they feel are 
inappropriate courses of action.  In Parnaby’s (2009) study, this was achieved by 
educating the client about their investments and by use of tangible documentation 
to illustrate different issues, to try to obtain alignment of view between the client 
and practitioner.  In the tax context Tomasic and Pentony (1991) similarly suggest 
that practitioners play a role in the re-education of clients about unacceptable tax 
mitigation.  Additionally, participants in Fogarty and Jones’ (2014) study indicate 
they were not willing to blindly acquiesce to complicity in tax avoidance at any 
cost (they were not willing to risk their livelihoods) and employed a ‘scale of 
acceptability’ to reach a tax planning position with which they (the practitioner) 
were comfortable. Risk to the practitioner is therefore taken into account upon 
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implementation of tax planning for clients (Fogarty and Jones, 2014; Tomasic and 
Pentony, 1991) thus it would seem that client requests for a more aggressive 
stance are not automatically complied with.   Indeed, participants suggested they 
may be selective about the clients they wish to act for (Fogarty and Jones, 2014). 
Client selection (or removal) was also a finding in Parnaby’s (2009) research.  
Client expectations around tax planning therefore require management by the 
practitioner.  This may include provision of information about the tax planning 
advice on offer (Fogarty and Jones, 2014; Tomasic and Pentony, 1991, and as 
indicated above, Parnaby, 2009 also uses such a technique in the financial 
planning field).  Indeed, it is suggested that clients expect to receive such 
information to manage tax risk (Hasseldine et al., 2011 and Tan et al., 2016).   
This latter point suggests that taxpayers are attuned to potential problems of 
unacceptable tax planning and wish to keep an eye on what their advisers 
suggest.  Additionally, Tan et al. (2016) identified that commitment to a 
practitioner could be threatened (perhaps unsurprisingly) if incorrect advice was 
given.  Interestingly however the provision of such information was found to 
diminish the standing of the practitioner in the eyes of the client in Gupta’s (2015) 
study.  Satisfaction waned if the practitioner insisted on providing their client with 
information about tax regulations and their tax obligations; that is the client did 
not want to know the ins and outs, they just wanted to be told what to do.  
Christensen (1992) however highlighted that clients felt they did not receive 
enough information about tax changes and the like, requesting more frequent 
information from their adviser, which again is at odds with Gupta’s (2015) 
findings.  Of course all these studies take place in different cultural settings, so 
perhaps the context has an impact upon such matters.  Nevertheless, as to 
whether clients want to pay for detailed tax information is another issue. It may 
be that they are willing to pay for the practitioner’s knowledge, but not the time it 
takes them to acquire it (that is research time into the tax issue for which advice 
is requested), per Fogarty and Jones (2014).  Complexity, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, may also affect the practitioner’s responses to client requests as Tran-
Nam et al. (2016) suggest.  They identified that frequent change in the tax rules 
and regulations impact adversely upon the client/practitioner relationship, that is 
uncertainty arises; additional time is spent resolving tax issues, and; difficulties 
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may arise when raising a fee for the work undertaken, all of which may have a 
negative influence on the client’s perception of their adviser. 
Finally, it is important that the tax practitioner/client relationship is built on trust 
and honesty.  This is important from both the client perspective (Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2003; Tan et al., 2016) and the practitioner perspective; although a 
trusted relationship may take time to develop (Fogarty and Jones, 2014).  Trust 
is important, as it may have bearing upon the willingness of a taxpayer to share 
knowledge with their practitioner (Hasseldine et al., 2011; Van de Rijt, 2019) 
which will of course impact upon the advice the practitioner may give (and could 
increase risk in that respect, if full knowledge of the situation is not available).   
There was suggestion that reticence to share knowledge may be owing to the 
perception that the practitioner will use the information to sell the taxpayer 
additional services and hence increase their fees (Hasseldine et al., 2011).  This 
indicates some scepticism here on part of the taxpayer, although contrary to this, 
as discussed above, the taxpayer does want a proactive, flexible approach from 
the practitioner to help them in their business.  Interestingly trust was found to be 
more important in the local practitioner context (smaller practitioners are perhaps 
more likely to be based locally) when compared to taxpayers represented by the 
Big 4 firms (Tan et al., 2016).  This could be owing to the in-depth knowledge 
smaller practitioners have of their clients (Stephenson et al., 2017) who offer what 
may be viewed as a more personal service.   Indeed, access to a local accountant 
was an important requirement of taxpayers too (Tan et al., 2016). 
The above provides a review of studies related to the client/practitioner 
relationship. Parnaby’s (2009) findings are included, as this research was 
undertaken in a related field, and the practitioner’s perspective was obtained 
about such a relationship.  A complete comparison between the personal planner 
and tax profession cannot however be made as the position of the clients differ.  
Clients of personal financial planners have a choice whether to invest their money 
as advised by the planner (or not).  However, whilst clients of tax practitioners 
(taxpayers) may nevertheless choose to disagree with the tax planning advice 
they are given, they cannot choose to disengage with the tax system itself as they 
have obligations they must fulfil; but Parnaby’s research does provide an 
interesting angle from the practitioner’s view. 
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Finally, a finding from Tomasic and Pentony (1991) also warrants attention given 
the context of this research.  This relates to the practitioner/non tax colleague 
relationship.  The word “dangerous” (p.294) was used in reference to the tax 
knowledge of audit partners.  This refers to the damage that those with a little tax 
knowledge can do, if they offer advice to clients which is not exactly correct, or, if 
an accounting transaction is executed without consideration of the tax 
implications.  That is, they do not request advice from their tax colleague, but ‘go 
it alone’.  Whilst the practitioner/non tax colleague relationship is not the same as 
that of the client/tax practitioner relationship, the former adds an additional 
dimension to the tax practitioner role in the management of client expectation 
should the practitioner subsequently intervene to correct advice previously given. 
The next section discusses the influences upon practitioner decision making as 
this will have impact upon the client/practitioner relationship.  As explained, much 
of the following is based around the JDM literature.  It is important to bear in mind 
that the wider social influences which may affect tax practice or the 
“organizational, institutional, political and societal phenomena” (Radcliffe et al., 
2018. p.46) are not considered in this particular literature.  The wider social 
context is therefore not taken into account in this type of research, although 
aspects of the micro context of tax practice itself are explored, such as the client, 
or the influence of colleagues. 
3.2.3 Risk management, confirmation bias and the client relationship 
Decision making is of course important in the tax field and at times a practitioner 
must make choices in the context of ambiguous/grey law as discussed in Chapter 
2.  Ambiguous or vague law can affect judgement and decision making (Helleloid, 
1989; Magro, 1999, referring to Spilker, 1997).  The choice a practitioner settles 
upon will affect the advice given to the taxpayer, and, may affect the amount of 
tax payable. Mala and Chand (2015, p.25) suggest that most accounting tasks 
“… involve decisions under uncertainty”, which has an impact upon risk (for the 
client as well as the practitioner).  When decisions are made in an uncertain 
environment, there is a risk the advice may be incorrect or the practitioner may 
be too aggressive in the approach to tax planning.  In making these choices the 
practitioner will at times have to decide whether to “play safe”, or “exploit 
ambiguity” (Tan, 2011, p.74) and in doing so consider the risk to themselves and 
the effect upon the client relationship, particularly if the client risk preferences do 
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not match those of the practitioner (Hite and McGill, 1992; Sakaurai and 
Braithwaite, 1993). If the practitioner decides to “exploit ambiguity”, this may have 
consequences for the client as well as the practitioner.  There may be financial 
loss for the client, and/or the practice (Fogarty and Jones, 2014; Mala and Chand, 
2015 and Tan et al., 2016) as the expectations of the client may be overinflated 
in terms of a satisfactory outcome, and/or the practice may be exposed to 
penalties (under the US system – see below). It is important for practitioners to 
remain objective and impartial when offering advice to clients (Cloyd and Spilker, 
1999, Kahle and White, 2004) to ensure contemplation of likely challenge to the 
chosen position in order to manage these types of risk and client expectation.  
Certainly, Doyle et al. (2009b) found practitioners were aware of the risks of 
litigation and to the reputation of themselves and their practice (organisation) 
when making choices under conditions of uncertainty and links were made to the 
practitioners’ ethical approach (that ethics may be “operationalised as risk 
management”, p.194). 
Indeed, consideration of risk to the practice may dampen the practitioner’s 
temptation to provide advice of a more ‘aggressive’ nature which may be difficult 
to responsibly defend (Carnes et al., 1996).  Good judgement is therefore 
essential to maintain professional reputation (Mala and Chand, 2015) and to 
defend the practice from risk (Tomasic and Pentony, 1991).  Practice risk, per 
Carnes et al. (1996) may be managed in part by seeking the opinion of colleagues 
to help protect against litigation and to assist with consistency of decision making 
in the practice.  On the other hand, however Carnes et al. (1996) interestingly 
suggest this action may have the opposite effect and raise practice risk (see the 
discussion below regarding ‘confirmation bias’).  As much JDM research is in the 
US context, it should be recognised that practitioners are subject to penalties.   
Practitioners must act as advocates6 for their clients, that is they must provide the 
                                                             
6 Those writing in the US context, do so in the knowledge that the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), require those governed by the AICPA regulations to act as ‘advocate’ for their 
clients (see Cloyd and Spilker, 1999; Spilker et al., 1999; Bobek et al., 2010; Cloyd et al., 2012; Spilker et 
al., 2016 for a discussion of advocacy and its impact on US advisers and Thuronyi and Vanistendael 1996, 
p.14 for a brief general discussion of advisers acting in the role as advocate).  Acting as advocate 
indicates that the position best suited to the client should be recommended, as long as it can be 
reasonably supported and is not “frivolous”, according to the AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in 
Tax Practice (as discussed and cited by Brody and Masselli, 1996)  which recognises that at times there 
will be a choice of action under the terms of the tax legislation, and certain courses of action may result 





advice of most advantage (least tax cost) to the client.  However, the advice must 
be reasonably supported and be in agreement with the tax law and regulation as 
it stands. If it is not penalties may arise.  Practitioners will wish to avoid penalties 
to minimise practice risk.  This may affect how the practitioner decides what 
advice to give (Brody and Masselli, 1996); that is, they may not provide the option 
of least tax cost even if appropriate, should there be a risk of incurring a penalty. 
The advice provided is therefore affected by factors external to the tax practice 
as the penalty may have bearing upon the practitioners’ judgement.  The situation 
in the US is, of course, different to the UK context.  However, with increased 
litigation against aggressive avoidance, combined with the recent introduction of 
tax penalties for “enablers of defeated tax avoidance legislation” (under the 
increased powers which HMRC now have, see Chapter 2) which will affect 
advisers in the UK, it is not unimaginable for these findings to be transferrable to 
the UK context.   
The consequences of the provision of risky advice for both the client and 
practitioner are mentioned above.  But are practitioners influenced to act in a 
particular way? There is an abundance of literature in the JDM field which 
considers the susceptibility of the practitioner to so called confirmation bias.  In 
other words, are practitioners influenced to act in a certain way by the wishes (or 
“desires” as it is often termed in this literature), of their client, colleagues or 
supervisors?  If the practitioner does bring his or her views into line with others 
this is known as confirmatory bias (Cloyd and Spilker, 1999; Cloyd et al., 2012 
Tan, 2011).  For instance, if a client (or possibly a supervisor of the practitioner) 
requests that a certain tax saving position is adopted, and the law is ambiguous 
in that area, the practitioner is assumed to favour (give greater weight to) the 
evidence that supports the tax saving view, over and above evidence which 
indicates the opposite outcome.  In other words, objectivity is impaired and 
confirmatory bias exists (Carnes et al., 1996; Cloyd and Spilker, 1999; and Kahle 
and White, 2004).  Carnes et al. (1996) also found that a practitioner may change 
their original view when discussing tax matters with colleagues, so bringing into 
line their view with their peers –  hence why it is suggested by Carnes et al. (1996) 
that by seeking the assistance of colleagues to help minimise practice risk, the 
opposite effect may occur, and in fact cause practice risk to increase.   
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It is suggested that practitioners are “highly attuned to the desires of their clients” 
(Kahle and White, 2004, p.23).  These findings correspond with Reckers et al. 
(1991) and Tan (2011) – although it is to be noted Tan (2011) is not within the 
JDM field of research.  Tan (2011) suggests that the practitioner adopts whatever 
position the client desires when providing tax planning advice (aggressive, or 
conservative as appropriate).  These findings however conflict with comments 
from practitioners in Tomasic and Pentony‘s (1991) and Fogarty and Jones’ 
(2014) studies that they would not be swayed by client demands and would 
disassociate themselves if uncomfortable with the situation.  The threat of 
litigation influenced the practitioners’ behaviour (Tomasic and Pentony, 1991).  
Nevertheless, could ‘client importance’ affect the practitioner approach?  Findings 
here also conflict.  Bobek et al. (2010) and Reckers et al. (1991) suggest that a 
practitioner’s objectivity could be impaired if acting for an important client (if for 
example they do not wish to lose the income stream).  Bobek and Radtke (2007), 
Fatemi et al. (2018; 2020), Hageman and Fisher (2016) and Helleloid (1989), 
however found that ethics and integrity were important determinants of a 
practitioner’s behaviour.  Bobek and Radtke (2007) and Hageman and Fisher 
(2016) contend a strong ethical environment encourages ethical behaviour (see 
also Section 3.4.5 below for the impact of the profession and organisation upon 
professional identity).  In other words, ethics were deemed more important than 
the risk of upsetting an important client.  Additionally, Fatemi et al. (2018) suggest 
that if practitioners are reminded of professional standards, or ethics (Fatemi et 
al., 2020) they take less risky positions; so it would appear in the findings to this 
research that conformation to client preference is not automatically the default 
position.  However, the context of the decision may be important too.  Spilker et 
al. (1999) suggest that practitioners adopt a riskier position when dealing with tax 
compliance matters (given there is more risk here for the client than the 
practitioner) than when providing advice about tax planning (as practice risk 
increases with tax planning activities).   
As discussed above, if there is a difference in risk appetite between the client and 
practitioner, the practitioner may shift position to match the risk preference of the 
client.  The findings above conflict – some suggest the practitioner may adopt the 
same position as the client (which in the scenarios above, discusses a position 
of risk), however others disagree.  Some suggest that the practitioner is actually 
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more risk averse than the client, and is generally not affected by the client’s own 
attitudes to risk (Brody and Masselli, 1996; Christensen, 1992; Helleloid, 1989; 
Hite et al., 1992). The discussion above may explain the reasons for this.  In 
summary this may be attributed to practitioners being bound by professional 
standards (Fatemi et al., 2018); the desire to avoid penalties for the taxpayer (or 
themselves in the USA) (Brody and Masselli, 1996; Christensen, 1992; Cloyd and 
Spilker, 1999; Hite et al., 1992), and; the risk of damage to the reputation of the 
practice (Carnes et al., 1996).  A conservative attitude was found to exist in 
relation to the preparation of tax returns, based on a scenario given to participants 
by Brody and Masselli (1996).  They acknowledge that this may be attributed to 
a possible lack of technical knowledge of the practitioner, but this finding appears 
to contradict the suggestions of Spilker et al. (1999) that practitioners take a more 
aggressive approach in a compliance capacity. 
3.3 HMRC relationship  
This section explores the relationship between the tax authorities and the tax 
practitioner.  There is not a great deal of academic literature which examines the 
relationship between HMRC in the UK and the tax practitioner per se (or which 
has focus upon the small practitioner in particular), and hence international 
studies are also drawn upon.   
Studies which include HMRC as a subject of research include exploration of the 
relationship of large business and HMRC (Freedman et al., 2007). The changing 
role of accountants within HMRC is examined by Oats and Tuck (2008), whilst 
analysing the relationship between HMRC and large corporate tax payers.  
Additionally, HMRC’s management of the UK tax system (Freedman and Vella, 
2011) has been studied and from time to time there have been calls for tax agents 
(practitioners) to be registered/regulated (Salter and Oats, 2011).  The regulation 
of tax agents is a theme which continues to be discussed today as highlighted in 
Chapter 2.  HMRC commissioned research into the role of the professional bodies 
in the regulation of tax agents in 2018 (Kantar Public, 2018) and consultation 
about raising standards in the tax advice market was recently undertaken (HMRC 
2020a and b).  Additionally, Mayson (2020) proposes the establishment of a Legal 
Services Regulation Authority (LSRA) which would capture registration of tax 
services (and hence regulate tax practitioners).  Mayson’s proposal includes a 
role for the appropriate professional body in these arrangements.   
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Research which specifically relates to the tax practitioner and the tax authorities 
is discussed below.  This encapsulates service issues and the changing 
relationship between the two parties. 
3.3.1 Service quality at the tax administration 
Stiglingh (2014) examines what practitioners would like in terms of a quality of 
service from the South African Revenue Service (SARS).  Her aim was to 
propose a service quality framework. She found that “service quality is seen as a 
multidimensional, hierarchical construct” (Stiglingh, 2014, p.244).  The view of the 
practitioners as to what they consider quality service depended upon different 
aspects such as their past experiences of communication with SARS (be that for 
instance interaction with personnel or use of SARS documentation).  In the UK 
context, Hasseldine et al. (2011), indicate the advisers of corporate clients have 
a good relationship with HMRC, the reasons for which included access to good 
quality materials (documentation) and HMRC flexibility in provision of assistance 
to the practitioner.  Dabner’s (2012) study of tax practitioners in the UK suggested 
they also desire good communication between themselves and HMRC, to be kept 
informed about technical issues and new systems and generally want ‘no 
surprises’.  These attributes may be seen as good service on behalf of the tax 
administration and bears out Stiglingh’s (2014) findings that experience of 
practitioner/authority interaction will determine what is perceived to be a good 
service.  Findings specifically suggest that “functional quality [the how] is more 
important to the perceived service quality than technical quality [the what which 
enables delivery of the service]” (Stiglingh, 2014 p.246).    Information about 
service quality of HMRC (the time taken to open post or answer the telephone 
etc.) in the UK tends to be published by the organisation itself, and/or commented 
upon by the National Audit Office (NAO) – see Section 2.4.3 in Chapter 2, for the 
challenges HMRC (and consequently practitioners and taxpayers) face in this 
respect.  
3.3.2 Changes in the relationship with tax authorities 
In Australia and New Zealand, the use of responsive regulation techniques 
(Braithwaite, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2007) and the effect upon tax practitioners is 
investigated by Dabner (2012:2015).  Gracia and Oats (2012a) observe an 
increasing shift to this type of system in the UK too.  Responsive regulation aims 
to:   
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“…move towards an environment where regulatees comply voluntarily, 
and there is mutual trust and respect between regulators and regulatees” 
(Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.305) 
If regulatees do not comply, penalties are invoked and the tax authorities may 
become more adversarial.  In light of this Gracia and Oats (2012a) explore tax 
regulation and boundaries in the tax field, using a Bourdieusian framework. For 
such a system to operate, the “regulatory institution” needs cooperation of the 
regulatees (the taxpayers, tax practitioners), Gracia and Oats (2012a, p 306).  If 
the regulatees ‘step out’ of sync with what the institution (HMRC) wants (for 
example tax avoidance matters) this invokes changes in the behaviour of 
stakeholders – HMRC included – which can upset the prior understandings of 
how the field operates.  Responsive regulation requires an enhanced relationship 
between tax practitioners and the tax authorities.  Trust is, as Gracia and Oats 
(2012a) suggest, an important basis for this system.   
Responsive regulation Dabner (2012, p.526) advocates, has developed from 
“theories proposing a partnership framework” so as  
to move tax administrators from a command and control posture to a more 
sophisticated form of regulation 
which, he notes, is described by the OECD (2008) as the “enhanced relationship” 
model. In describing various initiatives under this model in a number of countries 
(not necessarily responsive regulation, per se, although it is said to have 
developed from the ‘enhanced relationship’) Dabner (2012, p.528) observes that   
The notable feature of these initiatives is that they are primarily taxpayer 
focused with tax practitioners either sidelined or simply facilitating the 
arrangement between the administrator and the taxpayer. 
This of course illustrates a fundamental shift from the more traditional relationship 
and will have a number of implications.  Changes in the practitioner/tax authority 
relationship are also observed by Walpole and Salter (2014) who examine the 
effect of tightened controls on tax practitioners in Australia (who, unlike in the UK 
or New Zealand, must be registered to operate) following a change in Australian 
law, with the introduction of the Tax Agents Services Act (TASA) in 2009. 
Traditionally, a practitioner may have a sole obligation to the client (whilst of 
course also complying with the tax administration requirements), but under both 
these revised approaches (responsive regulation and TASA 2009), more 
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obligations are owed to the tax authorities.  The revised relationship, is viewed 
by the tax authorities at least, as a partnership between themselves and the 
practitioner, rather than the tax authority being seen as an ‘adversary’ in the 
traditional sense.  Interestingly, practitioners in Tomasic and Pentony’s (1991) 
study were uneasy, even then, about being seen as partners of the tax authority.  
Clearly there have been changes since 1991.  Walpole and Salter (2014) 
conclude that there has been a shift in the tripartite relationship (for more detail, 
see Section 3.4) – away from the client and more towards the tax authority.  This 
appears to have arisen as the tax authority increased controls over practitioners, 
perhaps in response to the shifting boundaries as posited by Gracia and Oats 
(2012a).  The consequence, Walpole and Salter (2014) observe, is that the agent 
no longer only takes account of the clients wishes, but also complies with the 
wishes of the tax authority too.  The theme here is a desire by the authorities to 
raise standards of the tax profession.   This is not the preserve of New Zealand 
or Australia, or indeed the UK (which is discussed below).  The US for instance 
uses a penalty system “to raise standards of tax professionals” (Dzienkowski and 
Peroni (2016, p.2729) and regulation has increased in response to aggressive 
tax positions (Fatemi et al., 2018) and additionally Blanthorne et al. (2013, p.170) 
cite Brody and Fisher (2008) suggesting “…that Congress [in the US] is serious 
about moving tax professionals away from being client advocates and more 
toward being government agents”.  This would suggest a major shift in position 
with regard to the obligations of tax practitioners and it would seem that Walpole 
and Salter (2014) have observed a move in the same direction in Australia. 
Nevertheless, a change in relationship of this nature brings with it a number of 
difficulties, as identified by Dabner (2012;2015) including the simple fact that 
traditionally the taxpayer has the opposite objective to that of the tax authority 
(one seeks to minimise tax and the other to maximise it).  Hence how should a 
practitioner approach this changing relationship? To whom is the obligation 
owed? The tax authorities or the client – or both? This is discussed further below 
in Section 3.4.   Other issues may arise, as Dabner (2012) highlights.  In seeking 
to collect the “correct” amount of tax in partnership with the tax authorities, what 
happens if, as it may, there is a difference in point of view between the practitioner 
and the tax authorities? This is highly possibly as the interpretation of law is not 
straightforward as explained in Chapter 2.  A good example is given by Gracia 
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and Oats (2012a), in their exploration of regulation featuring the Arctic Systems 
(Jones v Garnett) tax case.  In this case, HMRC believed there had been “a 
breach of the compliance boundary” (p.313) in respect of a common practice 
adopted by many small companies.  A court case unsettled this position and was 
unanticipated by taxpayers and practitioners.  HMRC used an unusual legal angle 
to attack this position (made possible given the problems of legal interpretation, 
and “fuzzy” tax rules as explained in Chapter 2).  Additionally, although HMRC 
issued guidance about this issue, they were accused of delaying the production 
of it, and providing examples too simple to be of use to the practitioner (thus 
avoiding more challenging grey areas) (Gracia and Oats, 2012a).  This increased, 
rather than reduced, uncertainty.  Ultimately, the taxpayer won the case, but the 
regulatory practice, use of power and behaviour of HMRC was questioned (as it 
was in respect of the loan charge in 2019 noted in Chapter 2). 
Dabner (2012) explores the views of a number of tax practitioners about their 
relationships with the tax authorities in light of responsive regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand, and the UK ‘Working Together’ initiative (see Chapter 2).   
Dabner (2012) found evidence of a marked deterioration in relations in both 
Australia and New Zealand, although it appears that larger practitioners had a 
more beneficial relationship with the tax authorities in New Zealand than those 
advising smaller business.  The reason for this was the ‘patchy’ relationship with 
some personnel within the organisation.  More senior staff offered, it was said, a 
more co-operative relationship to organisations likely to be represented by larger 
practitioners.  Dabner (2012) suggests the views of smaller practitioners could be 
sought in the UK to ascertain whether the same is found.  In terms of the UK 
practitioners generally, Dabner (2012) found that they had a far more cooperative 
relationship with the tax authorities at the time of writing.  This was confirmed by 
Hasseldine et al. (2011, p.45) who refer to their “flexibility” and “helpfulness” and 
participant’s general positive opinion of HMRC in what was described as quite an 
amicable, reciprocal relationship (although there was acknowledgement from 
HMRC that practitioners may use their knowledge against the exchequer).  
However, a discussion about additional regulation of the tax profession in the UK 
(by HMRC) was at that time creating tension and a feeling began to surface 
amongst practitioners that HMRC were simply out to collect the maximum 
revenue they could at that time (Dabner, 2012 and it is to be noted, a view shared 
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by Maas, 2015).  This resulted, it was suggested, in perceptions of distrust of tax 
agents.   
Additionally, Dabner (2012) highlights practitioners’ concerns about HMRC’s 
failure to address inadequacies within their own organisation; a view since 
expressed by Maas (2015).  This affected the relationship between both parties. 
Maas (2015, p.2) speaks wistfully of the years when the relationship between 
knowledgeable staff at HMRC and practitioners was one of trust and mutual 
respect (similar to findings by Hasseldine et al., 2011) who had a common interest 
in “determining the tax effect” for the client.  At the time of Dabner’s (2012) 
research, one of the reasons he gives for what is recognised to be a deteriorating 
relationship between the UK practitioner and HMRC is the closure of offices and 
loss of local knowledge, as Maas (2015) also observes.  Maas (2015) additionally 
bemoans the loss of technical skills and the unwillingness of HMRC to engage 
with the legislation or case law, choosing instead to cite HMRC manuals in their 
responses to practitioners.  Interestingly Tomasic and Pentony (1991, p.247) note 
comments of a practitioner who highlighted similar reticence with the Australian 
Tax authorities.  The reluctance to engage with tax legislation per se, the 
practitioner noted, meant the practitioner having to work with “two sets of law” 
(i.e. the legislation and the guidance).  Maas (2015) also refers to the difference 
in ‘speed’ at which HMRC and private organisations now work, wishing that 
HMRC should have to “justify their time to the citizenry in the same way [he has] 
to do with clients”.  This suggests that ‘time’ at HMRC does not have a value – 
which could mean that delays are not seen as problematic and that the 
organisation may have the luxury of spending hours dealing with a tax issue that 
the practitioner does not.  Ironically, despite delays and the slow speed at which 
tax matters may be processed, Maas (2015) notes HMRC demand a response to 
their correspondence by the practitioner, within 30 days which he feels is 
unrealistic.  Some may suggest HMRC too should at times be subject to 
penalties, as are taxpayers (Cave, 2020 citing Cullinane).  
Dabner (2012, p552) forecast that a “storm” may be approaching.  That is, the 
content felt by practitioners in 2011 about their relationships with HMRC, was 
beginning to slip.  It is of note that the various PAC committee meetings and the 
amendment of PCRT to tighten regulation around tax planning advice (see 
Chapter 2) occurred after the date of Dabner’s (2012) research, as tax 
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practitioners continue to be in the media spotlight. Comments from Maas (2015), 
in his speech to the ICAEW tax faculty confirms Dabner’s (2012) prediction.  He 
suggests that practitioners and HMRC are not seen as equals (as he feels that 
HMRC think they “know best” (p.6) or as he puts it, “They are not entitled to 
substitute their judgement for mine” (p.7)).  He wishes for recognition that 
practitioners are not “enemies” (p.6), or a “nuisance” or at worst “an accomplice” 
(p.2) (in unethical tax matters) as they are there to represent their clients and they 
want to work with (as perhaps opposed to for) HMRC (Maas, 2015, p.6).  He 
suggests tax practitioners see HMRC as “bullies” and that HMRC regard “all self-
employed taxpayers and small businesses as small-time crooks, taking it for 
granted that the taxpayer is cheating.” (p.2). Gracia and Oats (2012a) additionally 
observe that HMRC has become more aggressive towards some taxpayers; an 
observation which may have effect upon advisers too – as such characteristics 
may affect the trust in the relationship between the tax practitioner and tax 
authority.  Maas (2015) refers to the “perception gap” to describe what he feels 
is the “gulf between what we do and what HMRC think or expect us to do” (p.3).  
In other words, he describes a deteriorating relationship with HMRC (perhaps as 
Dabner (2012) describes in New Zealand and Australia and as forecast in the 
UK) and desires a less adversarial association with the organisation.  Negative 
attitudes are seen here by both parties to the relationship and interestingly the 
‘gulf’ described by Maas (2015) can be seen in the work by Addison and Mueller 
(2015) who examine the language and discourse of a transcript of a PAC 
meeting.  This was about the Big 4 professional firms.  Different metaphors were 
used to describe the Big 4, which suggests views towards tax practitioners may 
depend upon one’s particular perspective.  Nevertheless, Dzienkowski and 
Peroni (2016, p.2734) warn of the dangers of a poor relationship with the tax 
authorities, suggesting that a “[n]egative attitude towards tax authorities can 
affect compliance of taxpayers and tax practitioner ethics”.  Trust between both 
parties thus is required for a cooperative relationship as also observed by Gracia 
and Oats (2012a).  Nonetheless, questions about the conduct of practitioners and 




3.3.3 HMRC assistance to the tax practitioner 
HMRC can be a source of assistance to practitioners as found by Hasseldine et 
al. (2011).  Tax authorities may offer advance rulings (that is, a ruling is provided 
about the tax treatment of a transaction, prior to the transaction being undertaken.  
Ordinarily, the ruling is provided only if all the facts on which the decision has 
been based apply, when the transaction is actually undertaken).  Access to this 
type of assistance is one way practitioners may seek to reduce uncertainty.  Diller 
et al. (2017) suggest advance rulings can foster investment, as the taxpayer will 
have certainty of tax treatment in advance of their investment – and of course, 
audit costs may be reduced on behalf of the tax authority.  Dabner (2012 and 
2015) however suggests that the authorities’ discretion to administer a ruling 
unique to a particular taxpayer is now a source of contention as it may be 
perceived to be unfair to other taxpayers who may not be able to take advantage 
of the same rulings.  Indeed, Diller et al.  (2017) remark upon the publication of 
such agreements under the so called Luxembourg Leaks in 2014 (citing findings 
from the International Consortium of International Journalists).  This publication 
generated substantial interest and suggestions were made that such rulings may 
be linked to aggressive tax avoidance strategies.   Additionally, there have been 
criticisms of HMRC for their action in the past in reaching agreement with 
companies to determine tax payable in the event of dispute – the so called 
‘sweetheart deals’ (Huber, 2013).  There were accusations of failure in such 
negotiations, resulting in money lost to the exchequer (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2011).  The reluctance of the tax authorities to issue advance rulings 
(as noted by Dabner (2012, 2015)) could be symptomatic of the changing 
environment discussed above, that is tax authorities do not want to offer specific 
taxpayers assistance, which is perhaps linked to the wider tax avoidance debate.  
For a detailed review of HMRC’s discretionary powers, see Freedman and Vella 
(2011), who conclude that discretion is required for the tax system to function, yet 
it is a balancing act to ensure that HMRC do not overstep the boundaries.   
The studies presented above appear to be, sadly, illustrative of a difficult 
practitioner/tax authority relationship.  Certainly the relationship has changed 
over time which creates issues for practitioners and not just in the UK context.  
Nevertheless, HMRC does recognise the importance of tax practitioners and, as 
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discussed in Chapter 2, the organisation indicates good intention to engage with 
tax practitioners in a number of ways. 
We welcome the use of agents to represent customers where they add 
value in helping their clients to get their affairs right.  Agents can play a 
key role in helping people meet their obligations, while also supporting us 
in our ‘one to many’ relationships with customers.  (Kantar Public 
Research for HMRC, 2018, p.8). 
3.4 Practitioner’s Role in the tripartite relationship 
The relationships of the practitioner and the client, and, the practitioner and the 
tax authorities have been explored above.  It is clear to see that the practitioner 
is in the middle of both relationships.  They are an intermediary between both 
parties.  Each party may have conflicting demands and there may be challenges 
and difficulties arising from the practitioner’s position within this relationship. 
Various scholars have commented on this position. 
3.4.1 The position in the middle 
The practitioner must manage both relationships, as well as think about the wider 
public, the government, their profession, their firm and of course themselves 
when undertaking their work (Davidson, 2016; Doyle et al., 2009b; Frecknall-
Hughes and Kirchler, 2015).  In terms of the three-way relationship some suggest 
that there is a tension between obligations to the revenue authorities and to the 
client, as there is a 
dichotomy between the state's interest in raising revenue and in applying 
its taxation law in a consistent, efficient, and equitable manner and the 
client's interest in minimizing tax. (Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996, p.5) 
or as Davidson (2016) puts it there is a boundary between “obligations to the 
state” and the “rights and duties of individuals”.  A tension may exist, therefore, 
in how the practitioner uses specialist knowledge.  Using the analogy of Klepper 
et al. (1991) the practitioner may adopt an ‘enforcer’ role (to enable the client to 
submit an accurate tax return (compliance activities) or an “enabler” role in the 
tax planning context as without technical knowledge the client pays more tax.  It 
is to be noted however that today, the term ‘enabler’, carries with it more ominous 
connotations which captures aggressive tax avoidance.  These differing demands 
may create a “uniquely ambiguous position” (Baker, 2014, p.281) and Brody and 
Masselli (1996, p.2) suggest that this can create a dilemma as to “… which of the 
two masters … they should serve in ambiguous situations”.  
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So if tax law is not clear, should the practitioner choose the position which creates 
a lower tax payment, or not?  This will of course depend on the circumstances of 
the client, the transaction and the understanding of the law. This will inevitably 
bring with it a number of difficulties and perhaps divided loyalties.  The need to 
“strike an appropriate balance” is recognised by Hageman and Fisher (2016), 
Niemirowski and Wearing (2003) and Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996, p.1).  
This issue is described as a “unique role” (Fatemi et al., 2020, p.134), a “unique 
dilemma” (Blanthorne et al., 2013, p.150), a “dual duty” (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 
2016, p.2726), a “dual role” (Tran-Nam et al., 2016, p.458) a “dual responsibility” 
(Oatway, 1965, p.254, and also described similarly by Stuebs and Wilkinson, 
2010) and a “dual agency problem” (Leviner, 2012, p.1097).  Dzienkowski and 
Peroni (2016, p.2726) suggest that having the “government as an opponent” is 
“unique” which creates the “dual duty” as the practitioner has obligations with 
regard to revenue collection.  However, such a duty may affect the practitioner’s 
“…ability to represent their clients with maximum zeal” (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 
(2016, p.2722) as, Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016, p.2728) suggest, practitioners 
have an obligation to “represent their clients zealously within the bounds of the 
law”.  The possibility of being “pulled in different directions” is acknowledged by 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003, p.386), and is described similarly by Dabner 
(2012).  Philipps (1993, p.589) refers in the tax law context to the “tension 
between the lawyer’s duty to represent a client diligently and the sometimes 
conflicting duty to promote the administration of justice” (which he notes is often 
referred to as a “duty to the system”).  This latter point is also observed by 
Blanthorne et al. (2013) and Stuebs and Wilkinson (2010). Given the numerous 
references to the practitioner in the tripartite relationship, it is clearly an issue 
which warrants contemplation by the practitioners, HMRC and clients and it can 
be difficult to reconcile these different, conflicting roles (Frecknall-Hughes and 
Kirchler, 2015). 
It should be noted that all of these analogies originate from outside the UK, 
although the relationship (and responsibilities) between the revenue authorities, 
practitioners and clients is similar.  However, there are differences regarding 
registration of tax practitioners in different countries, as already noted, which may 
carry additional obligations and perhaps cast a slightly different light on these 
relationships.  Nevertheless, the practitioner should act in the client’s interests 
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within the tax law (Gupta, 2015; Leviner, 2012; OECD, 2008).   A balance is 
needed according to Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016) as if the practitioner leans 
too far towards the tax administration in terms of their responsibilities, they may 
be seen as “quasi-IRS agents”.  This may create problems for the practitioner’s 
obligations to the client.  This resonates with the dilemmas described by Dabner 
(2012, 2015) and Walpole and Salter (2014) in their discussion about the 
changed relationships between practitioners and the authorities in Australia and 
New Zealand.  In terms of the practitioner’s primary duty however, the CFE (2014, 
p.1) state that “… tax advisers are not watchdogs of the tax administration” and, 
the OECD (2008) acknowledge that a practitioner’s primary duty is to the client.   
Within the tripartite relationship, practitioners have an important role within the 
tax system itself.  This is not just true of the UK, but also the US (Helleloid, 1989) 
and New Zealand (Gupta, 2015). They have been described as “… critical 
gatekeepers for the tax system and its administration” (Leviner, 2012, p.1090; 
see also Oatway, 1965).  The term ‘gatekeeper’ is also used by Gupta (2015, 
p.77) who suggests that practitioners have a duty to “…uphold the integrity of the 
tax system”, although this term is disputed by Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016) as 
they remark that taxpayers themselves have obligations to the tax system too.  
Nevertheless, Davidson (2016), Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016) and Thuronyi 
and Vanistendael (1996) all suggest practitioners are integral to the tax system 
and are needed for it to function smoothly.  Tomasic and Pentony (1991) agree 
that practitioners are an important part of the tax system.  
Tomasic and Pentony (1991) in their study of tax practitioners and the tax 
authorities (the Australian Tax Office) found that tax practitioners had a number 
of roles.  These included “independent advisers” to clients, intermediaries 
between the tax authorities and the client, and “protectors of their practice” (a risk 
management role in protecting their practice as well as representing clients).  
Additionally, Tomasic and Pentony (1991) suggested that practitioners are 
“unpaid employees” of the tax administration, “compliance advisers” and 
“influencers on the tax system”.  The practitioners are not employees of the tax 
authorities in the literal sense, yet many of them felt that way.  That is, they were 
increasingly doing the job of the Australian Tax Office as more responsibilities 
previously undertaken by the tax administration were shifted to the taxpayer (and 
therefore their adviser.  Hence in the metaphorical sense, they may be seen as 
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“unpaid employees” of the tax system). Tomasic and Pentony (1991) conclude at 
the time that there was a closer relationship between tax practitioners and the tax 
authorities, but the tax practitioners were uneasy about being viewed as partners 
in this relationship.  This continues to be the case in later years (Dabner 2012, 
2015).  Interestingly, even back in 1991, the practitioner participants in Tomasic 
and Pentony’s (1991) study expressed unwillingness to take part in unacceptable 
tax avoidance.   The environment has changed greatly since this research was 
undertaken, yet there appears to be no similar research in the UK.   Maas (2015, 
p.4) however remarks that he does not actually see himself as being “[i]n the 
relationship between HMRC and the taxpayer”.  The contractual and legal 
obligations are, he feels, to his clients.  Ethical obligations, are, in his opinion, to 
comply with the rules of the professional bodies.  Hence the relationship with 
HMRC is seen as entirely separate in his view.  Nevertheless, grey, uncertain 
and ambiguous legislation can prove difficult for a practitioner to manage.  They 
may well be pulled in different directions and tempted to exploit ambiguity (i.e., to 
ascertain a credible explanation of the law according to Tan, 2011), should it 
exist, either by pressure from clients and/or their firms. This is despite the need 
to evaluate a transaction, or situation, in an unbiased manner (Hageman and 
Fisher, 2016).  This aspect is explored further below in Section 3.4.8 about how 
practitioners need appropriate tax knowledge.  Additionally, their background and 
ethical compass may also play a part here.   
The next section explores the literature surrounding the professional context in 
which the practitioner works, which starts to highlight the influences on the 
practitioner as a professional and an individual. 
3.4.2 The tax professional 
The tax practitioner is a professional.  It is important to note that tax practitioners 
who do not belong to a professional body, or are unqualified, may nevertheless 
consider they work in the tax profession and hence see themselves as 
professionals too, as do those who are members of such bodies.  The tax 
profession, per se, is thus distinct from the professional bodies which operate in 
the tax field.   The approach of all tax practitioners to their work may be affected 
by their professional identity, that is the “cognitive mechanism that affects 
workers’ attitudes…and behaviour in work settings and beyond” (Caza and 
Creary, 2016, p.260).  Professional identity is a somewhat subjective construct 
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and many different aspects feed into how one’s professional identity forms, as 
will be discussed in Section 3.4.5 below.  However, as already discussed, the 
participants in this research exclude those individuals who operate outside the 
remit of a professional body, or who are not HMRC trained.  As such, the 
professional body to which the participants in this research belong (see Chapter 
2) and/or their former training may influence how they approach client and HMRC 
relationships and how they view their roles as the central actor in the tripartite 
relationship.  Section 3.4.5 thus reviews the literature about professional identity 
to help shed more light on the factors that shape and influence an individual’s 
approach to their work.  Prior to this, and to add context to the discussion of 
professional identity, the reasons for the formation of a profession are touched 
upon in Section 3.4.3.   The context of the smaller practitioner is also commented 
upon in Section 3.4.4.  Finally, to draw together these aspects, the literature about 
the professional identity of the practitioner is presented in Section 3.4.5. 
3.4.3 Why professions develop 
There is an abundance of literature about why professions develop and there are 
many different views about the purpose of professions, the power they have, and 
their impact upon society.  See for instance, Abbott (1988), MacDonald (1995), 
McCahery and Picciotto (1995), Paisey and Paisey (2018) and Wilmott (1986).  
Of importance here are the reasons why professions develop, as individuals will 
enter a profession to undertake a particular type of work. 
The main reason for the development of any profession is expertise.  When 
individuals with common knowledge or specialisms group together and create 
some sort of domain around that specialism, a profession is formed (Abbott, 
1988; Adler et al., 2008; MacDonald 1995). Typically, a profession encapsulates 
expert knowledge about a particular field (Adler et al., 2008; Stuebs and 
Wilkinson, 2010) and is usually service focused (Stuebs and Wilkinson, 2010).  
Knowledge may not just relate to technical knowledge.  Those using the services 
of a profession will have access to the experience, judgement and related skills 
of the individuals who make up that particular profession. Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf (2011, p.68) suggest that a profession “guards and maintains [the] 
self-awareness” of workers who “possess a clear sense of what their work is 
about” and “secures the technical underpinnings of occupational practices, that 
is, knowledge and skills” (p.69).   
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Additionally, the language and discourse which relates to the tax and accounting 
field is of particular relevance in this context.  Those outside the tax profession 
may seek assistance to understand tax liabilities, or the tax consequences of a 
transaction and may require an expert to explain this in layman’s terms for them.  
In other words, they require an expert to translate the specialised language of the 
field, as they are unable to do so themselves.  Legal language (as well as 
knowledge) is given as a reason for the development of the legal profession 
(McCahery and Picciotto, 1995) and this is relevant to the tax profession too.  It 
is suggested that lawyers are translators. That is, lawyers translate the client 
discourse into legal language and then translate it back again into simple terms 
for clients (Cain, 1979, cited in McCahery and Picciotto, 1995). This is supported 
by Mulligan and Oats (2016. p.64) who report that “professions play a key role in 
translating legal prescriptions in to organizational practices” – that is, how law is 
implemented on the ground.  Of course, perhaps the same analogy (of translator 
and solution finder) can be applied to any profession (architect, medical or 
engineering for example), although here, it is possible to see clear links with the 
tax profession, particularly given the examples of complex and uncertain tax law 
in Chapter 2. 
Given a profession’s monopoly over knowledge (Abbott, 1988; Hamilton, 2013; 
Miller and Power, 1995; Paisey and Paisey, 2018), and certain expertise, this 
leads to deliberations about the profession’s role in society and questions of 
power.  A profession is seen as a “central means of institutionalising expertise in 
society” (Carter et al., 2015, p.1198) and Mulligan and Oats (2016, p.64) refer to 
a wielding of “considerable power not only as a result of their expert knowledge, 
but also through their ability to manipulate the social order within the field”.  In 
addition to offering expertise, the tax and accounting professional bodies also see 
their roles as “maintaining and enhancing standards through education” (Kantar 
Public research for HMRC, 2018, p.4). The power of a profession may often be 
seen via its gatekeeping capacity.  That is, entry to the profession is often 
controlled via acquisition of qualifications set by the professional bodies operating 
within that profession.  Those without the requisite requirements are excluded 
(Abbott, 1988 and Paisey and Paisey, 2018) from membership. This confers an 
air of status or exclusivity (MacDonald 1995) around that profession, giving an 
aura of respectability, and a highly educated membership.  This provides the 
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profession with credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of those outside the 
profession.  Of course not all tax professionals choose to join a professional body 
or undertake the qualifications on offer and yet they may also benefit from the 
credibility which is attached to belonging to a profession, per se.  This distinction 
between qualified and non-qualified practitioners may go unnoticed by members 
of the public when choosing a tax practitioner to act for them, as highlighted by 
HMRC (2015a). 
As explained in Chapter 2, the professions are self-regulating.  The government 
or state does not intervene unless there are exceptional circumstances as 
discussed by O’Regan and Killian (2014) in their examination of the failures of 
the Irish audit profession.  O’Regan and Killian (2014 p.616) suggest that when 
the public accept the position of the profession as a holder of knowledge, this 
gives it legitimacy “underpinning…its ability to self-regulate”.  Public trust is 
therefore required for the profession to maintain credibility (Adler et al., 2008; 
MacDonald, 1995).  There are different views around the effectiveness of self-
regulation and as indicated at Section 3.3 the self-regulation of the tax profession 
is currently under consideration, nevertheless, the accounting and tax 
professional bodies (unsurprisingly) believe that self-regulation works well 
(Kantar Public research for HRMC, 2018).  
3.4.4 The profession and smaller practitioners 
As this discussion is about smaller practitioners, it is pertinent to refer to the input 
of the accounting profession into this particular market.  Members of the 
accounting and tax bodies work for organisations of all sizes including the Big 4, 
down to sole practitioners.  Their requirements will differ.  Those working for the 
Big 4 may have the support and expertise of a large professional firm to assist 
them if necessary.  Such a professional support network will not exist in smaller 
firms and hence the professional body may need to offer different services to that 
particular market. Ramirez’s (2009) study specifically focussed upon the ICAEW 
in this respect, taking a historical look at the attitude of the organisation towards 
smaller practitioners (which make up a large proportion of the membership).  He 
discusses the “attempt by the [ICAEW] to give institutional existence to the 
category of ‘the smaller practitioner’” (p.381) and to understand their needs to 
target their services to them more appropriately.  This was not however felt to be 
of benefit by the smaller firms.  They felt that whilst ICAEW talked about matters, 
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there was no particular action taken to tailor what was on offer to the smaller 
practitioner (Ramirez, 2009). Clearly however smaller practitioners are seen as 
important to the ICAEW, as they have recently launched a new community to 
provide “sole practitioners and small firms with bespoke content, webinars, 
exclusive benefits and networking opportunities” (ICAEW, 2020e).  It will be 
interesting to see how this is received by this community and whether it is of 
benefit to the tax community in particular, given Ramirez’s 2009 findings. 
Nevertheless, membership of a professional body and the trust and credibility 
which is attached to such a membership, provides an added ‘seal of approval’ 
and a sign of quality assurance for members (White, 2019a).  This may be 
particularly relevant for smaller firms (Ramirez, 2009) as these firms will not have 
the support or financial backing of many larger firms.  Membership of a 
professional body will make them more visible to the public.  As explained in 
Chapter 2, there is no requirement for any tax practitioner to be qualified, 
registered, or belong to a professional body.  The professional bodies regularly 
raise concerns in this respect (Kantar Public research for HMRC 2018), given 
that they are unregulated and therefore have fewer obligations and there is a 
perception that they may offer less of a quality service than their members.  
3.4.5 Professional Identity 
Individuals make up a profession.  They may, or may not, be employed by an 
organisation which falls under the remit of a professional body.  The individual 
cannot be seen in isolation from either the organisation in which they work, or the 
professional body to which they belong.  The professional identity of the individual 
is therefore important.  Professional identity, is described by Alvesson et al. 
(2015) and Cooper and Robson (2006), as how individuals see themselves and 
how they perceive they link to the organisation in which they work.  Professional 
identity relates to how professionals conduct themselves, rather than the 
technical skills they possess (Grey, 1998) and Caza and Creary, citing Schein, 
1978 (2016, p.261) suggest that this includes the “attributes, beliefs, values, 
motives and experiences that people use to define themselves in their 
professional capacity”.  Brouard et al. (2017) suggest professional identity can 
also encompass links between the individual and society.  The issue of 
professional identity can be “complex and diffuse” (Alvesson et al., 2015, p.2; see 
also Brouard et al.,2017 and Fatemi et al., 2018).  Brouard et al. (2017) explore 
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the formation of the professional identity of accountants and highlight a number 
of influences (termed “audiences”) on the individual in this respect, including 
professional accounting organisations, employers, clients, government, media, 
general public and society in general.  It is suggested that these influences (or 
different loyalties (Alvesson et al., 2015)), or the framework within which an 
individual operates will have an influence upon professionalism and also affect 
the shaping of the identity of individual accountants (Brouard et al., 2017).  The 
approach of an individual towards their work and how they behave may therefore 
be affected by many different influences and experiences.  If the environment in 
which the individual works promotes the right ethics and ideals this can impact 
upon the way an individual acts in his or her professional life (Bobek and Radtke, 
2007; Borrego et al., 2017).  Overall, it is said that an individual’s professional 
identity (such as their beliefs and values per Caza and Creasy, 2016) will provide 
“clues” for how to act (Alvesson, 2015, p.404).    
The organisation in which an individual works and the professional body to which 
they belong will both have an important role in influencing individual behaviour, 
which was remarked upon by practitioners in Fogarty and Jones (2014) study and 
observed by Hageman and Fisher (2016).   How much influence is open to 
question.  The influence of the organisation is firstly discussed, followed by 
comments about the professional bodies. 
Research undertaken by Cooper and Robson (2006) suggests that the influence 
over members/individuals which once would have been held by professional 
accounting organisations, has been lost and replaced by the influence of the 
larger Big 4 professional services firms.  This was felt to have eroded 
professionalism amongst individuals, and is also remarked upon by Fatemi et al. 
(2018) and Suddaby et al. (2009).  Daoust (2020) additionally studied the 
recruitment practices of the large professional accounting firms in the audit 
context.  Daoust (2020) observes that recruitment events commence with the 
socialisation of the applicants into the firm’s culture and suggests that traditional 
emphasis on expertise, knowledge and the public interest which related to 
professional values has waned in favour of more commercial aspects.  That is 
the individual also becomes “socialized” in the ways of the organisation (i.e. 
educated, trained and learn to be accountable) according to Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf (2011, p.69).  Emphasis may be given to the promotion of certain 
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discourses, how to dress, the importance of exams, how to conduct oneself 
(Anderson-Gough et al., 1998) and how to speak and write (Cooper and Robson, 
2006).  The influence of the firm is important as this is the place where “trainees 
learn to articulate and enact professional and organizational practices and 
values” (Anderson-Gough et al., 1998 p.571).  Indeed, Hamilton (2013) suggests 
in her research that trainees are largely influenced by their firm, and rarely 
comment on the professional body other than in reference to qualifications and 
exams. Hamilton (2013) suggests that training within the organisation helps them 
become the professional individual.  Cooper and Robson (2006) found the same.  
It is clear that the organisation plays a large role in terms of how staff perceive 
themselves and in instilling the ethos of the firm to the individual (Cooper and 
Robson, 2006) and therefore will impact upon one’s approach and behaviour in 
the work place.  Yet, despite the influence of the firm, Hamilton (2013) suggests 
that membership of a professional body enables transmission of its own ethos to 
individuals, as they will be bound by its ethical rules and regulations, and they 
must meet the qualification criteria set by it as discussed in Chapter 2.  However, 
it is clear that both the organisation and the professional body will have influence 
over individual practitioners.  Suddaby et al. (2009) found no conflict between the 
profession and the employer as the majority of accounting professionals are 
committed to their profession.  
The above relationships between the practitioner as an individual, the firm in 
which they work and the influence of the professional bodies impact on the 
individual’s attitude and approach and ethical perspectives and hence affects 
their interaction with clients and HMRC and how they carry out their work. This 
can be shown diagrammatically at Fig. 3.1 below.  An individual’s professional 
identity may adapt and change as one’s experiences and knowledge develops 










Source: Author’s own 
3.4.6 The ethical environment 
The environment (of the firm, and/or the professional field) in which the individual 
operates is important, as there have been increasing questions as to the 
behaviour of some tax professionals in recent years.  As indicated in Chapter 2, 
at Section 2.6, there has been a shift in public perception -  to one of scepticism  
about the role of professions in society (Addison and Mueller, 2015).  With 
regards to tax particularly, this is seen now as a moral issue (Carter et al., 2015) 
and the ethics of some practitioners have been questioned, particularly in light of 
the facilitation and encouragement of tax avoidance.  The erosion of 
professionalism is discussed by Cooper and Robson (2006), Fatemi et al. (2018) 
and Suddaby et al. (2009).   Changes in perception such as these, and shifts in 
the public viewpoint may undermine the public trust which gives a profession 
credibility and this will affect professional identity.  The individuals within the 
profession will of course have a number of conflicting demands to reconcile in 
their approach to their work.  They work for commercial organisations and the 
economics are certainly important, and yet, a profession should operate in the 
public interest.  There can be tension (Stuebs and Wilkinson, 2010), but 
commercial aspects should not be “at the expense of ethics and public service” 
(Suddaby and Muzio, 2015, p.32).  The individual should not act in their own self-
interest.  Professional bodies should take steps to guide members in this respect 
(Stuebs and Wilkinson, 2010).  Given the individual is a provider of services 
related to tax, they will also have obligations to the tax authorities which they must 
reconcile to their particular role, or “embrace a professional identity that ties their 
obligations to the integrity of the tax system” (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016, 
91 
 
p.2738).  However, Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016) also note that if the tax return 
process is perceived to be an adversarial process, this can negatively affect the 
attitude of the individual towards the tax system – and whilst this particular point 
is not an influence of the employing organisation or professional body, this is 
important in the context of tax professionals.  Yet, consideration of ethics and the 
requirement to adopt an ethical approach to tax practice are undoubtedly 
important to a tax practitioner (and form part of one’s professional identity).   
The ethics of tax practice has been widely researched (Frecknall-Hughes et al., 
2017) including ethical reasoning of tax practitioners (Blanthorne et al., 2013; 
Doyle et al., 2013), the effect of practitioner firm size on ethics (Doyle et al., 2014) 
and the influence of ethical codes of conduct on professionalism in tax practice 
(Fatemi et al., 2020).  The link between risk management in taxation and ethics 
was studied by Doyle et al. (2009b).  The influence of ethical conflicts (in 
particular as ethical obligations may be broader than relevant legal obligations) 
of the practitioner and their responsibility to the client is discussed by Dalpont 
(2015) and Stuebs and Wilkinson (2010).  The impact of client importance, social 
interaction with clients and organisational climate on ethical decision making is 
also explored by Hageman and Fisher (2016).  Whilst the focus of this particular 
study is not on ethics per se, ethics cannot be ignored and these studies illustrate 
the wide research in this field. 
It has already been said, that knowledge and expertise lead to the development 
of a profession.  Additionally, training and exam success feed into the 
development of the tax professional as an individual.  Sections 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 
examine how knowledge and expertise develops and how tax practitioners 
acquire the skills needed to carry out their roles.  Such experiences cannot be 
divorced from the individual’s professional identity.  As an individual’s career 
develops, so too does their knowledge and approach to their role.  One may draw 
on former experiences to carry out the role of the intermediary between taxpayer 
and the tax authorities in order to fulfil the role in the middle of the tripartite 
relationship. 
3.4.7 Knowledge and expertise 
The professional bodies require evidence of the expertise of their members via 
examinations and appropriate work experience.  Knowledge and expertise is vital 
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to the tax practitioner’s role. As said by Hasseldine et al. (2011), a practitioner 
may be likened to a knowledge broker and sells their knowledge.  So how does 
this develop? The knowledge tax practitioners have will depend upon their 
background, experiences, training, support for continuing professional 
development, the professional body to which they belong, the size of the firm they 
work for, whether they have colleagues working with them, and so on.  A tax 
practitioner learns continuously throughout their career as a result of the complex 
and dynamic nature of tax law and the tax system, as evidenced in Chapter 2. 
The practitioner will be influenced by both the organisation and profession as 
discussed above.  The organisation is a site, it is suggested “…where accounting 
rules and standards are translated into practice, where professional identities are 
mediated” (Cooper and Robson, 2006, p.415).  This experience will then travel 
with that individual throughout their career and may ultimately shape how they 
then approach professional life in the future (Hamilton, 2013).  Over time, 
experience will develop and evolve, as will professional identity.  Professional 
identity is not something that is created at one point in time and never changes 
(Bevort and Suddaby, 2016; Brouard et al., 2017).  As individuals progress 
throughout their career, acquire other experiences, obtain additional training, take 
on other responsibilities, attain other skills and continue with their education, 
professional identity will change and links may be made here to the concept of 
Bourdieu’s habitus (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).  Thus “human capital” 
(Stringfellow and Shaw, 2009, p.137) develops and over time, evolves into 
experience and expertise, which Stringfellow and Shaw (2009) suggest, is 
particularly pronounced in small professional service firms, where the owner may 
be the main source of capital in the organisation. 
Those practitioners who belong to professional bodies will be required to 
evidence their on-going professional training and complete compulsory 
professional development (CPD) records.  These records should indicate regular 
access to appropriate training, for instance, attendance at courses and 
professional body meetings, and reading of text books and professional journals 
(see also McKerchar, 2005, from the Australian perspective).  Such training may 
be perceived to enhance the trust of those accessing their services (Paisey and 
Paisey, 2018).  The practitioners are seen as experts in their field and members 
are thus able to capitalise on the profession’s control of knowledge (Schinkel and 
93 
 
Noordegraaf, 2011).  Despite this, practitioners will learn much on the job 
(Hamilton, 2013; Hicks et al., 2007) as discussed in Section 3.4.8 below. 
3.4.8 Tax knowledge specifically   
The job will of course involve tax research.  That is, research of tax law, 
regulations and case law, and utilisation of extra-statutory guidance, in order to 
provide advice required, as observed by Fogarty and Jones (2014).  The tax 
practitioner therefore has a wealth of information that s/he may need to search 
through, and needs to be ‘on the ball’ with the current tax position, should a non-
routine tax matter land on the practitioner’s desk.  Each situation will differ, and 
what is required will depend upon the nature of the query.  When faced with a 
potentially large amount of information, and a finite amount of time to do the 
research, a practitioner needs to adopt a strategy (Bouwman et al., 1987) to 
locate, read, analyse and interpret laws, case law, and other authorities.  Drawing 
again on evidence from the JDM literature, the practitioner may find conflicting 
opinions and precedents during the research, which they need to weigh up to 
help them form a decision (Bain and Kilpatrick, 1990).  These will then be applied 
to the facts of the client case, to determine the advice to be given (Carnes et al., 
1996; Roberts, 1998; Spilker, 1995).  This will enable the practitioner to “… 
determine the level of authoritative support for alternative tax treatments” (Cloyd 
and Spilker, 1999, p.300).  This should be carried out objectively, however Cloyd 
and Spilker (1999) found that client preference may result in practitioners 
‘skewing’ their findings in favour of the clients preferred outcome – which is 
evidence of confirmatory bias discussed above, when examining the client 
relationship.  This finding was however affected by the background of the 
practitioner (Cloyd and Spilker, 2000), as discussed below.   Practitioners will use 
various tools in the information search, including database and internet searches, 
but it may be that as tax law itself is so voluminous, even the most experienced 
and knowledgeable practitioner is unlikely to recall all there is to know about a 
given topic, and this in itself may affect the search task (Bouwman et al., 1987).  
The specific way a practitioner does this will depend on their past experiences 
and knowledge (see for instance, Cloyd, 1997; Spilker, 1995).   Not surprisingly, 
time pressure was found to affect the effectiveness of the search for information 
(Spilker, 1995), as did task interruption (Long and Basoglu, 2016) hence both 
situations may impact upon the decision making process.  A link can be made 
94 
 
here to observations from Fogarty and Jones (2014) that short cuts may be made, 
and time pressures create fee problems.  Hence budgets and a finite amount of 
time may impact upon the advice ultimately given. 
As the career of a practitioner develops, knowledge will be combined with 
experience gained during working life as described above.  Kaplan et al. (1988) 
investigate how practitioners use past experiences to exercise judgement when 
interpreting tax law.  This was achieved by creating different scenarios based 
around a grey area of tax law.  They suggest that knowledge in ‘unambiguous’ 
areas of law (i.e., straightforward technical knowledge) is gleaned from the 
classroom, professional journals and the like.  Yet, in order to advise on 
ambiguous aspects of the law, practitioners draw on earlier knowledge and 
experiences.  Klepper et al. (1991) conclude that such experience enables 
advantage to be taken of ambiguous law in making recommendations to clients. 
Interestingly however, Cloyd and Spilker (2000) found that the background of the 
tax practitioner may have an effect here.  Those with legal training were less 
inclined to give undue weight to authorities which supported the client position.  
Instead they were shown to be more objective in decision making and showed 
less inclination of confirmatory bias than those with an accounting background. 
This was thought to be related to the difference in training and former 
experiences.  Those with legal training showed a more balanced approach to the 
search for information, as, it was suggested, they are trained to expect challenges 
to their arguments and are more familiar with case law.  This resonates with 
suggestions by Freedman and Power (1992) and Latham (2012) that one’s 
approach may depend upon one’s background given “… fundamental differences 
in analytical styles which have their basis in varied historical, cultural and 
educational patterns of development” (Freedman and Power, 1992, p.2, in their 
work which looks at the difference between the accounting and legal professions).  
Experience may therefore help drive the tax search for information and this 
illustrates that not all tax practitioners will have access to the same information, 
or adopt the same approach to providing tax advice.  Thus the effectiveness of 
the practitioner’s information search may affect the decision made (Cloyd, 1997).   
The above discussion indicates the issues that practitioners must contend with to 
advise clients appropriately, yet they must also act within the bounds of the law 
in their roles as intermediaries.  Given the complexities of the tax system and the 
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difficulties of tax law, as discussed in Chapter 2, it may not be straightforward at 
times to offer the advice requested.  As highlighted in Chapter 1, the organisation 
for which the practitioner works may also affect the approach to tax knowledge 
acquisition.  It is likely that a Big 4 firm will have a central team to provide multiple 
resources and regular updates to their many staff and of course, will employ 
numerous experts in certain areas of taxation who may be able to assist other 
colleagues as and when required.  Those working within a smaller firm will have 
less support and are likely to seek updates to knowledge outside the organisation 
(such as attendance at external training courses, attendance at CIOT events, use 
of online materials and so on).  Expertise may also be sought outside the smaller 
practitioner’s organisation, perhaps drawing upon the help of other practitioners.  
This action will depend upon the limitations of expertise within the firm, given the 
market in which they work.  From an accounting perspective, as mentioned 
above, ICAEW recently introduced a “small practitioners community” in which 
ICAEW members who are smaller practitioners and firms (limited for this purpose 
to a maximum of 4 partners) may participate.  This community offers resources 
(including for taxation), webinars and training opportunities tailored to that 
particular market, in acknowledgement that their needs may differ to those of 
larger organisations (ICAEW, 2020e).   Knowledge is important to all 
practitioners, but the context in which it may be attained differs depending on the 
size of the practice. 
3.5 Summary  
This chapter has reviewed the extant literature as the client/practitioner 
relationship, practitioner/tax authority relationship and that which explores the 
role of the practitioner in the middle of the client/tax authority tripartite 
relationship.  The impact of professional identity upon the practitioner and the 
importance of knowledge and ethics to the tax practitioner were also discussed.  
These matters affect the approach of the individual towards their work and hence 
the relationships with clients and HMRC, and by association, shapes the 
individual’s role as the actor in the centre of the tripartite relationship in a more 
general sense.  The relationships between the client, HMRC and the practitioner 
viewed as a whole give an insight to tax practice. 
Section 3.2 shows that the client/practitioner relationship is multifaceted and may 
be affected by many issues such as attitudes of both parties towards risk and 
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trust.  The demands of clients and influences of other external factors such as 
ethical considerations, practice risk, application of ambiguous law, and the 
practitioner’s background may also affect the relationship. 
What can be determined from this review is that many studies in the 
client/practitioner relationship field are undertaken from a quantitative/positivist 
perspective as indicated in Table 3.1.  There are few qualitative studies in this 
vein.  Additionally, there is a paucity of studies in the UK context.  Furthermore, 
many studies focus on the taxpayer perspective rather than that of the tax 
practitioner.  With the exception of Apostol and Pop (2019), Fogarty and Jones 
(2014), Hasseldine et al. (2011) and Tomasic and Pentony (1991) few studies 
about the client relationship per se incorporate the practitioner voice.   It is clear 
from Table 3.1 that the only study to incorporate the view of the smaller 
practitioner alone, is that of Stephenson et al. (2017) which is undertaken from a 
quantitative perspective.  A particular reflection about this market, according to 
Stephenson et al. (2017) is that smaller practitioners have better knowledge of 
their clients and more understanding of what their clients need (than larger 
practitioners may).  Other studies were not about the small practitioner market 
per se, but some made ad hoc observations about the client relationship in that 
market, such as that access to a local, trusted accountant was found important 
to Australian taxpayers (Tan et al., 2016). 
However, as Stephenson et al. (2017) observe at page p.201, generally 
…there is surprisingly little empirical literature of which we are aware that 
focuses on (1) tax-preparer perceptions of their clients, in general, or on 
(2) what preparers think their clients desire from tax preparation services 
in particular.  
Additionally, they assert that “…the academic tax literature reveals relatively little 
about client preparer interactions”, a view shared by many (Hite and McGill,1992; 
Gupta, 2015; Oats, 2012; Van de Rijt et al., 2019 and Tan, 2014).  Additionally, 
Apostol and Pop (2019. p.17) call for “more qualitative studies which have largely 
been absent in tax consultancy research” as they have “great potential to explore 
the rich details of everyday practices employed in the consultancy industry”. 
The thesis will address these calls and research question 1 is derived in light of 




Section 3.3 reviewed literature around the tax authority/practitioner relationship.  
Some of the qualitative studies referred to in Section 3.2 also ask tax practitioners 
for their views on the tax authority relationship (Apostol and Pop, 2019 in a 
developing tax consultancy profession in Romania; Hasseldine et al., 2011; and 
Tomasic and Pentony in Australia in 1991).  In addition, there are a number of 
qualitative studies in the tax practitioner/tax authority relationship in Australia 
(Dabner, 2012; Walpole and Salter, 2016), New Zealand (Dabner, 2012) and the 
UK (Dabner, 2012; Gracia and Oats, 2012a).  Broadly, there appears to be 
tussles between what the tax authorities want from the practitioner and what the 
practitioner wants, or is able, to give.  Additionally, the relationship between both 
parties seems to be weakening – as evidenced in the UK context (Dabner, 2012). 
This may be, in part, a result of the current narrative around the tax profession 
and their role in tax avoidance practice and the consequence of the changing 
structure in HMRC as highlighted in Chapter 2.  The impact of the changes on a 
service perspective is apparent (Dabner, 2012 and Maas, 2015 and, see also 
Stiglingh, 2014 where practitioners desire a functional service with the tax 
authorities). Nevertheless, the views of practitioners about the current 
relationship with the UK tax authorities, and how this impacts upon the tax 
practice, is lacking in the literature in general.  Additionally, given the large smaller 
practitioner market, their views are important and have not specifically been 
explored in prior literature. Dabner (2012) suggests that their views could be 
sought.  
This leads to research question 2; How does the shifting relationship with 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) impact upon the practices of tax 
practitioners? 
Finally, Section 3.4 highlights prior research into the practitioner’s role at the 
centre of the tripartite relationship.  There are many views and opinions about to 
whom practitioners should be obligated, and common sentiment is that they may 
feel pulled in different directions. There is a clear suggestion too that without tax 
practitioners tax systems would not function.  How the practitioner balances each 
of the client and HMRC relationships may be determined by how they see 
themselves (drawing upon their morals, values, beliefs, experiences, per Caza 
and Creary, 2016) that is their professional identity.  The studies identified 
(Alvesson et al., 2015; Brouard et al., 2017; Cooper and Robson, 2006) suggest 
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that the practitioner may be influenced by their firm, and profession and that as 
experience develops they draw upon this in their future roles (Bevort and 
Suddaby, 2015; Brouard et al., 2017).  Knowledge and expertise is of course 
important in the role of any professional, and literature in this field has also been 
explored, along with how the tax practitioner may equip themselves with 
knowledge to assist the client and manage their obligations to the tax authorities 
in their role within the tripartite relationship.  With specific regard to the smaller 
(accounting) firm Stringfellow and Shaw (2009) suggested that the owner of the 
firm attains the experience and expertise to advise clients.  The knowledge needs 
of the small practitioner market in this respect may differ to those of larger firms 
as also acknowledged by the ICAEW (2020) and Ramirez (2009) who discusses 
the approach of ICAEW in 2009 towards this segment of the accounting market. 
An initiative to provide more appropriate activities for the small practitioner market 
was reported as having little benefit (Ramirez, 2009), however the small 
practitioner market appears at the forefront of ICAEW thought, given further 
initiatives launched in November 2020. These are rare examples which take 
account of the smaller practitioner element of the tax practitioner market.  Finally, 
the JDM literature provides evidence for how practitioners may be unduly 
influenced by the client when undertaking tax research (Cloyd and Spilker, 1999), 
although it is observed that those with a legal background may approach this 
differently (Cloyd and Spilker, 2000).  As these studies were experimental 
research the practitioner’s voice is not heard.   
A practitioner’s role and obligations within the relationship, and the different pulls 
between HMRC and the client are vividly explained in the literature, but what 
actually causes difficulties in these relationships and how these difficulties are 
overcome, in the practitioner’s words, is not evident. How do they balance 
different relationships and a complex and shifting environment? Does the 
practitioner’s professional identity influence their approach? How do they 
implement tax regulation on the ground within tax practice? Practitioners do of 
course manage to cope with complexity and uncertainty (Bogenschneider, 2015 
and Picciotto, 2007) – but how is this achieved?  The thesis will contribute to this 
understanding as Fogarty and Jones (2014, p.313) (writing about the challenge 
to US practitioners of dealing with complex, uncertain law) suggest, “[h]ow 
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accounting firms get their staff to the point where they can survive in such a world 
needs to be better understood.”   
This leads to research question 3; How do the practitioners see their role in 
the tripartite relationship with clients and HMRC? 
Overall, there has been a “…neglect of tax practice as an objective of scholarly 
attention…” in general (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.319).  Specific investigation 
into the smaller practitioner segment of the huge tax practitioner market is also 
sparse. The thesis will focus upon smaller tax practice as a whole to contribute 
towards the literature in this respect to address the overall research question; 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
The next chapter explains the methodological perspective of the study, how it has 


















This chapter presents the approach to the research and introduces the theoretical 
framework, a Bourdieusian lens.  This lens is used to view the empirical data 
derived from the participants of this research, representing smaller tax practice. 
The study adopts an interpretive perspective and an abductive approach which 
enables analysis of the links between the empirical evidence and the theoretical 
framework.  The chapter commences by restating the research questions, as both 
informed by the literature review and the data collection from an exploratory focus 
group.  Each question is broken down into smaller objectives to allow fuller 
exploration of each question. This is followed by Section 4.3 which introduces the 
research approach and design. Section 4.4 explains the methods used in the 
research.  The subsequent sections present the ethical considerations and an 
overview of the theoretical framework. The final sections provide detail of data 
analysis and a summary. 
4.2 Research questions and objectives 
The focus of this study is the examination of smaller tax practice and its operation 
within a dynamic, frequently changing and complex environment.  
The overriding research question is: 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
There are 3 sub questions to enable exploration of the overarching question 
which are presented below.  These questions were derived from examination of 
the literature in respect of tax practitioners and client relationships; relationships 
with the tax authority and the unique position of the tax practitioner, as a 
professional, within this tripartite relationship.  Additionally, data from the early 
stages of this research (a focus group) contributed to the setting of the objectives 






Research question 1 
 How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in 
a dynamic environment? 
Objectives  
 to gain insight into, and explore, the practitioners’ views on 
their relationship with clients;  
 to describe and understand the environment in which the 
practitioner works and in which the client/practitioner 
relationship operates;  
 to explore how they manage this relationship 
Research question 2 
 How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) impact upon the practices of tax 
practitioners? 
Objectives 
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 the practitioners’ views on the relationship between 
themselves and HMRC; 
 the environment in which the relationship is managed; 
 The challenges and difficulties, as well as positive aspects 
of that relationship; 
 The impact that management of this relationship has on the 
practice of the practitioner; 
Research question 3 
 How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite 
relationship with clients and HMRC? 
Objectives 
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 How practitioners see their role ‘in between’ HMRC and the 
client; 
 The roles they play in managing both relationships; 
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 What challenges and difficulties arise from their roles; 
 How these challenges are overcome; 
 How the practitioners come to understand, interpret and 
implement tax rules on the ground whilst managing their 
position in the tripartite relationship. 
4.3 Research Approach and Research Design 
The research is qualitative in design.  An interpretivist perspective is employed. 
Much work in the accounting area (tax included) employs “quantitative and 
theoretical analysis” techniques i.e., has a positivist perspective (Oler et al.,2010, 
p.642).  This may be because accounting researchers try to obtain “academic 
respectability from peers in other fields” (Oler et al., 2010 p.642), or as Boden 
(2010, p.541) remarks, tax research is “easy prey for positivism” as it is a “rule 
bound field”.  This approach can be seen in various studies which employ the 
testing of hypotheses and experimental approaches to determine how tax 
practitioners behave in certain situations, or how they respond to different 
influences, as presented in Chapter 3.  A mix of questionnaires or surveys (for 
example Christensen, 1992; Gupta, 2015; Hite and McGill, 1992; Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2003; Stephenson et al., 2017; Tan et al., 2016; Tran-Nam et al., 
2016; Van de Rijt et al., 2019) or scenario based experiments may be employed.   
The judgement and decision making (JDM) literature in particular adopts the latter 
approach (see for instance, Bobek et al., 2010; Carnes et al., 1996; Cloyd et al., 
2012; Cloyd and Spilker, 1999; Fatemi et al., 2018; Fatemi et al., 2020; Kahle 
and White, 2004; Spilker, 1995; Long and Basoglu, 2016).  These types of study 
have a positivist approach.  However, as Oler et al. (2010) suggest, this particular 
focus has the consequence that certain accounting (here tax) research questions 
are ignored if they cannot be answered in a positivist fashion.  In light of this 
observation, given the nature of the research questions in this thesis, positivism 
(or a quantitative approach) is not considered suitable for this particular study, as 
it is unsuited to addressing the specified research questions.  Instead a qualitative 
approach is adopted. 
This particular research is very context specific, and aims to investigate the 
impact of changes in the tax field upon the practice of smaller tax practitioners. 
Details of their relationships with clients and HMRC are to be explored.  A deep 
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understanding of the practitioners’ world is needed.  Thus, to obtain insights and 
depth of detail about this world, evidence from the practitioners (their words and 
their perspectives) is required, to allow their voice to be heard.  Hence, context, 
and the meaning attributed to the information derived from the practitioners is 
important (Robson, 2011).  A qualitative approach will enable gathering of in-
depth explanations from the participants to allow understanding as to ‘what is 
going on’ in the context of the smaller practitioner and wider tax field (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998; Silverman, 2013).  An interpretive approach is employed to obtain 
the meanings that the participants “attribute to their environment” (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011, p.402) and to attain understanding of the world from the point of view 
of the researched; here the practitioners themselves (McKerchar, 2010; Robson, 
2011; Saunders et al., 2012). It is acknowledged that subjectivity is inevitable in 
this kind of research, however the intangible and subjective aspects, which are 
ignored in research of a positivist nature (Lee with Lings, 2008) and hence may 
miss part of the story (Silverman, 2013) are important to enable examination of 
“…phenomenon [and] identify themes and patterns” (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 
144) in the empirical data collected. 
Whilst a qualitative, interpretive perspective is to be deployed, this will take the 
form of an abductive approach.  As said, the context of the study is the smaller 
tax practice.  Those working in that environment (the subjects of the research) 
are the sources of experiences about their life in practice.  The smaller 
practitioner context thus enables study of a small element of the tax field (the 
micro, or emic perspective (Lukka and Modell, 2010) arising from the study of 
practices from inside that particular context (Lukka and Vinnari, 2014)).  It is 
recognised that smaller tax practice does not operate within a vacuum, but within 
a much wider tax field, which Lukka and Modell (2010) describe as the etic 
perspective, which here, is the study of small tax practice from the “outside” 
(Lukka and Vinnari, 2014, p.793).  These two elements (the emic and the etic) 
are linked, and an abductive approach allows investigation and understanding of 
these connections by linking the findings from the emic, to the etic via a 
theoretical framework (Lukka and Vinnari, 2014).  
An abductive approach is middle ground between inductive and deductive 
approaches.  An inductive methodology has focus upon the data, rather than the 
theory.  However, a deductive methodology prioritises theory. Abduction is mid-
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way between.  The practitioner accounts (the data collected) enable identification 
of the “processes and mechanisms that tie together the developed explanations” 
(Lukka 2014, p.562), thus the researcher adds interpretation and meaning to the 
raw data (Kennedy, 2018).  It is acknowledged that this is also indicative of an 
inductive approach, but in this study, an existing theory is borne in mind through 
which to view and understand what the emic accounts of the practitioners mean.  
A purely inductive approach would call for creation of a theory which critics (see 
Taylor, 2018) suggest is not feasible, as the researcher brings with them their 
own experiences and biases and consequently such biases prevent a wholly 
objective approach when interpreting the data (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011).  
Reflexivity is thus acknowledged; that is the researcher recognises their possible 
impact on the research process.  Given the researcher’s past experience of 
working in smaller tax practice this can narrow the divide between the participant 
and the researcher and Gioia et al. (2012, p.19) warns against “going native”.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the researcher’s former knowledge of, 
and background in, the environment subject to research.    
An abductive approach thus helps bridge “the gap between theory and research” 
(Taylor, 2018, p.513).  The role of theory, in abductive research is as a “source 
of inspiration” (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2018, p.15) or it is used to “sensitise” 
(Taylor, 2018, p.515) the researcher as to how the field may impact upon the data 
and how the data may impact upon the field (Lukka, 2014: Taylor, 2018).   That 
is, an iterative process is employed and findings are constantly compared, 
revisited and reanalysed throughout the research to make sense of, and allow 
understanding of, the data collected (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2018; Lukka, 
2014; Lukka and Modell, 2010).  Hence there is an interplay between the theory 
and the data (Kennedy, 2018; Taylor, 2018).  The data collection and analysis 
thus has overlap (Taylor, 2018) and is undertaken concurrently.   
In sum, integration of the emic (here small tax practice) with the etic (here the 
wider tax field), as in this study, is characteristic of abductive reasoning and 
allows the “linking of an individual piece of interpretive research within the extant 
body of knowledge on the focal field” (Lukka, 2014, p.560).  This allows one to 
make sense of and seek explanation and understanding of the empirical findings 
from the smaller tax practitioner context in relation to the wider, theoretical tax 
field by drawing on appropriate theory and the current knowledge about the field.  
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The researcher’s knowledge is also acknowledged.  The lens to be used in this 
research is Bourdieusian, as discussed at Section 4.7 below. 
The next section provides explanation of the research methods employed in this 
research. 
4.4 Research methods 
The tools (the method) to collect the data included a focus group and interviews.  
These are suited to a qualitative approach and are appropriate to address the 
research aims and objectives.   These methods allowed collection of data to attain 
the practitioner perspective about life in the small practitioner market, and 
enabled acquisition of stories, experiences and depth of explanation.  
Additionally, to provide additional orientation in respect of the research, a number 
of other data sources were also referred to – an explanation of which follows in 
Section 4.5.  This section starts by outlining details of the focus group and the 
process undertaken in that respect.  This is followed by an explanation of how 
the interview process was adopted in this research.  
4.4.1 Focus group 
Focus groups are helpful for exploratory purposes (Fontana and Frey, 1998) and 
to ‘pre-test’ later elements of the research, such as interviews, but can also be 
useful in their own right (Flick, 2014).  They can be loosely structured, depending 
on the purpose for which they are used (Fontana and Frey, 1998).  As such, the 
focus group was a pre-cursor to holding later interviews and the interview 
questions were informed by the findings from the focus group. 
A focus group was held in May 2015 attended by 5 representatives from smaller 
firms, all involved in the provision of tax advice, who were able to contribute to 
the questions asked i.e. the ability to participate was the defining characteristic 
for the selection of participants. Details of the invited participants are discussed 
at Section 4.43 below (sampling) and are shown in Table 4.1.    
There are debates about whether the participants should have homogenous 
characteristics or not (Krueger and Casey, 2015), and whether they should be 
unknown to each other (Hopkins, 2007, referring to Tonkiss, 2004).  The only 
requirement for this particular research was the size of firm from which they were 
drawn (see Section 4.43), given that the research questions are focussed around 
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the UK smaller tax practitioner.  Some members of the group did know each 
other. As they were drawn from the local area, this was unavoidable.  Hopkins 
(2007) cites Holbrook and Jackson (1996) who suggest that this can bring 
different strengths and weaknesses to the focus group.  With hindsight, the 
familiarity probably enabled a more informal, relaxed environment; although it is 
not possible to know to what extent this would help or hinder a ‘free’ discussion 
in terms of what participants are willing to say in response to the question asked. 
Potential participants were contacted by telephone, with further explanatory 
details sent by email.  Those contacted were known to the researcher via 
professional connections, which made the initial approach easier. These 
individuals were able to suggest other participants not known to the researcher, 
who were also contacted.  Although a favourable response was received from 
many, there were difficulties in logistics, which meant some were unable to join 
the group, although the offer of help at a later time was made by many.  Five 
participants attended, all of whom the researcher knew fairly well from previous 
connections.  This was a manageable number.  Each person was able to 
contribute and the problems of transcription (and the identification of ‘who said 
what’) was kept to a minimum thus avoiding difficulties which can arise with a 
large group as Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) and Saunders et al. (2012) identify.  
The discussion lasted for 2 hours, with a break for lunch. 
Ideally, Flick (2014) advises that at least two colleagues should be present when 
hosting a focus group so that note taking, or other organisational matters, do not 
interfere with listening to, and chairing of, the group.  A colleague assisted. It 
would have been difficult to obtain the full benefit from the group environment 
without help in terms of even the most mundane matters (for example, location 
of the facilities, offers of refreshment and so on). 
Ethical requirements were considered (see full details below) and an information 
sheet (appendix 10.3) was provided in advance of the meeting outlining areas for 
discussion and sample questions.  This proved to be useful as participants could 
think about different aspects before the meeting which added an additional 
perspective to the discussions, as discussed below.  After a brief ‘warm up’, as 
advised by Flick (2014) to break the ice, the discussion flowed well, and the 
participants were happy to contribute.  As per the ethical approval, the meeting 
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was held in accordance with the Chatham House rules, in order to encourage 
freedom of discussion.  This meant that the participants should not attribute the 
source of any comments outside of the discussion, to preserve confidentiality.  
The researcher chaired the group discussion as advised by Krueger and Casey, 
(2015) and was able to provide an appreciation of the issues discussed having 
worked in tax practice for a number of years, in both large and smaller firms.  The 
researcher was mindful of the need to allow space for discussion and “not disturb 
the initiative of the participants” as identified by Flick (2014, p.247), although it is 
noted by McGregor (2005) that the presence of the researcher could have effect 
on what is said.  
The aim was to hear ‘from the horse’s mouth’ about the issues and challenges 
affecting the operation of smaller tax practitioners in today’s environment and to 
garner preliminary data to be subsequently followed up by interviews.  The 
questions were loosely structured and open ended following suggestions by 
Krueger and Casey (2015) and allowed for meandering.  The group was engaged 
in an informal discussion based around a loose set of questions which adopted a 
non-directive style in accordance with Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) to identify the 
challenges practitioners face.  Questions covered three broad areas; client 
issues, relations with HMRC and specific difficulties in terms of offering advice. 
The researcher sought perceptions of the practitioners about the role of the 
smaller practitioner and whether this had changed over recent years in order to 
gain information about their “values, attitudes and opinions or knowledge” as 
directed by McGregor (2005, p.424); and Krueger and Casey (2015).  The aim 
was thus to use the focus group to act as a “vehicle for transferring ideas or 
knowledge….to [the] research[er]” as highlighted by McGregor (2005, p.424).   
Following advice from Hopkins (2007, citing Morgan, 1997), the researcher 
ensured there was engaged “…interaction…based on topics supplied by the 
researcher…”.  The exercise elicited many points of view, which is a benefit of a 
focus group, per Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) and McKerchar (2010).   Some 
vivid examples were used to illustrate the practitioners’ comments, some of which 
had been thought about prior to the commencement of the meeting and this 
contributed to the richness and depth of data.  The meeting was recorded and 
transcribed.  As Silverman (2013) suggests, themes could be identified, along 
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with shared views and common views – which also added to the depth of data 
(Patton, 2002).   
As Flick (2014) notes, if practical problems can be overcome, which they were in 
this instance, rich data can be obtained, at a minimum cost.  The findings were 
fruitful and proved helpful to help formulate the research questions.  Additionally, 
the findings were employed to create an interview schedule.  The findings were 
also data in their own right. The data was analysed as described below in Section 
4.8, Data Analysis. 
4.4.2 Interviews 
Following the focus group, interviews were conducted.  Interviews are one of the 
most common and effective methods to collect data (Bédard and Gendron, 2004). 
This method enables detailed questions to be asked.  Again, the aim was to shed 
light on what practitioners think i.e. to obtain their point of view, perspectives and 
experiences (per Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; Robson, 2011).  Interview 
questions were based around the research aims and subject matter of the project, 
to elicit the information needed following Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, p.130, 
referring to Bourdieu, 1999).  This enabled collection of rich descriptions and 
depth of information as Fontana and Frey (1998) and Robson (2011) explain.   
The questions covered matters such as the background of the participant, 
challenges they face, how they manage in a fast changing environment, and how 
they deal with tax law.   As well as being appropriate for the research aims, the 
interview process gave the participant some control over what they chose to say 
to protect confidentiality.  This position is confirmed by Turley (2004) whose 
experience was that participants (of practices, but in the auditing context) were 
happy to talk in the abstract or in general terms, but would not commit to specifics 
for fear of breaching confidentiality.  The same could be said of the focus group. 
As identified by Fontana and Frey (1998, p.47) interviews are a powerful way of 
“…understand[ing] our fellow human beings” and on a practical level allow easier 
access and quicker data gathering than by say, observation in the ‘traditional 
sense’ i.e. being part of, and observing the office environment, which may bring 
confidentiality issues (and access problems) into question (Turley, 2004). 
Interviewing is thus an economical choice in respect of time and resources 
(Fontana and Frey, 1998; Silverman, 2014). 
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Interviews may be structured (standardised questions), semi-structured (non-
standardised) or unstructured (Robson, 2011; Saunders et al., 2012).  The choice 
depends on the depth of information required (Robson, 2011).  Each has different 
characteristics and Silverman (2014) draws on Noaks and Wincup (2004, p.80) 
to help differentiate.  A structured interview is rigid in approach and may be suited 
to more quantitative or positivistic research; the researcher takes no part in the 
research itself as the questions are defined prior to the interview and there is no 
prompting or improvisation on behalf of the researcher.  At the other extreme, the 
unstructured, or ‘open ended’ interview (Silverman, 2014) is operated in a flexible 
manner, and although the interviewer may have an idea of the questions to ask, 
there is no control over direction of the interview.  In between each extreme is the 
semi-structured interview.   Both the unstructured and semi-structured interview 
enable collection of experiences and rich detail, yet there is a difference in how 
the interviews are directed and controlled. 
Semi-structured interviews were the chosen method in this case, (for both the 
focus group and the individual interviews) as they are suited to an exploratory 
approach, as suggested by Saunders et al. (2012, p.377).  This enabled control 
to be retained by the researcher, to guide the questions asked (per Robson, 2011 
and Silverman, 2013) and to maintain focus on the research objectives, which 
may not be the case for an unstructured interview as noted by Fontana and Frey 
(1998).  Additionally, this method permitted the researcher to put similar 
questions to each participant (Bryman and Bell, 2011) to help with data analysis.   
Semi-structured interviews are useful when the researcher has a specific focus 
in mind, yet, as identified by Gioia et al. (2012), Patton (2002) and Robson (2011) 
they also allow flexibility to add or adapt questions during the process and 
according to Bryman and Bell (2011) allow adjusted emphasis if necessary.  Data 
acquired from semi-structured interviews may thus be “…non-standardised, so 
that questions and procedures may alter and emerge during a research process 
that is both naturalistic and interactive” as identified by Saunders et al. (2012, 
p.163), who also recognise that such an approach is both suited to understanding 
attitudes and opinions and allows responses to be probed and built upon. This 
relates to the overlap between data collection and analysis (Taylor, 2018) and 
sits within the abductive approach to this thesis. This flexibility enabled 
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exploration of a “richer, theoretical perspective” (Saunders et al., 2012, p, 163) 
and facilitated acquisition of “richer answers” (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
The focus group and interview process thus garnered empirical data from which 
the smaller practitioner context was examined.  The responses attained allowed 
exploration of the meaning and understanding of practices; the environment; the 
relationships of the practitioner, and; the challenges arising in a dynamic 
environment along with the practitioner response.  The data therefore provided 
the means to address the research questions. 
4.4.3 Sampling 
The sample selection for the interviews and focus groups was via non-probability 
(non-random) sampling, or purposive sampling (Patton, 2002). Participants 
needed knowledge appropriate to the issues being investigated as advised by 
Johnson et al. (2007).  It is inevitable that subjective judgement was involved in 
the selection of the sample (Saunders et al., 2012, p.281). 
To identify participants for the focus group, the researcher drew on personal 
contacts as discussed above.  The same approach was adopted for the 
identification of interviewees, and additionally, the researcher spoke briefly at a 
CIOT event to explain the project and ask for volunteers to participate in the 
research.  The CIOT events have many individuals from smaller, independent 
firms amongst their audience.  Such events are opportunities for attendees to 
keep up to date and hear about changes to tax regulation.  Such opportunities 
may not be available ‘in-house’ to a smaller firm.  An information sheet was 
handed out with a returnable slip at the bottom to enable the researcher to make 
contact at a later date.  This generated a number of participants and worked well. 
It is important to note that the method of recruiting individuals resulted in a pool 
of qualified participants.  That is the participants were qualified tax practitioners 
and/or accountants, or individuals with HMRC experience, or who were qualified 
by experience and work under the supervision of a firm which is linked to a 
professional body (but may still be studying/not have qualified).  It is 
acknowledged that there are many unqualified tax advisers in the market (who 
do not belong to any of the professional accounting or taxation bodies, or work 
for a regulated firm, as explained in Chapter 2).  Unqualified practitioners have 
not been included in the sample and remain an unexplored field in the tax arena.  
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One suspects there may be different approaches to the practitioner role and 
different challenges within that particular field which would be interesting to 
explore in future research. 
Participants worked for smaller firms and included sole traders, those who work 
for firms with just a few employees, and those working for firms with 100+ staff.  
Participants were not drawn from larger professional service providers (such as 
the Big 4, ‘top 10’ or ‘top 20’ firms), nor from any organisation which had an 
international presence, although some participants may have previously worked 
for the Big 4 firms.  The participants required were thus those working for smaller 
organisations in accordance with the aim of the study which is to attain an 
understanding of tax practice in the UK smaller tax practitioner context.  
Participants therefore worked for a variety of firm sizes which of course had 
different characteristics and different levels of support in terms of training and 
number of colleagues for the individual.  This was explored during the research, 
along with the background and training of the participants as this too may affect 
their approach to their roles.   
None of the participants worked for firms which had, what was described as a 
“tax directorate” (I/V 23). What the interviewee meant was that some large 
organisations have a central team which produces regular tax updates 
(information about changes to tax regulation) which are then cascaded 
throughout the organisation (in-house) for staff use.  None of the participants 
worked for organisations that produced such information, hence they themselves 
must generate this material, which they obtain from various sources outside the 
firm (via training courses, attendance at CIOT events, researching matters in-
house and so on) which is characteristic of a smaller firm, as discussed in Section 
3.4.8. 
The tables below record for both the focus group (TABLE 4.1) and interview 
(TABLE 4.2), whether the participant has the benefit of working in a ‘tax team’, or 
not.  Whilst staff numbers will be fewer in the small firm context, the type of 
organisation the participants work for in this study vary from sole trader to firms 
with a number of staff.  Some may therefore work with other tax colleagues.  As 
will be seen, colleagues are sources of support and help.  Such in-house support 
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may not be available to all participants in the sample and hence help may have 
to be sought elsewhere depending on the practitioners’ circumstances.   
Given that there are fewer staff in the smaller practitioner context, it so follows 
that they are less likely to specialise in a particular tax, and so the knowledge 
required by smaller practitioners is likely to be much broader and less in depth 
than those working for larger organisations.  The client base of a small practitioner 
will include taxpayers of various size, industry, and type, and hence queries which 
arise may be ad-hoc and unexpected which will require learning on the job.  
Advice and expertise may be sought outside the organisation which is also 
indicative of the smaller practitioner context, and indeed some participants also 
offer such assistance to other advisers as explained below.   
Brief details of experience are also noted in the tables that follow, as this enabled 
the researcher to see how the practitioner had arrived in the role/position they 
had.  Interestingly, some of the sole traders (identified in Table 4.2 for the 
interviews, as interviewees 1,2,8 and 15) had acquired different levels of 
expertise in specific areas of tax, or had HMRC knowledge upon which they drew 
in their work, with many offering their expertise to other advisers as the table 
indicates.  Additionally, the sample included what may be termed, general 
practitioners, responsible for accounting and tax work (interviewees 9, 20 and 21) 
who were not necessarily tax ‘experts’ but nevertheless were responsible for 
client tax matters.  These differences may account for the participants’ responses 
as noted where appropriate in Chapters 5-7. 
The following provides details of the participants who took part in the focus group 
in May 2015 and the interviews which were obtained between November 2017 
and October 2018. 
25 people were interviewed in total.  4 were members of the focus group which 
took place during 2015, and an additional 21 participants were interviewed.  Thus, 
26 different individuals participated in the study overall (25 interviewees, plus one 





Table 4.1 Focus group details 
Participant Role Tax team? 5 or more 
FG1 Tax Manager Yes 
FG2 Sole Trader N/A 
FG3 Tax Partner Yes 
FG4 Partner – deals with tax 
and accounting issues 
No specific tax team, but 
has tax background 
FG5 Tax partner Yes 
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Role Tax team 5 or more Experience or qualifications Specialises in 
certain area of 
tax?7 
1 Sole trader (1) N/A HMRC, CTA   
2 Sole trader N/A Big 4, Top 108, smaller firms and 
CTA 
Yes 
3 Head of tax team (2) Yes ACCA and CTA  
4 Tax Partner (1,2)  Yes Top 10 and smaller firm, ACCA, 
CTA 
 
5 Provision of advice to smaller firms (1) Retired HMRC, Big 4  
6 Tax Senior Manager Yes Number of independent firms, 
CTA 
 
7 Specialist tax adviser Yes Top 10, CTA  
8 Sole trader (1) N/A HMRC, Big 4 Yes 
9 Sole trader N/A Big 4, ACA, CTA  
10 Tax manager (3) Yes ACA, CTA  
11 Tax manager (3)  Yes ATT, CTA Yes 
12  Tax associate (3) Yes ACA, CTA Yes 
13 Tax senior (3) Yes ACCA, CTA  
                                                             
7 These are not specified, as some are so unique that to state the specialism may compromise anonymity 
8 See here: https://www.accountancyage.com/rankings/top-5050-accountancy-firms-2020/ 
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14 Tax adviser No, team of 3 ATT, Big 4, various smaller firms  
15 Sole trader (1), (2) N/A Big 4, CTA  
16 Tax adviser (3) Yes ACCA, part CTA  
17  Tax adviser (3) Yes ACCA, CTA  
18  Tax manager (3) Yes CTA  
19 Tax manager (3) Yes Big 4, CTA  
20  Director of firm (3) No- accounts and tax work Big 4, ACA  
21 Director of firm (3) No – accounts and tax work ACCA  
22  Tax Partner Yes Big 4, Top 10, smaller firms, 
CTA 
 
23 Tax Partner (1,2,3) Yes Top 10, CTA  
24 Tax partner (1,3) Yes Top 10, CTA, ACA  
25  Tax adviser Yes CTA  
 
(1) – also provides advice to other practitioners 
(2) – member of original focus group 
(3) – Joint interview (participants 10 and 11, participants 12 and 13, participants 16 and 17, participants 18 and 19, participants 20 and 
21, participants 23 and 24) 
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4.4.4 The interview process 
There were 19 interviews (including joint interview participants).  These were 
conducted at a time and place to suit the participant and were held in cafes (1), 
at the offices or workplace of the participant (10), in pubs (5), at the researcher’s 
office (2), and at the home of one participant.  All were recorded with the 
participant’s permission and, somewhat surprisingly, the quality of all the 
recordings was good, even with the background noise present in public places. 
To save time, and at the participants’ suggestion, occasionally two people from 
the same firm were seen together.  There are advantages and disadvantages to 
this approach.  For instance, if one person does not feel comfortable in the 
company of another, or one person dominates the discussion, or they exhibit 
conformity of views (Fontana and Frey, 2004).  To try to overcome these issues, 
participants of a similar level were interviewed together (so partners, or senior 
managers, etc.). The advantages are largely in the time efficiency of data 
collection for the researcher, but time is also precious for the participants and this 
process enabled them to take part, but also preserve the firm’s time, as any 
disruption to the working day was minimised.  The group interviews went very 
well, as each participant could bounce off the other, leading to both agreement, 
and disagreement at times, and a lively discussion.  In all cases each participant 
made a good contribution to the discussion; no one person dominated. 
All participants were enthusiastic and willing to help.  The researcher realised 
(after holding 5 interviews) that to preserve the meeting time for the interview, it 
was more time efficient to send out the information sheets, consent forms (see 
ethics below at Section 4.6) and a summary of the purpose of the meeting in 
advance by email.  It took time to explain matters thoroughly at the 
commencement of each meeting and this ‘ate’ into the practitioner’s time, and so 
an alternative approach was ultimately taken.  This gave the participant time to 
look at the information the researcher was required to give, and consider if they 
were happy with the consent form and process.  The information sheet included 
sample questions, but the researcher explained that the interview might not cover 
everything, and that other questions might be included as the interview 
developed.  Some participants asked if they could see more specific questions 
before hand.  The researcher provided a tidier version of a prompt sheet (and 
provided the same ‘health warning’ that other questions may be asked and that 
117 
 
some stated questions may or may not be asked as the case may be).  In some 
cases, the participant had clearly thought about some of the questions prior to 
the interview and in those cases, on balance, the discussion acquired more depth 
and illumination. In these instances, examples could be given to illustrate various 
points, as the participant did not have to ‘think on their feet’ and grapple for 
examples, some of which may not have been forthcoming on the spot.  The 
researcher was conscious of imposing too heavily on the time of busy 
practitioners, so there was no requirement to consider the questions before hand.  
Indeed, it may be thought, perhaps, that better data is produced ‘on spec’ at the 
time, but on balance, provision of information in advance helped create a better 
discussion (although not all had had time to look at the questions before hand). 
Without fail, all interviews went smoothly, conversation did not run out, and 
although at times the conversation may digress on to other matters, the 
conversation was steered back to the issues at hand.  Some interviews lasted 
around 1.5 hours, others less, the shortest being around 40 minutes. An 
estimated interview time of 1 hour was given in all cases, but prior to 
commencement the time availability of the participant was also confirmed. 
The interview questions were developed from the research questions, also taking 
into account findings from the focus group.  An interview prompt sheet is shown 
in appendix 10.4.  The questions allowed for a loose structure to enable 
participants to explore/explain issues of importance to them. Questions were 
adapted following reflection for subsequent interviews if necessary.  This enabled 
the exploration of interesting phenomena highlighted by other participants as and 
when appropriate.   Despite this, the interview schedule did provide the 
researcher with a guide to maintain control over the direction of the interview.  
The researcher’s background was such that most of what was discussed was 
understood (and if not, the researcher was well informed enough to ask for and 
understand the resulting clarification).  Familiarity with terminology and aspects 
of the law were important to attain good understanding. The researcher’s 
background proved an advantage in this respect.  All knew the researcher’s 
background and it made the interviewing process much easier. 
Many themes were common.  Unexpectedly, although interestingly, some 
participants saw the interview as an opportunity to ‘get things off their chest’, and 
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felt it was therapeutic, or cathartic.  Some asked if their comments were the same 
as other participants, seeking reassurance that they were ‘the norm’ and not 
experiencing something unique to them.  Others were pleased that someone was 
looking into their work and expressed an interest in seeing the finished thesis, as 
they found what was discussed to be of interest and worthwhile. 
4.4.5 Practicalities of the interview and focus group 
As discussed, the researcher is knowledgeable about the interview/focus group 
topics.  This is required for successful interviewing (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; 
Silverman, 2013) to ensure responses are understood, and to help with 
subsequent analysis of data.  Being well informed enabled an “informed 
conversation” to elicit detail to address the research questions, as observed by 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, p.19).  It was expected that the relationship between 
the interviewer and participant therefore “produce(s) knowledge…” (Brinkmann 
and Kvale, 2015, p.25) as the interviewer was not just a bystander in the process 
of the interview, but an “active participant” (as suggested by Silverman, 2014, 
p.168) and the “field [will be] …shaped by the theoretical interests of the 
researcher” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p.820).  An awareness of reflexivity 
accords to an interpretivist research perspective and an abductive approach. 
A number of elements were borne in mind when planning the interview and focus 
group to help attain the best possible data, including; putting the participant at 
ease, ethical integrity, avoiding adding one’s own knowledge to the process 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p.194; Fontana and Frey 1998), being a good 
listener (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Fontana and Frey, 
1998; Robson, 2011) and the need to establish a rapport (Bédard and Gendron, 
2004; Fontana and Frey, 1998; Saunders et al., 2012;).  The researcher must be 
seen as trustworthy to ensure the validity of the data obtained (Bédard and 
Gendron, 2004), empathetic and persuasive in order to derive the information 
required (Fontana and Frey, 1998), and there should be confidence for a frank 
and open discussion so that the participant is happy to express themselves 
(Turley, 2004). In conjunction with the knowledge of the interviewer this therefore 
enabled themes to be identified as identified by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, 
referring to Bourdieu, 1999) to enable later data analysis.  
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Having been immersed within ‘practice life’ prior to working in academia, and still 
being part of a professional network of accountants and tax advisers, the above 
requirements were thus achievable to gain appropriate data of sufficient detail to 
address the research aims.  The researcher was known to many (not all) 
participants, which made a comfortable environment for productive discussion. 
4.5 Other data sources – additional orientation 
The data obtained from the focus group and interviews is supplemented with 
information obtained from CIOT local meetings (from branch booklets and topic 
notes) and, information from the HMRC website is touched upon where 
necessary.   Additionally, oral evidence from the Treasury Sub Committee Inquiry 
in 2018 in relation to The Conduct of Tax Enquiries and the Resolution of Tax 
Disputes has been reviewed (the purpose of this inquiry was to examine HMRC’s 
approach to tax disputes and tax audits).  Other materials reviewed included 
those produced by the All- Party Parliamentary Loan Charge Group (APPG), a 
group concerned about the fairness of the so called 2019 Loan Charge and 
HMRC’s role in administering this, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The local branch information is used to illustrate the diverse range of issues that 
smaller practitioners have to be aware of, and is also illustrative of a network to 
which the practitioner has access.  This can be a source of assistance to the 
practitioner if needed. The evidence from the Treasury Sub Committee (2018) 
and the APPG provide additional context in which to examine the relationships 
between HMRC and the tax practitioner. Findings from these additional sources 
are discussed in the relevant chapters. 
It should be noted this aspect of data collection is more ‘broad brush’ than that 
which detailed documentary analysis would require methodologically and it is 
simply used to enable additional orientation and context in terms of the research 
undertaken.  
4.6 Ethics 
Ethical approval was given for both the focus group and interviews.  Participant 
consent forms and information sheets were prepared and cover a number of 
issues such as reassurance over: confidentiality; storage of data, purposes of 
research (Bédard and Gendron, 2004, p.198; Turley, 2004); voluntary 
participation; the use of the data collected; examples of questions to be 
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discussed.  Participants were asked if they had any questions and were asked to 
sign a consent form, a copy of which was then either given to them/emailed, or 
some said they did not require it.  One person asked to see a transcript of the 
interview which was emailed to them (no comments were received).  Some asked 
to see a copy of the thesis – this will be provided on completion. 
4.7 Theoretical framework – an overview of the Bourdieusian 
lens 
Theory was a difficult issue to reconcile in the research process.  The researcher 
did not want to be ‘hindered’ or ‘restricted’ in terms of what could be asked, or 
what answers the practitioner provided.  An abductive approach enables this, 
therefore, it was decided to keep an open mind regarding theory – in some 
respects also following ‘middle range thinking’ (Laughlin, 1995).  ‘Middle range 
thinking’ is a methodological approach which sits in the middle ground between 
a positivist approach and a view that there is no theory at all.  In other words, one 
approaches the data collection with neither a rigid theory in mind, nor the attitude 
that no theory at all is appropriate.  Such a methodological approach also 
acknowledges that the researcher plays a part in the research process (Laughlin, 
1995), as with an abductive approach (Taylor, 2018). Given that the subject of 
the research is a social practice, a number of theories were considered, including 
use of a Bourdieusian lens. Keeping an open-mind from a methodological 
perspective enabled the researcher to have freedom to refer to, for example, 
questions about the practitioner’s background and prior experiences.  From a 
Bourdieusian perspective this may enable examination of habitus (see Section 
4.7.3).  In other words, the researcher approached the data collection with an 
idea of some “’skeletal’ theory with some broad understanding of relationships” 
(Laughlin, 1995, p.80), on which one could then generate ‘flesh’ to hang on the 
bones of the theory. In general, however, questions were not restricted by theory 
of any kind, in order to encourage practitioners to speak freely about issues of 
importance to them, in order to obtain “empirical richness” (Laughlin, 1995, p.80). 
‘Middle range thinking’ clearly has similarities to, and is to conducive to abductive 
reasoning as discussed in Section 4.3.  That is the theory was used as a “source 
of inspiration” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2018, p.15) and to “sensitise” (Taylor, 
2018, p.515) the researcher as to possible explanations for the accounts of the 
practitioners.  The next section highlights the relevance of Bourdieu’s theoretical 
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framework to studies of accounting and taxation and will illustrate its 
appropriateness in an abductive approach in enabling a theoretical linking of the 
emic findings at the smaller practitioner level, to the etic; the wider tax field or 
environment.  
4.7.1 Bourdieu and studies of tax and accounting 
As this thesis investigates how changes in the tax field impact upon the practice 
of smaller tax practitioners, this requires a close examination of social practices 
in this environment.  The empirical data will enable an in-depth view of smaller 
tax practice from those inside the organisations (the emic).  As smaller tax 
practice is but a small part of a wider tax field, explanations and understanding of 
the emic accounts may be linked to the etic (the wider tax environment) and a 
Bourdieusian lens, with particular focus upon the concept of ‘field’, is a theoretical 
framework which enables such a link. The framework is appropriate for 
examination of organisations (here smaller tax practice) (Swartz, 2008) and is 
suitable for an interpretive approach (Malsch et al., 2011), hence it is suitable for 
use in the context of the thesis. 
Gracia and Oats (2012a) observe that a Bourdieusian lens is not widely used in 
accounting research, and rarely in tax scholarship (Gracia and Oats, 2012b). Its 
popularity however appears to be increasing, as observed below. A Bourdieusian 
lens has been used in some accounting studies (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.304) 
to “develop understandings of accounting practice” and therefore illustrate the 
“usefulness and applicability of Bourdieu’s social theory to the accounting field 
generally”.  Malsch et al. (2011, p.221, noting Hopwood, 1983) suggest a need 
to obtain “…better understandings of accounting in the contexts in which it 
operates”, hence a Bourdieusian lens can contribute towards this understanding 
and can be used in the context of (smaller) tax practice.  Further, Gracia and Oats 
(2012b, p.114) draw on Dezalay and Madsen (2002) who use this framework in 
the field of law, employing the “conceptual toolbox” (see Section 4.7.3 for a 
discussion of the three concepts (or toolbox) of field, capital and habitus) to 
analyse aspects of law such as “…the state, the legal profession and legal 
language”.  Gracia and Oats (2012b) suggest that as ‘law’ may be “substituted” 
(p.114) with ‘tax’, this link enables one to legitimately use this framework in the 
tax and practitioner field.   
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Bourdieusian concepts have been used in the tax field a number of times to 
analyse tax as social practice.  For instance, Gracia and Oats (2012a) examine 
a particular aspect of tax practice, being analysis of a tax avoidance case.  They 
examine the interplay between participants in the tax field (i.e., the taxpayer, 
HMRC, the accounting profession, judiciary, and lobby groups).  The legitimacy 
of corporate tax minimization strategies in Australia and the Australian corporate 
tax field (and the stakeholders within it) are viewed via a Bourdieusian lens by 
Anesa et al. (2019).  In other research relevant to this study, a Bourdieusian lens 
has been used in the examination of small professional service and accounting 
firms.  Stringfellow et al. (2015) analyse the dominance of the Big 4 and their 
position in the social structure of professional accounting firms along with the 
impact (of this dominance) on smaller accounting firms; and, entrepreneurial 
capital in small professional service firms has also been examined using this lens 
(Stringfellow and Shaw, 2009). 
4.7.2 Suitability of the theoretical framework to this study 
In light of the above, a Bourdieusian framework transfers well to this study as the 
thesis has focus on the context, processes, practice and interplay between the 
tax practitioner, clients, HMRC, and other stakeholders which may be identified, 
as viewed from the perspective and context of the small practitioner.  Tax is a 
multidisciplinary subject, it draws people from accounting, law, tax practice, 
economics and other disciplines (Lamb, 2005), thus it is an interdisciplinary 
practice. Given this interdisciplinary perspective, it follows that the environment 
in which the smaller practitioner works is influenced by fields (and other 
disciplines) which lie outside, but nevertheless overlap the tax field (such as the 
legal field, the bureaucratic field, the professional field, the judicial field and even 
the small business field).  Smaller tax practice is thus a small part of social 
practice within this wider tax environment.  As Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.307) 
suggest:  
…the modern tax field is complex and not confined to a single site of 
autonomous social practice, but overlaid and intertwined with a number of 
other social and professional fields, including the accounting, political, 
bureaucratic and judicial fields 
A Bourdieusian framework allows analysis of these “complex” and “cross-
disciplinary relationships” (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.308) many of which, they 
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note “…arise only in the tax field”.  A ‘field’, as it relates to a Bourdieusian 
perspective is discussed in Section 4.7.3.  
As Bourdieu uses the tools of the framework (described in Section 4.7.3) to 
“bridge the apparent divide between ‘academic theories’ and everyday practices” 
(Webb et al., 2002, p.45), this sits well with the abductive approach which, as 
said, helps bridge “the gap between theory and research” (Taylor, 2018, p.513).  
Indeed, as Grenfell (2014) observes, Bourdieu’s approach seeks to take account 
of not just a theoretical angle but also the findings from the analysis of empirical 
data collected by the researcher, in order to see how the “real world is constituted” 
(Grenfell, 2014, p.214).  That is,  
…[T]he study of a social object can be described most simply as an 
ongoing and reflexive interplay between the two positions – empirical 
investigation and theoretical explanation. (Grenfell, 2014, p.214) 
Thus, data collection and analysis takes place on an ongoing basis allowing 
frequent reference to the theoretical framework and vice versa, as per an 
abductive approach (see Section 4.8) and is viewed through a Bourdieusian lens. 
In summary, the empirical evidence arising from the smaller tax practitioner 
market will be viewed amidst the wider tax, and overlapping fields.  A 
Bourdieusian lens will be used to examine and explain the empirical findings of 
the research to gain understanding of tax practice in the context in which it 
operates (here smaller tax practice). 
4.7.3 Introduction to the Bourdieusian Concepts and theoretical tools 
According to Webb et al. (2002), the Bourdieusian concepts (or tools) of habitus, 
capital and field; 
…constitute …arguably the most significant and successful attempt to 
make sense of the relationship between objective social structures 
(institutions, discourses, fields, ideologies) and everyday practices (what 
people do and why they do it).  (Webb et al., 2002, p.1) 
Hence, an understanding of the concepts of field, capital and habitus will enable 
an understanding of the smaller tax practice (that is, what the practitioners do and 
why they do it).  Bourdieu used these concepts to “…understand and explain the 
relationship between people’s practices and the contexts (authors emphasis) in 
which those practices occur” (Webb et al., 2002, p.21).  Or, as Grenfell (2014, 
p.223) puts it, Bourdieu thinks relationally by “seeing events in relation to people, 
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organisations, time and place”.  Webb et al. (2002) explain that these contexts 
relate to cultural fields.  
The following provides a brief discussion of the link between fields, capital and 
habitus. 
Field 
Bourdieu believed that the social world (society) is made up of social spaces, or 
in other words, fields.  (These same social spaces are also described as a “theory 
of social structure” by Dobbin, 2008, p.53). The fields are occupied by people or 
organisations (actors) in their various capacities (depending upon the field 
occupied and their relationship to that field).  Examples follow in Chapter 8, but 
in light of this research one could think about the tax field, the accounting field, 
the legal field, the political field and so on.  As Thomson (2014, p.68) also 
observes “Collectives of people may occupy more than one social space at a 
time”.  There are conflicting views as to whether a field is autonomous or not.  
Some suggest so (Hilgers and Mangez, 2015; Inghilleri, 2005).  Webb et al. 
(2002) suggest not, as fields can be influenced by other fields. Perhaps fields can 
be better described as operating “semi-autonomously” (Thomson, 2014, p.68).  
This can create difficulties in the analysis of a specific field as the boundaries 
between fields are described as “fuzzy” (Thomson, 2014, p.77), or not fixed 
(Gracia and Oats, 2012a; Madsen, 2013) and fields may “interpenetrate” other 
fields (Hilgers and Mangez, 2015, p.24).  Hence fields are not rigid and may 
overlap with each other (Dezalay and Madsen, 2012; Parnaby, 2009) as will be 
illustrated with the examination of the tax field and other interconnected fields in 
Chapter 8.  The way a field operates is often compared to a game (Everett, 2002; 
Thomson, 2014) and the same analogy is used by Bourdieu – who suggests that 
a field has its own rules (or discourse) which are not “explicit and codified” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.98).  Hence, each field operates according to 
its own rules, or accepted way of ‘doing things’ and participants are said to ‘play 
the game’ according to the rules of each individual field.  
Fields are apparent in many areas of social life and at times, may not be easy to 
define. To illustrate, a number of explanations follow.  Webb et al. (2002, p.21) 
see fields as the context in which people carry out practice, and describe these 
as cultural fields which can consist of a: 
125 
 
… series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, 
designations, appointments and titles which constitute an objective 
hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and 
activities. 
Or in Bourdieu’s own words, a field is: 
[a] network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions.  
These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the 
determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, 
by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the 
distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands 
access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by 
their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, 
homology, etc).  (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p.97). 
Lombardi and Cooper (2015, p.88) suggest that: 
A field could consist of any aspect of life, or social life, in which people of 
differing positions have rules imposed upon them in order to maintain the 
field’s social structure. 
Clearly therefore there are different interpretations or explanations about what a 
field is.  However, they may be thought of as sites of specific activity (Hilgers and 
Mangez, 2015) or as contexts in which practice is carried out (cultural fields) 
(Webb et al., 2000).   According to the explanations above a field may be seen 
as a network, or institution, or “any aspect of social life” (Lombardi and Cooper, 
2015, p.88). Some examples include: artists, intellectuals, class lifestyles, 
science (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), economics (Lang and Rego, 2015), 
education (Grenfell, 2017) and family (Glover, 2010; also Hilgers and Mangez, 
2015).  A field can be a physical thing such as a branch or organisation (Land 
and Rego, 2015).  Additionally, fields may be a type of professional activity such 
as translation (Grenfell, n.d.), or administration (Cooper and Joyce, 2013), sport 
or journalism (English, 2016), academia, or business (Dezalay and Madsen, 
2012), or law (Anesa et al., 2019), or simply just professional (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf, 2011).  To add to the complexity there may be fields within fields 
(subfields) too (Hilgers and Mangez, 2015; Thomson, 2014). There is no fixed 
definition of a field, hence as to where one draws the boundary around a field 
appears quite subjective. 
Fields are said to be fluid (Everett, 2002), in a constant state of flux and 
boundaries can change (Lang and Rego, 2015; Oakes et al., 1996) as the 
contexts in which they operate and society changes.   Madsen (2013) gives this 
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fluidity as a reason for the use of the framework for ‘studying the crossroads’ of 
fields (such as the influence of neighbouring fields) in the examination of the 
interaction of transnational and national legal fields. For Everett (2002) fields can 
change in response to externalities and can result in new ‘doxa’, or, in other 
words, a new understanding of how the field operates (Hilgers and Mangez, 
2015).  Or to put it another way, the rules of the game as they were understood 
to operate within the field, change in response to some event or externality. 
Nevertheless, as discussed, there appears to be no specific definition of a field 
and Bourdieu (1992) seems reluctant to give a precise definition.  Thomson 
(2014, p.73) notes, it should not be a “paint by numbers formula” hence the idea 
of a field depends on the situation.  Fields in the context of this study may include, 
for example the legal field (including, for example, lawyer participants), political 
field (participants of which include the government and policy makers), 
journalistic field (participants include those working for the media), professional 
field (participants include tax practitioners and professional bodies), the 
bureaucratic field (HMRC is the main participant in this field), the judicial field 
(participants include the courts and judges), the small business field (participants 
of which are small business taxpayers) and the non – qualified tax practitioner 
field (practitioners outside the professional body remit).  All these fields overlay 
the wider ‘tax field’.  These are further discussed in Chapter 8. 
As said, each field has participants, or actors within it – but how does a field 
operate? 
As Inghilleri (2005, p.136) notes: 
The principle of the dynamic of a field lies in the relations between the 
various forces that confront one another. This confrontation between the 
social agents or institutions located within the field is always constituted in 
relation to the distribution of specific forms of capital – it involves a struggle 
to gain symbolic and material advantage with respect to social positioning.  
Capital 
As Inghilleri (2005) suggests, the position (power) of the actors, or participants 
within each field, depends upon the capital to which they have access (Gracia 
and Oats, 2012a; Thomson, 2014).  As individuals (actors) vie for capital and 
position within a field, it follows that the field consists of those with more power 
than others, that is, the ‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’ (Everett, 2002).  There 
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are many forms of capital, which can include; money or property (economic 
capital); networks (social capital); professionalism (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 
2011) or qualifications, or status, prestige or reputation (symbolic capital); or 
capital in the form of skill, taste, lifestyle (Everett, 2002), experience or education 
(Oakes et al., 1998) art or literature (Cooper and Joyce, 2013) (which are 
indicative of cultural capital).  Symbolic capital is intangible, that is, it “exists in 
the eyes of others” (Glover, 2010, p.487). Bourdieu (1977, p.179) suggests that 
symbolic capital may be “… the most valuable form of accumulation” (type of 
capital) to have.  Additionally, capitals are linked, for instance, cultural capital can 
be turned into economic capital (Garcia Villegas, 2004).  For a detailed 
explanation of the many different types of capital, see Bourdieu 1986, The Forms 
of Capital. 
Grenfell (2017, p.7) provides a useful definition, describing capital as, the: 
… currency of the field, what fuels its operations, defines what is included 
and excluded from the field, what is valued and what is not valued, what 
those present in the field need to accrue status and/or power in order to 
exert control over it.  It is the medium of communication between field and 
habitus. 
Dobbin (2008) and Grenfell (2017) equate capital with power.  Indeed, Cooper 
and Joyce (2013, p.111) cite Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p.7) that Bourdieu 
himself “…used the terms power and capital interchangeably”.  The capital 
(power) to which participants have access, within the field, will differ.  Participants 
thus play the ‘rules of the game’ of the field, using different strategies to attain 
capital, to determine their position within it.  This is seen in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant’s (1992) reference to the “distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake” 
(p.97).  In other words, participants are said to have stakes in the game, and 
investment in the field (known by Bourdieu as illusio) where struggles/competition 
between actors take place (see, for instance, Dezalay and Madsen, 2012; Hilgers 
and Mangez, 2015) to vie for position (and power) within it.  Thus the 
“internal composition of [the field] will derive from the structure of power 
relationships within it” Gorton (2000, p.283 citing Bourdieu, 1983).  
Access to capital may also be used to attain entry to a particular field (Grenfell, 
2017; Oakes et al., 1998).  For example, access to cultural capital, such as 
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education and experience may allow entry to a professional body and the 
professional field. 
Habitus 
The capital that one may have is determined, in part, according to Bourdieu by 
that person’s background, education, upbringing and prior experiences in life, and 
can include training and ways of thinking.  Therefore, in the tax and accounting 
context, training and the influence of professional bodies (see Cooper and 
Robson, 2006; Hamilton, 2013; and Hamilton and Ó hÓgartaigh, 2009) may have 
effect upon these phenomena.  These phenomena are termed ‘habitus’.  
Bourdieu (1977, p.86) suggests that  
“…the habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual 
system of internalized structures, schemes of perception, conception, and 
action…”.  
In other words, according to Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.307) habitus 
conceptualises “attitudes, values and behaviours” or training and professional 
background, or, as Malsch et al. (2011, p.198) note, the “long processes of 
inculcation during a lifetime” and, “… the interplay of structures and practices in 
the conduct of everyday life” (p.203).  Habitus determines how one sees the 
world, “not consciously, but in a taken-for-granted sense” (Inghilleri, 2005, p.135), 
thus explaining how one may understand things and therefore how one may 
relate to the field in which they find themselves.  These concepts and ideas share 
similarity with one’s professional identity as discussed in Chapter 3.  Experience 
and training and one’s background feeds into one’s moral and ethical disposition 
and beliefs and affects and shapes how one approaches work. Anesa et al. 
(2019) describe habitus as a bridge between the field and capital as habitus can 
determine access to capital and hence position within the field.   Dobbin (2008, 
p.53) sees habitus as being a theory of the individual.  In effect therefore Dobbin 
sees the Bourdieusian concepts in a slightly different way, being theory of social 
structure (field), theory of the individual (habitus) and theory of power (capital).  
Habitus is a subjective concept (Bourdieu, 1977).  It is not fixed and can change 
over time (Gorton, 2000) and may respond to changes in the environment. Anesa 
et al. (2019) give the example of habitus changing in relation to reputation 
problems or risk management considerations.  Habitus will therefore continue to 
affect future outlook and actions of the individual (here tax practitioners) 
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(Haugaard, 2002) and will affect access to capital. For instance, the professional 
accounting training (the habitus) teaches the specialised language necessary for 
the job, providing linguistic capital or cultural capital in the form of the qualification 
attained (Hamilton and Ó hÓgartaigh, 2009) as discussed in Chapter 3.  The actor 
with access to the most appropriate capital is likely to succeed and progress 
within the field, raising to higher ‘ranks’ within it so having more power than those 
less well positioned, as explained above.  
Specific examples of the interaction of capital and habitus in the smaller tax 
practitioner context include for instance: 
Capitals such as professional qualifications (symbolic capital); networks which 
allow access to support and assistance (a type of social capital), which is 
important for the smaller practitioner as this support must often be accessed 
outside the firm (unlike with larger firms); and, additionally, the extent of specialist 
tax and technical knowledge of the practitioner may be viewed as cultural capital 
(or a type of technical or linguistic capital, unique to the tax practitioner 
environment).   
One’s habitus may offer an advantage in the acquisition of such capitals, or 
resources.  For instance, smaller practitioners who have worked in other 
organisations (which may include the Big 4), may have access to a wider network 
of former contacts (social capital) on which they can draw for support and those 
with HMRC experience have access to cultural capital which other practitioners 
may not, in the form of detailed technical knowledge about the organisation and 
how it works, which may be beneficial in their client work. The practitioners with 
specialist tax knowledge, for instance I/V2, also have strong technical (or cultural) 
capital, which has developed from their former work experiences (habitus), and 
which they thus convert into fee income (economic capital) and they may develop 
a reputation in that particular specialism (symbolic capital).  The acquisition of 
different types of capital give participants power within the field in which they 
work.  The professional field for instance of which the smaller tax practitioner is 
part, may vie for position in the tax field against HMRC (in the bureaucratic field) 
which accumulates its own capital, or practitioners may have to deal with the 
negative publicity from the journalistic field (which arises from the participation of 
some practitioners with tax avoidance) which may damage the value of the 
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practitioner’s symbolic capital and so on.  These matters are discussed further in 
the findings chapters 5-7 and drawn together in the discussion in Chapter 8. 
The interaction and links between these three concepts of the field, capital and 
the habitus (Grenfell, 2014; Thomson, 2014), Bourdieu espouses, results in a 
theory of practice, relating to what people do, and why people do it (Webb et al., 
2002), or simply what “people do in their daily lives” (Glover, 2010, p.486, citing 
Jenkins 1992).  This relates to social practices rather than individual actions 
(Inghilleri, 2005) as each aspect “plays a part in the generation of social 
phenomena” (Gorton, 2000, p.281 citing Harker, 1990). Or as Madsen (2013, 
p.16) remarks; 
Bourdieu introduced the notion of a field as a research tool for 
understanding not simply how the actions of certain groups (and networks) 
of agents structure the social world… 
but also how the social world affects those groups (or networks).  It is therefore 
feasible to focus on the ‘field’ from this framework to help analyse and explain the 
reason for practical problems, or as Thomson (2014, p.79) says; 
Field was not developed as grand theory, but as a means of translating 
practical problems into concrete empirical operations 
The Bourdieusian lens thus lends itself to the subject of the research by offering 
a number of tools and concepts by which to understand the issues and 
relationships arising in the context of the smaller tax practice.  
4.7.4 Employment of the theoretical framework in this study 
The Bourdieusian lens is one which enables the understanding of “tax as a social 
and institutional practice” (Gracia and Oats, 2012b, p.119), and in particular will 
be deployed in this study to aid understanding of the social practice of smaller tax 
practice.  By employing the three tools of the Bourdieusian framework of field, 
capital and habitus, an understanding and explanation for the emic empirical 
accounts (the micro context) of the smaller tax practitioner may be obtained.  In 
particular, this study will focus upon the different fields which overlay the tax field, 
by focusing upon the ‘field’ element of Bourdieu’s framework as discussed in 
Section 4.7.1.  In doing so, this will help illustrate the dynamic and interdisciplinary 
environment in which the practitioners work, the etic (the macro context).  The 
fields which overlay the tax field, contribute to the dysfunctionality and complexity 
of the tax field as a whole.  Hence by situating the empirical findings of the smaller 
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tax practitioners (emic) against the backdrop of the broader tax (and related) 
fields (etic) this will enable deeper understanding of what smaller tax practitioners 
do and why.  The practitioner relationship with clients, HMRC and their role in the 
tripartite relationship (as will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7) will be explored 
to shed light on how changes in the tax field impact upon tax practice which is 
the aim of this thesis.  
This approach will thus build on research which examines and explores the tax 
field by Anesa et al. (2019) and Gracia and Oats (2012a). The thesis will analyse 
practitioners’ views and interpret them in light of the other stakeholders in the 
field. The thesis thus contributes to a gap identified by Radcliffe et al. (2018, p.48) 
who suggest that, to date, research has more commonly focused either upon 
actors at the micro, emic aspect (here, the smaller tax practitioner) or the macro 
(etic) perspective (here the tax field) as opposed to exploring simultaneously “the 
extent to which tax professionals both shape and are shaped by 
their…environments”.  Whilst Radcliffe et al. (2018) examine institutional 
environments, this study employs a Bourdieusian lens to allow links to be made 
between both practice and other stakeholders in the wider tax field thus enabling 
deeper understanding of the empirical findings.   
The next section explains how data from the interview and focus group was 
analysed. 
4.8 Data analysis 
A thematic analysis of the data was carried out to elicit meaning from the data 
acquired (Oats, 2012; Robson, 2011). Robson (2011, p.467) suggests such 
analysis can be used on a “…descriptive or exploratory basis within a variety of 
theoretical frameworks”.  This mechanism helps identify themes and patterns in 
the data and is widely used in qualitative analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  As 
Braun and Clark (2006, p.79) note,  
[t]hematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes [a] 
data set in (rich) detail.  
They describe this method of analysing data as a “theoretically flexible approach” 
(p.77) and observe that it is suitable for different philosophical perspectives, that 
is, it is suitable for use if starting with a theory in mind, or approaching the 
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research with an open mind.  Hence in light of the research design discussed 
above this is an appropriate method of analysis.  Whilst Braun and Clarke (2006) 
write from the perspective of psychology, they note that as a technique for data 
analysis, it can be applied in many other qualitative contexts.  The method in 
which this was used in this research is described below. 
When an interview had taken place, this was transcribed as soon as practically 
possible.  The researcher undertook all the transcription of all interviews.  The 
focus group was professionally transcribed and received within a matter of days 
after the event.  Some suggest that transcription is best undertaken by the 
researcher as this allows immersion in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006, citing 
Riessman,1993) which allows creation of meaning simultaneously (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, citing Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999).  The reason for transcribing the 
interview data oneself in terms of this study, however, related to practicalities.  
The researcher is able to type reasonably quickly, and had the desire to 
transcribe recordings where possible prior to the next interview to ascertain if 
questions required adjustment. This relied solely upon the researcher’s own 
timetable which was easier to manage.  This enabled constant comparison of the 
data; hence data collection and data analysis ran side by side as the researcher 
looked for similarities and differences and explanations for what was being said.  
This is consistent with a constant comparison approach (Given, 2012) and is 
appropriate in abductive reasoning as data collection and analysis often take 
place concurrently in this approach (Kennedy, 2018; Taylor, 2018).   As the 
transcription for one interview was completed, themes could be identified and 
questions adjusted for the next participant if appropriate.  An iterative process of 
data comparisons, to enable creation and adjustment of themes (Given, 2012) 
and reference to and from the theory (the Bourdieusian lens) took place.  The 
self-transcription process enabled a deep in-depth knowledge of the responses 
(that is, an immersion in the data) and ‘who said what’ which assisted data 
extraction.  In addition, the researcher could also reflect upon the disposition of 
the participants, noting exasperation, loss of words, ‘sighs’, emphasis made and 
so on.  This enabled reflection on comments made and helped form an initial view 
as to the themes arising, and as time progressed, similarities and differences in 
opinion and responses were observed.    
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Once the transcription had taken place, the interview was dissected into three 
broad headings (or codes) that were initially apparent from the descriptive facts 
given by the participants.  These were the client, HMRC and the practitioner 
themselves.  Each of these main themes relate to each of the three research 
objectives, which taken together answer the overall question of: 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
The three research objectives relate to the themes as follows: 
1. How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in a 
dynamic environment? 
This question provides an examination of the client/practitioner relationship in the 
UK smaller practitioner context from the perspective of the tax practitioner and is 
related to the theme of ‘the client’.  The findings in relation to this question are 
shown in Chapter 5. 
2. How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) impact upon the practices of tax practitioners? 
This question focuses upon the interactions between HMRC and the practitioner 
which play out in a changed (and changing) environment and is related to the 
theme of ‘HMRC’.  The findings in relation to this question are shown in Chapter 
6. 
3. How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship 
with clients and HMRC? 
This question investigates how the practitioners see their role in the tripartite 
relationship, between the client (objective 1) and HMRC (objective 2).  The 
findings in relation to this question are shown in Chapter 7.  
Having determined the three main themes, each theme was reanalysed and 
broken down into smaller sub themes and comments from each interview were 
allocated to each sub theme.  This enabled a deeper analysis of similarities, 
differences and the stories told in order to build up a picture of smaller tax 
practice.  The Bourdieusian lens was used to seek understanding and 
explanation of the empirical data.  This was not an easy process given the 
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quantity of data and the length of some transcripts.  It was not easy to bracket 
certain items together and as a result, in the first instance this resulted in a great 
deal of overlap between sub themes.  The data was revisited and revised and 
refined to minimise this.  In terms of coding, this progressed from the descriptive 
facts (what the participant said) – from which the three main themes were initially 
identified (followed by, subsequently, the sub themes within) - and to which 
relevant comments and observations were added as appropriate.  This was then 
followed by adding analytical (interpretative) meaning, as identified by the 
practitioner.  This process of coding the data therefore progressed from the 
descriptive (or emic codes, arising from the self-understanding (Stringfellow et 
al., 2015) of the insider, or the participant) to the analytical (etic codes, generated 
by the researcher) (Fetterman, 2012). This is similar to the explanation provided 
by Van Maanen (1979), who makes a distinction between what the informant 
(insider) says – known as first order codes, and the researcher’s view as to what 
is going on, or their interpretation (known as second order concepts) of the facts.  
The second order codes are generated by the researcher and should take 
account of the context in which things are said.  The context in this research is 
the wider theoretical field, the macro, or etic context (Lukka, 2014) in which 
smaller practice (the emic) is carried out. This approach is enabled in this 
research by employing the Bourdieusian lens and conceptual tools. Gioia et al. 
(2012) suggest that by taking both the voice of the researched and the 
researcher, as also acknowledged in abductive research and in Bourdieusian 
thinking, this adds to the quality of qualitative research.  For a discussion about 
the Bourdieusian view on reflexivity, see for example, Inghilleri (2005, p.137). 
The researcher started the analysis of the interview transcripts by hand, colour 
coding and highlighting relevant themes, initially via pen and paper, and then, to 
ensure accurate coding, via WORD documents.  The different themes became 
headings under which comments and quotes were collected.  The data was 
frequently revisited and adjustments were made, and reference was made to and 
from the theoretical framework. NVIVO (a qualitative data analysis computer 
software package) was explored, but as the researcher had already undertaken 
much analysis in the manner described above the decision was made to continue 
with the original technique. Finally, the findings were illustrated with extracts from 
the data and reviewed and analysed in light of the literature, this was then further 
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analysed/interpreted to add additional meaning and explanation via the 
Bourdieusian lens and in particular exploration of the overlapping fields of the tax 
field as a whole – see Chapter 8, ‘Discussion’. 
Braun and Clarke suggest the following approach to thematic analysis (see Table 
4.3), which the researcher broadly followed as described above in order to 
determine the themes around the research objectives highlighted. 
 
Table 4.3 Phases of thematic analysis, from Braun and Clarke (2006), p.87 
 
Phase Description of the process 
1.Familiarizing yourself with your data Transcribing data (if necessary), 
reading and re-reading the data, noting 
down initial ideas. 
 
2.Generating initial codes Coding interesting features of the data 
in a systematic fashion across the 
entire data set, collating data relevant 
to each code. 
 
3. Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, 
gathering all data relevant to each 
potential theme 
4. Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation 
to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the 
entire data set (Level 2), generating a 
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis 
5. Defining and naming themes Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics 
of each theme, and the overall story the 
analysis tells, generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
6. Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. 
Selection of vivid, compelling extract 
examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to 
the research question and literature, 





4.9 Limitations to the research process 
This research adopts a qualitative approach and has an interpretive perspective.  
This type of research inevitably incorporates subjectivity, both in the nature in 
which the empirical findings are interpreted and in the exercise of the researcher’s 
judgement in this respect.  The researcher’s background and former involvement 
in practice is also recognised as unconscious bias may influence the research 
process (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011). 
The methods to obtain the data include a focus group and interviews.  The 
reliability of interviews can be questioned as it is not a standardised practice 
(Robson, 2011).  Nevertheless, Bryman and Bell (2011, p.400) suggest that 
interviews can produce some credible findings and extend knowledge, as long as 
the sample is defended, explanations are given about how the data collection is 
undertaken and that the context is clear.  The sample details and explanation of 
data collection process is given above.  Despite this it is acknowledged that as 
the interviewee has control over their responses (Turley, 2004), it is possible they 
may say only what they think the researcher would like to hear and/or may 
withhold details of less desirable practices. 
This research is about the tax practitioners’ perspective of smaller tax practice.  
The research therefore incorporates only one perspective.  As highlighted in the 
suggested avenues for additional research at Section 9.3, the views of those 
working in the tax authorities and/or clients may provide different views upon 
smaller tax practice. It should also be noted that the sample of practitioners 
includes only ‘qualified’ practitioners (or those belonging to a professional body) 
as defined. It is recognised that one’s background, training, former work 
experiences, and the influence of organisations (former and current) in which the 
practitioner works may affect views and perspectives (see Addison and Mueller, 
2015).    No practitioners outside the professional body remit (except for those 
with a HMRC background) were included in the sample and different findings may 
be attained had this been the case. Again, this aspect is included in Section 9.3 
as an area for additional research. Finally, smaller tax practice in this research 
has a fairly broad definition, from sole traders up to practitioners working for a 
mid-size practice.  It is recognised that this is a broad range.  Other research 
could focus upon, say sole traders within this market, to enable more 
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generalisability (for a discussion of generalisability in the qualitative research 
arena, see Parker and Northcott, 2016). 
In terms of generalisability, whilst it is not impossible for a qualitative study to be 
generalisable to other contexts (Parker and Northcott, 2016), the objective of this 
particular study was to enhance understanding of smaller tax practice.  Given the 
nature of the research it is not statistically generalisable. 
4.10  Summary 
This chapter has presented the methodology and an explanation of the methods 
employed (interviews and focus groups) to gain the rich data required to address 
the research questions.  The rationale for using these methods has been 
explained.  The process to obtain the data, along with the techniques for 
analysing the data has been discussed.  In addition, an exposition of the 
theoretical framework has been presented along with an explanation of how it is 
employed in relation to an abductive approach and data collection and analysis.  
The findings from the data collection follow in Chapters 5 (the client relationship), 
Chapter 6 (HMRC relationship) and Chapter 7 (the practitioner’s role in the 
tripartite relationship).  Chapter 8 (Discussion) draws these three chapters 
together by employing the theoretical framework to analyse the fields which 
overlap the tax field to shed further light and explanation upon the tax practice of 













5 Findings – The Client Relationship 
5.1 Introduction 
The practitioner acts as an intermediary, or a bridge between HMRC and the 
client.  They must manage both relationships.  This chapter focuses on the 
practitioners’ views of the practitioner/client relationship.  The findings in relation 
to research question 1 are presented and analysed, so as to address the question 
how do smaller tax practitioners manage client relationships in a dynamic 
environment?  In addressing this question, the following objectives will be 
examined, as discussed in Section 4.2.  The chapter aims 
 to gain insight into, and explore, the practitioners’ views on 
their relationship with clients;  
 to describe and understand the environment in which the 
practitioner works and in which the client/practitioner 
relationship operates;  
 to explore how they manage this relationship 
The management of client expectations is one of the biggest challenges in the 
day-to-day work of the tax practitioner, according to the interviewees. This 
chapter explores this challenge and provides context to the environment in which 
the practitioner works and in which the relationship operates. 
The themes and expectations discussed below have emerged from, and were 
grounded in, the data, and are developed from the stories the practitioners told. 
The narratives revealed commonality amongst the participants. The evidence 
suggests that there are a number of ‘client expectation gaps’ between what 
clients want and what practitioners can achieve.   A number of these gaps are 
explored.  To allow analysis and obtain insight into the client/practitioner 
relationship, what (and why) challenges arise and how the relationship is 
managed, the themes arising have been grouped into the following categories.  
 The ‘expert’ expectation  
 The ‘scope’ expectation  
 The ‘HMRC’ expectation 
 The ‘fee’ expectation 
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This chapter provides focus on the client/practitioner relationship, addressing 
calls for additional research in this respect (Hite and McGill, 1992; Gupta, 2015; 
Oats, 2012; Stephenson, 2017; Tan, 2014; Van de Rijt et al., 2019). 
Clients engage tax practitioners for their expertise.  The role of expert is 
legitimised by the practitioners’ qualifications, experience, and support of a 
professional body (Adler et al., 2008; Stuebs and Wilkinson, 2010).  At times, the 
value the client places on this expertise (and hence the legitimacy of the 
practitioner) can be questioned.  This may be because of the time the practitioner 
takes to answer a question, the fee charged, or even the amount of tax the client 
is advised to pay.  What follows shows that practitioners take account of many 
aspects within their work which may not be readily visible to clients (such as risk 
and reputation) alongside balancing the client expectations.  Whilst risk 
management is not a client expectation as such, it does form part of client 
management.  Risk management featured regularly in the discussions with 
participants and it is part of the dynamic environment in which this relationship 
plays out. 
The chapter therefore commences with ‘risk management’ in Section 5.2, so as 
to set the context for the rest of the chapter.  This is followed by an analysis of 
each of the expert, scope, HMRC, and fee expectations, before a summary is 
presented. 
5.2 The risk management environment 
When a client (or potential client) asks for assistance, the participants indicated 
that prior to taking on the task, they firstly must determine if they are actually able 
to do the work (in terms of having the skill, knowledge, or experience to do so), 
and/or, do they even want to act for that particular client.   
Phrases, such as “knowing your boundaries” (I/V4) and it being important to 
“know what you know” (I/V6 and I/V9) cropped up regularly.   Professional 
indemnity and the “insurance risk” (I/V6), and the potential of being sued, was 
never far from the practitioners’ minds.  Given the complex, changing tax 
environment, as explored in Chapter 2, the participants described the 
management of risk in three particular ways; to the organisation (that is the 
practice risk per Mala and Chand, 2015 and Tomasic and Pentony, 1991), to 
themselves and to the client (as identified by Davidson, 2016; Doyle et al., 2009b 
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and; Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015).  The reasons why risk management 
features so heavily and so prominently in the practitioners’ work can be traced 
back to the wider tax field, and will be discussed in Chapter 8.  The worry of 
stepping outside one’s area of expertise, or knowledge without adequate support 
to resolve the question asked, was an issue for many.  This is perhaps indicative 
of the smaller practitioner context as queries may be broad in scope, ad hoc in 
nature and often not anticipated.  That is, the nature of the work undertaken is 
often less specialised than that of a larger, or Big 4 tax practitioner.  As highlighted 
in the participants’ comments below, ethical considerations, a strong sense of 
minimising risk in general and preservation of reputation was apparent, 
consistent with the findings of Doyle et al. (2009b).  The participants did not 
indicate there was tension, or trade off, between commercial interest (the fee) 
and the risks of taking on certain work contrary to Stuebs and Wilkinson (2010) 
and Suddaby and Muzio (2015).  Nevertheless, the practitioners are in business 
to make money, thus, it may be questionable whether the alternative would 
otherwise be admitted by the participants in an interview situation.  Nevertheless, 
these matters do give a clue about the tax practitioners’ professional identities, 
that is how they see themselves in relation to their organisation and how they 
conduct themselves as discussed by Alvesson et al. (2015), Cooper and Robson 
(2006) and Grey (1998).   
To illustrate, as explained clearly by a tax partner in a mid-size firm: 
There are issues around risk management and whether you are prepared 
to take the work on … I think that is a key issue for a mid-size firm.   Before 
you can even start to look at a piece of work you look at the scale of it 
and whether the relationship is of the type the firm should be involved 
with and have the capacity to deal with and that is quite an important 
step I think that probably was not there so much in the past. [I/V23] 
The former experience of some participants, such as I/V4, I/V9 and I/V23 (quoted 
above), included work in a top 10, or Big 4 firm, I/V6 had smaller firm experience, 
yet the sentiment was the same.  Interestingly, this was common sentiment, right 
across the board, from sole traders up to the mid-size firm.  There are a number 
of points here to which I/V23 refers.  The scope of the work, the capacity and 
competence (knowledge/expertise/staff numbers) to deal with the query, as well 
as reflection on whether the work and relationship is actually wanted by the firm 
(ever more important to consider in the current climate around tax avoidance 
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issues – to which the practitioner also alludes given the comments about action 
in this respect “in the past”).    The participant is aware that their own experience 
may not be conducive to the tax issue upon which they are asked to advise.  The 
work is not automatically taken without consideration of a number of issues which 
include both practice risk and preservation of reputation. 
A sole trader participant also remarked: 
I may recommend someone else…that is one of the first things in your 
code of practice isn’t it, the ethics?  That if you are not competent to 
handle it, and, I would regard competent as also not being necessarily only 
[competent on] the technical side, but also are you comfortable negotiating 
[with HMRC once you take on the work]?   [I/V1] 
Interestingly here, this participant suggests that as well as being able to handle 
technical matters, a practitioner should feel confident entering into negotiations 
with HMRC.  I/V1 implies that, in such cases, the work may be passed on to 
another more experienced expert, as the risk of not being ‘up to the job’ is not 
acceptable. “The ethics” are clearly important to I/V1 who states this fact explicitly 
and, although not mentioned by I/V23, ethics (although perhaps operationalised 
as risk management, Doyle et al., 2009b) is implicit in the comment made – 
“should the firm be involved with…” a particular relationship. 
Ethics and integrity (examples of professional values and professionalism of the 
practitioner) therefore appear to play a part in the risk management concerns of 
these participants.  Such values may relate to influences of a professional body 
(I/V6, for instance did not want to “end up in hot water with the institute”) or the 
ethos of the practitioner’s organisation (consistent with the findings of Fogarty 
and Jones, 2014 and Hageman and Fisher, 2016) and affect the professional 
judgements of the practitioners, such as; is the client wanted and are we 
competent to act for the client. It is suggested that professionalism has diminished 
in recent years in the accounting profession by Cooper and Robson (2006), 
Fatemi et al. (2018) and Suddaby et al. (2009), however these practitioner 
comments indicate the importance of ethics and integrity in their own decision 
making – perhaps even more so than in the recent past, given I/V23’s clear 
acknowledgement of the changed environment in which tax practice now 
operates.  The conduct of these participants is important to each of them, which 
is indicative of their professional identities as suggested by Grey (1998). 
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Bearing in mind the context of risk management in general, client expectations 
are now presented. 
5.3 The ‘expert’ expectation  
There are many reasons why a taxpayer engages a tax practitioner as discussed 
in Chapter 2.  
In simple terms taxpayers may want to comply with the law and fulfil their 
obligations under the tax system, but complexities may cause them to seek 
assistance. In other words, the taxpayer engages an expert to solve a problem, 
for which they themselves do not have the expertise, time, or inclination. 
I/V15 gave a good analogy: 
Every area of difficulty in life requires somebody somewhere to provide 
expert advice and the tax system has developed in such a way that 
advisers have proved to be necessary in explaining to people what the 
score is  
In other words, the interviewee suggests taxpayers can approach a practitioner 
who is well versed (or expert) in the system to represent them (in the same way 
as one would need a builder, or other tradesperson).  Reference is made to the 
complex tax system which the participant suggests is the reason why 
practitioners are needed.  This role (a facilitator role) is discussed in Chapter 7. 
It is of course not unreasonable for clients to expect the practitioner to be an 
expert.  Yet, as reported by many participants (and irrespective of firm size) 
clients may expect practitioners to give “an instant answer and … think you 
should know everything about tax there and then” [I/V6].  Clients may also believe 
practitioners are experts who know how HMRC “thinks” and that “[you must] have 
done everything before” [I/V24].  There is an expectation that practitioners have 
the resources, experience and knowledge to instantly provide the advice asked 
for, in return for the client’s fee.  In other words, the client pays for access to these 
resources (or capitals) of the practitioner, which is discussed further in Chapter 
8. 
Tax however, is a huge area in terms of breadth and depth, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2 and the reasons for which are further analysed in Chapter 8.  Those 
working in the smaller practice context must manage this to a greater extent than 
those working in a specialist capacity such as within a Big 4 specialist 
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department, a boutique firm, or those who serve niche areas.  Consequently, 
research into a tax problem may be required as it is impossible for a practitioner 
to have knowledge of all possible taxes or all possible situations, a sentiment 
expressed by various participants as evidenced by I/V6 below.  The breadth of 
tax, as a subject, creates additional risk to the practitioner and their organisation 
and adds additional context to the comments regarding ‘knowing what you know’.  
Research into a tax question may not be straightforward and as will be seen in 
Chapter 7, there are many processes practitioners adopt to ensure they are 
supported/get comfort in the opinion given.  The consequence is that answers 
may not be immediately forthcoming.  This can create a gap in expectation 
between what the client expects they will get for the fee paid, how quickly they 
get that advice, and what advice the practitioner is willing and able to provide.  As 
I/V6 explained: 
…. that happens in tax doesn’t it? You don’t always know the answer 
straight away and it is important skill I think that you need to recognise.  
That you don’t know everything and you need to look certain things up, as 
tax is a complicated area. 
Tax is such a massive area …. And so many different branches of it.  It’s 
quite a broad area and it can be very difficult…. 
Clients may not appreciate these issues, and why should they, as they have 
asked the practitioner to address their tax question.  As I/V24 explained: 
It is always difficult knowing at the outset with a piece of work exactly 
where it is going to go, what you need to know.  And, if it is something 
you have never looked at before it is not necessarily something you cannot 
do, but you just need to have the experience and judgement to know 
how you are going to find the answer and that I think is where it comes in 
with the time and support of the teams and the wider group. 
This indicates the subjectivity and uncertainty around some tax issues.  Again, 
the participant refers to risk management by contemplating whether the work is 
something that can be undertaken within the bounds of existing experience, or 
not.  Moreover, the practitioner may need time to investigate, and support from 
colleagues to address the client question (see Chapter 7).  Of course the research 
process will depend on the nature of the query.  The above makes reference to 
the acquisition and use of experience in the practitioner’s role as discussed by 
Cooper and Robson (2006), Hamilton (2013) and Stringfellow and Shaw (2009).  
Judgement is highlighted which also develops with experience and this particular 
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participant had worked in the larger, ‘top 10’ organisations previously and will 
carry the knowledge gained from such roles into her/his current position. 
Investigation into the tax effects of transactions is a considerable part of the role 
for many practitioners, as the above two participants indicate. This is necessary 
to reduce uncertainties around the advice to be offered, or to bolster technical 
knowledge as suggested by I/V7 and as found by McKerchar (2005).  Smaller 
practitioners are aware of the limitations of their technical knowledge as found by 
Stringfellow et al. (2015).   Estimates of time spent on research, were difficult for 
the participants to ascertain, as no two days are the same, but estimates ranged 
from half an hour per week (sole practitioner I/V9 whose work consisted largely 
of more straightforward tax return compliance), 5% (I/V2 a practitioner in a niche 
market, owing to experience of the issues in the field, illustrating the ‘depth’ noted 
above); to 50%, and some who could only say it would involve long periods of 
time.  I/V23 and I/V24 (joint interviewees) explain why time consuming work may 
be required: 
The difficulty we have got is that you can read around as much as you like 
in terms of the legislation, the guidance and the revenue manuals, but it is 
not that often that a piece of work you are advising on will fit exactly 
into a previous circumstance and even if you think it does, with the way 
the cases go and the way revenue enquiries go…  [I/V23] 
It could vary.        [I/V24] 
And you could have a very, very robust position but the courts could decide 
actually what was meant to happen could be something different. So there 
is a bit of a risk I think anyway.     [I/V23] 
Yes, subjectivity and a risk      
Which sort of goes back to … risk management… because one of the 
biggest debates for us is what detail do we put into our report as to the 
thought process as to why we have reached that conclusion. 
Whereas the client actually probably just wants the answer, that says 
you know this is what I want to do, why have you told me about all the 
other bits! 
It is about making sure about the thought process and that the client buys 
into it and understands it and accepts the conclusion with full knowledge -  
whereas actually what the client wants you to say is you need to buy that 
building in that entity for that amount of money and that is the VAT 
treatment …Clients always want the absolute answer and no 
uncertainty and that is the hardest thing about being a tax adviser 
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nowadays as you cannot really offer much certainty about anything.
         [I/V24] 
The exchange above indicates that no two tax questions are the same.  
Assumptions cannot be made.  Many of the complexities identified in Chapter 2 
are highlighted here including complex and ambiguous law, interpretation of law 
and legal precedent, all of which drive the requirement to investigate thoroughly.  
Here this particular practitioner is concerned that if there is a disagreement with 
HMRC the case may end up in court.  The practitioner also highlights that 
certainty cannot be attained from previous tax situations or cases (even if they 
appear similar), as even a fine difference in circumstances could cause variation 
in tax treatment.  Nevertheless, the practitioner suggests that the client wants to 
be told what to do without being bothered about all these issues, which 
corroborates findings by Gupta (2015).  Uncertainty is mentioned.  Uncertainty is 
said to drive taxpayers to seek advice (MacNeil, 2009; Raskolnikov, 2015).  
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for an adviser to determine the absolute answer 
to a question, as this practitioner indicates.  This is said to be an issue for even 
the most experienced of tax professionals, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 
identified by Eustice (1989), Prebble (2014) and Zelenak (2014).  The client, 
clearly, from the bold text above, does not want to hear about uncertainty.  
Presumably this is because they have turned to an expert and are paying, they 
think, for an answer from someone they expect is “conversant” with the law 
(Sakurai and Brathwaite, 2003, p.376) or for them to “absorb the uncertainty” on 
their behalf (Fogarty and Jones, 2014, p.287).  The practitioner, however, as the 
adviser, indicates the risks they must bear in mind.  Here a main concern is that 
those in other fields (HMRC, or the judiciary for instance) may have a different 
opinion as to the tax treatment of a transaction if the law is uncertain or 
ambiguous.  By implication, therefore, a practitioner is likely to undertake time 
consuming work in some cases, which clients may not anticipate.   A report to the 
client, is also mentioned; this is an important mechanism for the practitioner.  The 
report is the mechanism by which the advice is documented and formalised and 
this is one way of managing client expectations as discussed in Section 5.3.1. 
Additionally, clients may not even think about tax issues at all.  What appears to 
be a simple question to the client is not actually so when the tax issues are 




 Yes, clients have some crazy, crazy ideas what they want to do 
          [I/V13] 
“I want to do this and then this, but before this, I want to do this!”. There is 
so much legislation.  I suppose they come in thinking their idea is easy. 
         [I/V12] 
They know where they want to be and what the end result is, and what 
their end aim is and they think that, you know, it is easy to get there, 
because to them, it is just a change in shareholdings – “from this, to 
this, to this and at this time, for this purpose”.  But – it is the in between bit 
[i.e. the tax effects] that they just don’t get.   [I/V13] 
This interchange shows that the taxpayer focuses on their business (i.e., in this 
example, the client is concerned about the share reorganisation itself) and not 
the tax issues.  From the client perspective, the tax consequences just happen to 
be incidental to the transaction, and may be completely forgotten, or if not 
forgotten, as the interviewees identify, the complexity may not be appreciated.  
The practitioner’s job is to point this out as it may require far more input (research 
time and additional fee) from the practitioner than the client expects. 
If there is no simple answer to a question, and the practitioner does feel able to 
assist, but explains to the client that they need time to investigate, there was a 
feeling amongst some that doubt about the practitioner’s competence arises. 
I/V12 mentioned this as a specific expectation to be managed carefully.   I/V15 
also felt that:  
…some clients are reasonable and understand that you can’t possibly 
know it. Some…may want to replace you…as they expect people to know 
exactly what the law says…. 
Of course, the taxpayer believes they have engaged an ‘expert’.  The taxpayer 
may have been drawn to seek advice by the practitioner’s symbolic capital – that 
of a professional person, or membership of a professional body, and sees them 
therefore as someone who can ‘provide the answer’.  This symbolic capital may 
thus be questioned; the practitioner’s legitimacy may be challenged.  Of course, 
as the participant indicates, it is not the case that the participant is unable to assist 
the client, rather that the practitioner’s expertise may be employed in ways 
different to that expected.  That is, the tax practitioner will anticipate their work 
may involve investigation, research, interpretation of law and, depending on the 
transaction, how different taxes may interact (described as a strength of small 
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practitioners by I/V3, given the nature of the client base as discussed in Chapter 
1), as there may be many aspects to a tax question.  Indeed, there may be more 
than one answer and each answer may have different tax effects.  Thus it is 
evident that the participants in the study do draw on their knowledge and 
experience and resources (capitals of various kinds), but not in the way a 
taxpayer may anticipate.  It would seem, from the explanations above that the 
participants are pulled in different directions.  They describe client demands and 
expectations on the one hand and yet, they indicate they have responsibilities to 
themselves and their firm on the other.  Thorough research enables them to 
manage risks to give the advice required.  Interestingly, the increase in 
technology and the search capacity (of many online commercial tax databases to 
which many participants subscribe) does not seem to have alleviated the need to 
invest so much time in research (also observed by Fogarty and Jones, 2014) as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.  Practitioners in this study do worry about the time 
research takes and the impact on the fee (see Section 5.6 below), but they did 
not seem to be concerned about time pressures per se as identified by Fogarty 
and Jones (2014) and Magro (1999); rather what seems to be more important is 
that they manage the risks around the provision of advice appropriately.  Clearly 
the quotes above suggest that some clients may not understand the issues faced 
by practitioners – and why should they, as they have engaged an expert.  
Conversely some participants reported instances when clients choose to ignore 
the practitioner’s advice (and hence expertise).  This arises largely in the tax 
planning context. Some (but not all) participants are proactive in spotting tax 
planning opportunities by regularly reviewing client circumstances to identify 
reliefs that may be claimed. This suggests good knowledge of client 
circumstances (as found by Stephenson et al. (2017) in the smaller practitioner 
context).  This draws on the practitioner’s knowledge, experience, and 
understanding of regulations and law, as well as their detailed understanding of 
the client’s situation.  However, others may offer tax planning on a more ad hoc 
(reactive) basis.  Advice may be generated by a query from a client (if they have 
become ill for instance, or want to retire), or planning opportunities may be picked 
up when the practitioner undertakes compliance for the client.  There is a mixture 
of approaches (although Tomasic and Pentony (1991) suggest much planning is 
reactive).   But reactive, or proactive, if the practitioner acts on these 
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opportunities, their legitimacy in the eyes of the client may increase (as well as 
fees of course), particularly as an unrepresented taxpayer does not have access 
to the tax field to get this advice (that is unless the unrepresented taxpayer tries 
the DIY approach via social media/internet, which comes with the many potential 
problems discussed below). 
On the whole, it would be assumed, or expected, that the rational person would 
wish to save tax as suggested by Freedman (2008) and this is often, but not 
always, the case.  Sometimes the practitioner recommendations are ignored or 
not implemented. The participants gave a number of reasons for this.  It is 
apparent in many instances, that the client’s main concern is running their 
business.  Or they find life very busy. Tax is not their main concern (this is at 
odds, the participants suggest, with the HMRC perspective, as discussed at 
Section 6.5.2).  Consequently, the time needed to think about the practitioner’s 
suggestions, followed by the effort to implement them, is thought to detract from 
other issues seen to be more important to them.  This means that reliefs go 
unclaimed, or the planning (a simple example given by I/V9 was to sell some 
shares either side of the tax year to use up the capital gains tax (CGT) annual 
exempt amount across two years instead of just the one) does not occur.  It may 
also be that the client just wants ‘to get a deal done’.   An example was given by 
I/V8, where the advice to do a deal two days later than planned to defer payment 
of the resulting CGT was ignored as the client just wanted to finalise the deal.  
Tax did not come into the decision making process at all.  Here the clients limit 
the execution/use of the practitioner’s knowledge.  Fees also play a part.  The 
financial cost of the advice and time to implement the planning, as identified by 
I/V14 and I/V22, versus the tax saving, appear to be additional factors as also 
identified by Kitt (2014) regarding R&D reliefs. Indeed, I/V22 referred to some 
clients who missed an “open goal” in terms of tax reliefs due to them, as they 
were too busy to implement them.  Experience was, per I/V22 that some may, in 
due course, take up the offer of the practitioner’s advice – they just have many 
other priorities. 
Other clients were thought to be happy, or “content” (I/V1) with the amount of tax 
they pay.  That is, if they are overpaying tax, then so be it.  Some practitioners 
reported that some clients choose simply not to enter into any transaction that 
they think could draw them to the attention of HMRC, preferring to stay ‘under the 
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radar’.  The examples provided related to simple claims for tax reliefs to which 
the clients were entitled – so nothing convoluted. This behaviour has been 
observed in relation to R&D claims (Hasseldine et al., 2011; OTS, 2014, p.37). 
I/V 3 explained they (the tax team) know their clients so well (which again 
supports Stephenson et al’s. (2017) findings) that they know who not to bother 
with tax planning suggestions, as some clients would just worry about putting in 
the claim. That is the practitioner is keenly aware of the client wishes and aligns 
their service accordingly to keep clients comfortable and not rock the boat.  Many 
clients, participants suggested, want 100% certainty, so if there is any uncertainty 
that a claim would not be agreed they will not enter into it.  If it is not 
“straightforward” (I/V1) or is felt to be a little “grey” the practitioner may have a 
battle getting the client to claim what is a “rightful deduction” (I/V4).  Additionally, 
examples were given where individuals within an organisation (described as the 
‘gatekeeper’) mistakenly believe that an R&D claim (for example) is not applicable 
to them, even though the practitioner knows it is. In other words, the knowledge 
of the practitioner is not accepted by some clients. In such cases therefore 
taxpayers may overpay their taxes.   
Whilst practitioners can encourage clients to take up planning advice, it is of 
course the client’s choice. This links to literature about ‘client preference’, in which 
Hite and McGill (1992) suggest that the desires of the client and the tax 
practitioner need to align, in order to keep the client happy.  This plays out in the 
example given by I/V3 above.  The participant adjusted their views to match their 
client’s preference.  There is a line to tread however if the client has a more 
aggressive outlook than the practitioner as suggested by Bain and Kilpatrick 
(1990) as this has to be carefully managed as discussed below in Section 5.4 
regarding the Scope Expectation.  
Additionally, clients may bypass the expert advice of their practitioner (if they 
have one) by turning to information on the internet or from friends. A number of 
participants referred to this. Such behaviour was observed by Parnaby (2009) in 
the financial planning context. The attempt to locate information by clients 
themselves could amount to an attempt to cut costs (see below), which could be 
seen to devalue a practitioner’s knowledge and experience. I/V25 referred to a 
client who suggested he believed his mate over and above the practitioner’s 
professional advice. Information on the internet may also lull clients into thinking 
150 
 
that tax is simple, that is, they do not see or expect the complexities the 
participants speak about.  Participants, interestingly gave HMRC webpages as 
the example here.  This is a respectable source of information, yet, it was said 
the information was too simplistic as also identified by Todd (Treasury Sub 
Committee, 2018).  Therefore, relying on simplistic information (or even 
misinformation, from less reputable webpages) could be problematic (see Onu 
and Oats, 2018).  The expectation that tax is ‘simple’ has to be managed. 
Some participants additionally feared that internet-based information may create 
a ‘false sense’ of security for clients.  An example about a share option scheme 
was given.  This had been the topic of discussion between the practitioner and 
the client.  The client ‘googled’ the issue and thought that as this appeared quite 
a simple thing to set up, as all they needed to pay for was a form, they could to 
‘do it themselves’.  This was described as “dangerous” (I/V24) as things are not 
as simple as they seem, yet clients may not appreciate this (and hence, by 
association the value of the practitioner’s advice).  The risk is that the taxpayer 
could end up in a difficult situation by not recognising the problems to watch out 
for. Interestingly, share schemes (and their difficulties) feature amongst the topics 
of local CIOT meetings (appendix 10.1). Furthermore, the participants reported 
taxpayers ‘scaring’ themselves by reading materials online that would not 
previously have been easily accessible.   
…[clients] scare themselves.  One of the big issues for customs at the 
moment is evidencing goods that have left the UK.  All of that is in the 
market place, and one of our contacts clients researched it on the internet 
and scared himself silly, and it is almost like he has diagnosed himself with 
cancer        [I/V23] 
And of course, internet searches cause some clients to want to try less 
acceptable, tax avoidance techniques, which is further discussed below under 
the Scope Expectation. 
In sum, the client may at times question whether the practitioner is indeed the 
expert and is competent enough to advise them on their transaction.  They may 
not appreciate or understand that tax law is lengthy and complex, or that it is 
impossible for the general tax practitioner to have a detailed knowledge of all (or 
even much) of the law itself.  They may not realise that the practitioner has to 
investigate the interaction of several different taxes in relation to the transaction, 
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as is often the case with the tax queries of small business.  In other 
circumstances, participants report clients rebuffing their attempts to suggest tax 
reliefs to which they may be entitled for the reasons discussed. The expectations 
of the client therefore must be managed to ensure a good client/practitioner 
relationship.   
5.3.1 How the practitioner manages the expert expectation 
Many participants felt it important to fully inform clients about their tax choices 
and make them aware of uncertainties, even though clients expect practitioners 
to be the expert and resolve ambiguity or doubts.  Yet, as noted, uncertainties 
may not entirely disappear, but may better be described as ‘managed’.  If advice 
is uncertain, say, based on ambiguous law, the participants caveat the advice 
provided.  This ensures the client is aware that HMRC’s interpretation (and view) 
may differ to the practitioner’s advice.  As I/V6 said, “It is a shame why you have 
to do that…in an ideal world you would know where you stood.”  Tax law is often 
criticised for such uncertainties (Ansari and Sossin, 2017; Gribnau, 2013) and as 
clients may not be aware of these problems, it may be that the legitimacy of the 
practitioner as an expert is questioned – as they have not provided a definitive 
answer. 
Nevertheless, participants expressed concern that clients ‘buy in’ to what is being 
said (per I/V24, at Section 5.3… [i]t is about making sure about the thought 
process and that the client buys into it and understands it and accepts the 
conclusion with full knowledge) and are informed where they stand (I/V15), and 
are made aware of the potential impacts of HMRC challenge to the position 
entered into.  Despite Gupta’s (2015) findings that clients may be less satisfied 
by the practitioner’s service if they are given too much information, this does not 
bear out the action of the participants in this research. The client is included in 
the decision making process, as it is the client who must sign the submitted tax 
return – hence their understanding of the position was seen as important.  To 
emphasise the point, in situations of uncertainty, participants may estimate the 
odds of the different legal interpretations (theirs versus HMRC) being accepted.  
Some also employ their knowledge to ‘cost’ each avenue (in terms of fees and 
tax) to warn the client of the financial effects in case of HMRC challenge. I/V8 
explained that if the tax savings resulting from the practitioner view (when 
compared to that of HMRC’s likely view) were minimal, it would be put to the client 
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that to choose the HMRC route might be the wisest course of action – even if I/V8 
did not agree with the HMRC interpretation.  This prevents challenge about 
different interpretations of law and hence time, effort and fees (and uncertainty 
for the taxpayer).  This position ties into the role the practitioner adopts for the 
client as negotiator and defender (see Chapter 7).  Thus the practitioner draws 
on previous experience and can legitimise their role i.e., ‘I can save you this much 
based on my knowledge, but my advice is to not return that position, as in financial 
terms, it is easier just to defer to HMRC’s point of view’. Other participants also 
described playing ‘devil’s advocate’ – that is, putting on the HMRC ‘hat’ to explain 
to the client HMRC’s likely perspective.  This also helps determine if the client is 
happy to accept the chance of audit should the submitted tax position be subject 
to differences of opinion and interpretation – that is, do they want the “aggro” 
(I/V1). These are alternative techniques to manage uncertainties and client 
expectations to ensure the client is on board with the advice provided by the 
practitioner and is able to make an informed decision.  These techniques may 
also help align the risk appetite of the client and practitioner (as Hite and McGill, 
1992 and Sakaurai and Braithwaite, 1993 identify difficulties in the 
client/practitioner relationship in this respect) and additionally, examination of the 
various different perspectives and outcomes may assist the practitioner to employ 
objectivity in the decision making process (which is noted as important by Cloyd 
and Spilker, 1999; Kahle and White, 2004).  Such techniques feed into the 
management of risk more generally. 
To provide a view of both sides of the argument, the practitioners draw on former 
experiences.  It should also be noted that some participants, I/V8 included, have 
former HMRC experience, thus, it may be that those participants may view the 
‘HMRC side’ rather differently to other practitioners. Certainly knowledge of 
HMRC as an organisation (as former insiders to that environment) was evident. 
Some continued to maintain contacts within the organisation.  They may thus 
know how the ‘revenue official’ may operate. This gives such practitioners an 
advantage over other general practitioners.  They have a different type of 
knowledge, as they have ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ knowledge (knowledge which 
extends beyond the smaller tax practice from a different field), hence their 
technical and cultural capital is enhanced.   
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Some practitioners may seek help from other tax practitioners if needed, which 
again is indicative of the smaller practitioner market, as they may not have the 
required expertise to hand.  This is discussed further in Chapter 7.  Some 
participants, including some former employees of HMRC, act as ‘advisers to 
advisers’ (many have clients who are practitioners themselves) by drawing on 
former experiences and networks to carve out a particular area in which to offer 
their services.  For instance, I/V15, having built up years of practice experience 
and depth of knowledge (including time at a Big 4 firm) may save other 
practitioners hours of time investigating a transaction in a field in which s/he 
specialises (a similar sentiment was expressed by I/V1).  I/V8 “leverages” on work 
which plays to her/his strengths (which have developed from former experience) 
and whilst the complexities of the tax system are recognised, this practitioner 
finds it rare to be “completely stumped” having built up such a depth of knowledge 
in the fields in which s/he works.  The professional identity of the ‘adviser to the 
adviser’ thus develops over time, as experience is gained from former work 
places, work practices, work colleagues, and types of organisation in which one 
has worked – which produce many networks and contacts upon which the 
practitioners may later draw in setting up their smaller tax practice.  That said, it 
continues to be evident that these practitioners, at times, also meet the same 
problems as those with less in-depth experience as the evidence shows.  Indeed, 
a range of strategies to manage the client ‘expert’ expectation is adopted by 
many. 
Many participants reported recording the advice they give in some shape or form, 
which relates to the “buy in” described by I/V24 above.  A letter or report may be 
provided, or the practitioner may hold meetings, or create minutes to outline 
matters for the client.  In other words, what practitioners describe is an attempt to 
educate the client about how and why time was spent on their query, along with 
the outcomes of the work, including the choices of available action and 
associated tax cost, if appropriate. This may elicit trust in the client/practitioner 
relationship. These techniques help explain the worth or value of the practitioners’ 
work, the resources employed (such as knowledge, experience and the symbolic 
capital (per Stringfellow and Thompson, 2014) of their professional background) 
to arrive at the outcome, and can help justify the fee. Documentation of the advice 
therefore converts the intangible, unseen efforts of the practitioner into a visible, 
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tangible output, which may also illustrate the different complexities and choices 
for the client, by taking abstract tax concepts and reducing them to more simple 
explanations as illustrated below by I/V6.  This relates to the translator role as 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
When you are meeting new clients and they have a particular tax query it 
is tempting to just give them the answer if you have spent hours in the past 
perhaps researching it for another client [Note – this was said to be an 
infrequent, but possible occurrence] but if you do that then they won’t 
appreciate the value of the advice or pay an appropriate fee for it… [that 
is a] problem in tax I think. Accountants generally…don’t experience that 
as you can produce an actual document such as a thick set of accounts 
… if you send [the client] a thick tax report they can see you have put a lot 
of work in it.         [I/V6] 
Additionally, the participants use such documentation as protection for 
themselves (a form of risk management). I/V15 advises clients they cannot rely 
on anything unless it is provided in writing.  Clients may not want a long document 
of explanation (they may wish just to be told what to do, as I/V24 observed at 
Section 5.3 and Gupta, 2015 found in her research) and indeed FG5 observed 
that clients do not want a “dissertation, but as I/V24 says, there is more to this.  
To manage the client’s expectation and obtain ‘buy in’, documentation is required 
to draw important issues to their attention. Whilst Gupta (2015) found clients did 
not want to be kept informed of details, other authors found the opposite 
(Christensen, 1992; Hasseldine et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2016).  From the 
practitioners’ perspective, the actions above and the attempt to educate clients 
of the tax position, are consistent with findings by Fogarty and Jones (2014), 
Tomasic and Pentony (1991) and Parnaby (2009). 
Finally, if there is a choice of tax route, once the decision is made, disclosure of 
the position is shown on the tax return to protect the taxpayer from later dispute 
and ‘discovery’ (that is HMRC are not told the full facts relating to the chosen tax 
treatment, but later become aware of it).  Hence the practitioner has a number of 
techniques to manage the client expert expectation.   
The next section explores the ‘scope’ expectation. 
5.4 The scope expectation 
The ‘scope expectation’ relates to what the client expects the practitioner to 
achieve on their behalf.  This encapsulates both tax planning strategies and the 
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expectation, by some clients, that practitioners should be on their side at all costs 
and will be happy to ‘bend the rules’ to overlook identified errors, which may 
otherwise cost the client more in tax.  Hence some participants reported, they are 
subject to the accusation that they work for HMRC rather than the client. 
The ‘scope expectation’ for tax planning may be narrower than the client expects 
as a result of the practitioners’ ethical obligations, and, this is discussed further, 
in light of the theoretical framework in Chapter 8.  However, the ‘scope’ of a 
transaction may nevertheless be broadened by the tax practitioner, to obtain the 
‘bigger picture’ about a proposed transaction.  This is necessary to identify 
additional, unintended tax (and other) implications of a transaction which must be 
drawn to the attention of the client.  
This section is subdivided into ‘client tax planning’ and ‘scope for bending the 
rules’. 
5.4.1 Client tax planning and a changed environment 
…. I think clients come to you thinking the scope for planning is very 
wide…But in reality it’s…very narrow. And it’s about dispelling that myth 
… I think the reality is, we’ve got little scope, a lot less than they think we 
have when they first come to us.      [FG5] 
The above quote indicates that there can be a mismatch between what the 
participant expects to achieve in respect of tax planning and what the client thinks 
can be achieved.  As discussed in Section 5.3, whilst tax planning is part of the 
practitioner role, some clients may choose to ignore the advice provided.  
However, others may have the opposite perspective entirely and hope to access 
various tax saving initiatives, not all of which may be advisable. As FG5 suggests 
the practitioner may then have to advise on what is and is not appropriate. Note 
– the participants generally termed what they saw to be ‘acceptable tax saving’ 
as ‘tax planning’ and the ‘unacceptable tax saving’ as ‘tax avoidance’.  This is 
how the distinction is made in the narrative which follows.  
Some participants have clients approach them with tax saving ideas from the 
internet, or identified from media reports.  One participant has a client who 
frequently asks if particular tax planning schemes (as identified by the client via 
the internet) are “doable”. Another fielded calls from clients after the ‘Jimmy Carr 
scandal’; not condemning what Jimmy Carr had done, but asking why their own 
tax practitioner had not advised them to do the same.  Jimmy Carr (comedian) 
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had taken part in a tax scheme known as K2, in which earnings were sheltered 
from tax.  He received much negative publicity. He described making a ‘terrible 
error of judgment’ at the time (BBC, 2012). Yet, the practitioner’s clients 
wondered why they had not been offered the same opportunities. The practitioner 
explained they did not offer avoidance schemes of that nature.  This raises wider 
issues about the influence of the press. Reports about this matter have, 
presumably unintentionally, acted as an advertisement for such schemes for 
those whose views do not align with the debates about tax morality and may 
indicate such taxpayers’ “erosion…of respect for the tax system” as identified by 
Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016, p.2736).  These taxpayers appear to fear they 
have ‘lost out’ somehow, and may question the legitimacy of the tax practitioner’s 
expertise and query what service they are paying for.  Here is a direct mismatch 
between expectation and action, and the practitioner’s professional background 
and ethical stance is at odds with what the client wants, i.e. client preference does 
not align with that of the practitioner, an issue identified by Brody and Masselli 
(1996), Cloyd and Spilker (1999), Christensen (1992), Helleloid (1989) and Hite 
and McGill (1992). 
There was acknowledgement amongst all participants that the tax planning 
environment is not the same as that a number of years ago.  A couple of 
interviewees acknowledged that they had participated in ‘tax avoidance’ in the 
past.  One referred to the sale of film schemes for a fee (see Chapter 2).  Others 
say they have never been involved in any tax avoidance.  Without exception, 
however, all participants said they do not themselves take part in artificial 
schemes or aggressive avoidance (i.e. what they now term ‘tax avoidance’).  Of 
course, it might be said that they may not say otherwise.  Interestingly the general 
practitioners (I/V20 and I/V21) expressed doubt about the scope of their 
obligations to their clients.  They had been approached in the past by various 
‘boutique’ firms offering tax saving mechanisms.   The practitioners were torn as 
to whether they were obliged to (rather than wanted to) mention these to clients 
who asked about more aggressive methods to save tax, although it was clear 
they would strongly advise against them.  This dilemma seemed to have been 
triggered from attendance at a CPD course. The concern appeared to be whether 
they would not be acting in the client interest, if they did not pass on such 
information.  There seemed to be a reverse type of ethical dilemma here, as the 
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practitioners were questioning their responsibilities to the client, along with the 
morality of “dodgy” schemes.  Nevertheless, there is sensitivity around the tax 
avoidance issue and a keen awareness of the shift in society’s opinion of these 
matters as described in Chapter 2.  A consequence of this shift however, is the 
concern of some participants, that the line as to what is, or is not, acceptable is 
not always clear and this caused angst as the following two participants articulate. 
The political landscape is changing all the time. 
I think the press help the government as they started using the words 
avoidance [legal] and evasion [illegal] in the same sentence and although 
the legal interpretation has not changed, I think the way people view it 
morally has changed so we just don’t get involved [in avoidance]. 
          [I/V4] 
And: 
We are not aggressive advisers…. We do not promote tax avoidance 
schemes [but] I am concerned about the way it is going…  
It has become, well, morally unacceptable to do any sort of tax avoidance, 
and well, verging on tax planning.  I suppose there is a grey area. [I/V6] 
Here, I/V4 mentions the political and media influence and a shift in language from 
what the practitioner was used to. There is thus a change in discourse which is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 8.  Both participants refer to morality.  This adds 
another dimension to the advice giving process.  The wording of the law is one 
aspect which a practitioner must manage on behalf of clients, yet, the implication 
is that they must also manage a moral angle – so how does this impact upon the 
practitioner and tax practice?  The participants realise the boundaries have 
shifted.  This causes doubt and worry that tax planning may also be tainted with 
the same brush as tax avoidance schemes as observed by Fernie (2016) which 
may heighten sensitivities and uncertainties as identified by I/V6. That said the 
participants do not shy away from tax planning, as further discussed in Chapter 
7. 
The above refers to a narrow scope for tax planning, but, on the other hand the 
adviser may broaden the scope around what the client asks.  This may mean a 
request for more information and a consequential increase in fees.  The tax 
practitioner role involves looking forward, to anticipate future tax (or other 
business related) implications of the transaction currently planned, as I/V24 
pointed out.  For instance, if a business is being restructured, this might require 
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advice across a number of taxes. There may also be different ways to achieve 
the same commercial outcome which may nevertheless have different tax 
implications, some more costly than others (I/V24).  Suggestions may be made 
as to how to achieve the most tax efficient outcome, but if there are uncertainties 
or likely challenge to the different alternatives these need to be borne in mind and 
discussed with the client to determine an agreed approach.  The work required 
depends upon the circumstances.  The client may think they have asked a simple 
tax question, only to find that this becomes a much larger project.  Here the tax 
practitioners are proactive to ensure they protect the client from unexpected 
consequences.  They may ensure costly tax ‘traps’ are avoided, or opportunities 
are taken in to account (for instance, do you want to take on employees, reward 
employees, retire, what will happen then? (I/V23/24), or what happens if the 
shareholders fall out; what happens to the shares of shareholders who leave? 
(I/V8)). Clients may well not have thought about these matters. This type of advice 
is inextricably bound up with tax planning.  Participants described drawing on 
years of experience to identify what questions should be asked in what situation 
and it seems that their advice may extend out of the tax arena per se, hence they 
may play more of a business adviser role.  For instance, the participants in this 
study have, amongst them, experience in the Big 4 and top 10 firms, from HMRC, 
from other organisations in general, as well as experience gained in their current 
roles on which they can draw.  In sum, the practitioner may take on a role broader 
than that expected by the client. This close connection with the client is also 
characteristic of the smaller practitioner market. 
5.4.2 How the practitioner manages the scope expectation - ‘tax planning’  
So how do participants determine what they are comfortable with?  How do they 
decide? I/V4 adopts a ‘risk scale’, i.e., no tax planning and no risk at all at one 
end, shifting through various situations on the scale until tax avoidance starts to 
blur with tax evasion at the top end of the scale (which is similar to the findings of 
Fogarty and Jones, 2014). The practitioner is comfortable if clients remain at the 
bottom end of the risk scale, that is, at 3 or 4, perhaps less so at 6 or 7, and 
definitely not if at 9 or 10. (Interestingly HMRC, adopt similar strategies to profile 
taxpayers (see Freedman et al., 2009, for a discussion about companies and tax 
risk)).  Additionally, the practitioner looks out for ‘tax motive’ (versus commercial 
motive) and is alert to indications as to whether planning falls under the 
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arrangements not palatable to HMRC, such as film schemes and employee 
benefit trusts (EBTs) (see Chapter 2) to help assess the risk of suggestions some 
of which may come from clients themselves.  Low risk tax planning relates to 
business reliefs, pension planning, and the reliefs which a taxpayer is meant to 
claim in accordance with the intention behind the law which introduced them.  
Taxpayers however may not be aware of such reliefs without a practitioner’s 
assistance, as discussed at Section 5.3.1 above.  This is the field of tax planning 
in which many practitioners appear to feel most comfortable as illustrated in the 
comment below.  Indeed, the participant describes appealing to the ‘social 
conscience’ of the client to deflect requests to partake in more aggressive types 
of tax avoidance:   
We had one client ... who wanted to do some really aggressive stuff and I 
just said ‘no’ I am not going there – but there is no need – you know if you 
take advantage of pensions relief, R&D relief, patent box, capital 
allowances … you are not going to do badly, you are going to pay a bit of 
something, and you drive round on the roads and use the hospitals, so you 
can forget paying nothing.  So it is down to advisers to educate clients 
properly, and down to clients to listen.    [I/V22] 
Clues as to the practitioner’s professional identity are observed here as the 
practitioner draws on past experiences, ethics and morality to encourage the 
client round to the practitioner’s way of thinking.  The practitioner is responding 
to the changed environment and is pulling on social conscience to legitimise this 
point of view.  A specific choice of language, and a subtle reference to social 
obligations, are employed in this respect, rather than simply seeing matters in 
terms of financial (tax) savings alone. 
The use of judgement and experience to manage expectations in terms of ‘scope’ 
is well illustrated by I/V2, the specialist tax adviser.  Having worked in the 
specialist field for years, knowledge of what is and is not acceptable in that 
particular field in terms of tax planning and uncertain law, has been gained over 
time.  This practitioner also referred to an in built mechanism about what she/he 
would be comfortable with. Other practitioners alluded to the same – again 
drawing on past experiences to determine their own comfort position. 
I say [to the client] well, this is ambiguous, and if you lost there would be 
X amount of tax due…I don’t even do those contentious claims… You sort 
of get a feeling ‘hmm, I don’t think that will work’, so I am not going to do 
it.           [I/V2] 
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Additionally, as part of the risk management role the interviewees revealed that 
frequently, the balance of probabilities is taken into account to weigh up whether 
planning transactions which involve uncertain law will be successful, or open to 
challenge as already discussed.  
In summary, in today’s environment, the evidence of the practitioners would 
suggest that if a client wants to undertake what the practitioner felt was 
unacceptable tax avoidance, or to adopt a tax position which the practitioner 
could not ‘defend’ or ‘justify’, (in terms of where the lines may blur, or legislation 
may be grey) then the client is told this is not appropriate, and it will not be 
pursued.  Practitioners, as seen by the evidence in Chapter 7, are highly sensitive 
to this.  The rules of the game (in the tax field), as they have known them, have 
changed. Permitted discourses in the field have changed and practitioners are 
sensitive to these changes.  Without exception (and subject to the limitation that 
interviewees may not admit otherwise) interviewees said they wanted to feel 
comfortable with the advice provided.  This appears to contradict Carnes et al. 
(1996), Cloyd and Spilker (1999), Kahle and White (2004), Reckers et al. (1991) 
and Tan (2011) in terms of bowing to client pressure.  Of course, the background 
of the participants may impact upon the views they express.  An individual is said 
to be affected by numerous influences (or “audiences” (Brouard, 2017)) which, 
taken together may affect one’s beliefs and how one thinks and behaves in their 
work.  Such influences may be former work experiences, former training, ones 
employing organisation, the ethical environments to which one has been 
exposed, or the professional body to which the individual belongs, and can 
include the views of the media, or society in general.  These influences, or 
different loyalties (Alvesson et al., 2015) help shape one’s moral and ethical 
outlook, which ultimately guides how the individual sees and conducts 
themselves as found by Alvesson et al. (2015), Caza and Creary (2016), Cooper 
and Robson (2006) and Grey (1998). The practitioner may consider their 
reputation for instance, or that of their employer which may limit their behaviour, 
but this may be bound up with the organisations approach (or professional body 
guidance) to an individual’s ethical obligations or risk management matters.  Such 
circumstances, along with former work experiences and professional training may 
have a bearing upon how the practitioner thinks and acts.  In other words, the 
practitioners within this study suggest that they have the training, and disposition 
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to ‘rein in’ the client if necessary. They appear to be happy to tell the client ‘how 
it is’ in terms of tax payments or the availability of reliefs.  That is, the practitioners 
indicated that they are aware of the scope of what is acceptable (in their view).  
These issues may be indicative of the professional identity of the practitioner as 
discussed in Chapter 3, as they may take ‘cues’ from their former training and 
experiences, and the ethos of the organisations in which they work, which guide 
how they behave and which guide them as to the acceptability, or otherwise of 
certain actions.  
Hence it seems that the expectations of what the client wants to achieve are 
managed by the practitioner to ensure a revision of those expectations to a 
position that the practitioner is happy with (whilst taking account of the blurred 
lines between the acceptable and unacceptable tax planning; and in these cases 
a view must be taken).  Overall however, the practitioners in this study do not 
seem to consider the clients wishes of great importance.  If the practitioner is not 
comfortable, many participants advise that they will walk away.  Many said their 
clients did not wish to push the boundaries too much in any case.   
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that aggressive tax planning schemes continue 
to exist as evidenced by the legislation designed to prevent such schemes, and 
as evidenced by the clients of the tax practitioners in this study; such ventures 
are easily found via internet searches, which shows a continuing market for such 
tax avoidance. Indeed, some practitioners had taken on new clients who, as it 
was diplomatically put, had “fallen out” [I/V10] with their aggressive tax planner 
(film schemes and EBTs were mentioned) and they were trying to unravel 
things/put things right for such clients.  It may however be said of course that the 
participants in this study may choose not to highlight their own involvement in 
such schemes.  Furthermore, had the pool of participants differed, there may be 
different views forthcoming.  Whilst a couple of participants operate within a niche 
area of tax in this study, further interviews with a detailed focus on ‘boutique’ tax 
practitioners, or the non-professionally qualified tax market, or even the tax 
lawyer market, or those working for the ‘Big 4’ may yield additional different 
outlooks and opinions about this particular issue.  It is not possible to say for 
certain, but this has been noted as a potential area for additional research in 
Section 9.4 as clearly all such opinions cannot be extrapolated to the entire 
market of tax practitioners.  It should be recognised that much of the debate 
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around tax avoidance, discussed in Chapter 2, relates to global MNE’s most often 
represented by the Big 4 or international tax lawyers who may be able to exploit 
the differences in international tax law, to the benefit of the MNE.  The client base 
of the Big 4 is not the same as that of the smaller practitioner.  It is possible that 
a MNE may wield greater power (perhaps threaten to change practitioner for 
example) over their desires to minimise their tax charge and are likely to be more 
aware of the tax avoidance schemes on offer, thus the relationship between such 
clients and their tax practitioner may differ to that described above.  This may be 
explored in future research, as it may thus be easier for a smaller tax practitioner 
to resist client pressure (although it is clear from the evidence here that the 
internet plays an increasing role in publicising such schemes to many (and not 
just the larger company) taxpayers).    
5.4.3 Scope for bending the rules (ethics and an unappreciated role) 
Evidence obtained from the participants suggested that they are perceived, at 
times, to throw obstacles in the way of the client. That is, they are accused of 
both working for the revenue and, costing the client tax they did not expect to pay 
(which links into what the practitioner actually does, see Chapter 7 – as part of 
their role is prevention of errors, which is examined under their role as ‘defender’ 
of the client).   Practitioners have ethical and moral obligations in this respect.  
The crux of the issue is the divergence from what the client may want (reduced 
tax bills) versus the practitioner’s responsibilities under the terms of the law.  
Practitioners reported being the target of client frustrations, particularly if things 
turn out in ways the client had not expected, for instance, receiving a higher tax 
bill than anticipated, or tax problems arising with their business idea.   
I/V16 felt that some clients ‘blamed’ them for tax rule changes advised to them in 
their capacity of channelling information to the client, which is a role identified by 
Brock and Russell (2015).  It was felt necessary to explain that they are just the 
‘messenger’ and were simply helping the client understand.  I/V19 described 
clients transferring their frustration to the practitioner, leaving them feeling like 
“you are the bad person for bringing this to their attention.”  Clients wonder why 
changes occur, question the logic (I/V11), or wonder why practices that have 
been in existence for years have been unsettled (such as changes to taxation of 
dividends, which is particularly appropriate to the clients of the small practitioner 
as many owner-managed businesses will receive both a salary and dividends 
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from their own companies).  Tran-Nam et al. (2016) identified that frequent 
changes to tax rules and regulations impact adversely on the client/practitioner 
relationship and consequently, clients may view their practitioner in a negative 
light, as described here. 
The examples that follow give a flavour of how the practitioner stands their ground 
under pressure from the client and how expectations are managed. Here 
practitioners again illustrate they are aware of the ethical environment (as found 
by Fatemi et al., 2018) and that they are willing to go against client wishes if 
necessary (as also found by Tomasic and Pentony, 1991). 
5.4.4 How the practitioner manages the scope expectation – ‘scope for 
bending the rules’ 
If in the course of looking at a taxpayer’s affairs, an error comes to light, then 
corrective action is taken (as discussed in Chapter 7 which explores the 
practitioner role).  There can be a gap in expectation here.  Clients may find 
themselves ‘sacked’ if they do not, for example, amend an incorrect tax return.   
Some may also expect that they can claim tax reliefs/claim expenditure against 
income in all circumstances.  Practitioners will not do this if it is not acceptable.  
They report holding their ground.  That is, one has to be rather “stern” (I/V16), as 
“you cannot do it just to please them” and it does seem to be the case that the 
practitioner will withstand pressure from the client “I think no, it is not due, and I 
am not claiming it, so it is as simple as that” (I/V1).   
The following is an example of where the practitioner refuses to budge on an 
issue.  A new client asked the practitioner to submit a claim for entrepreneur’s 
relief in respect of the sale of shares.  Voting rights9 must be attached to the 
shares to claim the relief.  This did not apply in this case and a claim could not be 
submitted. 
I … had to tell him [after discovering the shares did not carry voting rights] 
that he will not get ER.  
[He said] Yes I should do,  
[I said] yes but you did not have voting rights 
                                                             
9 To obtain entrepreneurs’ relief at the date of this interview, various conditions have to be met, which 
attach to the shares being sold – one of which is that the shares must carry voting rights. 
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[He said] well I should have had 
[I said] but yes, but you did not 
You do feel a bit…but still… You cannot do it just to please them if it is not 
right….        [I/V18] 
The colleague of I/V18 then interjected 
[They say] you sound like you are working for the HMRC!  Really no I am 
not – I am still looking after your best interests. Sometimes it is really just 
that clear cut.       [I/V19] 
What can be seen here is the practitioner acting on behalf of both the client and 
HMRC.  Chapter 7 describes this as the defender role.  
The next section focuses on client expectations specifically linked to HMRC. 
5.5 HMRC expectation 
Some participants felt that shortcomings of HMRC (discussed further in Chapter 
6) reflect badly on them.  This affects the practitioner/client relationship and hence 
is briefly mentioned here too. 
One practitioner relayed a story about a tax refund which was outstanding for 
months.  HMRC regularly ‘fobbed off’ the practitioner who had to relay this 
information (the response was the same – call back in 4 weeks) to the 
(disbelieving) client.  The practitioner felt that the client’s perception of them at 
this point was poor – when in reality, the practitioner had no control over the tax 
refund.  It was also suggested that simple errors in PAYE codes (put right by the 
practitioner, but not actioned by HMRC) resulted in verbal abuse from clients.  
Additionally, one practitioner had notified HMRC that penalties, interest, and 
underpaid tax, was not actually due in respect of their client yet, it took weeks for 
this to be actioned.  As the client continued to receive tax demands and reminders 
to pay, the client believed the practitioner had not dealt with this properly (FG 3). 
These are all examples where the HMRC system is out of step with the 
practitioners’ work as discussed by Maas (2015).  In private practice, time is 
money.  The HMRC system runs at a far slower pace and this is discussed further 
in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8 in light of discussions around the tax field and the 
Bourdieusian framework.  Practitioners have no control over this, yet they must 
work with it.  They have no choice.   
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Additionally, some participants observed that taxpayers appoint advisers 
because they do not want to deal with their own tax affairs. However, it is felt that 
HMRC have started to target the taxpayer directly in a number of instances (going 
outside the tripartite relationship) leaving some practitioners feeling a little side-
lined.  This appears symptomatic of new initiatives in the tax practitioner/tax 
authority relationship highlighted by Dabner (2012, 2015).   This change is 
increasingly observed by the practitioners. This subtly shifts the relationship 
between the client and practitioner, and has created additional client 
management concerns.  For instance, Making Tax Digital (MTD) is taxpayer 
focussed (see Chapter 6), as are ‘personal tax accounts’ which contain various 
online tax information in relation to each taxpayer.  At the time of the interviews, 
the agent did not get right of access to the personal tax accounts of individuals, 
yet there is certain information therein that the practitioner might need (pension 
information was given as the example).  This annoyed one client.  He was 
unwilling to access his account for the information as he felt this is what he paid 
the practitioner for – he did not want to deal with his own tax compliance, which 
agrees with findings by Evans et al. (2014).  (Things may now have changed 
regarding some rights of access in this respect).  Further details on the tripartite 
relationship are included in Chapter 6. 
The above are examples of changes in the rules of the game, that is, the former 
norm with which the participants were familiar has changed.   HMRC has a large 
impact upon the world of the practitioner and the working environment between 
the practitioner and HMRC has changed considerably, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.   
Finally, the practitioner may protect the client from HMRC error.  For instance, 
one client would have overpaid £30,000 CGT without the practitioner’s 
assistance, owing to wrong advice being given by HMRC over the telephone.  
The practitioner’s knowledge in this particular example surpassed that of HMRC, 
which could be said to increase trust in and legitimacy of the practitioner as a 
provider of tax advice.  This ties in to the ‘knowledge gap’ which practitioners 
identified as problematic in their dealings with HMRC (see Chapter 6).  However, 
the authority of HMRC and its perceived power has an impact upon taxpayers, 
who believe it (the organisation) will not make mistakes, yet at times, as here, it 
can, and practitioners have to manage this on behalf of their clients.   
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The final expectation relates to the practitioner’s fee.  Surprisingly, many 
comments were made about fees and at times angst was evidenced, as will be 
seen.  The working practices of HMRC also create problems in this respect too. 
5.6 The fee expectation 
The findings show that there is often difficulty in charging clients for anything other 
than routine work.  This is can be linked to the ‘expert expectation’ and the need 
to invest time and effort into ‘invisible’ research to answer the client’s problem.   
That is the unseen use of practitioners’ expertise.  At the outset, it may not be 
known how long this may take, as the scope of the problem may only become 
clear once the work has commenced.  The work practitioners do in relation to 
HMRC delays or error, also causes billing issues.  There is a danger therefore 
that the client may be undercharged and dilemmas arise about how best to 
manage this. 
Some try to scope out the work to the best of their ability (drawing on prior 
experience) to determine, for instance, which taxes come into play regarding the 
tax problem being investigated.  As I/V22 pointed out, it is no good quoting for a 
piece of work, only to start it, and then realise there are, say inheritance tax (IHT) 
issues which had not been identified at the beginning (again symptomatic of the 
breadth of tax work of the smaller tax practitioner).  The practitioner draws on 
past experiences to find a way to manage this aspect, and suggests that care 
must be taken to ensure: 
we don’t have any miscommunication with the client and we are clear on 
what the assignment looks like before we start.  I think that is unusual, to 
be honest, but that is just years of having worked with people who have 
done a load of work and can’t bill it.     [I/V22] 
Other practitioners estimate a ‘ball park’ in terms of time it will take, then keep in 
close contact with the client if things are taking longer than thought, to manage 
their expectations about the likely fee.  It is the case, however, that many write 
off time spent on research and charge it down to training, or alternatively ‘bank it’ 
somewhere. Then, if a similar problem comes up in the future, both time and a 
fee can be billed from the bank (this was observed by Fogarty and Jones, 2014 
as a potential solution to this issue too).  Others (I/V14) think that agreeing a 
reasonable fee with the client is about the client having trust and confidence in 
the practitioner, which means that symbolic capital is important here.  
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Documentation, the output of the adviser is also used to help justify a fee.  
Additionally, some referred to ‘getting better’ at billing (drawing on past 
experiences to achieve this). 
Some participants however choose not to bill for all the time taken to research a 
tax issue: 
I/V1 explained that the first time something is looked at, one never bills everything 
and I/V9 and I/V12 were of a similar opinion. 
Sometimes you are bit unsure of something; sometimes you get the 
answer straight away; sometimes it takes you longer to get the answer 
than you can reasonably charge the client. So you have to write some time 
off, but it all comes out in the wash. 
…if you specified to someone that you were charging them for researching 
something they would not be very happy as they would expect you to have 
that competence and expertise anyway. It’s not like that you present a fee 
for the work, which includes the numbers and the time spent relearning the 
rules if you need to.       [I/V 9] 
And 
If I go over budget, generally for advisory, we have to suck it up, as we did 
not realise how much research you have to do and arguably if we had to 
do research because it is a training need, is that a cost we should be 
passing on anyway, as they come to us……?   [I/V12] 
These comments are consistent with findings by Fogarty and Jones (2014), that 
a client is happy to pay for the answer, but not the time it takes to obtain the 
knowledge required to answer it.  Perhaps there is an unwillingness on behalf of 
the practitioner to explain the extent (and time taken) of the research in case 
doubt is cast on their abilities, expertise or competence (as discussed at 5.3 
above)? And there appears to be difficulty in distinguishing between research 
directly related to the tax problem, from that which just improves the technical 
ability of the practitioner (which could be possibly be more pronounced in the 
smaller practitioner environment) as found by McKerchar (2005). 
Generally, the problem with the small practitioner market, is that many questions 
are ad-hoc and work must be undertaken to get to a ‘standing start’ in many 
instances. This effort may not be converted into a fee, as there is a clear 
perception on behalf of the practitioner that the client would not expect to pay for 
this aspect of the work.  Indeed, Stringfellow et al. (2015), suggest smaller 
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accountancy practitioners work longer hours than they charge for as they are 
aware of the limits of their technical expertise, and the same appears to hold true 
here in the smaller tax practitioner context. 
5.7 Management of colleagues and the impact upon the client 
relationship 
Interestingly, the interviewees revealed that the ‘management of expectations’ is 
not solely client focussed.  That is, they must also manage expectations of ‘non-
tax’ colleagues.  This impacts upon management of the client, as it is often the 
case that there is interaction between clients and other colleagues prior to the 
involvement of the tax practitioner.  As Tomasic and Pentony (1991, p.294) found, 
a little knowledge in the hands of the non-tax specialist was described as 
“dangerous”.  It is fair to say this feeling was reciprocated amongst a number of 
practitioners.  Problems arise if the non-tax colleague misadvises the client 
(perhaps about an accounting transaction – purchase of own shares by a 
company was the common example - without appreciation of the tax 
consequences), or inadvertently withholds information from the tax practitioner, 
should its tax significance not be appreciated.  Corrective action may ensue – 
and of course must be explained to clients.  This illustrates tension with a similar, 
but distinct field, the accounting field, and its effects in the tax field.  Here the tax 
practitioner’s capital (knowledge) is seen as superior to that of the accountant, 
and they have more power to ensure the original advice is adapted, but 
interestingly, sometimes, the accounting colleague chooses not to seek that 
superior advice in the first place (which would avoid these issues). 
A perspective on this is given below. I/V12 (a joint interviewee) found this situation 
challenging and exasperating; 
I always say [I will only do that] if I can defend it, because it is my advice 
and [if] HMRC query it I have got to defend it! If I feel comfortable that I 
can defend it, I will send it out. If I can’t defend it -  how possibly can I send 
it out? Because if HMRC enquire – oh – it is just because…. [I/V12] 
I just picked that one. It sounded good.    [I/V13] 
I just went Eeny, meeny, miny, mo as I just went for this answer as I just 
could not decide which.  That’s what I say a lot, especially to colleagues 
… who say ‘can’t you just do this’? I will say I can’t defend that. I cannot 
turn round and give a valid reason why I have done that, so no I can’t.  If 
you want to do that then fine and then you defend it!  [I/V12] 
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This often elicits accusations that the tax colleague works for HMRC, yet provides 
evidence that the participant does not give into peer pressure. 
Despite the above, the value of a tax practitioner’s knowledge may be 
underplayed by their accounting colleagues.  An example was given where an 
IHT report was asked for by a non-tax colleague.  The report was produced, 
showing an IHT liability.  The non-tax colleague had however not expected the 
tax team to bill the client for this work. The client was not happy either, particularly 
as they had not expected to see potential tax liabilities highlighted in the report, 
as they were just contemplating “giving things away” (I/V12).  Nevertheless, the 
report was seen by the tax team to be a specialist piece of work. This is not an 
isolated incident.  In these instances, the specialist knowledge of the tax 
practitioner is undervalued and at times is not converted into fee income.  This 
may be as a result of an interplay between the accounting and tax colleagues 
and who may have a closer relationship with clients, and of course – whether a 
fee has been discussed (see Section 5.6), or not, but this will nevertheless impact 
upon the earning capacity for the practice. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the research question “how do smaller tax 
practitioners manage client relationships in a dynamic environment” and attended 
to the following objectives: 
 to gain insight into, and explore, the practitioners’ views on 
their relationship with clients;  
 to describe and understand the environment in which the 
practitioner works and in which the client/practitioner 
relationship operates;  
 to explore how they manage this relationship 
The practitioners’ views on their client relationships have been explored which 
enabled identification of a number of ‘client expectation gaps’.  These gaps have 
been examined against the context of risk management.   As highlighted 
throughout the Chapter, practitioners manage many different issues in the 
client/practitioner relationship such as complexity, breadth of tax regulation, 
understanding client circumstances (to provide tax planning advice) and ethical 
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issues which enable an understanding of the environment in which the 
client/practitioner relationship operates.  It is clear that the smaller tax practitioner 
environment is multifaceted and clients are unlikely to appreciate the different 
issues the practitioner must address to provide the advice requested.  That is, 
much of the practitioners’ efforts may go unseen.  There is a ‘mismatch’ of 
expectations, in terms of what the smaller practitioner knows and can do, and 
how quickly; the scope for tax planning, or turning a blind eye to errors; the impact 
of HMRC on the relationship; and the fees charged.  The impact of non – tax 
colleagues upon the relationship is also examined. 
The strategies used by practitioners to manage these gaps (and thus the 
client/practitioner relationship) are also explored.  
The practitioner must balance management of both HMRC (and the slower speed 
at which it works) and the client.  The impact of HMRC upon the practitioners’ 













6 Findings – HMRC 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (at Section 4.8), three main themes became clear as 
the data was analysed.  One of these, HMRC, relates to the second research 
objective.  As the interviews progressed (and taking account of comments from 
the focus group) it became clear that HMRC as an organisation has a great 
impact upon the practitioners.  New challenges have evidently arisen in the 
practitioner/HMRC relationship – challenges, which had not existed until relatively 
recently.  This chapter therefore presents and examines the findings in relation 
to research question 2, “How does the shifting relationship with HMRC impact 
upon the practices of tax practitioners?”  The objectives related to this Chapter 
are shown in Section 4.2 and are to explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 the practitioners’ views on the relationship between 
themselves and HMRC; 
 the environment in which the relationship is managed; 
 The challenges and difficulties, as well as positive aspects 
of that relationship; 
 The impact that management of this relationship has on the 
practice of the practitioner; 
 
The chapter explores the shifting relationship with HMRC, and examines how it 
impacts upon practices of the practitioner – as viewed through the eyes of the 
practitioner.   
The perception of the practitioners in the study is that they face challenges which 
arise from the restructure at HMRC, a reduction in HMRC resources and changes 
in HMRC attitude towards both practitioner and the taxpayer.  Some practitioners 
felt perturbed about the relationship with HMRC, given their experiences of recent 
interactions with HMRC, and frustration was felt at times.  Despite this some 
teams at HMRC were praised.  This chapter explains the environment in which 
this relationship is managed, and highlights the challenges and impacts of the 
relationship upon the practitioner role.  Positive aspects are also explored.  The 
points arising were many, some of which are supported by evidence from the 
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Treasury Sub-Committee (2018) regarding the conduct of tax enquiries and 
resolution of tax disputes. 
The themes arising from the data may be viewed as expectation gaps between 
what the practitioner desires (or expects), in terms of service from and the 
relationship with HMRC, and what they actually get.  As will be seen these gaps 
increase uncertainty in the practitioners working environment, which requires 
careful management. Themes arising from the practitioners’ experiences and 
stories are explored under the following headings: 
 The relationship gap 
 The trust gap 
 The systems gap 
 The knowledge gap 
 Where the gaps narrow 
Aspects of the above are interrelated with the management of client expectations 
(Chapter 5) as will be examined.  For instance, the delays at HMRC as a result 
of system issues, or lack of resource, have the potential to cause problems in the 
client relationship.  The chapter takes each of the gaps in turn, commencing with 
the relationship gap. 
6.2 The relationship gap 
The evidence confirms that those who have worked in the profession for many 
years have seen the structure of HMRC change beyond all recognition.  This 
change (a forecast storm) was anticipated by Dabner (2012).  This has had a 
huge impact on the relationship between HMRC and the participants in this study 
as the following suggests: 
If you were to ask me what significant changes have taken place in the last 
5-10 years, I think the biggest change is the Revenue reorganisation.  This 
is one change which denies the practitioner the opportunity to talk to 
someone from the revenue and I think that is a really big issue……in days 
gone by at least you could talk problems through, even if you came up 
against a blank wall       [I/V15] 
Some participants remember the days when they knew the name of local tax 
inspectors, who at that time had a specific portfolio of taxpayers to look after, and 
with whom the practitioner spoke regularly.  There was thus a personal, named 
contact within HMRC who was accessible to the practitioners, and what is clear 
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from the findings is that this was thought to be some sort of ‘proper’ relationship 
which as I/V15 explains above, is now lost.  
I/V23 was more specific: 
[it was] quite an open framework and I think that framework has now gone.  
You probably do not know the person dealing with your clients…you have 
not got an ongoing relationship with them and actually the dynamic is very 
different to what it was before.  
The participants noted that even written correspondence is now sent to a central 
point, rather than direct to a named person, so practitioners have little idea who 
is dealing with matters.  The lack of contact described by I/V15 above goes 
deeper than just having someone to whom they could pick up the telephone – 
there used to be a meaningful, working relationship, as suggested by I/V23.  This 
relationship appeared, formerly, to be part of the normal working day for 
practitioners.  Many lamented this loss of personal contact (and the help from 
HMRC staff that could be derived from this relationship).  Many suggested that if 
they could alter anything, it would be to change the relationship back to how it 
used to be.  The loss of this direct relationship was also observed by Keith 
Gordon, Barrister at Temple Tax Chambers who provided oral evidence to the 
Treasury Sub-Committee (2018, at question 52); also by Maas (2015) in his 
speech to the ICAEW Tax Faculty; and was also reported in HMRC research 
findings (2014b).  The advantage of the former relationship was reassurance for 
the practitioner.  Reassurance they could speak with someone who knew their 
client, knew the locality, knew and understood the workings of the client’s 
business, and who could provide help and assistance if required, i.e. a trusted 
individual who could be approached if needed.  This has all but disappeared and 
I/V4 even felt that HMRC had no idea who the practitioner was.  This has had a 
profound effect on the relationship between HMRC and the practitioner, as will 
be seen below, resulting in increasing uncertainty in an already complex system.   
A better relationship between HMRC and the practitioners was seen as 
necessary to ensure a seamless working relationship between HMRC, the 
practitioner and the client: 
…we’re desperate to have a better relationship with the Revenue, we’re 
happy to correspond by email, we’re happy to phone them up.  We’re 
happy to have a customer relationship manager [this was a HMRC 
member of staff, a point of contact for compliance for businesses to ensure 
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coherent customer management] because we know that would assist our 
relationship with the client, and make things work more smoothly….  
         [FG2] 
Frustration was evident in this regard:  
You can never get through to them, you can’t get to speak to them, they 
have to ring you, you can’t send emails, and explaining [that] to a 
client…you can’t…..(exasperated and lost for words)  [I/V14]  
In general, there are perceived barriers which prevent access to any help at all 
beyond the initial telephone call, or getting past the ‘receptionist’, as it was 
described by I/V13. 
However, begrudging acceptance of the situation is also evident.  
…we just can’t get to that [better relationship] because the level of 
resources within the Revenue is insufficiently large or has insufficient 
expertise to allow us to do that.     [FG2] 
What is described here (and acknowledged by this participant) is a huge 
organisational change that of course has implications for HMRC itself and yet 
impacts upon the practitioner’s role immeasurably.  The relationship that 
previously existed a number of years ago which meant practitioners were happy 
to converse with HMRC (to mutual benefit it seems – or certainly so in the eyes 
of the participants) has evaporated. Interestingly, the quotes above come from 
those without a former HMRC working relationship.  As discussed in Section 
5.3.1, some participants have HMRC experience and maintain contacts within the 
organisation, hence their experiences may differ, although they too may face 
challenges in the relationship given the changes in the organisation as is further 
discussed below.  Additionally, of course, those with less experience may not 
even appreciate this former relationship existed, but those that do have seen a 
relationship that has been transformed and this has consequences.  The ‘trust 
gap’ is one consequence, as is the ‘knowledge gap’, that is the “insufficient 
expertise” identified by FG2. Both these gaps are explored below. 
6.3 The trust gap 
The word “trust” featured a number of times in the findings, in the context of the 
practitioners’ relationship with HMRC.  Additionally, “mutual trust and respect” is 
a phrase in the taxpayers’ charter, and interestingly also used by Maas (2015) 
who refers to it in the past tense when describing working practices with HMRC. 
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Bober (2012), De Cogan (2011) and Gracia and Oats (2012a) observe that if trust 
is damaged it can affect the relationship to such an extent that the operation of 
the tax system may be at risk.  Trust between both parties is therefore extremely 
important in such a relationship. 
The trust gap is split into various subsections, as different matters have diverse 
impacts upon trust in the relationship, these are; the unfriendly relationship; the 
impact of HMRC powers; and the impact of HMRC working practices, including 
both negative and positive impacts. 
6.3.1 The unfriendly relationship – the antagonistic relationship with tax 
practitioners 
Many participants made comments about how they thought HMRC perceived 
them. Opinion varied, but there was a distinct feeling among the majority that 
attitudes towards practitioners are not the same as in the past.  The reason for 
this was thought to be related to the toughening stance of HMRC in respect of 
unacceptable tax avoidance, and the pressure to collect as much tax as possible, 
as described in the context to the practitioners’ environment (Chapter 2).  There 
was a feeling that they were seen in an unfavourable light (as also indicated by 
Addison and Mueller, 2015; Mazars, 2014) although, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
most said they had never been involved with unacceptable tax avoidance in any 
case.  The responsibilities of the practitioner to their client and HMRC are 
explored further in Chapter 7, however, not all practitioners have partaken in the 
tax avoidance market and yet, many appear to feel the fallout from this reduction 
in trust in a number of ways which is consistent with comments by Gracia and 
Oats (2012a) and Mazars (2014).  It seems that some feel ‘tarred with the same 
brush’ as the international tax lawyers, or Big 4 who have been in the media 
spotlight, despite serving a different market.  Some participants clearly feel less 
comfortable in the tax practitioner role in the current environment, as will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7.  Participants acknowledged the changed 
environment in which they work and that the rules of the game as they knew them 
are no longer valid as the following quotes show. 
I/V11 referred to more “hostile” relations with HMRC.  The feeling was that HMRC 
now view the practitioner as an ‘us and them sort of thing’.  This interestingly 
contradicts HMRC publications which acknowledge the importance of tax 
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practitioners (Kantar Public research for HMRC, 2018). As discussed in Chapter 
5 and the ‘HMRC expectation’ some felt that HMRC are increasingly side-lining 
the practitioner by targeting the taxpayer (client) directly.  This therefore has 
consequences for the practitioner/client relationship.  For instance, I/V16 and 
I/V23 referred to a shift in how HMRC approach taxpayers who are represented 
by a practitioner. Letters which would, in the past, have come to the practitioner, 
are sent directly to the client with a copy to the practitioner.  There is also a time 
lag before the practitioner obtains a copy, which was thought to be intentional.  
This therefore puts pressure on the client/practitioner relationship (I/V 23). The 
practitioner cannot forewarn their client of the contents of the letter, and this puts 
the practitioner on the ‘back foot’, as they may not be aware correspondence has 
been issued until the client calls them.   
I/V23 explains: 
The way that their letters are phrased - they are very abrupt, direct, 
aggressive and if you have not been able to talk to your client in advance 
and say actually this is on its way, take it as it is meant - it is formal, but 
we can deal with the questions behind it…that is a very different 
conversation to having one with the client who says I have received this 
today, [it] says I can be locked up, if I don’t respond within 28 days and 
there is a massive list at the back, what does it mean? 
I/V24 (colleague of I/V23) agreed: 
Always very scary, human rights law, penalties telling you the worst, which 
is all very calculated from the revenue perspective – they have got very 
clever with their nudges and prompts and use of language. 
The above illustrates changes in HMRC behaviour and leaves the practitioner 
feeling less in control of the client’s situation.  If what is said is correct, and the 
delay experienced by the practitioner in obtaining a copy of the client letter is 
intentional, this illustrates an example of the exercise of power by HMRC, as 
suggested by Gracia and Oats (2012a).  HMRC has dominance over the 
practitioner’s position within the tax field, as there is little they can do about it.   
The use of “nudges and prompts” and aggressive language as described by I/V24 
is also indicative of this, as highlighted by Lymer (2018) and McCleod (2013).  
This action and the wording of such correspondence makes the client 
uncomfortable and worried (indeed, as Clegg, 2021 observed, some taxpayers 
may feel “intimidated”).  Practitioners described themselves as the buffer 
between the client and the revenue, and one role is to act as a ‘defender’ of the 
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client (see Chapter 7) and to protect them from HMRC (as observed by Brock 
and Russel, 2015) and this role becomes weakened in these instances.   The 
client cannot be advised and reassured in advance of receiving the letter and 
these procedures were said to put a wedge between the client and practitioner.  
What is described is a change in practice by HMRC which has impact upon the 
practitioners’ relationship with HMRC (and the client too).   
I/V23 views the above as an attempt by HMRC to operate “outside” the tripartite 
relationship, and liaise with the client directly rather than via the practitioner (as 
also observed by Dabner, 2012 who explores changing relationships between tax 
authorities and practitioners).  But why such a change? Is this because trust in 
the practitioner has reduced?   Practitioners have attracted ‘bad press’ in recent 
years and there is reduced trust in the tax profession in general (Addison and 
Mueller, 2015; Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016; Mazars, 2014; Radcliffe et al., 
2018) and consequently the tax practitioner working environment is changing 
(Chapter 2).  The regulators (HMRC) response to the practitioner and taxpayer, 
as stakeholders in the field has changed.  Possibly, in HMRC’s judgement, the 
role the practitioner has is questionable.  The practitioner will want to help a client 
achieve an efficient tax position where possible, which may be at odds with 
HMRC’s objectives to increase tax revenue. Hence HMRC may begin to side-line 
the practitioner to communicate with taxpayers directly about a tax audit.  May 
the client may be inclined to favour HMRC’s view about their tax position?  Will 
they thus act in accordance with the ‘nudges’ within the correspondence they 
receive (Clegg, 2021), rather than engage with the advice from their practitioner?  
It may be that the client wishes to ‘settle’ quickly to remove the pressure they feel 
from HMRC, irrespective of whether HMRC have a case, or not.  As per the 
discussion in Chapter 5, clients tend to believe those in authority (and hence this 
is indicative of power over the taxpayer).  Here there is a power shift away from 
the practitioner to the revenue authority.  This (along with the evidence of the 
APPG regarding the loan charge) brings into question the power of such 
authorities.   
There is also evidence of a change in practice in how tax audits may be resolved.  
FG5, whilst reminiscing about the past, refers to the loss of the pragmatic HMRC 
view which enabled an agreed resolution of disputed tax questions (although 
there are instances that this still exists as discussed at Section 6.3.4).  Each party, 
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in the past, felt they had trust in the other to settle certain issues as Maas (2015) 
also highlights.  For example, if both HMRC and the practitioner were of the view 
that there could be protracted negotiations ahead, then the commercial effect 
would be considered, so you could: 
cut to the chase…you would both be sensible and you would say, well, it’s 
going to take a long time to do it this way, let’s just shake hands on it…but 
because they have all become entrenched in their little bit, you don’t get 
that anymore.       [FG5] 
Today, there appears to be less chance of such negotiation, and instead a 
‘digging in of the heels’ on the part of HMRC.  A negotiator role (see Chapter 7) 
was one which the practitioner saw as part of their remit, yet the new rules of the 
game within the tax field, and particularly in the relationship between HMRC and 
the tax practitioner, may weaken this. I/V15 described HMRC as having a “pre-
determined view” or “their minds are fairly fixed” and hence found HMRC unwilling 
to be pragmatic and draw a conclusion to matters with mutual agreement.  I/V19 
comments were similar, describing “preconceived ideas and they will not be 
persuaded otherwise”. I/V25 described some inspectors as “not wanting to 
budge”, or not “having it any other way”, and they were not prepared to listen to 
the practitioner.  These comments derive from practitioners who have a variety 
of experience, I/V15 in particular has many years of experience and acts as 
adviser to other practitioners.  These experiences are very similar to that outlined 
by Gordon in the evidence provided to the Treasury Sub-Committee (2018, 
question 34) and the views expressed by Maas (2015) as discussed in Chapter 
3 – that HMRC “knows best”.  The flexibility remarked upon by participants in 
Hasseldine, et al’s. (2011) study appears to have diminished.  It may be that such 
interventions would require use of discretion, which, HMRC no longer wish to 
exercise (according to Dabner, 2012, 2015).  If negotiation is not possible the 
practitioner has to decide whether to try the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)10 mechanism.  However, it was noted that the ADR is not available in some 
cases (if the disagreement is about penalties and interest), and that the only 
solution would be to take the disagreement in such cases to a tribunal. I/V15 
                                                             
10 This is explained as follows: “ADR involves an HMRC officer trained in mediation skills and techniques 
who acts as neutral third party without forming a view on who is right or wrong. As the mediator they’ll 
help you [the taxpayer] and the HMRC officer resolve a dispute together.” HMRC (n.d), Alternative 





suggested that this may not be an easy solution for some practitioners or 
taxpayers, as they may not feel comfortable putting a case together – that is they 
may lack experience, and some may not wish to go through the process (and 
cost may also be an issue).  Additionally, Gordon’s evidence to the Treasury Sub-
Committee, (2018) suggests that some cases may be pursued by HMRC and 
pushed to tribunal even when the practitioner views they have little chance of 
winning.   There may be a resource issue here in that the smaller practitioner may 
not have the experience or time or budget to see a case through to tribunal, even 
if the taxpayer is willing to pursue this.  Outside assistance may be required, 
whereas larger firms may have in house experience and support to facilitate such 
matters.  Many factors may come into play however, as the amount of tax at stake 
is likely to be a fundamental issue, as well as the nature of the client and their 
appetite to challenge HMRC’s opinion.  The smaller business client or individual 
may be less willing to enter into such challenges, than perhaps larger MNEs, or 
more wealthy individuals who are more likely to be represented by a Big 4 firm 
for instance. 
Furthermore, some practitioners referred to “weak” arguments raised by 
inspectors in recent audits into taxpayers’ returns (although I/V2 recognised this 
was an attempt to protect the “UK tax net”, as inspectors will be under pressure 
to bring in increased revenue).  Examples were provided of those considered 
unusual including disagreements over warranty provisions, and disputes about a 
car benefit in kind calculation.  Very often the tax at stake is not large, and 
although the practitioner has a robust position (or feel they do), the practitioner 
will agree to ‘settle’ the case rather than run up large fees.  The fact that this 
occurs is further illustrative of the power (or capital) of HMRC.  Gracia and Oats 
(2012a, p.314) suggested that “interpretations of texts” may be manipulated by 
those with power “in order to regularise and control practice consistent with its 
interpretations” – could this be what is happening here?  Is HMRC using the 
vague and indeterminate language of the law to its advantage?  Or is it a case of 
tax inspectors (or practitioners) misunderstanding matters?  It is up to the 
practitioner to deal with these issues on behalf of the client.   If the position is 
settled to save aggravation and rising practitioner fees, this does beg the question 
of how much tax is paid which is not actually due (which resonates with comments 
by Maas 2015).   
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Many comments were made about how HMRC used to be tasked with collecting 
the right amount of tax (that is as opposed to the maximum amount of tax).  As 
I/V5, a former HMRC inspector, says: 
… we were always told in the revenue, your job is to get the tax position 
right, not as a lot of people assume, get the maximum amount of tax, but 
to get the right amount of tax. 
However, the thought today is that there has been a paradigm shift – and now 
the maximum amount of tax is what inspectors seek to collect.  The above 
comments may illustrate this position. 
I/V19 also held this opinion, yet remarked 
taxpayers really are allowed to arrange their affairs, so they don’t have to 
pay the maximum amount of tax”  
and suggested that an unrepresented taxpayer may not manage to do this, as  
I think they [HMRC] would look out for maximising tax [of the 
unrepresented taxpayer] – that is my perception.   
I/V24 also felt that 
The revenue has shifted -  where they would have had an open mind…now 
they come at things from how they get to the position where it is the most 
tax…. 
Additionally, I/V25 described HMRC as:  
“…less understanding now. They [say] this is what it is!  There is ‘so much 
tax to collect’ and they are having it!  I don’t think they see it from the 
taxpayer’s perspective much anymore…before they did…they had that 
relationship with you and they knew you were not trying to pull a fast one.   
HMRC was described as “aggressive” in their approach to anti-avoidance and 
employment taxes by I/V22, who also advised that there is a need to “protect 
clients” from these situations, as also identified by the APPG regarding the loan 
charge.  I/V22 further commented that: 
…I think they are out of order quite a lot and they are just trying to bully 
people into sticking their hands up for stuff which is not actually true, or 
pushing them into settlements and things like that, so they are a bit 
aggressive at the top end…having said that…most people in the revenue 
are trying their best to do a good job, but there are not enough of them.  
There are a number of issues which are apparent from the quotes above. The 
practitioner uses the term ‘bully’; Maas (2015) says the same. There is a 
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suggestion that today there is far less understanding of the taxpayer’s position.  
Similar could be said of the discussion around the loan charge as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Some may suggest taxpayers should have had their eyes open to the 
effect of how they were remunerated and therefore HMRC are right in their 
approach to chase underpayments and yet, others would disagree.  The above 
is not about the loan charge per se, but one can see similarities as there has been 
a change in the attitude towards taxpayers (as well as practitioners).  Gracia and 
Oats (2012a) also suggest an increasing aggression towards taxpayers.  The 
practitioner’s role of facilitator (see Chapter 7) is made difficult, as HMRC appear 
obstructive, and can draw on their position and power within the tax field to be 
so. The loss of the mutually beneficial relationship is mentioned yet again by 
I/V25.  There are many issues here and there is an impact on the trust between 
the practitioner and HMRC, and vice versa, and this has created a much changed 
relationship for the practitioner to manage. 
6.3.2 Impact of HMRC powers 
As suggested above, there are reports that HMRC lack of understanding of the 
situations in which clients find themselves.  Regulatory practice has impact upon 
society and consequently lives.   Regulators, should be disinterested (Gracia and 
Oats, 2012a, referring to Bourdieu), but the practitioners recognise that taxpayers 
are human beings and may expect some sort of empathy or understanding of 
their situations. I/V10 recalls a situation where HMRC were told that their client 
(a new client who had approached them to help them unravel participation in a 
tax avoidance scheme) would pay an Advanced Payment Notice (tax to be paid 
prior to the determination of a tax avoidance case), on the receipt of funds from 
the sale of a property.  This could be proven, and yet no account was taken of 
this explanation, instead, the client was taken to court.  This situation elicited the 
following comment: 
It is that sort of intransigent, dogmatic... [attitude]…which is what we are 
facing more and more and every day with HMRC.  It is as they are 
gradually being given more powers and more freedom, aren’t they? 
Effectively?  And with that power [it] is going to their head a little bit.  [I/V10] 
The same practitioner described this as “disconcerting” and “…it does feel like 
you are dealing with a very sort of Orwellian State, and it did not used to be”. 
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Reference is made here to the wider powers HMRC have attained in recent years.  
The practitioner’s appeal to HMRC to wait for the funds was ignored.  The impact 
of this approach on this particular practitioner’s opinion of HMRC is clear to see. 
The practitioner suggested that some taxpayers had found themselves in very 
difficult circumstances, given a change in the approach of HMRC towards film 
schemes and EBTs and similar (see Chapter 2).  The question was asked why 
HMRC had not given ‘health warnings’ much sooner.  Film schemes in particular 
were, it was suggested, viewed as investment opportunities when first developed, 
yet the narrative, over a long period of time has changed immeasurably, resulting 
in the consequences described above.  The practitioner observed that these 
issues affect many taxpayers, and not just the “ultra-wealthy”.  
This particular practitioner has come to expect trouble, difficulties, and poor 
relationships in general with HMRC.  Trust between both parties has been 
seriously weakened.  This may not be as a result of this particular incidence 
alone, but is likely to be a combination of many of the examples given.  Indeed, 
Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016) suggest that if the tax return system is adversarial 
in anyway, this may affect one’s attitude towards it.  
Perhaps, in acknowledgement of all these ‘shifts’ in attitude and changes in the 
taxpayer’s environment, there does appear to be a softening of the attitude of the 
tax tribunals (the first ‘court’ stage of resolving disagreements with HMRC) 
towards taxpayers.  
….at the revenue level they continue to write out and deny the taxpayer 
any rights.  At the tribunal level the tribunal is now much more willing to 
look at the circumstances      [I/V15] 
This appears to suggest that the tribunals are taking more account of the taxpayer 
circumstances than HMRC initially do.  The practitioner referred to imbalance in 
the rights between HMRC and the client.  S/he suggests these matters now 
appear to be acknowledged via the tribunal system, and that taxpayers are seen 
in a more sympathetic light.  Perhaps in a simplistic sense one could see this as 
an attempt to address the power balance away from HMRC.  But, as mentioned, 
not everyone is able (has the skills or the time or expertise) or is willing to take a 
case to a tribunal (Gracia and Oats, 2012a) which may preclude some taxpayers 




6.3.3 The impact of HMRC working practices 
The frustration caused by the ‘generalist’ (i.e. not specialist - see below) expertise 
of HMRC was evident, although some participants were more concerned than 
others.  The following exchange, which takes place between IV10 and I/V11 (an 
interview undertaken jointly) illustrates clear frustration with the ‘general’ sections 
of HMRC, although a specialist team is defended.  The exchange below came in 
answer to the researcher asking what the practitioner thinks makes their job 
difficult: 
[I/V10] HMRC. HMRC without any question. The intransigence, the 
incompetence, and the downright ‘you can’t speak to anybody who knows 
anything’ and that has changed so much in my career.  It used to be that 
you could phone somebody who knew what they were talking about and 
you could have a sensible discussion. The more computerised they have 
become, the more frustrating and the more time consuming. It is time you 
cannot recover from clients and I would say that that is the biggest single 
issue that we have got. They are utterly incompetent. And the time we 
spend trying to sort out and work around their systems, which is 
irrecoverable.  To me -  HMRC is the biggest challenge we face.  
[I/V11] I would actually not agree with that 
[I/V10] That’s because you don’t do much compliance 
[I/V11] Well, I oversee it and I am in the same room as everyone who deals 
with the compliance but the compliance is with HMRC xxx team on the 
whole 
[I/V10] Ah OK. 
[I/V11] They are the people which you can get some common sense from. 
They are an office.  So from my perspective they are not the biggest barrier 
for me, they do make mistakes and they do mess up, and can be a bit, you 
know, stupid at times, but on the whole I think they are one of the better 
quality offices. 
[I/V10] I would agree.  I think if you have specific dedicated officers, so if 
one of ours goes to the high net wealth unit - thank goodness - because 
you can actually speak to somebody who knows what they are talking 
about. 
It’s the general modge (sic) that just sits in the post that gets moved from 
one office to another and no one knows what is going on 
But it’s looking for a needle in a hay stack.  The majority of the time you 
are dealing with people who patently have no idea what they are talking 
about… 
This illustrates a feeling of frustration.  I/V10 also used the word ‘shambolic’ to 
describe her/his view of organisation and practice at HMRC.  The practitioner 
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cannot get on with what they believe is the work they are paid to do.  Some work 
they cannot bill, frustrating their ability to convert their knowledge into fee income.  
The work the practitioner does is in an administrative capacity.  Time is spent 
sorting out/chasing up issues with HMRC on behalf of the client.  The practitioner 
believes they have better knowledge than the generalist members of staff in 
HMRC, and frustration with this is evident.  Having said this, those within HMRC 
who are well trained, with specialist knowledge are defended. This was a 
common observation amongst many participants.  Such individuals are seen as 
a genuine source of assistance for the practitioner, as they can continue to draw 
on their expertise to help manage uncertainties in their role.  In other words, these 
individuals provide an additional source of assistance to the practitioner, and this 
discussed further 6.3.4.  The team with which I/V11 frequently works is clearly 
trusted, but there is a lack of trust between I/V10 and the ‘general’ HMRC team 
that they will be able to get things right or be helpful towards the practitioner.   
6.3.4 The positives 
Nevertheless, not all examples of the interaction with tax practitioners were 
negative. The employer compliance teams were singled out in particular for 
continuing to have “conversation” with the practitioner and the taxpayer (I/V19), 
which interestingly contrasts with the perspective of I/V22, who described these 
as “aggressive” at times. I/V12 spoke highly of the VAT teams who, it was 
explained, try to adopt a helpful approach to the taxpayer, in the interests of 
getting the VAT position correct. I/V24 referred to a pragmatic, helpful inspector, 
who looked at the overall picture and client circumstances during a tax audit to 
bring the case to a resolution.  The inspector was willing to be flexible around the 
tax issues being discussed.  It was however noted by I/V24 that it had taken 2 or 
3 years, and 3 or 4 inspectors, to get to that point.   It was evident too, that not all 
inspectors are the same. Some are more open to negotiation than others, but in 
general, there appears to be less willingness to discuss matters than in the past, 
which has implications for the taxpayer/tax practitioner/HMRC relationship as 
discussed.  This would suggest different practitioners may have different 
experiences with the same teams at HMRC.  The type of experience may be 
down to the different individual attitude of both practitioner and revenue staff.  In 
other words, tax practice in this sense may depend upon the “people, 
organisations, time and place” (Grenfell, 2014, p.223) depending upon the 
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context in which this occurs (Webb et al., 2002) and hence is an example of 
relational practice.   
6.4 The systems gap 
Many participants mentioned ‘delays’ at HMRC, some of which may be related to 
the systems within the organisation.  Delays and errors at HMRC have a severe 
impact upon the practitioner/client relationship as discussed at Chapter 5. 
6.4.1 Delays 
Various examples of delays at HMRC were given. I/V16 said that HMRC had told 
them there was a delay (at the time of the interview in 2018) of 10 weeks for post 
to be opened, i.e. not actioned, which takes even longer.  I/V11 had a case of a 
repayment claim being outstanding over 18 months.  I/V14 referred to delays 
dealing with appeals against assessments.  I/V2 said the team that deals with 
most of the firm’s clients should take 28 days to action what is sent, yet at the 
time of the interview in 2018, this took 6 months per client.  Additionally, an 
enquiry, which in the opinion of I/V2, had no reason not to be closed, had taken 
over 2 years to deal with, and was still not officially finalised. In this case the 
taxpayer was owed thousands of pounds.  The practitioner pointed out that this 
was money due to the taxpayer, which could well affect their day to day living, as 
they were not wealthy.  I/V24 referred to an enquiry in which months had gone 
by, and s/he suspected that information provided to HMRC had “dropped off the 
face of the earth” between different HMRC departments.  Interestingly, the facility 
to contact HMRC via email is only just becoming available, although as the 
ICAEW (2021) suggest there continues to be no general email facility (although 
email can be used, in certain forms, for certain types of transaction).  FG2 referred 
to one inspector who corresponded via email, which in 2015, at the date of the 
focus group, was not (surprisingly) the norm, and the other participants spoke 
wistfully of how they would appreciate the same (and such a desire was noted in 
research undertaken by HMRC, 2014b). 
If a practitioner requires assistance, the call now goes to a ‘call centre’.  Often the 
call handler is unable to answer an enquiry, and suggests a call back by another 
individual, which can take 2 or 3 days to occur.  This was found frustrating by 
many, and one participant described waiting 40 minutes for the call to be 
answered in the first place (I/V6), even if calling the agent helpline (a telephone 
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line set up by HMRC for agents only, the idea being that there is quicker access 
to assistance for practitioners using this helpline, as per the agent strategy as 
discussed at Chapter 2).  Nevertheless, I/V9 and I/V20 thought that delays were 
getting shorter and the system was getting better.   
It is clear that the pace at which HMRC works, is not the pace at which 
professional practice should or would like to work.  In professional practice, time 
is money as indicated in Chapter 5.  The cost created by delay is time that is 
difficult (or impossible) to bill and it has an effect on the time that could be spent 
on ‘chargeable’ work for other clients.  There is a clear mismatch in how the two 
systems ‘sit’ and yet, the relationship is one which must be maintained.  Matters 
such as those described above create the feeling that the value of time at HMRC 
is not important as Maas (2015) suggests.  And yet for a practitioner, time is key 
to how they bill their clients and they need to work in an efficient manner. 
Many interviewees highlighted the problems a slower system causes with clients, 
and how this can put strain on the relationship.  The following exchange illustrates 
the frustration when chasing a repayment of tax (time after time after time): 
I/V10 And you can just tell from the client’s voice when you phone them 
and say…. 
I/V11 That strain 
I/V10 that sort of  - Do I believe you,  don’t I believe you?  Have you just 
been sat doing nothing?  And I say there is nothing I can do as it is in their 
pile of post and until they process that post, phoning them doesn’t actually 
do anything. You can just hear in their voice that they think that you can’t 
be bothered to do it, or bothered to chase it up. 
The clients mentioned here thus question the expertise of the practitioner and 
hence their legitimacy.  They do not know whether to continue to trust the 
practitioner.  This creates additional work, a problem with fees and impacts upon 
the role of facilitator (i.e. helping to ensure taxpayers have good interaction with 
the tax system) as discussed in Chapter 7.  Again, there is little the practitioner 
can do about the bureaucratic shortcomings at HMRC other than to manage this 
in the best way possible, to keep their clients informed, and to maintain their trust. 
Additionally, I/V14 commented: 
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You are in the firing line from the client, although they do tend to 
understand now, but it is letting them know that most of the people at the 
revenue are just admin people as they cannot answer questions. 
This is quite a telling comment.  Expertise is no longer expected, rather those 
answering the telephones are seen just to represent an administrative, rather 
than expert, function.  That is, the practitioner’s knowledge is again seen as 
superior, and the practitioner advises the clients as such, to protect their 
legitimacy in the client’s eyes and to preserve the trust in that relationship.  
Delays cause resentment and frustration.  Yet further resentment arises about 
HMRC information requests. Practitioners are required to send information within 
30 days of the date (not receipt) of the letter.  Many pointed out that when the 
letter arrives, some days after it was written, this cuts down their time to comply 
with such instruction immensely.  If they do not send what is needed when asked, 
they are subject to various actions, and so the practitioners nevertheless comply.  
This situation prompts the practitioner to further question the authority and power 
of HMRC.  More than one practitioner raised this disparity in deadline time limits 
as unfair and “ridiculous”, and there was temptation to ignore the deadlines, and 
take the same length of time to respond as HMRC take, in turn, to respond to the 
practitioners.  There was clear annoyance that the rules which apply to the 
practitioner did not apply to HMRC, but again, practitioners take note of HMRC 
powers; they have no alternative but to comply.  These comments can be 
compared to those of Maas (2015) who had similar experiences and feelings. 
This is also highlighted by I/V19: 
Yes, it is ridiculous, you know we have to wait and wait and wait for replies, 
yet when it is on the other foot, you have to jump about then getting 
information together, getting valuations done, and whatever they 
request…. 
6.4.2 Errors  
HMRC errors featured in the discussions.  Errors in letters (I/V6), erroneous 
penalty and interest claims (FG4), erroneous advice, repeated errors in PAYE 
codes (I/V25), and so on.  As explained in Section 5.5 about management of 
client expectations, clients may not believe HMRC can get things wrong, and may 
automatically assume what is said, or the amount of tax demanded to be correct.  
Part of the practitioners’ role is to check things on behalf of clients, in their 
defender role (see Chapter 7).   Some errors were thought to result from technical 
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incompetence and lack of training. Such errors were described as “irritating” 
(I/V22).   I/V10 was lost for words when trying to explain the amount of time spent 
sorting out the “messes” that HMRC were making on an almost daily basis.  This 
clearly had changed the nature of the practitioner’s job. Compliance was not an 
issue in the “old days”, but today, there are lots of problems as “you are dealing 
with systems that don’t work”.  The issues practitioners highlight here are related 
to what is felt to be inferior capital in HMRC, in terms of their poor knowledge and 
poor resources; which practitioners nevertheless, sympathetically acknowledge 
is difficult for the staff within that organisation to deal with.  Ultimately, it is the 
practitioner who has to manage this on behalf of the clients they represent.   
Some of the errors, practitioners suggested, were linked to the computerisation 
of systems, and the lack of human input (in exercising knowledge and judgement) 
to consider whether what was being sent to the taxpayer was correct, with “tax 
codes and stuff … just done by the computer and just churned out…but could 
just be a load of nonsense” (I/V6).  Numerous errors in tax codes were mentioned 
and I/V10 described them as landing like “confetti” on the taxpayers’ doorsteps, 
as often one code after another is sent to the same taxpayer.  Practitioners may 
be well versed in correcting errors in tax codes on behalf of taxpayers, but it begs 
the question about those who are unrepresented (and take at face value what 
has been issued).  Practitioners may try to get the code corrected, but the 
correction may then not be actioned on a timely basis (further delay problems) or 
further errors may ensue.  Whilst this may seem a small issue in the scheme of 
things, such a simple matter can take on huge significance when clients get 
annoyed, and the practitioner is in the firing line (I/V10) for the taxpayers’ 
frustrations.  This is further evidence of the mismatch between the speeds at 
which private practice and HMRC operate and the reference to computer 
“nonsense” relates to problems with digitalisation.   There are penalties for 
taxpayer error and mistake, but no reciprocal system for the organisation (see 
Cave, 2020, citing Cullinane in this respect).  This creates resentment and puts 
further pressure on the trust in the relationship. 
6.4.3 Increasing digitalisation 
Practitioner frustration when asking for help at HMRC was evident.  More than 
one practitioner used the phrase “computer says no!” when clearly the practitioner 
thought the answer should be otherwise. 
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More “human contact” was desired by I/V5, having found it difficult to obtain any 
help at all regarding a particular tax issue, given the closure of enquiry offices. 
I/V5 felt sorry for those taxpayers who do not have any professional 
representation.  Interestingly, I/V5 (who has former HMRC experience) mused 
that HMRC appear, today, to not want practitioners to act for taxpayers (given the 
negative publicity they have received in recent years) and yet -  the face to face 
help required from HMRC is no longer there for those with no representation.  
Face to face contact has been replaced by telephone helplines, yet, these too 
come in for criticism from both the agent’s perspective (as discussed above) and 
the taxpayer’s perspective (I/V14 referred to a taxpayer who had spent 2 hours 
trying to provide HMRC with bank details).  Some may say that in the internet 
age, the HMRC webpages are there to help, which of course they are, and yet 
this form of assistance was also criticised by some practitioners, but not all, as 
seen below. 
Interestingly, the general practitioners I/V9, I/V20/21 (joint interviewees) were 
happy not to interact with HMRC in a personal capacity.  I/V20/21 used what they 
described as helpful resources from HMRC webpages where possible.  These 
included webinars and access via an “agent portal” to allow them to work 
remotely, thus reducing the need for direct contact with HMRC.  These type of 
resources were praised. Interestingly however, as discussed below at 6.5.2, 
these practitioners also doubted the value of using HMRC helplines – which may 
have a bearing on their views.  Additionally, perhaps the nature of their roles 
allows more limited contact with HMRC.  General practitioners may come across 
less complex matters which do not require as much HMRC contact, which may 
allow them to keep the physical relationship with HMRC at arm’s length. 
Some participants also questioned whether HMRC’s systems would cope with 
new Making Tax Digital (MTD) systems (see Chapter 2).  Given other 
experiences (a new HMRC reporting system for trusts was mentioned) 
practitioners were worried about this.  One practitioner noted “set back after set 
back” and “zero support” for the (at the time) recently introduced trust reporting 
system.  HMRC staff were not blamed here, rather the decision to introduce a 
new system, possibly too early for it to work properly was the issue – leaving both 
the practitioner and HMRC staff in the dark about how it should work and how to 
resolve the problems with it.  
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Some practitioners felt MTD had been rushed in, only for this to be then followed 
by a delay (see Chapter 2) which has a big impact on practitioners’ planning. The 
implication here is that the economic consequences of action (or inaction) in one 
field (here HMRC or the wider political or parliamentary fields and the decisions 
made within them) are not considered on others affected by decisions or 
changes, in this instance practitioners, specifically in the tax field.  One 
organisation had been planning forward, reducing staff numbers, and buying 
[software] licences to prepare for the introduction of MTD, only for the 
implementation of it to then be delayed.  This created unexpected costs and 
staffing issues.  As explained 
I think for a firm like ours the lack of clarity or certainty from HMRC [causes 
many problems] -  we all go rushing off down that path, suddenly we stop 
there, screech to a halt and all go rushing off down that one! 
The principle of MTD itself was not seen to be an issue, but the method of bringing 
in the changes and the readiness, or otherwise, of HMRC and its systems was 
criticised. 
Some observed lack of HMRC engagement with taxpayers about MTD in general.  
I/V20 and I/V21 felt that it was down to them to educate taxpayers, rather than 
HMRC.  Other firms were offering open evenings to explain it.  This is illustrative 
of the role the practitioner plays in acting as a ‘conduit’ of information between 
HMRC and the taxpayer (Brock and Russell, 2015), in other words, translating 
into simple terms the action which will be needed to keep the tax system running 
in the new desired format. ICAEW (2020c) highlighted that poor knowledge and 
poor communications from HMRC were amongst a number of issues behind non-
compliance, hence the feelings of I/V20 and I/V21 appear to be correct here.  
These roles may be similar to those described by Tomasic and Pentony (1991), 
as being tantamount to unpaid employees of the tax authority– that is the 
practitioners work on behalf of the tax authority to advise and educate taxpayers 
of upcoming changes to the tax system. 
Practitioners need HMRC systems to work to provide the facilitator role as 
discussed in Chapter 7.  Without this, problems are created for client work and 
impact upon fees.  Nevertheless, having said the above, it was acknowledged by 
I/V10 and I/V11 (joint interviewees), that the people behind the design of HMRC 
systems share the frustrations of those who have to use those systems.  These 
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participants also recognised that there are bound to be problems in such a 
“massive” organisation.  These observations came from the participants’ 
attendance at an event hosted by HMRC, hence the event enabled the 
practitioners to see the human face (particularly of the “techy guys” [I/V11]) 
behind HMRC: 
[That] was a day when they wanted to consult with people like us [the 
practitioners] and you know they were great, fantastic people - you really 
felt like they were taking on board what you were saying. They 
acknowledged the failings of the system, but they were going to do their 
best. You almost have to remind yourself that these are the people that 
make up HMRC.       [I/V10] 
What the participant describes is an example of engagement between HMRC 
and practitioners, perhaps as part of the agent strategy, as discussed in Chapter 
2.  If nothing else, it appears that the meeting improved understanding between 
both parties and reinforced that fact that people make up the organisation HMRC, 
which enables increased understanding and empathy between the attendees and 
HMRC as an organisation.  The participant appears almost surprised that 
attendance at the meeting had been so positive, and beneficial, having expressed 
that s/he was not sure what to expect.  The participant’s opinion towards HMRC 
as an organisation in this respect (the systems issues) seemed to soften 
somewhat. 
As this section explores the practitioners’ view of HMRC systems, it is appropriate 
to mention changes (as observed by the practitioners) to HMRC webpages.  This 
was touched upon in Section 5.5 about clients’ expectations of HMRC.   
The website comes in for mixed reviews, with some interviewees (1,2,6,7) feeling 
that it has been dumbed down to such an extent that it is not helpful to the 
taxpayer, and that it is far too basic, or “vague” (I/V12), even being described as 
“awful” (I/V22).  The language on the main website pages (i.e. as being distinct 
from language say in HMRC manuals, which are not readily apparent to basic 
users of the website) comes in for criticism, as being too simple.  The ‘landing 
page’ about whatever the person is searching is felt by some to be far too 
simplistic, and the concern expressed was whether a taxpayer trying to help 
themselves and do the right thing, would know that.   Practitioners realise there 
is ‘more to it’, and will know where to look to ascertain the details and more 
comprehensive rules, but some felt that there are not sufficient links to enable a 
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taxpayer to look further into issues without having more knowledge about the 
subject themselves.  Having tried to locate a tax regulation from HMRC’s 
webpages, to reference material in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the researcher found 
the same.  There were no links to such information from the landing page.  As 
I/V6 said “You can’t make something very complicated simple by putting simple 
guidance on the revenue website….it is a minefield”.  Other observations 
included: 
If you are a taxpayer genuinely trying your best and if you need to get 
some clarity on something quick to make a business decision … it would 
take you a week and then they would be none the wiser -  and that is where 
we come in.          [I/V22] 
Given the suggested attempt to weaken the relationship between the practitioner 
and the client, one would expect information in a form to encourage or enable 
taxpayers to undertake some of their own tax obligations, would be available.  
HMRC webpages will be an obvious source of assistance – but there are 
weaknesses as described above.  Victoria Todd also criticised the simplicity of 
the webpages, and suggested that this can create problems for the taxpayer, 
during the provision of evidence to the Treasury Sub-Committee (2018, 
paragraph 68).  She stated: 
Even the simple information is in parts misleading; in parts it is wrong…It 
has impacts for HMRC...How can people meet their obligations if they do 
not have the information they need to do that?   
The role of the adviser is examined further in Chapter 7, but here, the value of 
the knowledge of the practitioner is again illustrated.  The suggestion is that it will 
be more beneficial for taxpayers to use the services of the practitioner to attain 
the correct tax position and fulfil their tax obligations, rather than ‘go it alone’, 
even if relying upon HMRC official webpages.  Of course, clients pay a fee for 
doing so, so it may be questioned whether the participants would say anything 
otherwise.  Additionally, of course, the complexity of the tax system creates work 
for the tax practitioner.  Nevertheless, some taxpayers may not be able to pay for 
representation.  Examination of how an unrepresented taxpayer fulfils their tax 
obligations is another avenue for future exploration. 
It is also of note that information on the HMRC webpages is not trusted by some 
practitioners, and they check information from it with other sources.  
Nevertheless, some think the HMRC materials are reasonably helpful, and 
193 
 
provide useful information for the taxpayer and themselves.  Many find them easy 
to use.  But all are aware that they can find additional information via other less 
visible pages on the HMRC website (whether they rely on HMRC information is 
a different matter) which may not be within the reach of the ordinary taxpayer.  
Additionally, practitioners have access to other resources to help ascertain a 
taxpayer’s position as discussed in Chapter 7 and hence they can help 
represented taxpayers navigate the system and its difficulties. 
6.5 The knowledge gap 
The knowledge/expertise of HMRC staff was briefly discussed in Chapter 5 under 
the HMRC/client expectation gap.   
Knowledge levels of front line staff at HMRC were thought to be poor by the whole 
range of practitioners in this study, including the general and niche practitioners.  
Nevertheless, at times, assistance was said to be satisfactory, although this 
appeared to be the exception.  There was a general feeling that the help obtained 
(or not) depended upon who at HMRC answered the telephone.  It was felt to be 
‘hit and miss’ as to whether one could speak to a knowledgeable or helpful 
individual.  Poor understanding of tax issues and lack of technical knowledge by 
some at HMRC was identified as a problem, and this was in part thought to be 
owing to insufficient training. 
As IV/2 remarked: 
Weren’t they boasting that when they brought in that agents [help] line that 
you would speak to someone with at least one year’s experience? Is that 
really a boast!  Without being awful they haven’t really got a lot of 
knowledge…. 
The one-year training period was also criticised by members of the focus group. 
When practitioners contact HMRC, they are aware that their call will be answered 
by any number of staff in a call centre.  There is a feeling of being “passed from 
pillar to post and you don’t get anybody who really has a technical knowledge, 
and sometimes the interest, to answer your question.” (FG1). The call centre 
arrangement was viewed by participants as response to reductions in staff 
numbers, but if this does not work satisfactorily there will be consequences, not 
just for the tax practitioner/client relationship, but also for the unrepresented 
taxpayers (as discussed above). 
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Whilst poor tax technical knowledge of helpline staff was criticised by participants 
so was lack of flexibility to deal with different client circumstances, both of which 
are further discussed in Section 6.5.1. 
6.5.1 One size fits all 
The participants described their experiences of using HMRC telephone helplines.  
If help was required for technical style questions, such as where something is 
entered on a tax return (an example of pension details was given by I/V21), the 
HMRC response was generally praised. This kind of help, however, does not 
require tax knowledge per se, which differentiates it from the kind of knowledge 
required to help with tax questions.  The experience of those using the helpline 
for assistance with tax queries revealed either that no answer, or a wrong answer 
was given, or the answer provided was too “tentative” (I/V13) and not sufficient.  
The manner in which responses were given were variously described as reading 
from a “script” (I/V16), or a “flow chart” (I/V13).  This hinders the ability of staff to 
provide a contextualised response.  I/V15 lamented the lack of “opportunities for 
discretion” as, it was noted, “we are human beings and you do need discretion”. 
It is fair to say that many of the practitioners no longer access help in this manner.   
As the comment from I/V15 indicates, there is room for improvement: 
[T]he revenue are unsympathetic about taxpayers who they think as 
reasonable people sitting on the Clapham Omnibus [who] should be able 
to deal with tax issues and [who] could ring them up. In a recent case I had 
it was quite clear that the notes kept by the revenue of the telephone calls 
were insufficient to say, or show, what had exactly been discussed by the 
client/taxpayer or indeed whether the taxpayer understood what had been 
said. Quite clearly in the case I have got….it is a case where the taxpayer 
did not understand what the revenue were saying, but at every point the 
revenue are saying, ‘well all you had to do would be ring up and we would 
tell you’, well they might have told [that to] the individual, but the individual 
did not understand. 
What is described is, in the main, a lack of understanding of the taxpayer’s (or 
tax practitioner’s) situation.  HMRC have been criticised for exercising discretion 
in the past, particularly in coming to agreement with large taxpayers about the tax 
that is to be paid which, critics would suggest, was not sufficient in amount.  These 
issues have been highlighted in the media and have become politicised (see 
Huber, 2013; Public Accounts Committee, 2011).  A possible consequence of 
these issues is what now occurs at the coal face as described above, i.e. to treat 
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every taxpayer the same and not to deviate from the ‘script’, which is what the 
practitioners seem to indicate.  This could be part of the reason why the taxpayer 
(referred to by I/V15) could not understand the explanation from HMRC.  The 
practitioners, however, acknowledge that the tax system is so complex and 
uncertain that neither help via the helpline, or help via the webpages can be 
‘boiled down’ to very simple concepts.  Each taxpayer’s circumstances may be 
unique.  This rigidness, or unwillingness, to be flexible or see beyond the basics, 
to help the practitioner help the taxpayer, has created a poor perception of some 
HMRC staff.  The word ‘numpty’ featured a couple of times, along with less 
complimentary descriptions, which are not noted here. Additionally, practitioners’ 
access to HMRC knowledge for a ruling in advance of a transaction is now also 
restricted as further discussed in Chapter 7 – that is discretion here has also been 
reduced.   Nevertheless, I/V7 suggested that, there may be some willingness to 
be flexible – but it depends who answers the call.  I/V10 suggested the same, 
and described receiving a pragmatic, practical answer as to how to resolve a tax 
issue for a client suffering with dementia.  Additionally, the offer (by one HMRC 
staff member) to simply write a note on a taxpayer’s file (rather than ask the 
practitioner to write a letter of explanation) also attracted praise.  Those giving 
these examples appeared surprised (and pleased) by such helpful, pragmatic 
approaches – which would suggest that such responses by HMRC staff are not 
considered the norm. 
However, it is important to note that there was some sympathy (see below) for 
the people working at HMRC, as the practitioners understood the situation in 
which they find themselves is not of their making.  
6.5.2 Expertise and knowledge 
As this sample of participants were qualified, or ex HMRC inspectors, or working 
for regulated firms, the training they will have undertaken will have been lengthy 
and in depth, which substantially contrasts with the 12 months training for HMRC 
frontline staff as noted.  The participants in this research also have experience of 
working in the field, which strengthens their knowledge, consistent with Cooper 
and Robson (2006), Hamilton (2013) and Stringfellow and Shaw (2009).  Many, 
as indicated at Table 4.2 in Chapter 4, have experiences gained from other tax 
practitioner settings, be that Big 4, top 10, or other smaller organisations.  Of 
course, HMRC staff too will gain experience in their roles, which becomes evident 
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in the specialist roles discussed below.  However, the participants appear to feel 
that they know more than the frontline staff.  On occasions, practitioners report 
telling HMRC staff what was possible (i.e. telling them their job), as previous 
conversations with colleagues had already ascertained this fact. As I/V7 notes: 
…if I am just ringing up about routine compliance, it is a mixture 
sometimes.  You can get someone who is really helpful or someone who 
is a bit of a numpty…I wanted to do this thing and the guy on the other end 
categorically said I could not do it and I knew full well that I could… 
I/V18 felt that sometimes HMRC staff did not understand the practitioner, and 
sometimes asked the same questions over and over, which was not helpful in 
moving the query on, or getting a resolution.  I/V18 gave the following example 
regarding calculation of foreign income: 
[They asked] how have you calculated it and we kept telling them this is 
what we have done.  But they kept coming back and saying but this is the 
effective rate, and he has paid an effective rate of this……and your 
effective rate is that. 
[We replied] but yes, this is how we calculated it! In the end we said to [the 
client], it would only be £2.5K to settle [and] we said it would be cheaper 
in terms of our fees and time, just to settle and accept their argument.  And 
that is what we did, but we settled on the basis that our fees were building 
up, rather on the fact that we did not agree with them. 
…it got to be a bit like, ‘this is how we have done it, this is how we have 
always done it’, but [they said] ‘but yes, this is the effective rate’, but [we 
said] ‘yes this is how we have done it’….it was just going on. 
I think sometimes the people at the other side do not understand. 
They accepted that and they closed that with no penalty…so they 
accepted that that people had not been careless, so it is just a difference 
of how you interpret the rules. 
I/V8 gave another example, having been engaged in rounds of correspondence 
about a company reorganisation, in which HMRC made some suggestions which 
the practitioner knew were not valid and not appropriate for the circumstances 
and did not make sense.  Correspondence went back and forth, but I/V8 stood 
ground as, it was explained, s/he had clear confidence in their own knowledge.  
It was observed that those with less knowledge may well have given in. 
There are various issues here.  Firstly, what IV/18 describes could be just as the 
practitioner sees it – an inability to see, or engage with the practitioner’s point of 
view.  But could this be seen instead as unwillingness - given the comments and 
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observations from practitioners about staff at HMRC having a pre-determined 
view, or digging in heels in order to extract as much tax as possible?  
Alternatively, it may be a misunderstanding on the part of the practitioner – 
nevertheless, the commercial element of the argument won out in the end, as it 
was cheaper to pay the tax.  This contrasts with I/V8, as the practitioner was so 
sure of the position, this was accepted by HMRC in the end.  The tax at stake 
may have been much larger, but the participant was successfully able to 
challenge HMRC’s knowledge about the transaction.  Here the technical capital 
of the practitioner wins out. 
The knowledge of those who staff the HMRC helplines was generally thought 
weak.   The general practitioners (I/V20 and I/V21), those without specific tax 
training, limited their questions for the general HMRC helpline to queries about 
compliance or registering taxpayers, or checking something, as:  
 If you ask them a question you probably get the wrong answer [I/V20] 
Yes, if it is advice, I would not say it is that good…and we just don’t ask 
for it really.  Maybe [we will call] the VAT helpline, but we take it with a 
pinch of salt, the result [as], the next person…can give you a different 
answer.         [I/V21] 
The above indicates gaps in technical tax knowledge, but practitioners also noted 
a general unwillingness by some at HMRC to understand the commercial aspects 
of a business.  More than one practitioner noted an inability to “understand 
commercial reality” (IV15), which was a criticism that was also levied at the 
inspector level.  Some of this was said to be owing to the relocation of inspectors 
away from the local areas in which they lived and worked. For instance, if a 
computer programme flagged up a change in the fortunes of a local business, 
which then became subject to enquiry (an audit), this could have been avoided if 
it had been known, say, that road works had had a severe effect on trade for 
business in that vicinity (example given by FG5).  However, a lack of commercial 
awareness was said to have always been a problem, as noted by FG3 
Last time we did a Working Together meeting with the Revenue (see the 
agent strategy details at Chapter 2) – this was a few years ago – we were 
trying to present to them the commerciality of the real world, and the fact 
that SMES weren’t spending all their days thinking about paying less tax.  
Actually it is the bottom of their agenda, because they are more bothered 
about trading. 
 Yes - having profits to pay it on!      [FG5] 
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Yeah – agreed – yeah.  And the Revenue wouldn’t get it, couldn’t get it.  
They honestly thought there was a different agenda, and it was solely a 
family moneybox, we were taking money out and not paying tax on it.  They 
didn’t see the commerciality of it.       [FG3] 
 They didn’t see these people as generating jobs   [FG2] 
There are a number of points arising from these comments.  The Working 
Together initiative, as part of the agent strategy, does not elicit the same positive 
response of I/V10 who attended an event about HMRC systems at 6.4.3 above.  
It would appear from the participant’s comments here, that their attempts to 
encourage understanding of client circumstances by their HMRC counterparts, 
were not successful.  “Working Together” in this particular respect, did not appear 
successful from the practitioner’s perspective.  Whether this divergence of views 
is indicative of the practitioner’s deeper understanding of their clients (that is they 
have more knowledge about the client than HMRC) or whether it is suggestive of 
a change in HMRC position (a pre-determined mind-set, identified by Maas, 
2015) and a requirement to increase or maximise the tax take (commented upon 
by Dabner, 2012 and Maas, 2015) is not clear to see.   The practitioners see a 
business first and foremost which then has to pay tax.  The problem they highlight 
is that in their view a wider picture (of the client) – to encompass the commercial 
aspects as well as the tax aspects of their transactions -  is not considered by 
HMRC.    This limits negotiation between HMRC and the practitioner and is an 
additional challenge for the practitioner to resolve. This becomes a problem when 
the practitioner undertakes their various roles of facilitator, translator, defender, 
negotiator and overall puzzle solver when representing the client (see Chapter 
7).   
6.6 Where the gaps narrow 
6.6.1 Specialist teams  
Not all HMRC departments come in for criticism.  As noted above, technical (or 
IT related) helplines are praised.  A VAT team was commended for their 
assistance to clients, as also discussed.  Without exception, specialist teams at 
HMRC, be they in relation to R&D, clearance department for transactions or 
simply ‘niche units’ within HMRC, such as the those responsible for trusts, or 
those dealing with ‘high net worth taxpayers’ were praised.  In particular, the 
participants were happy to be known as “customers” in their dealings with the 
R&D team (FG5), the implication being, that this term is just not appropriate in 
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the usual sense, given the difficulties practitioners or taxpayers encounter on a 
day to day basis (see Tuck et al., 2011 for the use of the term ‘customer’).  Praise 
was given for the in-depth technical knowledge of such teams, their training, and 
their ability to provide answers and advice in response to the practitioners’ 
questions, which is reported to be rarely the case when practitioners contact 
‘general helplines’.  The knowledge and skills of these teams were clearly seen 
as superior and held in high regard by the practitioners.  Additionally, practitioners 
could still contact the departments directly – which was appreciated.  Generally, 
there was acknowledgement that there are some “very skilled people within the 
revenue who are quite helpful and supportive” (I/V23), and that there had been 
some good interaction and relationships with those carrying out tax audits 
(Interviewees 7, 12, 13, 23, 24), particularly with those still willing to consider 
commercial implications, and apply a pragmatic approach to resolve outstanding 
issues.  So there are positive experiences.  In life however, focus is often on 
negative experiences, and these are what are most clearly remembered, 
particularly if additional work and problems result, and some of these are seen 
above. 
6.6.2 Sympathy for HMRC 
Delays and the lack of technical competence displayed by the ‘customer facing’ 
HMRC representatives is understood by the practitioners to be a result of under 
resourcing, cost cutting, staff reduction and restructuring (see Chapter 2).  
However, the workings of HMRC after such changes, at least from the point of 
view of the practitioners, is worse and not better as practitioner/HMRC problems 
identified by HMRC (2014b), Lovell (2016), NAO (2016), and NAO (2019) also 
indicate.  There was some general sympathy for staff at HMRC, and it was 
recognised that they too may face the same issues as practitioners, such as 
keeping up with frequent changes and increasingly complex tax legislation, and 
additionally they will have targets to meet in terms of tax collected, meaning that 
they also have more demands on them.  The practitioners realised that many 
were “overworked” as “there aren’t enough of them” and that they were “let down 
by the system” (FG3). I/V22 acknowledged that these were “foot soldiers” who 
were doing their best.  The staff were recognised to be “only human” (I/V8), and 
have to deal with huge amounts of queries.  It was observed by I/V10 and I/V11 
that attendance at an event organised by HMRC for practitioners (possibly part 
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of the agent strategy discussed in Chapter 2) also enabled the ‘human side’ of 
HMRC to shine through, which elicited a softening in tone towards HMRC as an 
organisation. Some staff were praised for seeing “the common sense of how to 
deal with it [they saw] the human side … and that just reminded me of how it used 
to be in the old days…” [I/V10].  This again makes reference to how the situation 
has changed over the working life of the practitioner. Overall, however, the desire 
was for a better system, improved relations with HMRC, fewer delays, more 
joined up thinking and knowledgeable and helpful staff.   
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the practitioners’ views of the relationship between 
themselves and HMRC, and highlights aspects of the current environment in 
which this relationship is managed. This addresses research question 2 “How 
does the shifting relationship with HMRC impact upon the practices of tax 
practitioners?” by taking account of the following objectives as explained in 
Chapter 4: 
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 the practitioners’ views on the relationship between 
themselves and HMRC; 
 the environment in which the relationship is managed; 
 The challenges and difficulties, as well as positive aspects 
of that relationship; 
 The impact that management of this relationship has on the 
practice of the practitioner; 
The practitioners’ views on the relationship between themselves and HMRC 
reveal a number of ‘gaps’ in respect of the type of relationship that is desired by 
the practitioners and the relationship that currently exists.  These ‘gaps’ are 
evident in the nature of the relationship itself, trust between both parties, the 
different ways in which private practice and a large organisation operate, and in 
knowledge.  The participants describe lack of expertise, delays and errors which 
arise in HMRC systems, and an unwillingness, at times, by some, to negotiate or 
engage with the practitioner perspective. HMRC service, based on personal 
experiences is found to be poor which is consistent with Hasseldine et al. (2011) 
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and Stiglingh (2014), although there are exceptions, as discussed.  These 
matters create a demanding environment in which the relationship plays out and 
present challenges for the practitioner in their day to day work, which at times, 
does not run smoothly as a result.  It is clear that some of these challenges have 
occurred relatively recently as some describe that the practitioner/HMRC 
environment with which they were familiar has altered greatly. Uncertainty has 
increased.  The old familiarity (the ‘norm’) has become unsettled and tax practice 
must adjust to the new rules of the game, as further discussed in Chapter 8. 
These, challenges and changes (and ‘gaps’) within the HMRC/practitioner 
relationship have broader impacts upon the practice of the tax practitioner.  The 
practitioner relationship with clients is affected, and there are personal 
implications for some participants, as the changing environment affects how their 
feel about their work. I/V10 suggests, for instance, the work s/he does has 
changed beyond all recognition in recent years and FG2 expresses the concern 
that “…the Revenue … I think part of it doesn’t respect what we do”.  Additionally, 
there is resentment that HMRC as an organisation appears to be immune from 
the consequences of delay and error arising from within that field, whilst the 
practitioners are not.  The practitioners face problems from a vast bureaucratic 
organisation which seems to them, to be chaotic rather than offering the seamless 
experience they desire, although there is understanding of the reasons why this 
may be (and sympathy too for those working in the organisation).   
FG5 sums it up neatly: 
The join, in-between the Revenue and the client, is really key about our 
role, but actually we’re let down by the Revenue on that, and that destroys 
client confidence 
Chapter 8, ‘Discussion’, sheds further light on many of the aspects discussed 
above. 
The practitioner as intermediary in the tripartite relationship is now explored in 






7 Findings - The practitioner’s voice – their role in the 
tripartite relationship 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together aspects of the client and HMRC relationships as 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  Findings are presented and analysed, so as to 
address the question How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite 
relationship with clients and HMRC?  The objectives for this question are shown 
in Section 4.2 and they are to explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 How practitioners see their role ‘in between’ HMRC and the 
client; 
 The roles they play in managing both relationships; 
 What challenges and difficulties arise from their roles; 
 How these challenges are overcome; 
 How the practitioners come to understand, interpret and 
implement tax rules on the ground whilst managing their 
position in the tripartite relationship. 
This chapter will give voice to the practitioner and explain how they see their role 
in the tripartite relationship and the different roles they employ in managing both 
the client and HMRC.  The challenges they face and how these are managed will 
be explored to shed light on how the implementation of tax rules tax place on the 
ground. 
 
The practitioner must manage two very different relationships which creates 
different demands on the practitioner’s role as explored in Chapter 5 (The client 
relationship) and Chapter 6 (HMRC), as well as various gaps in expectation.  The 
practitioner role is said to occupy a “uniquely ambiguous position” (Baker, 2014, 
p.281).  Consequently, the practitioner needs to “strike an appropriate balance” 
(Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996, p.1) to manage these relationships and may 
be “pulled in different directions” (Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2003, p.386), a point 
also observed by Hageman and Fisher (2016) and Niemirowski and Wearing 
(2003).  The challenges that the interviewees balance in dealing with clients on 
the one hand and HMRC on the other are many.  
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But how do practitioners see themselves?  How do they manage their position 
within the tripartite relationship? What is it, specifically, about the uncertainties in 
the practitioner environment which creates difficulty for the practitioner and why?  
This chapter gives the practitioner perspective.  What follows is how the 
practitioners see their roles, and how they view their identity within the tax system 
itself as the ‘middle’ actor in the tripartite relationship.  Having explored the 
relationship from the client and HMRC angle it is possible to derive new 
categories to explain the various roles of the practitioner.  The themes arising 
from the evidences about the practitioners’ roles were inspired by and tend to 
align with a comment from IV/7.  This practitioner had asked for the interview 
questions in advance of the meeting and had put a lot of thought into them.  When 
asked how s/he saw the role of the practitioner in practice, the reply was “we have 
many roles” and specifically said those roles encompassed the following: 
 “We help them [the client] to get their tax right; a defender; a negotiator; 
and a facilitator. 
Additionally, many participants referred to their role as ‘translator’.   This chapter 
therefore examines the identity of the tax practitioner by interpreting their roles 
as facilitator, defender, translator, negotiator, and overall, a puzzle solver.  These 
roles encompass both a client and HMRC facing position and hence illustrate the 
practitioner position in the middle of the tripartite relationship.  Each role is taken 
in turn. 
7.2 The practitioner as facilitator 
As explored throughout Chapters 5 and 6, the participants help clients to comply 
with tax obligations, to claim tax reliefs, and advise on tax planning.  As will be 
seen in this chapter more vividly, the participants also see their role as being 
central to the tax system, helping it function as it should.  That is, they can be 
seen as facilitators.  Given that they assist both clients and HMRC, and play a 
role in the tax system more generally, one can see the role of facilitator faces in 
both directions.   
This section explores the facilitator role of the practitioner in two respects: as tax 
planning facilitator and as facilitator to assist taxpayers to navigate a complex tax 




7.2.1 Tax planning facilitator 
Without the assistance of the tax practitioner’s knowledge taxpayers (here, 
SMEs, or small business for example) may not be aware of the tax reliefs (which 
broadly reduce tax liabilities) they could claim.  In other words, the practitioner 
enables the taxpayer to “take advantages of the reliefs”, as described below.  
Practitioners are however aware of the narrower ‘scope’ they have for tax 
planning, in today’s environment, which creates the gap discussed at Chapter 5. 
I think we are here to make sure the clients just pay the right amount of 
taxes and take advantages of the reliefs that are out there…They are there 
to be claimed by businesses so they can afford to invest in plant and 
machinery and hopefully generate work which employs people…[I/V3] 
This narrative focuses on the entitlement of taxpayers to pay the right amount of 
tax and to claim the eligible tax reliefs.  As to what the ‘right’ amount of tax is may 
be difficult to ascertain if the applicable law is grey or uncertain as discussed in 
Chapter 5 in light of the expert gap and this aspect of a practitioner’s role is further 
considered below. Nevertheless, the practitioner explains why reliefs exist (to 
assist investment and hence employment) and gives the economic context.   The 
practitioner seems to feel the need to justify why clients are advised to claim such 
reliefs.  This justification is returned to in the discussion below.  This narrative is 
similar to that of I/V22 
We are there to help them legitimately minimise the tax bills by claiming 
their entitlement to reliefs which parliament has enacted and HMRC have 
put there for a policy reason, so R&D, capital allowances and things like 
that.  Traditional smaller accountants have not got the expertise to do that, 
which is where you know I think that the qualified tax profession comes in 
really…Sometimes you get elements of the revenue where they see 
people claiming a load of reliefs and they don’t like it. Well that’s tough, 
you guys set the rules, we help people claim it.    [I/V22] 
I/V22 also illustrates how the practitioner’s knowledge is put to use.  Value is 
attached to the fact that this knowledge comes from the professional tax 
practitioner, so drawing on the symbolic capital that qualifications may carry 
consistent with observations of Stringfellow and Shaw (2009) and Stringfellow 
and Thompson (2014).  The status of the profession is emphasised, which is an 
intangible ‘asset’ from which those belonging to it can draw.  Although 
interestingly whether the client views this in the same way is open to question as 
it is likely many assume a practitioner is qualified in any case (as identified in 
research by HMRC, 2015a).  Nevertheless, there is feeling amongst some of the 
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interviewees that the current arrangements for tax practitioners (in that no 
registration or qualification is required) is not satisfactory and can damage the 
reputations of those in the profession who are qualified.  Clearly this is an issue 
to be addressed in the tax field in general, per the Kantar Public 2018 research 
for HMRC.   There is also a defensive element to the comment of I/V22, as with 
I/V3, about the tax savings taxpayers might achieve by “claiming a load of reliefs”. 
There is inference that some claims come under unnecessary audit from HMRC 
(that is “they don’t like it”) despite the practitioner feeling that the taxpayer is 
entitled to claim them, within the rules as they exist.  Of course, any claim may 
be challenged as HMRC must ensure claims for tax relief are not made 
inappropriately.  The comment by I/V22 however infers that HMRC ‘challenges’ 
are a more common occurrence than may be desired by the practitioner; the 
potential reasons for which are explored below.  The comments from I/V9 
illustrate similar sensitivities 
I have never been under any illusions, at the end of the day, when I work 
for my clients even in a fairly simple case there is always some tax 
planning you can do.  It is never just compliance.  In almost every case 
you always have to take a view on something and if you took view A you 
pay £100 more tax or £1000 more tax, or whatever, but there is always 
that aspect to it.  So, in that sense, I am always working against the public 
revenue -  I can’t see any other way of looking at it 
… It’s kind of like being an honest broker isn’t it? 
As I say making sure the compliance is dealt with but also, yes, saving 
them a bit of tax, NI or VAT or whatever it is. 
All three participants (I/V3, I/V22 and I/V9) describe facing two ways in their roles.  
That is to do as much as possible to assist the client to comply with their 
obligations, but also to provide advice to ensure tax saving.  These roles are akin 
to the enforcer (meeting tax obligations) and exploiter roles (in the context of 
enabling tax planning) described by Klepper et al. (1991).  All three comments 
have a defensive tone as if the participants feel the need to justify why they offer 
advice which reduce funds going to the treasury.  In all cases what is described 
is legitimate tax planning rather than unacceptable tax avoidance schemes.  
Appropriate reliefs are there to be claimed as highlighted by I/V3.  Reliefs are 
often devised to act as economic incentives and to encourage investment.  
However, the comments of the participants may be seen as a consequence of 
tension in the political field – that is the offering of reliefs on one hand, but a 
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change in attitude towards tax planning and tax collection on the other. This has 
impact on the approaches adopted by HMRC as they are under pressure to 
collect more tax as a result.  There is a changed narrative around tax planning 
(and a concern that this may be tainted with the same brush as tax avoidance, 
as also suggested by Fernie 2016) and a loss of trust in the tax profession more 
generally (as discussed in Chapter 2) and this may explain the practitioners’ 
justifications.    
Despite the above, participants do not shy away from tax planning. As I/V23 
identifies, clients expect to pay for their “knowledge and experience” to determine 
how to approach a transaction in a tax efficient way, which may include access 
to business reliefs.  Nevertheless, some law is grey, not clear or ambiguous and 
the application of law may depend upon interpretation of it. In some instances, as 
already identified, there will be a choice of approaches. See Section 7.4 below. 
7.2.2 Navigation of the tax system 
The tax practitioner, as facilitator, assists taxpayers to navigate the tax system. 
In one instance I/V1 provided assistance to a taxpayer, without fee, to navigate 
the bailiff system to which they should not have been subject.  The practitioner 
could draw on previous knowledge of HMRC systems (as discussed in Chapter 
5, this background (or habitus) provides a unique form of capital upon which the 
practitioner can draw) to help bring this to a satisfactory conclusion for the client.  
Given I/V1’s former background it is likely that this was the reason for the 
successful conclusion here – it is unlikely that others with less advanced 
knowledge of HMRC systems would have achieved the same outcome so 
smoothly.  Here hours of work were undertaken but not charged for, not because 
of lack of technical knowledge of a smaller practitioner (as identified by 
Stringfellow and Shaw, 2009) - in fact the opposite is true here -  but because the 
practitioner feels an ethical obligation to assist.  The ethical stance may have 
developed during years of earlier work experience as a tax inspector and tax 
practitioner.  The practitioner’s professional identity plays a role here, and in 
particular the conduct of this practitioner (rather than the provision of technical 
skills) was the important thing for I/V1 as highlighted by Grey (1998).  One might 
also say that this example illustrates the owner as the ‘human capital’ here, 
whose experience enables resolution of this matter, consistent with Stringfellow 
and Shaw (2009).  Of course, this participant is also a sole practitioner and has 
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sole control over the fee; the above may not have been possible in a larger 
organisation, even if one’s belief and preferred conduct (professional identity) 
was to act in this manner. 
Additionally, I/V9 facilitated a tax refund for an elderly couple.  They did not know 
how to claim a transfer of the Married Couples Allowance (MCA).  
I sent a MCA claim in, and backdated it for 4 years…plus the current year. 
The tax repayment was over £3k.  That was just applying the rules [relating 
to the MCA], but they [client] did not know the rules and the system itself 
does not automatically give them that benefit - which is strange really. 
So you [the government] set a rule saying people can benefit from this 
transfer, but then you leave it up to them whether they should do it or not. 
So in that sense, helping…out…is quite fulfilling. I don’t mind reducing the 
public purse in that sense because in my view they should have 
automatically been given that transfer… it should just be allocated.  The 
revenue system should be clever enough to realise that Mr A is not using 
his allowance and Mrs A could use it, and that would mean she is due a 
tax repayment but they [those responsible for the tax system] will never do 
that -  so sometimes you can feel quite rewarded! But it is not very often 
you get cases like that really. 
I/V9, clearly felt satisfied facilitating this claim.  Nevertheless, again the 
practitioner makes reference to the fact that MCA claim takes funds away from 
the exchequer – despite the fact that this is a legitimate relief, perhaps for the 
reasons already suggested. Yet, without advice these clients could not have 
obtained the benefit from it.  This particular practitioner had an interesting 
perspective on the role:  
…obviously, being a tax practitioner is not the most socially useful job in 
the world, not as useful as being a policeman or a nurse or whatever, but 
it is the nature of the beast isn’t it you can’t just have a tax system with the 
taxpayers and the revenue. 
…The vast majority of the taxpayers who are individuals and indeed most 
of the small companies - there is absolutely no way they can comply [with 
their tax obligations] without having an accountant – and it is just getting 
more and more complicated… 
The interviewee suggests that the tax system cannot operate without 
practitioners. Of course, one could say that a practitioner would say this – as they 
are paid to help clients navigate the system.  However, on the other hand, without 
practitioner services would taxpayers inadvertently not pay the correct 
tax/understand their tax positions, given the complexity in the system?  The 
practitioner alludes to this possibility.  Given the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 
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about the taxpayers' use of potentially unreputable internet based information, or 
their reliance upon the simplistic explanations of HMRC webpages, which may 
cause error (see also Victoria Todd, Treasury Sub-Committee, 2018) the 
practitioner feels their role is integral to the tax system.  In this particular case the 
practitioner has accessed the tax relief and ensures the client pays the correct 
amount of tax.  Without the practitioner’s help, the couple would have overpaid 
their tax substantially.  In sum the practitioner sees a role which navigates a 
dysfunctional tax system (see Chapter 2).  
Many participants feel they play an important role helping HMRC collect tax, and 
keep the system running.  That is, they facilitate the operation of the tax system.  
This role was however perceived as undervalued and not appreciated, but many 
defended their abilities in this respect. 
I think we are perceived quite negatively at the moment…particularly by 
the media, seen as having no morals and looking to do something dodgy, 
but the reality is that most advisers aren’t doing anything like that at all and 
are probably actually helping the revenue and are helping the client to pay 
the right amount of tax and helping the revenue out really…  [I/V6] 
Clearly, as I/V6 intimates, how the profession (and by inference, given the tone 
of the language used in this quotation, the practitioner as an individual too) is 
perceived is important to I/V6.  The dominant negative narrative, portrayed, here 
via the “media” is mentioned.  The vocabulary used by the practitioner confirms 
this; “perceived negatively”, “no morals”, “dodgy”. The suggestion by I/V6 is that 
this particular role (which is said to bring benefit to the tax system) receives little 
attention by the media, public, HMRC and so on.  However, HMRC do state that 
they recognise the importance of practitioners to the tax system (as identified by 
Kantar Public research for HMRC, 2018).  Nevertheless, this is not a position this 
participant identifies with.  As said, in the view of I/V6 ‘most practitioners’ do have 
morals and will not be ‘looking to do something dodgy’.  Whilst all practitioners 
continue to offer tax planning, there are degrees of what is and is not acceptable, 
as I/V6 recognises, and not all practitioners partake in the unacceptable. This 
practitioner distinguishes her/himself from those who perhaps may “do something 
dodgy”.  There is a feeling that all practitioners are tarred with the same brush, 
given shifts in attitude in recent years towards what is now termed unacceptable 
tax avoidance, as discussed in Chapter 2. I/V6 is not the only practitioner feeling 
perturbed by the general feeling towards the profession, be it by the media, the 
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public, or HMRC as an organisation.  I/V7 spoke of helping people to do the right 
thing in terms of their tax obligations but is seen as “…the devil incarnate” and 
I/V10 felt even more strongly 
It is about us against them (HMRC), they think that we are all fiddling it 
which winds me up…the impression that they believe all agents are trying 
to do them out of tax.  Without actually accepting that without tax agents 
the system would not operate…     [I/V10] 
The comments here can be linked to the individual’s professional identity, how 
one sees themselves professionally and how they conduct themselves (as 
discussed by Alvesson et al., 2015; Brouard, 2017; Cooper and Robson, 2006; 
Grey, 1998; and how they are viewed by the different stakeholders or “audiences” 
as described by Brouard et al., 2017).  The language of both practitioners about 
how they think other stakeholders see them is very evocative; “devil incarnate” 
and “fiddling”. However, they see themselves in a totally different light.  Their 
professional identities it seems would steer them away from being “dodgy” and it 
makes them feel uncomfortable to think others perceive them differently.  
Nevertheless, these interviewees saw their role as a key part of the tax system, 
so “integral” to it I/V9.  They suggest it would not run without them. They facilitate 
the operation of it.  It was also recognised that HMRC would require more 
resources without the practitioner’s assistance for taxpayers, as they prevent 
many problems that would otherwise slip through the net I/V5.  So to use the 
analogy of Tomasic and Pentony (1991) they are tantamount to ‘employees’ of 
the tax authorities. This was also a view from I/V8 who said: 
My little daydream is if the revenue goes too far one day [in their attitudes 
towards practitioners] is that every practitioner in the country downs tools 
for 6 months. 
To see what happens? 
Yes, exactly it would be a disaster for the country 
The revenue would actually find itself trying to take individual taxpayers to 
the tribunal or something for having got their tax returns wrong and they 
[the taxpayers] would say we don’t understand anything about tax - what 
do you expect us to do? 
These comments suggest that the interviewees feel their role in bringing this 
particular benefit to society is not recognised, and their experience of the tax 
system and their tax knowledge, in doing so, is not valued.  The suggestion from 
I/V8 is that by withdrawing this knowledge and experience, the effects upon the 
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tax system would soon be felt.  The practitioner as the intermediary in the tripartite 
relationship would not exist, which would mean direct HMRC/taxpayer interaction 
in all respects – and the suggestion is that the system could not function as it 
does now.   
The practitioner role in this respect is usefully summarised by a practitioner; 
[we] help clients interpret the tax system to make sure they pay the right 
amount of tax, so that is a compliance thing. I think HMRC need us to do 
that because the vast majority of clients want to get it right but the system 
is so complex they cannot possibly do it. I mean look, it is hard for us 
sometimes. So I think the profession is an essential outsource of HMRC to 
ensure that the country collects the right amount of tax. [I/V22] 
It is clear, from the language employed by the participants, that they are aware 
of their ‘reputations’ in the wider environment (from the point of view of HMRC, 
the public and the media) and yet, this is not how they see themselves at all.  It 
would appear that their positions as qualified tax practitioners and the symbolic 
capital this brings in terms of experience and training is not ‘useful currency’ from 
the perspective of some stakeholders in the tax field, despite the integral role they 
appear to play in the tax system (which is commented upon by Gupta, 2015; 
Leviner, 2012; Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996; Tomasic and Pentony, 1991).  
The facilitator role faces both the client and HMRC, according to the practitioner 
perspective.  Nevertheless, there is a huge gulf between how the participants see 
themselves and how they think others see them.  This is not the image they wish 
to project.  
7.3 The Practitioner as Translator 
I/V22 refers to an interpretation role above. ‘Translator’ was a word which 
featured frequently in the transcripts.  The themes emerging from the data 
indicate three broad ways in which a practitioner has a translation role. 
The first relates to the translation of the legislation into action on the ground 
according to the client circumstances/transaction. 
The second requires the practitioner to relay the above information to the client, 
by translating this back into simple language for the client to understand the 
consequences and implications of a transaction (this is often achieved by offering 
written advice, as discussed in Chapter 5). 
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The third, is to act as a conduit of information between HMRC and the client 
(consistent with Brock and Russell, 2015).  This can include relaying changes 
from the annual finance act to those clients who will be affected by them, or 
explanation of fundamental changes to tax administrative practices such as 
Making Tax Digital (as discussed in Chapter 6). Some practitioners feel they play 
a major part in delivery of this information to clients, which again is an important 
part of ensuring a sustainable, and functioning tax system. 
This section largely examines the first aspect, with the second and third aspect 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
7.3.1 Translation of tax legislation 
As the examples below illustrate, the interviewees may struggle to interpret (or 
translate) imprecise law.  Dilemmas about how to apply or implement law create 
uncertainty for both the practitioner and the client.  Precision in tax legislation (or 
legislation which avoids the need to ‘guess’ the tax effect of a transaction) is 
desirable (Edwardsson and Wockelberg, 2013; Freedman and Vella, 2011; 
Gribnau, 2013, Rowland, 1995) in terms of reducing uncertainty.  Yet, the 
practitioners interviewed do not experience this to be the case. “Ambiguous”, 
“grey”, “legal jargon”, and outdated language (as described by the practitioners) 
causes them problems, as does law which is described as “difficult to read” (which 
also encapsulates the complicated structure of legal provisions, as well as the 
language of it).  For example: 
…what really winds me up is the double negatives they use, like ‘not more 
than 183 days’ – why don’t they say less than? So 183 days or less. 
You have to say and think -  what does that actually mean…. 
There was one piece of legislation I read, and I can’t remember the word 
it used, but nobody on the planet uses that word these days it was like 
where there is 3 or 4 words strung together to make another word, 
notwithstanding or something….      [IV7] 
This participant grapples with the construction of the language and the way the 
words are written.  Whether a legally trained tax adviser would comment upon 
this particular difficulty may differ, as they will be trained in how to read and 
interpret legislation and will likely be familiar with how legal language is 
constructed (Cloyd and Spilker, 2000).  The reading of legislation can be affected 
by one’s background (Freedman and Power, 1992; Latham, 2012).  Words have 
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different meanings to different people (Latham, 2012) so it is possible that 
individuals read different meanings into the legislation.  The role of the legal field 
in the creation of the language of law cannot be ignored here as it, will of course, 
have consequences for the tax field.  That is, lawyers may draft the (what often 
seems to non-legally trained practitioners uncertain or difficult) legislation, which 
then has to be implemented within the tax field – and often by non-lawyers.  This 
is explored further in the discussion in Chapter 8. 
Two interviewees even commented about the location of commas in legislation, 
and how that could affect the reading and understanding of the legal provision.  
Additionally, some tax legislation was described as being: 
…just ambiguous, genuinely ambiguous [and] I have no idea which one of 
two or more alternatives were intended.    [I/V8] 
This was said by a practitioner with many years’ experience both in private 
practice at a Big 4, and in HMRC.  Judgement is needed to determine application 
of such legislation, and this is where expertise and knowledge comes in to play 
(see Chapter 5 about how this is managed).  Interestingly I/V8 refers to what the 
law “intended” – this suggests s/he considers the ‘spirit’ of the legislation, rather 
than simple reliance upon the literal language or wording of the provision.  
However, even then this does not add clarity for this practitioner.  Other 
participants found similar issues, as discussed below. 
Some recent legislation is criticised as widely drafted (too broad in scope) by the 
interviewees.  This creates problems to ascertain to whom or to what transactions 
the legislation applies. That is, the interviewees did not find it specific enough as 
observed by Cave (2017b). Those who mentioned new legislation did so with 
exasperation, were lost for words, and ‘sighs’ were encountered from some.  
Some felt it was ‘rushed in’; that there was not sufficient consultation, and that 
there was no thought for how those at the ‘coal face’ have to implement it (as 
Bowler, 2010 identified).   
everything seems rushed through these days, nothing seems thought 
through.  Nobody seems to take advice.  It almost seems like a bright spark 
has an idea and runs with it without having a concept of it.  And…well…I 
don’t know… (was lost for words here)    [I/V11] 
Whilst some make criticisms as above, they did not say whether they had taken 
part in the consultation processes about changes to tax regulation as discussed 
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in Chapter 2.  The professional bodies were however criticised by one practitioner 
for being on the back foot.  That is, they were accused of reacting to such 
problems after the event, rather than making representations beforehand.  It was 
thought that the profession should stand up for the practitioners and support them 
more in such circumstances – as this clearly was not what that participant felt 
was the case.  As to whether this is indicative of the disconnect felt by members 
of the smaller accounting profession and their professional body (Ramirez, 2009) 
however is not possible to tell. 
The participants felt that broadly drafted legislation could trap transactions that 
they felt it should not (this is consistent with Cave, 2017b, in that it “throws a wide 
net over a large population of taxpayers”).   There was difficulty implementing 
such legislation.  In attempts to do so, more than one participant tried to apply 
what they termed as ‘common sense’ – that is asking in their (the practitioners’) 
view, what is this legislation designed to trap/what is the intention of the 
legislation? This approach is similar to I/V8 above.  Once that had been 
ascertained, they felt more comfortable as to what it should ‘trap’ but there was 
no certainty that it would only apply in the way they thought.  Uncertainty was the 
theme here.  The legislation is not precise enough to provide the tax practitioner 
with sufficient certainty. I/V10 described this as “lazy legislature” and would prefer 
more precision in that legislation should be “worded to catch what they want to 
catch”.  The participants here appear to describe legislation based on overriding 
principles, rather than based upon detailed rules (for a discussion of principles 
based legislation see Avery Jones, 1996; Freedman, 2010; and James, 2010) 
and it seems these particular practitioners struggle with how to interpret it.  They 
wonder whether they should adopt a literal approach to interpretation of the 
legislation – i.e. in which case the wording of the law suggests all transactions 
could be caught (per McBarnet and Whelan, 1991; Picciotto, 2007; and Powers, 
1976), or should they instead seek the intention behind the legislation (as 
discussed by Freedman, 2010; Lee, 1999) – that appears to be their attempt at 
applying, as they described, ‘common sense’. Yet, there is no certainty.     
Law which is wide in scope without sufficient precision, or direction for its 
application is criticised for its brevity above.  This contrasts with the view of I/V15, 
who had difficulty with lengthier, more specific legislation which includes 
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numerous rules (rules based legislation is discussed by McBarnet and Whelan, 
1991). 
This new stuff, which goes on for multiple sort of sub sub sub sections, 
242 FF or VV or something like that. 
It is designed to try and make sure there is no possible way around it, but 
the problem is it becomes a nightmare to read for people who try and 
understand it.       [I/V15] 
This practitioner has many years’ experience and a Big 4 background and also 
acts as an adviser to other practitioners who require assistance, so it is clear that 
the way the tax legislation is written can cause substantial problems for many.  
The practitioner’s experience derived over the years may assist to a certain point, 
but as I/V15 suggests above, this does not make the 
implementation/understanding of the legislation automatically much easier.  The 
point made here about the form of the legislation relates to the anti-avoidance 
‘problem’.  Anti-avoidance provisions create layers of complexity.  Provisions are 
bolted on to existing legislation, or drafters and policymakers try to legislate for 
all eventualities, as referred to in the quotation above, which is consistent with 
the observations of Bowler (2010), Chittenden and Foster (2009), James and 
Wallschutzky (1997) and Thuronyi (1992).  I/V3 agreed, observing that such 
provisions make legislation “all over the place” and that they can catch “…things 
it should not catch”.   This creates the opposite problem to broadly drawn 
legislation which is not thought to be detailed enough as described by I/V10. 
The following examples illustrate the thought processes of the practitioner when 
faced with implementing legislation on the ground – that is applying it to taxpayer 
circumstances. 
7.3.1.1 Inheritance tax 
Practitioners must report tax avoidance schemes for inheritance tax under the 
disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAs) regulations.  Broadly this requires 
practitioners to disclose certain schemes relating to tax avoidance.  The 
application of this to inheritance tax is relatively recent. The simple gifting of 
assets to avoid inheritance tax, as long as the donor lives at least 7 years after 
the gift (an established and accepted practice) appeared to come within the terms 
of the new legislation as the quote below suggests.   Subsequent guidance ruled 
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this out, but the joint interviewees below believed the legislation itself should be 
clearer, as the explanation shows: 
I/V10 IHT DOTAs [legislation] -  so they [HMRC] said that [relates to IHT] 
planning.  So [are] gifts in the 7 years before death -  are they caught?  Oh 
no…concessions [subsequently issued by HMRC after the issue of the 
legislation] come out and they [gifts in the 7 years before death] are not 
caught…! 
I/V11 [HMRC said] [t]hat is not what we meant! 
I/V10 If it’s [the planning] within the reach of the normal person [it’s OK 
and not classed as tax avoidance].  But, what is or isn’t within the reach of 
the normal person?! How do you define that?! 
This shows the thought process of the ‘translator’.  The doubt is around the term 
‘planning’ and ‘normal person’.  Initially it was not clear what was meant by the 
new law.  This created uncertainty around what had been a settled position.  Upon 
reading the legislation literally, this practitioner believed the wording of it could 
apply to the standard practice of ‘giving gifts away’ bringing such actions within 
the scope of the new anti-avoidance provisions.  That is, the legislative provision 
appeared to cast the net wide (as suggested by Cave, 2017b). This created doubt 
in the participant’s mind about application of the provision.  Had there been a 
change in the way the law now works, or not?  The way some clarity was 
ultimately obtained was also subject to criticism by the participant – see Section 
7.3.2. 
7.3.1.2 Phoenix companies 
Anti-avoidance provisions for so called phoenix companies11 were also 
questioned by a number of participants. Whilst the interviewees could see the 
reason for the rules, for many, client circumstances were such that it was not 
clear whether the transaction would be caught or not.  In a number of cases, the 
practitioner thought the rules should not apply if based on [again] ‘common sense’ 
(see above), but they actually did not know, and in some cases, if clients were to 
fall foul of the rules, the tax charge could double.   
As I/V3 explained 
                                                             
11 When a company is liquidated, the profits then withdrawn are subject to capital gains tax, often at a 
rate of 10%.  This is usually more favourable than being assessed to income tax.  Consequently, to stop 
an individual repeatedly doing this (closing down and then opening a new company carrying on the 
same trade) there are anti-avoidance rules in place. 
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I get that people should not be able to liquidate; shut down and get money 
out at 10% and start again. And instead of taking income out, just keep 
doing that. I get that and I agree with that. 
But sometimes… I do believe in [looking at] what is the purpose of the 
legislation, thinking what it is trying to achieve or what is it trying to stop. 
The application of the rules to the winding up of a company were not clear to this 
practitioner. To seek certainty, the intention of the legislation (and the commercial 
reason for the transaction) was seen as important.  To apply the wording of the 
legislation literally may produce an outcome which may not be desirable for the 
client.  Yet the participant was not clear whether the legislation should apply in 
this manner, or not.  There was clear doubt here.  The participant is stuck between 
two methods of interpretation of legislation (the literal wording of it, versus the 
purpose or intention of it), but does not lose sight of the commercial reason for 
the transaction either. The problem was how to advise the client; one way would 
be less costly than another.  The participant wanted to do the right thing (not 
misadvise the client), but was not sure which route was the right one.  Presumably 
the route costing least tax was preferable, but clarity as to whether this was the 
right way to advise the client was hard to find. 
Another practitioner’s client wished to reorganise his affairs prior to death.  If he 
did nothing, IHT would be payable on the estate, but no further tax would arise.  
To reorganise things prior to death saves problems for the family, but other taxes 
would be payable – here specifically, CGT.  In other words, the client was 
voluntarily willing to pay a large amount of CGT (£1m).  Given the restructuring 
needed, and to help manage uncertainty around the application of the phoenix 
rules, advice was taken about the transaction (the practitioner did not say from 
who, although this practitioner is also an ‘adviser to other advisers’ and has a 
wide range of contacts and networks, and has a broad range of experience which 
has been gained over many years).  The practitioner was told that commercially 
the restructure made sense and the phoenix trade arrangement legislation should 
not apply, but there was no certainty that it would not.  The practitioner 
approached HMRC to see if they would give advance ruling on this, but they 
would not which is consistent with findings by Dabner (2012) and Diller (2012).  
I/V15 said “that seems to me wrong as because if you know in advance whether 
it is or it is not [going to apply] then you know whether to do it or not” and in this 
particular case, this inaction prevented a very substantial tax payment which was 
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to be made, in effect, voluntarily – as the risk could not be taken that a much 
higher tax charge may be invoked should the phoenix rules apply.  Certainty is 
needed, but is not forthcoming.  This, to the practitioner, seemed a ridiculous 
situation that could be ‘clarified’ if HMRC would provide a ruling on the transaction 
prior to it being undertaken, but as seen in Section 7.3.2 below this is, nowadays, 
often not possible to obtain.  HMRC guidance was also criticised.   
There is a whole load of stuff in the guidance on company liquation anti-
avoidance rules which came in a couple of years ago. I think some of the 
examples of the revenue response is incorrect, or at least incomplete and 
therefore misleading.      [I/V8] 
I/V8 is an experienced practitioner in this field.  The view is that the guidance is 
misleading (in what way, or how, is not explained), thus reliance upon the 
guidance may have unintended consequences for those less knowledgeable.    In 
the cases of I/V3 and I/V15 they are required to interpret law for their clients’ 
situations.  In both cases each seems to consider what the law is trying to 
achieve, or its intention as described by Freedman (2010) and Lee (1999).  In 
both cases each note that there is no intention of tax avoidance, and that there is 
a commercial reason for the transaction. That is probably understandable, given 
in recent years HMRC look at the spirit of the legislation or its intent, particularly 
in anti-avoidance cases (see Chapter 2).  This does not however, give the 
certainty required for either practitioner, as the literal interpretation (the meaning 
of the words) appears to conflict as also identified by Powers (1976), McBarnet 
and Whelan (1991) and Picciotto (2007).  These examples illustrate the pull 
between what the legislation may literally say and the commercial reasons for the 
transactions, which may make interpretation difficult (this is mentioned at Chapter 
6 in respect of HMRC attitude towards small businesses).  Certainty is not 
obtainable. HMRC as a source of reassurance is not an option.  Here the advisers 
struggle to attain the right outcome – that is to advise the clients appropriately 
whilst complying with the law.  The time it takes to do this contributes to the ‘expert 
gap’ seen in Chapter 5. 
7.3.2 Impact of anti-avoidance provisions 
Some practitioners voiced concerns about the “paranoia” (I/V22) around tax 
avoidance, and the desire of the policy makers to ‘shut down’ any potential 
avenue for it.  This affects how the legislation is drafted as already discussed.  
Additionally, it seems that HMRC are unwilling to commit to specific advice about 
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the application of legislation in case the practitioner tries to work around it, which 
makes the interpretation of legislation even more difficult. This is illustrated in the 
discussion above.  HMRC advance clearance rulings (see Diller et al., 2017) have 
reduced significantly as highlighted by I/V15 above, which is consistent with 
Dabner (2012) probably for the same reasons.  This facility is missed by 
practitioners.  Some describe it as the only route which would have provided 
certainty in the past.  Attempts to get advice appear to be rebuffed as HMRC are 
“not a confirmation service” (I/V12) or the answer is simply “no” this will not work, 
which is thought to be the stock answer.  I/V12 suggested that the questions put 
to HMRC relate to genuine uncertainty (as opposed to trying to identify a tax 
‘loophole’), and yet no help is given.  As one practitioner (I/V23) said, it is almost 
like if you are having to ask a question then you must have identified a grey area 
of law, so the answer given to the practitioner is simply ‘no’, when in reality this 
is not the case at all, as,  
you just want some certainty over it, as you have a client beating you over 
the head saying what is the answer?! 
This indicates tension. Clients want certainty.  HMRC have withdrawn access to 
their knowledge (and hence their own perspective on the transaction), which ties 
into the “one size fits all” approach in Chapter 6.  HMRC guidance may of course 
instead be accessed, but this was also thought to be unhelpful at times.  The 
speed at which guidance is issued after new legislation appears on the statute 
books was criticised, as was the substance of it too.  Nevertheless, guidance 
eventually clarified I/V10’s uncertainty around IHT DOTAs legislation. Yet the 
very fact that guidance was used to exempt various transactions from the 
legislation was criticised by I/V10 and I/V11.  As I/V11 stated, one seems to be 
“taxed by legislation and [then later down the line] untaxed by guidance”.  This, 
interestingly, was the title of an article by Cave (2017). Cave (2017) explained 
that the guidance that does the ‘untaxing’ does not have the force of law, unlike 
the tax legislation per se.  This means neither the practitioner, nor taxpayer can 
rely upon it, and additionally, guidance is easily changed, or removed by HMRC 
which may of course create additional problems as explained in Chapter 2.  
The production of broad legislation, followed by the issue of guidance has 
happened, I/V10 and I/V11 report, so frequently recently that they ‘sit’ on new 
legislation and do not try and work out to whom it applies (if they can, that is, they 
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get no client questions about it), and then they wait for the guidance to appear a 
number of months later.  In other words, they ‘delay’ the need to translate the 
new law for client situations.  Despite this, the guidance ultimately issued was 
thought in the main unsatisfactory. It was said to be weak and included only 
obvious and simple circumstances that the practitioner could have worked out 
themselves (as reported by Gracia and Oats, 2012a, in respect of the Arctic 
Systems (Jones v Garnett) case).  In other words, the more complex, unusual 
transactions that practitioners find themselves looking at for clients are not 
covered in the guidance. Further guidance about the “mischief they are trying to 
solve” (I/V10) would be appreciated to help with application of the legislation at 
the coal face.  The desire was to understand what the legislation is designed to 
prevent – but as to whether this would be helpful is debatable (given the 
discussion above regarding the literal interpretation versus the intention of law). 
The delay in issue of guidance, or the weak examples provided therein, could be 
seen, per Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.316) to allow “HMRC to sustain a climate of 
uncertainty and anxiety, reinforcing their dominance and control over the field”, 
hence further example of a shift in power to the tax authorities and away from the 
practitioner.  The narratives given above would tend to support this view. 
7.4 The practitioner as defender 
The practitioner may also be viewed as a defender.  Their role is varied in this 
respect. 
Participants described themselves as a ‘buffer’ between HMRC and the client.  
They may need to protect (or defend) the client.  But they may also protect (or 
defend) the tax net from client error.  Clearly this latter point may be a contentious 
claim, given the role some in the tax profession play in tax avoidance – which by 
its nature, reduces funds going to the exchequer.  However, as will be illustrated, 
there is another way of looking at the practitioner role. The practitioner uses their 
experience and knowledge to spot errors, hence they may prevent mistakes 
which could otherwise reduce the tax take (which without practitioner intervention 
may go undetected and uncorrected). Despite this, it is fair to say that 
practitioners do not feel valued in this respect, as will be discussed. 
The client defender role is illustrated in the discussion from the focus group 
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 …it’s about sort of shepherding them [the client] down the right route, 
then, isn’t it?        [FG3] 
So I would say we’re more of a, kind of a go-between, because we do have 
the knowledge that they don’t, of how the Revenue works, and by the same 
token, sometimes you need to protect them from the Revenue, you know, 
when you have things like enquiries [audits], sometimes the Revenue kind 
of overstep the mark, so I see us as being, just being in between [FG4] 
The ’shepherding’ comment indicates that the practitioner defends not just the 
client from HMRC (should the organisation “overstep the mark”), but also from 
themselves, as suggested.  The inference here is that the practitioner helps them 
meet their obligations by showing them the “right route”, which could encapsulate 
prevention of error or misdemeanour – this is further explored below.  FG4 clearly 
refers to the use of the practitioner’s knowledge (their technical capital, or even 
symbolic capital, which is drawn upon as a resource) in the role as ‘go between’. 
In summary therefore the practitioner acts as a defender of both the client and 
HMRC.   The practitioner also defends themselves.  These three roles are 
discussed below. 
7.4.1 Defender of the client 
The interviewees see their clients as business people, employers and 
contributors to the local economy. They suggest that they do not see businesses 
which simply focus upon tax matters.  Whilst “tax is an issue…it is not a driver [of 
decisions]. They have got way more important things to think about” (FG4) as 
they are concerned with running their business. Yet, as suggested in Chapter 6 
(the ‘knowledge gap’), HMRC appear to have a mind set in which they question, 
automatically, the motive of a transaction, assuming the motive to be tax related, 
rather than there be a commercial reason.  Practitioners feel HMRC works to a 
totally “different agenda” (FG3) and as said in Chapter 6 HMRC may dig their 
heels in in order to seek payment of more tax.  Practitioners may be forced to 
defend clients in this respect.   
…you know on some reorganisations [of the client’s business] they 
[HMRC] say you are doing this to save a load of tax! And we are like ‘no’, 
we are reconstructing a group to safeguard jobs, to ring fence areas that 
are in risky sectors, and the shareholders have fallen out, and this bloke 
wants to sell his shares because he is 75 and he wants to cash his chips 
in. What is the point in having ER and reliefs for stuff if people are not 
allowed to sell stuff? Quite often it is because they [HMRC] see stuff that 
is not there.        [IV/22] 
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What is described here is a difference in discourse between the practitioner and 
HMRC.  The practitioner’s view is that legislative provisions conflict with the 
commercial issues.   The practitioner refers to business related tax reliefs, which 
when claimed, are challenged by HMRC.  If a business/individual is entitled to 
claim such reliefs, practitioners defend their entitlement.  Realisation by HMRC 
that the business is being reorganised for valid (not simply tax) purposes was 
thought lacking. Interestingly, the ‘commercial transaction’ versus a ‘tax 
transaction’ argument, appears to filter through into interpretation of the 
legislation.  It was suggested by I/V19 that HMRC read the law literally (that is 
they take the meaning of the words in a literal sense), and this will “trump” the 
commercial argument all the time. In other words, the commercial, economic 
event taking place is not given consideration when deciding the tax treatment.  
This is interesting, as for many years now, it has been the ‘substance’ of 
transactions, and a consideration of the economic effects of a transaction, rather 
than the ‘literal’ wording of the law, that has been taken into account when looking 
at tax avoidance cases which have arrived before the courts as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The possibility was raised by one practitioner (I/V3) that the approach 
taken by HMRC may depend upon the potential tax take by each option, so 
adapting the reading of the law to suit.  Again, a conflict in approach between 
HMRC and the practitioner can be seen here.  Could this be further example 
where “interpretations of texts” may be manipulated by those with power “in order 
to regularise and control practice consistent with its interpretations” (Gracia and 
Oats, 2012a, p.314)?  This thus poses a challenge to the practitioner and client 
alike, as there is a lack of consistency.  Doubt and uncertainty may increase, as 
the practitioner may be unsure what HMRC’s reaction will be. Indeed, this can be 
seen in the discussion above at Section 7.3.2 – should they read the law literally, 
or should they seek the intention (substance) behind the legislation.  The 
observation of I/V19 may feed into these dilemmas.  Nevertheless, the benefit of 
the practitioner’s knowledge in these situations may be weakened, and hence 
their role as ‘defender’ of the client may be called into play. 
Some taxpayers were said to be ‘naïve’.  In such cases, they may need protection 
from themselves. Hence the practitioner defends the client in a slightly different 
way here.  I/V15 and I/V24 referred to clients who mistakenly believe that tax 
rules and regulations (and how HMRC see things) are based on ‘logic’, when in 
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the tax field this is definitely not the case.  Clients may see things far too 
simplistically (or rely on the HMRC webpages, which are criticised as being too 
simple, as identified by Todd, Treasury Sub-Committee, 2018, see 2.5 above) 
and hence make errors in their tax submissions.   Additionally, practitioners are 
aware of the problems that the internet brings, against which taxpayers need 
protection.   
It’s not the man in the pub anymore, it is Google…. I have one client who 
must spend every evening looking at tax planning ideas on Google and 
emailing me a link and saying can I do this?  I say no, it won’t work you 
will end up in prison. But there is not so much of that.  [IV22] 
This is touched upon in Chapter 5, when examining the client/practitioner 
relationship, but it is relevant here too as misinformation (see Onu and Oats, 
2018) is something against which the practitioner needs to protect the client. The 
practitioner’s knowledge therefore helps keep the client within ‘the rules’, helps 
protect revenue and helps manage expectations as discussed at Chapter 5. 
7.4.2 Defender of the revenue 
Leaving aside the role some practitioners may play in the sale of tax avoidance 
schemes, there is an alternative perspective.  The participants in this research 
could be said to defend the tax net.  Many described the correction of client errors, 
and gave examples where they take a stance against claims for reliefs or 
expenses which may be claimed by clients but may not be due.  Many referred 
to their ethical disposition (or their professional identity as discussed above) and 
their desire to feel comfortable with advice given. The role of the profession may 
have influence here.  The participants are obligated to act appropriately and to 
have regard to ethical requirements. As a result of these obligations (to 
themselves, the client, HMRC, the profession and so on) practitioners must 
advise clients to correct potential errors and ensure they submit the correct 
position.  Similarly, if clients are pushing the tax planning boundaries a bit too 
much, to a point that does not sit well with the practitioner, the practitioner ‘reins’ 
them in (roles also described by the OECD, 2008). The following quote illustrates 
this.  
I have probably collected more tax as an adviser than I ever did as an 
investigator just by advising people not to even … try the things they are 
thinking of, where if they had not had advice there would be all sorts that 
they are claiming….[IV1] (a former revenue officer and now practitioner) 
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This practitioner suggests that in her/his experience taxpayers with 
representation submit more accurate positions.  The practitioner draws on their 
unique experience and knowledge of HMRC to suggest this – experiences which 
now feed into the role as practitioner. I/V2 said similar, finding that those without 
representation tend to underpay, rather than overpay their taxes.  Without 
representation, it is suggested, errors, which may simply be based on a lack of 
understanding of a very complex system, go unchecked. More than one 
practitioner gave examples.  For instance, one practitioner expected to lose a 
client because of an error made by HMRC. The client was undercharged as 
despite submitting all the correct information, the calculation of tax payable 
received from HMRC was incorrect.  The practitioner had to (again, an ethical 
obligation) advise the taxpayer to pay the correct amount; news which did not go 
down well with the client and is an example of a situation in which practitioners 
may be accused of working for HMRC, rather than the client - as discussed in 
Chapter 5 (the ‘scope’ gap). 
I/V12 noted this accusation   
[some taxpayers] say why did I come to you?  I wanted you to save me tax 
not cost me all this…  
In general, advisers emphasised that they must do the right thing ethically 
speaking -  although it may be unlikely in an interview scenario for anyone to 
admit otherwise. Additionally, they make ‘disclosures’ [to HMRC on behalf of 
taxpayers] of errors, or of under payments of tax, using both official HMRC 
channels to do so (e.g. ‘let property disclosures’; an initiative for landlords in 
receipt of rent to get their tax affairs in order; I/V7 has undertaken a number of 
these, “loads”, was the term used) or simply acting when matters come to light, 
as evidenced by many conversations.  
I/V11 (a joint interviewee) gave the following example.  Information provided by 
a new client resulted in a disclosure of underpaid tax, as an issue had been dealt 
with (unintentionally) incorrectly for years.  
…I am going through a disclosure … and doing the honest thing and 




We identify the issue for HMRC as they have limited resources…. let’s get 
this straight and pay the tax [the client] should have paid and some 
penalties and interest 
So actually we have put an extra £10k in the system 
I/V10 And, multiply that across all agents across the land…! 
I/V11 How much are you putting in? And how much recognition do you 
get? None…we are just treated as the enemy.  
This further illustrates depth of feeling.  There is a desire for greater recognition 
of the role they play in protection and defence of the tax net – that is adding funds 
into the system, by using their knowledge and experience, and ethical obligations 
to do so.   
These examples support the comments of many practitioners that they ‘help’ the 
tax system run more smoothly, as discussed under the facilitator role above. 
Of course, as well as correcting errors, practitioners are happy to help clients plan 
their tax affairs efficiently – but not at any cost – as explained in Chapter 5 (‘scope’ 
gap).  This could be viewed as another form of defence of the tax net (as well as 
defence of the practitioner and their organisation too), as further illustrated by the 
participant below. 
…we see a lot of potential new clients.  There have been some over recent 
years where it is clear that some appear to be engaging in activities that 
are contrary to what HMRC would want them to do, so we refuse to act 
and walk out of the meeting.  We have had one or two clients saying they 
want to look at something, which in fairness in the last 20 years, the 
profession would have handled … but we are not going there.  So I have 
no interest in acting for people like that.    [I/V22] 
Here the practitioner illustrates sensitivities about the changed environment 
around tax avoidance and the effect upon their work and explains there is a line 
they will not cross.  There is a mismatch between what the client wants and what 
the practitioner is willing to take part in (which is opposite to findings per Sakurai 
and Braithwaite, 2003).  There is however acknowledgement that had these 
meetings taken place some years ago, then the profession (the practitioner) may 
have acquiesced – in which case the literature, written at that time, may have 
reflected the situation more accurately, as per Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003).  
The comment by I/V22 reflects the changes in opinion towards aggressive tax 
avoidance schemes in recent years and the shift in the practitioner/HMRC 
relationship, with the practitioner moving closer to the HMRC position – as 
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similarly identified by Walpole and Salter (2014) in the Australian context.  
Additionally, clues to changes in professional identity are apparent here.  As 
Bevort and Suddaby (2016) and Brouard et al. (2017) observe, changes in 
professional identity occur over time, as experience develops and contexts 
change.  A change in professional identity (in terms of how one conducts oneself) 
is implied here (that is, the historic approach to such requests may have differed).  
The specific reasons for this are not clear to see.  This participant, had in the past 
worked for larger firms which may have had the resources to facilitate more 
aggressive schemes, so perhaps the smaller practitioner context enables the 
practitioner to hold firm against the client demands as possibly the facility to enter 
into such schemes is limited.  As Cooper and Robson (2006) identify, the ethos 
of the participant’s current (smaller) organisation may also play a part.  
Reputation of the practitioner and the firm may also be relevant, as may the 
influence of a professional body membership.  Nevertheless, the participant’s 
awareness of the current narrative around tax avoidance is also evident and has 
a bearing upon her/his conduct.  
The following illustrates the practitioner’s role in between HMRC and the client 
and thoughts around tax planning, in today’s environment. 
I try to say to clients, there are things that are black and white.  You have 
to declare all your turnover. And there are things that are open to 
interpretation. And I will make sure, I will almost police you on the stuff 
that’s black and white, if you’re not doing it right. You have to, because I’m 
a chartered accountant and I love you, but I’m not going to jail for you. 
And then there is stuff that is open, that’s subjective. And I will, as long as 
it’s defendable, try and push it as far as I can for you, without stepping over 
that line. But it’s about spelling out to them…So there is a pull, because 
people expect you to, you know, pull a white rabbit out of a hat, and very 
often you can’t. And it’s, how do you communicate that to them, in a way 
that they’ll understand and more importantly, they’ll accept.  [FG5] 
This practitioner refers to interpretation of subjective law, but views it from the 
perspective of HMRC, the client, and also the practitioner themselves – all parties 
in the relationship have an interest here.  Compliance is more black and white.  
Tax planning is less so.  The participant refers to things that are open to 
interpretation and suggests that a tax efficient view will be adopted, on behalf of 
the client (as long as it is defendable – which is similar to the advocate position 
in the US).  But there is a line the practitioner will not cross (see Chapter 5, which 
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referred to ‘scales’ of acceptability) and the practitioner needs to balance each 
relationship.  It would appear that the practitioner here will pull the client back 
from seeking an inappropriate tax position and will not just be led by client wishes, 
‘to pull the white rabbit out of the hat’ to achieve maximum tax savings if that is 
not feasible in the view of the participant, which contradicts Carnes et al. (1996), 
Cloyd and Spilker (1999), Kahle and White (2004); and Tan (2011). Nevertheless, 
the participant is ‘tuned in’ to the request to save tax where possible for the client.  
As to whether this leads to confirmation bias (that legislation which supports a tax 
saving is favoured over that pointing to the contrary (discussed in a study by 
Cloyd and Spilker, 1999)) is not possible to see in this situation.  However, the 
practitioner’s ethics, morals, socialisation within the professional environment 
and hence professional identity (discussed by Alvesson et al., 2015 and Cooper 
and Robson, 2006) and how individuals see themselves does appear to come 
into play in terms of how the individual conducts her/himself.  The participant 
refers to her/his status as a Chartered Accountant (symbolic capital) and is aware 
of the consequences of breaching ethical requirements (personal morals and/or 
the influence of the profession to which the participant belongs perhaps) – which 
has an influence on how the participant approaches the client request. 
7.4.3  Defend themselves [the practitioner]  
The role of the practitioner in tax planning is discussed in earlier sections, and 
implicitly they appear to defend themselves from association with unacceptable 
tax avoidance matters.  In terms of the provision of advice to clients, be that in 
relation to compliance, or tax planning, or explaining the tax effects of a 
transaction, all interviewees provided evidence of careful thought and research.  
All said they avoided acting ‘rashly’ or ‘off the cuff’ and would regularly double-
check things, so as to be as sure as possible about their conclusions.  Some 
referred to the litigious nature of the industry, and the problems of being sued for 
what is not said as opposed to what is said.  One practitioner (FG5) has a rule of 
never sending out what has been written on the same day.  The advice is ‘sat on’ 
to allow thoughts to settle, and to take time to reflect on the advice, and to allow 
consideration of “the bits that you did not think were relevant”. Additionally, the 
practitioner may support their opinion by drawing on a number of other sources, 
as discussed in Section 7.6.2. Risk management is clearly important here and 
yet such activities may also contribute to the ‘expert gap’ identified in Chapter 5.  
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The participants defended their positions as well-trained, qualified practitioners.  
Many distinguished themselves from other practitioners who operate in the non-
qualified tax field. It is fair to say, these advisers were not held in high regard 
amongst the participants of this research.   I/V4 referred to a call from such an 
adviser asking for help with taper relief (a CGT relief) in the recent past – despite 
the fact that this was abolished in 2007.  Other questions fielded by this 
practitioner in response to requests for help from this market were described as 
“quite shocking”.  I/V5 used the phrase “no clue about anything much” to describe 
some operating in this field, and many participants had sorted out or unravelled 
the tax affairs of former clients of such firms. I/V15 described this field as a 
“problem” as there is no “monitoring” and many may “struggle” and were years 
“out of date”.  The feeling was many advised from leaflets, guidance, and the like 
and almost ‘wing it’ without a full understanding of the situation on which they 
were advising. I/V22 suggested such a market was “not as well qualified, who are 
not as ethically straight as we are…”. Participants seemed to feel that these 
negative issues reflected badly on them too and there was defence of this, with 
reference to their qualified status, levels of training, and ethical obligations – that 
is the symbolic and technical capital which the participants in this research have.  
There was acknowledgement that, of course, not all practitioners would offer poor 
advice, but in general, reform of the regulation around the tax practitioner market 
was desired.   
In summary the role of the defender can be seen from the perspective of the 
client, HMRC (or the revenue), even though this may be thought a contentious 
claim for the reasons discussed, and the practitioner themselves.  
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003) suggest practitioners are ‘pulled’ in different 
directions.  Brody and Masselli (1996) suggest practitioners have two masters.  
Baker (2014) suggests practitioners are in an ambiguous position between the 
tax authorities and the client.   Maas (2015) however disagrees, saying the only 
obligation of the practitioner is to the client.  The above evidence however does 
indicate the practitioner has an eye on responsibilities to both parties and 
themselves. Nevertheless, many confirmed their chief responsibility to the client. 
On the whole the participants do acknowledge that they are some sort of ‘buffer’ 
between the revenue and the client and they appear to provide a defence 
mechanism for both parties.  They see their roles as being of importance to the 
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tax system.  In this respect, and in light of the work they do as discussed above, 
indications are they are integral to the tax system and do help it function smoothly 
which is consistent with Davidson (2014), Dzienkowski and Peroni (2016), 
Thuronyi and Vanistendael (1996) and Tomasic and Pentony (1991). 
7.5 The practitioner as negotiator 
As intermediary (between HMRC and the taxpayer) the practitioner corresponds 
with HMRC on behalf of the taxpayer. This may be in respect of a tax audit, or in 
respect of the valuation of an asset for instance.  This will, at times, involve 
negotiation as suggested by Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler (2015). The 
practitioner and HMRC may have diverging viewpoints over legal interpretation 
during a tax audit.  Additionally, negotiation may involve discussions about the 
valuation of goodwill, or private company shares, and the like, which will involve 
judgement by both parties.  The practitioner will wish to obtain the best (most tax 
efficient) position for the client, and so this role may also be linked to that of ‘the 
defender’ of the taxpayer.   To carry out this role, a further skill is employed – that 
of negotiator. 
The ability to negotiate with HMRC, and to feel comfortable doing so, was 
highlighted as necessary by I/V1, and is factored in to the risk assessment of 
taking on work for a client.  The role of negotiator involves clear understanding 
about what HMRC asks, being sure enough that the practitioner’s position is the 
correct one, and also being able to present this confidently in the negotiation – 
this latter point is emphasised by I/V8.   
…I know enough to know when I can stand my ground and when perhaps 
I should advise the client when to stand down for example, but I can see 
other people, and perhaps -  and I don’t mean this in a nasty way -  but 
people who are less sure of their ground and may be less robust personally 
just not wanting to be an accountant who is having an argument with 
HMRC.         [I/V8] 
This comment is illustrative of the practitioner employing experience and prior 
knowledge to determine where to draw the line during negotiations with HMRC.  
Additionally, both I/V8 and I/V1 have knowledge of HMRC as an organisation, 
and understanding the habitus of HMRC agents perhaps puts them in a position 
to draw on additional knowledge that other practitioners may not have as 
previously mentioned.  This may help ascertain the boundaries of any argument.   
They may be more knowledgeable about how to present matters and therefore 
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there may be more to the argument than just “technical knowledge” (I/V1). Many 
interviewees referred to negotiation with HMRC.  The ability and willingness to 
challenge HMRC is also a necessary attribute of a practitioner (a simple example 
given by I/V8 was asking HMRC to cite the legislation (rather than HMRC 
manuals) in their correspondence, consistent with comments by Maas 2015), as 
the HMRC manuals have no force of law. 
That said, it was noted by many that, over time, negotiation has become more 
difficult. It is still a possibility, but the role of the practitioner as negotiator appears 
to have weakened.   
I think it depends who you get from the revenue as to how much 
negotiation there is - we did have one enquiry - [the inspector] was willing 
to negotiate, and willing to wait for information that we were trying to 
collect.  Whereas some of them -  like the one that X dealt with - he was 
pretty firm, you know ‘this what is in the legislation, this is what I need, I 
am not having it any other way’.      [I/V25] 
The position has become more fractious.  If genuine disagreement continues, the 
only way to resolve the difference in opinion may be to go to tribunal, and that 
has disadvantages in terms of time, cost, and the experience required for this, as 
IV/15 noted and as discussed at Section 6.3.1 above.  This action will also 
depend upon the appetite of the client and practitioner to take the disagreement 
forward, and how sure one feels about the potential outcome as per I/V8’s 
comments above. Perhaps there is a belief at HMRC that a practitioner may 
‘settle’, as explained in Chapter 6, prior to getting this far, given the difficulties of 
resolving the matter.  This is further evidence of a shift in the practitioner/HMRC 
relationship as also identified by Walpole and Salter (2014).  An example was 
given by I/V19, who had questions from a tax inspector about aspects of a tax 
return (during a tax audit), the likes of which had never been seen before by that 
practitioner or their colleagues.  One may speculate why this is -  from the HMRC 
perspective this may be an attempt to generate further tax revenue, or it could 
simply be the practitioner has misunderstood the situation.  Nevertheless, the 
practitioner did not agree with HMRC, but it was cheaper (to limit the practitioner’s 
time and therefore the fee) for the client to settle (pay the tax) rather than argue 
the point, as the tax at stake was not large.  By adopting this course of action, the 
tax increases, albeit by small amounts of tax (which are perhaps more common 
for the clients of the smaller tax practitioner, than from the larger clients of the 
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larger firms) which could possibly be the intention behind the inspector’s unusual 
approach to the tax audit.  
The practitioner does not just adopt a negotiation role with HMRC.  Negotiation 
may also take place between the client and the practitioner.  This may occur if 
there is a decision to be made about the tax position in light of grey or ambiguous 
legislation which may have different interpretations.  Examples were given above 
in Section 5.3.1 which discussed management of client expectations.   
7.6 The practitioner as puzzle solver 
The roles of facilitator, defender, translator and negotiator have been discussed 
and examples provided which relate to these particular roles.  This section takes 
an overview to further illustrate the variety of work undertaken by the smaller 
practitioner and the difficulties they face in the tripartite relationship.  There are 
many occasions when the practitioner appears to be faced with a perplexing 
puzzle, which seems to have no outright ‘correct’ answer as tax law is uncertain 
and messy as described.  Client circumstances may often be unique and may not 
fit exactly with previous similar situations.  This section shows the human side of 
what is involved in a tax practitioner’s day to day work and adds more insight into 
how they cope with the dynamic environment.  Their thoughts and feelings also 
become apparent. This section also has an explanation of the methods (and 
resources used) by which practitioners come to understand the puzzle. 
7.6.1 Exercise of judgement and drawing on experience 
A “rollercoaster” of emotions was an analogy was used by FG4 whilst describing 
the process to solve a tax problem.  The emotions described included peaks and 
troughs in feelings (from despair to elation and back again) in respect of the 
advice process.  
It’s about judgement, when it comes down to it. And you can only use your 
own [judgement], and that comes from whatever your historic experiences 
are, I think. I mean…. can you find the answers, well, sometimes there 
isn’t a definitive answer      [FG4] 
The participant went on to describe working on a tax problem with colleagues, 
consideration of different approaches to the tax problem and even thinking about 
the problems outside of work.  In other words, there may not be a simple solution 
to a tax problem. There may be multiple things to consider.  Time, thought, and 
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effort may be spent to arrive at a resolution.  To arrive at an opinion, the 
practitioner refers to former experiences and background (habitus). Team 
members are important in arriving at a conclusion – that is drawing on the 
expertise of others.  The opportunity to talk issues through was an important 
source of comfort (or another opinion) for many (and may act as additional 
protection against practice risk, which is consistent with Carnes et al., 1996).   
I/V7 also described the importance of colleagues and regularly took the 
opportunity to share questions with the whole team to seek opinion upon how to 
answer them.  The practitioner describes a role which does not finish at the end 
of the working day, as difficult tax matters may prey on the mind (also similarly 
described by I/V12).  The remaining uncertainty, the absence of a “definitive 
answer” is also referred to by FG4 – in other words what the participant can offer 
is simply an opinion. 
These matters are not unique.  I/V7 described the emotional energy of having 
solved a tax problem only to be told by a helpline external to the firm (a 
subscription based tax helpline – see Section 7.6.2 below) that the advice (that 
had already been provided) was incorrect.  The work was redone, only to discover 
the first position was correct.  Not only was time wasted, but the practitioner felt 
sick on discovering the so-called ‘error’, as it was thought the client had been 
incorrectly advised.  Tomasic and Pentony (1991) suggest that smaller 
practitioners come under greater pressure than those working for larger firms 
given the client base.  This could be illustrative of this.  The amount of tax at stake 
for a smaller taxpayer, may be far more significant than that of a larger company.  
The difficulties here arise from differences in legal interpretation.  This is not just 
a problem for the practitioner, but for their adviser/source of outside help.  Many 
questions may be unique or uncommon and there may be no ‘standard answer’.  
The ability to draw on prior experience may be limited at times (which goes for 
both the practitioner and other advisers to whom they may turn for help), see 
Section 7.6.2 below. 
Research into tax issues can be difficult. I/V7 was quite evocative in explanation 
as shown below: 
… I get to that point where I don’t actually know.  I don’t know the answer.  
I don’t know how these [taxes] interact. I haven’t got a clue. I don’t even 
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know what that [that has been read] has just said.  I have read it 10 times 
and I still don’t know. 
This describes the feelings experienced when looking into a tax issue.  It was 
said with some frustration and exasperation, yet the practitioner was ultimately 
confident there would be resolution to the issue.  Various examples were provided 
by participants during the interview process and I/V25 adds more depth to these 
issues, having been asked the question about the specific challenges faced by 
the practitioner: 
I find it hard not being able to have a clear answer, I like to have a yes or 
no answer and if I am still uncertain it annoys me as I want to know for 
definite! Is that eligible for capital allowances?  Am I going to get capital 
allowances on it?  Or is it part of the building? [and therefore not eligible]. 
It annoys me that I cannot find an answer.  It would be really nice to have 
legislation written in layman’s terms, with a lot more yes and nos! 
You just don’t know for certain that you are right; you interpret it so you 
think it is right, but it is not totally clear.  [In arriving at the answer] you have 
just to try to find a similarity [to claims for similar assets], or a similar [tax 
law] case. 
…you could spend hours on it and you can cost your client a lot of money, 
when you keep coming back to the same answers.  There might be a lot 
of tax at stake. 
[The worry is] is it going to be one that HMRC enquire into…..? 
You have to put the reasoning why on the file and if anything does come 
of it, it is based on this legislation interpreted [in] this way similar to this 
[whatever the decision is based on as compared to the claim at hand] so 
this is how you come to the decision. 
This participant has a research strategy (discussed by Bouwman, 1987), and yet 
explains that, at times, an element of doubt remains, even after thorough 
research. In other words, there is never 100% closure. This participant (as with 
I/V7) is frustrated that certainty cannot be achieved.  Tax law (or any law) is open 
to interpretation and is subjective. This participant would like more objectivity and 
does not feel comfortable with the subjective aspect of tax law.  Capital 
allowances are mentioned and interpretation depends on the definition of ‘plant’ 
and consequently, knowledge of case law and how it is applied. To resolve this 
the practitioner draws on knowledge, experience and judgement to weigh up the 
different evidence to come to a decision (consistent with Bain and Kilpatrick, 
1990).  However, if there is no case which is exactly the same as the practitioner’s 
situation, then reliance on similar, but not identical precedent, leaves doubt in the 
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practitioner’s mind, as HMRC may have a different interpretation (as described 
by I/V23 and I/V24 in Chapter 5).  The participant also refers to the impact of the 
fee and the time required for the research (as discussed by Fogarty and Jones, 
2014).  The above provides further insight to the ‘expert’ and ‘fee’ gaps as 
identified at Chapter 5. 
Whilst I/V25 expresses frustration in the role, others relished puzzle solving and 
enjoyed the ‘thrill of the chase’.  There was often a sense of satisfaction of a job 
well done, when reaching the end of a piece of work from most practitioners.  I/V8 
referred to times when research into a tax transaction could throw up unexpected 
tax consequences, giving moments of revelation and interest where “You find 
yourself dropping a line to your mates [asking] do you agree with this 
interpretation [of this particular legislation]?” and I/V12, too said that the challenge 
of finding the answer is most enjoyable  
That’s what tax is isn’t it? That working your way through it, through 
however many million pages, guidance, legislation, notices. It’s great!  
         [I/V12] 
Despite some of the frustrations and difficulties already described in Chapters 5 
and 6 and in the sections above, the variety and challenge of the tax practitioners’ 
work, is clearly relished by these particular participants. 
IV/24 described the key to the puzzle as building a picture of the transaction.  This 
involves interpretation of the law, obtaining a rounded view, doing thorough 
research, and not acting upon the first bit of information discovered.  In other 
words, the practitioner builds ‘evidence’ and support for the position ultimately 
taken.  This, in itself, may be a difficult part of the process as IV/7 explained 
…I will gather my information and see how this all interacts with each 
other.  Then it is hmmm.  Some of the time it is dead clear, and other times 
it is not... 
The techniques the participants use to assist them to solve a tax puzzle are 
discussed in Section 7.6.2. 
7.6.2 Tools to solve the puzzle 
The dilemmas and difficulties encountered by tax practitioners in the provision of 
tax advice have been explored in this chapter. Practitioners describe an armoury 
of techniques to acquire the evidence of and support for the approach they 
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ultimately take.  The smaller practitioner may have to seek more help outside 
their firm, than those in a larger organisation, although of course many will have 
in-firm access to legislation, guidance, commentary or technical databases as 
discussed. 
Practitioners may refer to commentary about the law (text books, HMRC 
guidance etc.) to help them understand and apply legislation, but the interviewees 
are keenly aware that only the legislation itself has the force of law. That is, the 
legislation, not the guidance (or HMRC manuals) should be cited in 
evidence/correspondence.  Of the 25 interviewees, 23 made use of the actual 
legislation (as opposed to relying entirely on commentary) for this reason. This is 
somewhat at odds with Picciotto’s (2007) comments that accounting practitioners 
tend not to refer to the legislation per se based on Mori research about tax 
legislation.  Reliance on guidance may not be satisfactory, for some, in other 
respects too, as described by I/V10 above – it may arrive late, or be too vague, 
or it may change or be removed without notice as identified by Hart (2017).  Thus 
one participant now stores permanent copies of all guidance referred to during 
the decision making (or opinion forming) process.   
The starting point for a research strategy for many is ‘google’.  This is despite 
recommending clients do not adopt this approach to comply with their tax 
obligations. Nevertheless, participants may find queries and problems at some of 
the webpages such as accountingweb or taxationweb mentioned in Chapter 2 
which may be similar to their own, which may point them in the direction of useful 
information.  However, this technique was used as a steer and the information 
gleaned in this way was said to be taken with a “pinch of salt” as it was recognised 
that it may not be correct.  Interestingly I/V23 suggested new staff members 
required training to undertake research properly.  Their instinct is to ‘google’ for 
information and take the first answer found without necessarily finding complete 
support and evidence for the response to the question asked. This may reflect 
the habitus of new recruits and their attachment to technology, social media and 
the like, hence new habits, it is suggested need to be instilled.  Hence 
socialisation within the organisation and introduction to the techniques and values 
of the organisation are apparent here and these findings are consistent with 




Many participants subscribe to commercial databases – which include access to 
tax legislation, commentary, examples and may also include access to a ‘helpline’ 
where practitioners can discuss tax queries for a steer or a second opinion, as 
described in the example above by I/V7 at Section 7.6.1 above.   The 
effectiveness of the subscription based helplines appeared to vary. Many 
indicated they called the helplines only after thorough research, so they tended 
to use these services for comfort.  I/V15 did not use them as experience 
suggested they gave the wrong advice. There were occasions where views 
conflicted (between the practitioner, the helpline and even a second helpline) and 
the practitioner would take account of all views and to arrive at a reasoned 
judgement.  Presumably in these circumstances the ‘adviser to the adviser’ meets 
the same difficulties the practitioners in respect of complex law, interpretation 
difficulties etc.  Additionally, IV/20 thought the effectiveness of helplines was 
limited as their offers of additional assistance were a sales technique to get the 
practitioner to buy their services. Thus it is left to the participant to determine their 
own approach – they may draw on former experiences, draw on advice from 
colleagues or other advisers (see below) or use a helpline, as discussed, to draw 
a reasoned conclusion.  Nevertheless, many packages have inbuilt “advice” 
sections, to provide a steer for the practitioner.  Specialised software will also 
calculate tax liabilities. I/V9 and IV/20 and IV/21, general practitioners rely on this 
heavily, as IV/20 said 
.. it’s expensive for a practice like ours, but the software is very good and 
it knows more about tax than I do! 
The tax practitioners in this research recognised when something is best resolved 
using outside help (that is help outside their own firm, be that via a subscription 
based helpline or an alternative source).  Again, this links to risk management 
and is characteristic of the smaller practitioner firm.  It would appear on occasion 
that rather than there be a 3-way relationship between HMRC, the practitioner 
and the client there is actually a 4-way relationship – the 4th party being another 
adviser.  This can take many forms: - helplines as above; contacts known to the 
practitioner from previous connections; those known to specialise in a particular 
field; and networks of firms themselves, made up of many member practices who 
can offer advice to other member firms upon request.  Some participants acted 
in the capacity of advisers to others, using former experiences (such as HMRC 
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knowledge) to provide this service.  Other larger firms in the sample described 
playing a role in the ‘outsourcing’ of compliance services and tax return 
completion for some smaller practitioners and/or they belonged to one of the 
network of firms described above if they were large enough to offer support (it 
depends what experiences the employees of the firm have). Local professional 
network meetings are also particularly important for the smaller practitioner – not 
only as a source of CPD and access to updated knowledge (see Chapter 2), but 
for access to specialist knowledge via speakers, who may be contacted for 
assistance.  This shows the value of the tax network. Additionally, the knowledge 
and experience and support of colleagues (where available) is important, as 
described above by I/V7 and I/V3.  This may include discussion of ideas 
collaboratively, or to seek other opinions about the application or interpretation of 
legislation and so on. 
Access to outside help however is not always a panacea, given the complex tax 
world, as the following example illustrates. A number of participants referred to 
employment related securities legislation.  This legislation is designed prevent 
tax advantages of share transactions for employees – yet is described, now, as 
“probably the most subjective and grey area” (I/V24), for which HMRC clearance 
will not be given making this a risky area.   I/V15 sought the advice of a solicitor 
on one such transaction, who suggested that at least 5 hours would be required 
read the rules and provide the advice needed.  The associated cost was therefore 
large. This “enormous” (some “sixty pages or something”) legislation was 
described as a ‘nightmare’.  Risks were said to have increased in this field, given 
EBT tax issues (see Chapter 2). This legislation affects many practitioners, as 
even what seem to be simple transactions may well fall within it, even if the 
practitioner expects they should not.  The legislation itself is examined by Ross 
Martin (2006) who refers to Moody (2006) who suggested that this legislation is 
too complex for the general practitioner to understand.  Here, even the ‘expert to 
the expert’ (the solicitor) was not able to answer the question posed quickly.  The 
practitioner found this frustrating.  
Knowledge in a rapidly changing field is important.  Various HMRC bulletins, or 
tax briefings are frequently issued. Numerous journals and articles may be read.  
Change is frequent (see Chapter 2).  Participants reported feeling inundated by 
the rapid change and quantity of materials, and suggested they were selective in 
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their approach, so as not to feel overwhelmed (feelings also identified by 
McKerchar, 2005).  Attendance at CIOT meetings or other professional body 
events were mentioned by some, and update meetings were held for all staff in 
some of the larger firms.  All updates came from the staff within each firm in this 
sample, that is, no firm had a central office, or source to collate all the changes.  
Training in general, along with exam success was also an important issue which 
arose during discussions. This again relates to professional identity of the 
individual and by undertaking a qualification to join a particular professional body, 
this adds to the symbolic capital of both the individual and the organisation for 
which they may work as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Despite increases in technology (which has expanded access to numerous tax 
research materials) life for tax practitioners does not appear to be easier as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Search tools, instant access to legislation, specialist 
software which brings together tax ‘topics’, online access to HMRC materials, 
regular inbox bulletins and so on may have changed the way practitioners search 
for information, but has not necessarily made the process of solving the puzzle 
any easier.  Underlying this is the fact that the tax system continues to be 
complex, dynamic and dysfunctional and the quantity of, or accessibility to, 
research materials does nothing to address this.  Perhaps the ability for ‘instant 
searches’ even hinders progress, as there is the added problem of determining 
the legitimacy and validity of materials online and it is clear from the discussion 
above that many may feel overwhelmed with information availability and keeping 
up with frequent change. 
Nevertheless, the participants do have access to the various tools, which they 
draw on to employ judgement to resolve whatever the issue is.  Judgement as a 
word cropped up frequently.  Indeed, I/V15 described the adoption of a 
“multilayer” approach to research, drawing upon many resources to help employ 
judgement to come to a conclusion.  Hence, practitioners do ultimately solve the 
puzzle, or come to some sort of consensus or decision on the answer as Picciotto 
(2007) and Bogenschneider (2015) suggest.  As I/V1 stated 
you do spend time doubting yourself…but I am confident that [having read 
lots of material and] having come to that decision, I have probably got to 
the right answer 
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Various examples of ‘non routine’ work have been given by the practitioners to 
illustrate the problems they face.  To those outside the tax practitioner field, the 
variety, complexity, and broad range of questions with which they have to 
grapple, may be surprising.  This list is shown in Appendix 10.2.  All examples 
are, without fail, those which do not have an immediate answer, and it appears 
that many of the problems relate to the difficult area of anti-avoidance legislation 
(as discussed at Section 7.3.2) and how to apply the law in that respect, which 
makes the tax position far more complex than it otherwise would be.   
I/V3 sums this up well:  
we interpret how we think [the law] should be interpreted, we look at 
different magazines and books on the subject, we speak to other advisers 
and we just get to a situation where we think we can advise on what is our 
opinion of the law and that is what we have to stress. That’s our opinion.  
There are lots of things that are just not clear cut and I think that is where 
the difficulties are.  I think if you can explain this to the client and they fully 
understand that, there is not much more you can do 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter illustrates the many roles that smaller practitioners undertake. 
Responsibilities to both the client, HMRC, and themselves are apparent and this 
chapter draws together the practitioner role in the tripartite relationship to answer 
the question “how do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship 
with clients and HMRC?”  by addressing the following objectives:  
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 How practitioners see their role ‘in between’ HMRC and the 
client; 
 The roles they play in managing both relationships; 
 What challenges and difficulties arise from their roles; 
 How these challenges are overcome; 
 How the practitioners come to understand, interpret and 
implement tax rules on the ground whilst managing their 
position in the tripartite relationship. 
The chapter has explored how practitioners see their role, and the challenges 
they face, within the tripartite relationship.  Links can be made to the gaps in 
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expectation in the client relationship and those in the tax authority relationship as 
identified in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The findings illustrate that the participants adopt a number of roles to carry out 
tax practice and maintain both the client and HMRC relationships.  These are 
facilitator (of tax planning and navigation of the tax system, to enable clients to 
meet their tax obligations), defender (of themselves, the client and the revenue), 
translator (of legislation), negotiator (on behalf of the client) and overall puzzle 
solver. These roles face both the client and HMRC and the practitioner may 
therefore find themselves in a conflicting position.  Illustrations of how the 
practitioners employ experience, knowledge and ethical disposition to carry out 
these roles and balance competing discourses are given. Difficulties are faced in 
all these roles, the reasons for which are highlighted in Chapter 2.  The 
participants see their role in this relationship as being integral to the tax system 
(they help it keep running, prevent errors and help taxpayers comply), yet this 
role is not believed to be acknowledged.  Participants are also aware of how 
society perceives them. Changes in attitude towards tax planning at the tax field 
level explain the practitioners’ defensive tones and heightened sensitivities in this 
respect.  The difficulties which arise in the implementation of law (and tax rules 
and regulation in general) at the ‘coal face’ are also illustrated and examples of 
how practitioners come to a conclusion on tax advice are given.  Changes in the 
relationship with HMRC are evident. There are fewer opportunities to access 
advance rulings to alleviate uncertainty, and a changed relationship in general 
with HMRC counterparts makes negotiation difficult, which impacts upon the 
client/practitioner relationship too.  Tension in the relationship seems to have 
increased which affects the practitioners’ tax practice. Practitioners of course, do 
ultimately manage uncertainty, by employing the various strategies discussed, 
and they do balance their responsibilities to themselves, the client and HMRC to 
enable them to undertake their role as tax adviser to the taxpayer.  
The following chapter draws together Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (which taken together 
illustrate tax practice in the small practitioner context) and provides discussion in 







The aim of this study is to achieve an understanding of tax practice in the UK in 
the smaller tax practitioner context, which is to be addressed by the question: 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
In seeking answers to this question, empirical evidence has been obtained from 
the participants within smaller tax practices, that is, hearing the voices of those 
inside tax practice itself.  The findings chapters have presented this evidence in 
accordance with the following 3 sub questions. 
How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in a dynamic 
environment? (Chapter 5) 
How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
impact upon the practices of tax practitioners? (Chapter 6) 
How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship with 
clients and HMRC? (Chapter 7) 
 
NB, the evidence presented in the above chapters and in the discussion below, 
refers, at times to the participants, or practitioners.  It is acknowledged in the 
limitations to the research, in Chapter 4, that these findings may not be 
generalisable to the entire population of tax practitioners. 
 
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 illustrates “tax-preparer perceptions of their 
clients” and provides observations about “client preparer interactions” 
(Stephenson et al., 2017, p.201) addressing calls for more research in this area.  
These findings distil into a number of ‘expectations’.  The ‘expectations’ refer to 
client expectations which the practitioner may not always be able to meet, so 
resulting in a ‘gap’ between what the practitioner believes a client wants from their 
service, and what they (the practitioner) can actually provide.  Chapter 6 offers 
evidence of the tax practitioner view about the current relationship with the tax 
authorities.  There is little prior UK research on this topic, as highlighted in 
Chapter 3.  This relationship has a significant impact upon practice.  Notable 
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perception gaps are apparent between what the practitioners desire from the 
relationship (and service) with HMRC, and that which they actually have to 
manage on a day to day basis.  These ‘gaps’ have been compounded in recent 
years both by various reorganisations at HMRC and, many practitioners feel, the 
shift in opinion towards the tax profession (which is often portrayed in a negative 
light as discussed at Chapter 2).  Chapter 7 brings together the issues arising 
from management of client expectations, and management of the HMRC 
relationship, to present evidence of how practitioners actually implement tax rules 
and regulations at the ‘coal face’ and how they balance the demands and 
obligations upon themselves (which come from both clients and HMRC).  
Evidence about the practitioner’s role within the tripartite relationship is thus 
explored.  It was found that the practitioners adopt a number of roles with regard 
to their professional responsibilities which enable them to carry out their practice.  
The roles may face both ways, that is, both client facing, and facing towards 
HMRC. 
Overall, it is apparent throughout the findings chapters that there are many 
complexities, uncertainties, and challenges within the smaller tax practitioner 
context, which are further discussed in Section 8.3.  The study offers insight into 
how these matters impact upon smaller tax practice, along with exploration as to 
how practitioners manage such challenges.  In general, the findings chapters 
shine a light on tax practice as a whole, as taken together the three chapters give 
deep insights into tax practice in the smaller tax practitioner context.   
In sum, the empirical chapters portray a rich study of tax practitioners in the micro 
(or emic, Lukka and Modell, 2010) domain.  To aid a deeper understanding of the 
empirical findings (such as the challenges identified and their impact upon 
practice), the place of tax practice within the wider environment is explored in 
this, the Discussion Chapter.  That is, the link between the micro (emic) and the 
macro (etic) is examined. 
The chapter unfolds as follows.  The link between tax practice (emic) and the 
wider environment (etic) and the employment of the theoretical framework is 
discussed in Section 8.2.  This includes identification of the tax field and its 
composition.  Smaller tax practice and its link to the tax field is highlighted in 
Section 8.3.  This is followed by findings from each of the empirical chapters 
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which are discussed in light of the Bourdieusian field framework; secondary 
themes which draw the empirical chapters together are also summarised. A 
summary of the chapter follows at Section 8.4. 
8.2 Tax practice and its position within the wider environment 
This section discusses the link between the emic and the etic and explains how 
the theoretical framework is employed to aid understanding of the empirical 
evidence discussed in Chapters, 5,6 and 7. 
A diagrammatic representation of tax practice, at the emic level, as discussed in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is shown in Fig 8.1.  The empirical data presented within the 
findings chapters provides the tax practitioner perspective on each of the three 
parties (the client, HMRC and themselves) which form the tripartite relationship.  
As illustrated in Fig 8.1, the taxpayer makes requests of the tax practitioner, who 
acts on their behalf in dealings with HMRC, if the nature of the request requires 
it.  HMRC, in turn, respond to the tax practitioner, who interacts with the taxpayer.  
Depending on the practitioner response to the taxpayer, there may be gaps in 
what the taxpayer expects from the practitioner in terms of service, as explored 
in Chapter 5.  The relationship with HMRC is not always as the practitioner would 
desire, and at times the service from HMRC also falls short, in the eyes of the 
practitioner.  This results in a number of gaps, described in Chapter 6, which have 
an impact not just upon the practitioner, but also upon the client/practitioner 
relationship.  Consequently, to manage both the client and the HMRC relationship 
the practitioner adopts a number of roles (as illustrated in Fig 8.1).  The 
practitioner employs a number of techniques, strategies and resources to enable 
them to respond to clients and HMRC alike in a dynamic tax environment.  The 
techniques they use are discussed throughout each of the empirical chapters, 
with more specific details shown at Section 7.6.2 in Chapter 7.  It should be noted 
that Fig 8.1 shows the practitioner understanding of established practice.  Whilst 
the practitioner continues to be in the middle of the relationship, it was suggested 
(in Chapter 6) that on occasion HMRC have begun to contact the client directly 
(rather than the practitioner), which may affect the order of ‘who contacts whom’.  





Fig 8.1 Tax practice in a dynamic environment 
  
Source: Author’s own 
Of course, tax practice does not operate in isolation, but within a broader 
environment, described here as the ‘tax field’.  The tax environment is often 
described as dynamic, complex, challenging and full of “dysfunctional laws” 
(Fogarty and Jones, 2014, p.287) and regulations which frequently change.  
Without representation, taxpayers must manage this unwieldy, complicated, 
uncertain field in terms of the tax system itself, administrative requirements and 
self-assessment of the correct amount of tax.  As identified in Chapter 2, many 
taxpayers may feel unable or unwilling to battle with such complexities and 
choose to pass on their uncertainties arising from this dysfunctional system 
(arising in the etic domain) to the tax professional (at the emic domain) for them 
to resolve.  This is represented diagrammatically at Fig. 8.2. (the relationship is 
not necessarily linear, as, for example, advice proffered, may impact upon the tax 
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field itself, apropos the tax avoidance discussion in Chapter 2).  An examination 
of the tax environment in which smaller tax practice operates and thus exploration 
of the wider tax field will help shed light on what smaller tax practitioners do, and 
why they do what they do in their daily work (Webb et al., 2002), and show how 
changes in the tax field impact upon their practice.  Such examination will provide 
additional explanation and understanding of smaller tax practice as identified in 
the empirical chapters and as shown in Fig 8.1.  This examination is to be 
informed using a tool from Bourdieu’s concepts and theory of practice as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.7.3 and 4.7.4), that is, the focus will be upon 
Bourdieu’s concepts of “fields” to explore tax practice at the ‘macro’ domain.  By 
standing back from the smaller practice itself, a more holistic view of the wider 
environment and context in which tax practice operates is attained.  The 
theoretical framework thus provides a way of analysing the ‘etic’ (macro) domain 
(Lukka and Modell, 2010) to enable understanding of the empirical data arising 

















Figure 8.2 The relationship between the etic domain (the tax field) and the emic 
domain (tax practice) 
 
Source: Author’s own 
The next section explores the dynamics and composition of the ‘tax field’. 
8.2.1 Identification of the tax field 
An explanation of a field, according to Bourdieu, is discussed in Chapter 4. Fields 
are described as social spaces, or networks (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), 
contexts in which practice is carried out (Webb et al., 2000) or “any aspect of 
social life” (Lombardi and Cooper, 2015, p.88).  Examples are given in Chapter 4 
of the different types of field, which may consist of, for instance, organisations or 
types of activity.  Using these explanations, it is possible to create a picture of the 
See figure 8.3 
See figure 8.1 
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‘tax field’ itself, although it is acknowledged that as to where one draws a 
boundary around a field is subjective.  The ‘tax field’ is not itself an isolated field, 
but is made up of many related and interconnected fields which, together, make 
up the ‘tax field’.  As Gracia and Oats (2012a, p.307) suggest, the tax field is 
“overlaid and intertwined with a number of other social and professional fields”. 
The fields of relevance in this study (in relation to constructing the ‘tax field’) have 
been identified by drawing both upon the context to the research (as discussed 
in Chapter 2), and from the comments made by the participants of the study.  
These are identified as the political, journalistic, professional, bureaucratic 
(HMRC), small business and non-qualified practitioner fields; all fields which were 
explicitly mentioned by the participants.  Additionally, the legal fields and judicial 
fields are also identified.  The latter two fields were not named by the participants, 
but by implication, from the evidence collected, these fields have an impact upon 
the work of the tax practitioner.  As said, the existence of a ‘field’ is subjective 
and as the tax field has many participants including for instance, taxpayers, 
practitioners, professional bodies and HMRC it is recognised that “[c]ollectives of 
people may occupy more than one social space [field] at a time” (Thomson, 2014, 
p.68) and fields may overlap.   Indeed, the smaller practitioners could themselves 
be seen as a separate field, although here they are treated as participants 
(actors) of the professional field and some participants of the legal field may also 
be actors in the judicial field for example judges, administrators and users of the 
law. The boundaries of fields are fluid and changeable (Everett, 2002; Lang and 
Rego, 2015; Oakes et al., 1996) and may vary in response to changes in society 
and events both within and outside the field. The overlapping fields can thus have 
impact upon each other and the wider tax field, particularly as fields may also 
interpenetrate (Hilgers and Mangez, 2015).  It so follows that influences from 
events which arise in one field may cross the fluid (or porous) boundaries of other 
fields with the consequence that events in the etic domain (macro environment) 
affect the emic – here smaller tax practice. This characteristic is not unique to the 
tax field as discussed in Chapter 4.  Overlapping fields in the personal financial 
planner context are explored by Parnaby (2009) and in the study of the interaction 
of transnational and national legal fields by Madsen (2013), thus an analysis of 
the overlapping fields in the context of the tax field, is helpful to explain the 
operation of smaller tax practice.  Additionally, tax, as a subject, or object of 
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research, is interdisciplinary, drawing from areas such as economics, politics, 
accounting, law and so on, hence exploration of overlapping fields using a 
Bourdieusian framework will also allow analysis of these “complex” and “cross-
disciplinary relationships” (Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.308).  A diagrammatic 
representation of the overlapping fields is shown at Fig 8.3 – this shows that each 
of the fields interlinks/overlaps/are entwined together to illustrate that each field 
cannot be viewed in isolation from another.  Note: the order of the fields is simply 
random and is only for illustrative purposes. 
It is also recognised that there may be other fields which may form part of the ‘tax 
field’ (so the above ‘fields’ may not be exhaustive) but those of relevance to this 
research, as derived from the empirical evidence are identified above and are 






































Source: Author’s own 
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8.2.2 Composition of the fields 
The tax field is thus inhabited by many actors, or participants, as well as a number 
of other fields (some of which are identified in Fig. 8.3).  Each field will have its 
own dynamics and discourses or rules (ways of doing things) (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992) and the positions of actors within the fields, according to their 
capital (or power) accumulations, will contribute to the different field dynamics 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: Everett, 2002; Gracia and Oats, 2012a; 
Thomson, 2014), as discussed in Chapter 4.  The impacts of competing 
discourses upon smaller tax practice are examined at the micro (emic) level 
below in Section 8.3.  Firstly, however, an explanation about the composition of 
the fields and their particular impact upon the tax field is given, by taking each 
field identified at Fig. 8.3 in turn. The discourse and pressures (and actions of 
actors) within each identified field, in light of the current environment and context 
(as identified in Chapter 2 and as evidenced in the empirical chapters) in relation 
to the tax field, are briefly explained.   
Political field 
 Greater government control over tax avoidance 
 Pressure to collect more tax revenue 
 Creates the requirement for new tax laws to implement tax policy 
 Tax policy is not necessarily determined by those with detailed technical 
knowledge 
 Determines what to tax (income/wealth/spending) and how to tax it 
 Encourages economic development via creation of tax reliefs (such as 
R&D incentives; Entrepreneurs’ relief) 
 Use the tax system to respond to changes in the economic environment; 
which can result in frequent change 
 Use the tax system for social objectives 
 Annual budgets and Finance Acts, resulting in regular changes to tax laws 
Legal field 
 Drafts legislation to implement government tax policy 
 Is responsible for wording and structure of legislation 
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 “Bolts on” anti-avoidance rules to existing legislation (Chittenden and 
Foster, 2009; James and Wallschutzky, 1997; Weisbach, 1999b) in 
response to political requests to close ‘loopholes’ 
 Create new legislation with ‘anti-avoidance’ in mind 
 Source of advice to taxpayers and the tax (non-lawyer) profession 
Judicial field 
 Interpretation of law 
 Adjudicate disputes between (here) taxpayer (via adviser) and HMRC 
 Results in case law and legal precedent 
 Rulings may unsettle previously settled tax positions 
Bureaucratic field (specifically here HMRC) 
 Collect and administer taxes 
 Under pressure to collect more taxes 
 Provide a service to the public 
 To treat taxpayers fairly (per taxpayers’ charter, Chapter 2) 
 Engage with tax agents (per Chapter 2) 
 Manage and interpret complex law, seek judicial rulings and deal with 
frequent change 
 Cope with the above whilst undergoing organisational change at the 
HMRC level in terms of physical reorganisation/resource 
issues/introduction of new systems 
Professional field (within which the tax practitioners from this research sit) 
 Educate members and provide qualifications 
 Provision of ethical guidance and requirements, including for example 
PCRT (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
 Oversight of members 
 Provide opportunities for consultation on proposed tax changes 
 Many different actors in the field (professional bodies, as discussed in 






Small business field (type of taxpayer common to the smaller practitioner 
context) 
 May not appreciate tax complexity 
 May entirely ignore tax consequences of a transaction 
 Focus upon the business/commerciality rather than tax issues 
 Tax planning opportunities may be identified by either practitioner or 
taxpayer 
Journalistic field 
 Discourse about tax avoidance.   
 Variety of perspectives (professional field, media field, etc.) 
 Online forums, websites and impact on behaviour of those who use these 
Practitioners outside the professional field (those outside a professional 
body) 
 The non-qualified practitioners 
 Public may think all practitioners are qualified (per Chapter 2) 
 No oversight or registration 
 
In terms of how the fields are composed, HMRC is shown as part of the 
bureaucratic field; the practitioner is shown as a participant in the professional 
field (more specifically here the tax or accounting profession, rather than say the 
legal profession as of course the term ‘professional field’ has wide reach).  Tax 
practitioners who operate outside the professional field (the non-qualified) are 
shown as a separate field, as whilst participants from this field are outside this 
study, they were frequently mentioned by the interviewees.  With regard to 
taxpayers, these may belong to different fields, such as the small business field, 
or the multinational enterprise field etc.  The small business field is included here, 
as this is indicative of the types of client the smaller practitioner will deal with. The 
participants within the remaining fields, are considered to be those working within 
the different practices within those particular fields, be they lawyers, 
policymakers, journalists, judges, the courts and so on.   
A closer examination of these overlapping fields is needed to understand the 
impact upon the smaller tax practice.  This analysis can then be used to 
understand the empirical findings in light of the research questions asked. For 
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instance, both the tax practitioner and HMRC as participants in the broader tax 
field manage complex tax law (which derives from the legal field, and which has 
origins in the political field); the practitioner and HMRC (and indeed those in other 
fields of practice) will be governed by their respective professional organisations 
and regulations; HMRC may not provide clear guidance as to how a transaction 
should be taxed, or may be difficult to contact (as evidenced in Chapter 6) 
creating issues in the tax field deriving from the bureaucratic field; and the tax 
and accounting professional bodies within the professional field require their 
members to be up to date, compliant with ethical responsibilities and to adhere 
to, for instance, the PCRT (as explained in Chapter 2), which impacts upon the 
behaviour of the tax practitioner and their interactions with clients and HMRC and 
participants in other fields.  The smaller practitioners discussed here are likely to 
have taxpayers from the smaller business field amongst their clients, the nature 
of which requires the practitioner to have knowledge of multiple taxes, as 
transactions may have many tax effects which may add uncertainty to their task.  
This explanation is of course, not exhaustive in any way, but gives a flavour of 
how influences from other fields impact upon each other, as will be further 
explored in the small practitioner sense at Section 8.3. 
The fields are not static, they are fluid (Everett, 2002), in a constant state of flux 
and boundaries can change (Lang and Rego, 2015; Oakes et al., 1996).  This 
fluidity adds further dimension to smaller tax practice.  The discourses and rules 
of the game may change depending on events within (or outside) the field, 
requiring new understanding of how the field operates (Hilgers and Mangez, 
2015).  Additionally, there may be an absence of common discourse amongst the 
fields which overlay the tax field.  These matters, along with the interplay between 
different fields, combine to create a complex environment which will affect tax 
practice.   
The consequences of changes at field level (upon tax practice) are examined in 
more detail at Section 8.3 however, it is a general consensus amongst 
participants of this study that the environment they work in is not how it was some 
years ago.  Struggles by the participants within the different fields to obtain more 
capital (power) result in changes in the dynamics of the different fields (and to the 
previously understood rules of the game) and thus creates challenge to 
established practice (Dezalay and Madsen, 2012; Gorton, 2002; Hilgers and 
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Mangez, 2015).  A new understanding of the field is therefore required (Hilgers 
and Mangez, 2015).  This has effect on the practitioner’s role in the middle of the 
tripartite relationship, and how they balance obligations to both clients on the one 
hand, and HMRC on the other.  The roles they employ to manage this are 
multifaceted, as explained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
What follows at Section 8.3 is a discussion of how the Bourdieusian field 
framework can be used to inform the findings at the practitioner level.   Of course, 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice combines matters of the field, habitus and capital, 
as discussed in Chapter 4.  The three concepts are interlinked, relational, and 
taken together can help explain overall practice.  Whilst ‘field’ is the focus here, 
there will be references to the resources (capitals) of the practitioner and how 
they employ them to manage practice (which may be affected by their habitus). 
Indeed, an examination of capital will help identify which participants, within which 
fields, have more power over the tax field than others and therefore have an 
impact upon the practice of the tax practitioner. 
The next section begins with an overview of the smaller tax practitioner context 
which is then followed by taking each of the research questions in turn (and the 
associated empirical chapter) to explore links between the macro (etic) and micro 
(emic) perspective to shed more light on smaller tax practice per se, and in 
particular to answer the overall research question as to how changes in the tax 
field impact upon the practice of the smaller tax practitioner. 
8.3 The tax field and smaller tax practice 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show the working environment of the practitioner is complex 
and certainly not static.  It should be said however that the participants in the 
study expect that they will have to deal with, at times, complex legislation and a 
complicated tax system and they anticipate that their daily tasks may involve 
management and resolution of uncertainties to enable them to provide the advice 
required by their clients.  
The ‘small business taxpayer field’ (largely owner-managed businesses and 
individual taxpayers) creates challenges for the smaller practitioner which may 
differ to those working for larger, more specialised organisations.  The nature of 
the work is such that the practitioners may obtain many different tax questions in 
their daily work – some of which they will never have come across before.  Many 
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queries may be ‘ad hoc’ and given the nature of the client base, the scope of 
queries is very broad (see Appendix 10.2 for examples).  The practitioners expect 
to have to work with pages of legislation, guidance, and perhaps to seek advice 
themselves, as it is often anticipated that the answer may not come easily to 
them.  As discussed in Chapter 5, many are aware of the risks of stepping outside 
their areas of expertise, however, on the whole, practitioners do not have detailed 
knowledge about one particular tax (as those working for larger firms may), 
instead, they require breadth of knowledge, and understanding of multiple taxes, 
to enable them to meet the requirements of their client base. Nevertheless, this 
is anticipated as part of the environment in which they work. A broad knowledge 
was seen as a strength of a smaller practitioner and is illustrative of the technical 
capital on which they can draw (there are exceptions, apropos those operating in 
a niche environment, or those working in the larger of the smaller practices who 
may form areas of specialisation).  Another characteristic of the ‘small business 
taxpayer field’ is the taxpayer’s need for broader business advice, and the tax 
practitioner may have to offer this.  This is attained by having a good knowledge 
of the client as suggested by Stephenson et al. (2017).  Various examples were 
provided by the participants relating to general business and commercial matters.  
The smaller business owner may require direction as to impacts of decisions 
upon employees, shareholders, business succession planning and so on.  
Hence, here, the practitioner’s knowledge and experience is used in a different 
(not necessarily tax related) capacity. 
This, the broader context in which smaller tax practice is situated is expected as 
the norm and tax practitioners are accustomed to this.  In other words, the rules 
of the game, in the context described above, are such that practitioners expect to 
resolve complex tax queries or solve the puzzle with which they are presented, 
as discussed in Chapter 7.  However, the practitioners feel that their work 
environment and their profession has changed greatly in recent years and they 
may experience new, unsettling or unexpected challenges to their practice.  As 
will be discussed, these challenges to established tax practice emanate from 
changes in the dynamics of the tax field.  The practitioners’ work environment has 
changed from what they knew; the rules of the game have shifted.  These 
changes affect the type of work they do, how they feel about themselves and their 
profession. Thus, as will be seen, changes at the field level have consequences 
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for the practitioners’ work practices and relationship management, which adds 
additional uncertainty and a further dimension to the practitioners’ work.  
Practitioners must adjust to a new normal. 
The shifts and changes in dynamics in the tax field and the associated impacts 
upon smaller tax practice are encapsulated in the discussion that follows.  A 
number of overriding themes can be seen including uncertainty, issues of trust 
and the professional identity of the practitioner. 
As a reminder the overarching question to be addressed is: 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of the smaller tax 
practitioner? 
The following sections discuss each of the sub questions of the study in turn, to 
assess the impact of changes in the tax field upon each of the practitioners’ 
relationships with the client (8.3.1), HMRC (8.3.2) and their position within the 
middle of the tripartite relationship (8.3.3). 
8.3.1 How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in a 
dynamic environment? (Chapter 5) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the practitioner must address a number of challenges 
in the practitioner/client relationship, including management of expectations.  The 
themes arising from the evidence indicate a number of gaps between what the 
client expects a practitioner can do, and what they can actually achieve, which 
are identified in Chapter 5 as the ‘expert’, ‘scope’, ‘HMRC’ and ‘fee’ expectation 
gaps.   
Various influences stem from the tax field which affect a practitioner’s approach 
to client relationships and examination of these help shed light upon why the gaps 
arise.  A number of factors combine to create the environment in which tax 
practice plays out, including as described at Section 8.2.2, complex or uncertain 
laws, bureaucratic and administrative challenges, the nature of the small 
business field, as well as the requirements of professional bodies.  Each of these 
fields have different perspectives and discourses, which add various different 
dimensions to a practitioner’s work.  At a simple level, taxpayers may want to 
minimise tax, HMRC may want to maximise it and HMRC is under pressure in 
this respect for the reasons given at Section 8.2.2.  HMRC may thus, for example, 
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challenge claims to tax relief more frequently to prevent loss of tax and may be 
less willing to negotiate over doubtful positions (both examples which featured in 
evidence through Chapter 5-7).  Additionally, to prevent taxpayers (or their 
advisers) taking unfair advantage of the law, the political field may require new 
laws, or adaptation of existing law; this may sometimes arise, perhaps, as a 
consequence of (some) tax practitioners’ former advice.  Thus the tax practitioner 
has impact upon the tax field itself in this respect as shown at Fig 8.2.  Legislation 
created by the legal field may be written in a manner which makes it more difficult 
for the taxpayer to ‘get around’, thus legal provisions may become more 
complicated, or the practitioner may not understand how to implement them.  The 
interplay between the political, legal, bureaucratic and other related fields and the 
frequent change within them creates uncertainty.  Tax practice must work with 
this environment; hence it follows that there may be expectation gaps about what 
a client thinks a practitioner can do for them. 
Complex or vague legislation alone may prevent provision of an instant answer 
to a client query. Research may be required.  This may include ‘groundwork’ to 
get to a ‘standing start’ (given the broad scope of smaller tax practice), or to 
ascertain how ambiguous law may apply to a transaction.  The practitioner must 
do sufficient work to be comfortable in their technical ability to attain an 
appropriate answer. This is an anticipated part of their role and participants draw 
on former experiences (their habitus) to manage this.  However, participants 
highlighted an environment of growing uncertainty – be that increasing 
subjectivity in application of legal provision or a blurring of the line between 
unacceptable tax avoidance and tax planning.  The latter two examples result 
from changes in the dynamics in the tax field, which are discussed further below 
when examining the ‘scope’ gap.  Some tax matters may thus require further 
investment of time to resolve uncertainties and manage risks as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  As an instant answer may not be forthcoming for the client, this leads 
to the ‘expert expectation’ gap.  Whilst the practitioner invests time to undertake 
research to manage their own uncertainties, this may affect the client relationship.  
Some reported that clients may question their capabilities if an immediate answer 
is not provided.  The client expects to pay for the knowledge of the practitioner 
as they have passed their own uncertainties to the adviser, and they expect the 
adviser to address these (as also identified by Fogarty and Jones, 2014).  If they 
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do not meet the client’s expectations, this creates uncertainty from the client 
perspective (in the ability of the practitioner and for their own tax position) and 
affects the trust in the relationship.  Clients may question the technical capital (the 
knowledge, experience) and professional capability of the practitioner and 
wonder what they are paying for; as the work undertaken to resolve a query is 
often unseen.  The expertise of the practitioner is thus used in ways not expected 
(or seen) by the client.  The capitals to which the practitioners have access to 
resolve the client query (their knowledge, past experience and access to 
resources such as legislation, guidance etc.), is an intangible commodity from the 
perspective of the client and indeed the symbolic capital which comes from the 
practitioner’s professional qualifications may also be questioned, thus resulting in 
the expert gap. 
Relatedly smaller tax practitioners frequently interact with their non-tax 
colleagues.  This relationship may create further uncertainty.  A number of 
practitioners described backtracking on client advice incorrectly provided by 
accounting colleagues (as identified by Tomasic and Pentony, 1991).  Why the 
advice of tax colleagues is not always sought in the first instance is not clear.  
There may be a concern about fees, or the accounting colleague may feel their 
knowledge is sufficient, hence devaluing the expertise of their tax colleagues.  
The tax professional however has other knowledge (or cultural capital) which may 
benefit the client, which other colleagues may not, such as a broad view of the 
operation of the tax field and the challenges which arise therefrom and how they 
may affect the client’s position. Different fields collide here – the accounting 
professional and the tax professional, both of which seek the approval of the client 
(and hence an increase in power over colleagues and the clients perhaps). 
Nevertheless, although the goal to advise the client appropriately should be 
common, the different expertise and approach of each professional may create 
risk management problems if the wrong advice is given and may further 
contribute to the ‘expert’ gap.  The trust between the client and the tax (and 
accounting) practitioner may also be tested. 
The ’scope expectation’ described in Chapter 5 has various perspectives.  If a 
client is told that an error must be corrected to avoid loss of tax to HMRC, the 
practitioner’s allegiance may be doubted, as in the client’s eyes, the allegiance 
appears to be to HMRC rather than themselves.  Trust in the relationship may 
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thus be tested as the scope of the practitioner’s role is questioned.  The 
practitioner’s professional identity (their conduct, behaviour, morals and beliefs) 
as discussed in Chapter 3 has consequence for trust in the relationship, as they 
have ethical obligations to their profession in such circumstances which prevents 
them acting in a way the client would prefer. 
Further, many participants observed that clients focus upon making their 
business a success.  Tax matters may be seen as incidental, or not given any 
thought at all.  Perhaps the client assumes their practitioner will ‘sort it all out’, as 
they have passed on such uncertainties to them (as identified by Fogarty and 
Jones, 2014), but in some cases the practitioner may need to bring this to the 
client’s attention.  This has implications for the scope of the practitioner’s work in 
a totally different capacity.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the practitioner may 
employ their technical capital and experience to identify future tax or business 
problems by broadening the scope of the advice. 
Finally, there is a tax planning ‘scope gap’.  The participants acknowledge 
changes in the tax field in recent years have narrowed what advice a practitioner 
feels comfortable in providing. The dynamics and rules of the game have 
changed as a result of external pressures on the government and HMRC to get 
a ‘grip’ over tax avoidance, which has consequence for the tax field and the 
different powers (capitals) of the participants within it. The dynamics have 
changed as struggles ensue for increased power over the field.  The fact that the 
tax profession has been involved with unacceptable tax avoidance in the past has 
resulted in a change in position of stakeholders within the field to address these 
matters, as the regulatory system has been upset (Gracia and Oats, 2012a), 
hence is illustrative of how the tax practice (the emic) affects the wider tax field 
(the etic).   The power of the practitioners to assist the taxpayer to ‘game’ the 
system (Eustice, 1989; Freedman, 2010; Ginsberg, 1984; Kleinbard, 1990; 
MacNeil, 2009; McBarnet and Whelan, 1991; Monroe 1981; Picciotto, 2007; 
Powers, 1976; Prebble, 1994; Weisbach, 1999b) has reduced, resulting in a 
transfer of power to HMRC.  There are changes in many fields as a consequence, 
not just the bureaucratic field. Even if a practitioner has not been involved in 
unacceptable tax avoidance practices in the past, they are nevertheless affected 
by the response of the tax profession to this issue and must abide by the 
strengthened PRCT rules as discussed in Chapter 2.  They must also implement 
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revised legal provisions.  The judicial field now tends to interpret law in anti-
avoidance cases in favour of HMRC and not the taxpayer. Additionally, the 
reporting about tax avoidance in the journalistic field has contributed to 
uncertainties around the acceptability of tax planning in general.  On the other 
hand, media reports about tax avoidance schemes, may act as advertisements 
to clients who wish to take part in them which creates further client management 
(and trust) issues, as the client risk preference may not align with that of the 
practitioner (as observed by Hite and McGill, 1992; Sakaurai and Braithwaite, 
1993).  These clients may question (or challenge) the practitioners’ expertise (as 
discussed by Parnaby, 2009, in the financial planning field).  An example of this 
was provided by I/V4 whose client questioned why tax shelters used by celebrities 
had not been offered to them. The practitioner’s legitimacy is challenged here – 
the client sees potential tax savings which they have not been offered.  They may 
question why, in their view, the practitioner has not acted on their behalf. The 
‘scope’ expectation gap can thus be seen.  There is a tax planning gap, between 
what a practitioner is comfortable to advise upon, versus what the client may like 
to achieve. Some also prevented clients from entering into dubious schemes 
identified on the internet.  The evidence suggested that practitioners will not 
automatically conform to client preferences in this respect, if they are 
uncomfortable with matters, despite findings by Carnes et al. (1996), Cloyd and 
Spilker, (1999) and Kahle and White, (2004), although it is acknowledged that 
their findings come from a time prior to the revised narrative around tax 
avoidance.  It would however appear that there is evidence to suggest that some 
practitioners are actually more risk averse than some clients, consistent with 
findings of Brody and Masselli, (1996), Christensen, (1992), Helleloid, (1989) and 
Hite et al. (1992).  It may be that the risk appetite of the practitioners has shifted 
as a consequence of the changed dynamics in the tax field as described.  They 
may be far more cautious.  Additionally, increased HMRC powers and penalty 
provisions, which again arise outside of tax practice per se may also have 
influence on the practitioners’ behaviours and hence tax practice (Brody and 
Masselli, 1996).  Nevertheless, the practitioners continue to seek an efficient tax 
position for their clients, but a number of matters come into play. The practitioner 
draws on their judgment and experience. Responsibilities to HMRC and 
awareness of the ‘moral’ argument, are also relevant and the practitioner has 
regard to their own conduct and professional identity to determine a position with 
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which they feel comfortable.  Thus if the client and the practitioner are not on the 
same page, a further scope gap may arise.  
Nevertheless, although some clients want a proactive tax adviser as identified by 
Christensen (1992) and Hasseldine et al. (2011), some forego the tax planning 
advice proffered by the practitioner as discussed in Chapter 5.  Some are simply 
‘content’ with the tax they pay.  Some may fear the symbolic power (the authority) 
of HMRC, as they may not want to come to their attention.  It would seem that 
HMRC has domination in the field (over and above the practitioner advice, hence 
weakening the practitioner’s capital in this respect).   Many examples related to 
claims for tax reliefs. There is seemingly a ‘pull’ between the political field which 
introduces such claims (as economic incentives) and the actors in the 
bureaucratic field (HMRC) who in their quest to protect the revenue net and to 
treat taxpayers equally may investigate the claim to ensure it is legitimate.  The 
taxpayer may not want to be exposed to this scrutiny, particularly if there is any 
uncertainty as to whether, or not, a claim may be successful.   These are 
examples in which the practitioner is unable to utilise their technical capital and 
knowledge to save the client tax, and consequently, they are unable to convert 
this knowledge into economic capital (a fee).  Here, the expertise of the 
practitioner is not questioned per se, but the taxpayer is prevented from acting 
upon the advice given by other actors within the broader tax field.  The tax 
practitioner’s advice is not seemingly trusted by the client, the reasons for which 
derive in other fields.  Some practitioners however know their clients so well, they 
know not to offer unwanted advice to them, as it may increase the client’s 
uncertainties.  This in-depth knowledge about the client, is representative of the 
small practitioner field (which was also identified by Stephenson et al., 2017) and 
is an example of the alignment of the practitioners’ expectations with those of the 
client, to maintain the relationship. 
The client/practitioner relationship is also affected by circumstances at HMRC.  
There is a ‘HMRC expectation’ gap.  Briefly, delays and errors at HMRC are 
outside the control of practitioners, yet the client may question the competence 
of the practitioner in this regard which may create trust problems in the 
client/practitioner relationship. The authority of HMRC is seen as powerful by 
taxpayers (given its symbolic power as an organisation) and practitioners must 
manage this perception, as mistakes and delays can arise in any organisation, 
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HMRC included.  Errors and delays by HMRC impact upon the capacity of the 
practitioner to convert time into economic capital, i.e. fees are affected. More 
details about the HMRC aspect of the practitioner/client relationships are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 and thus in Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 below. 
The final gap is the ‘fee expectation’.  The empirical evidence suggested fees 
pose a dilemma for many.  The main issue was what to charge for ‘investigating’ 
a transaction (a problem also identified by Fogarty and Jones, 2014). This 
problem may be related to the habitus of the practitioner.  Their background and 
experiences may be such that protracted research is required, given the 
complexities of smaller tax practice.  Many were not prepared to charge the client 
for the whole of the work (as found by Stringfellow et al., 2015 in the small 
accounting practitioner context), and indeed would not expect the client to pay for 
research time, or ‘looking things up’ – as the client would not anticipate having to 
pay for this.  This was also identified by Fogarty and Jones (2014), that is, the 
client is happy to pay for knowledge, but not the time taken to acquire it.  This 
suggests that, perversely, taking a smaller fee protects the symbolic and cultural 
capital (the technical knowledge) of the practitioner from scrutiny or question by 
the client in case their competence is doubted.  There may also be a risk 
management perspective.  The practitioner may choose to do more investigative 
research to grasp the more technical aspects as suggested by McKerchar (2005) 
and manage uncertainty and hence the risk of getting the advice wrong (a fact 
which may be more pronounced in the smaller practitioner context, as identified 
by Stringfellow et al., 2015 as such practitioners are aware of the limitations of 
their expertise). This may ensure the practitioner feels more secure about the 
advice offered, but they seem unwilling to charge the client for this work.  
The above provides evidence of the ‘pull’ on the practitioner between the client 
demands, their ethical obligations to act within the law in seeking a tax efficient 
position for a client and to uphold the regulations of their profession. The way 
practitioners feel about being drawn into something they think unacceptable is 
indicative of a practitioner’s professional identity (see Section 3.4.5).  An 
individual’s professional identity is shaped by many influences.  Such influences 
include the remit of the professional body to which s/he may belong (as not all 
may belong to such a body, as discussed in Chapter 2) and the ethical obligations 
of the practitioner (to her/himself, the professional body, the client and wider 
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society) as inculcated during training and career development, all of which affect 
the practitioner’s disposition and appetite for risk, thus, habitus is relevant here 
too.  An awareness of a risk to one’s reputation, or the organisation in which they 
work may also influence risk taking and may be inextricably linked to the ethical 
approach of practitioners (Doyle et al., 2009b). Practice risk (and exposure to 
penalties) is said to temper the desire to take unacceptable risks such as taking 
advantage of ambiguous law (Carnes et al., 1996).  Smaller practitioners and 
partners in small firms in particular will be particularly attuned to practice risk as 
in some instances the small practitioner IS the firm.  Development of skills in the 
workplace (Hamilton, 2013; Hicks et al., 2011) also provide practitioners with the 
knowledge and confidence to undertake the broad range of work in the smaller 
practitioner environment and enable an awareness of knowledge limitations and 
hence when to investigate further.  The “human capital” (Stringfellow and Shaw, 
2009, p.137) which has developed overtime thus evolves into experience and 
expertise. 
The practitioner must deal with complex scenarios which arise from a 
combination of factors which flow from the overlapping fields within the broader 
tax field.  This affects their work, how they approach it, and consequently their 
relationships with clients. Nevertheless, they need to satisfy a number of parties: 
themselves (that they are providing the right advice); the professional field 
(keeping to the ethical standards and professional behaviour required); the 
bureaucratic field (that they enable the taxpayer to meet their obligations and 
conform to the law); and the taxpayer (to advise them appropriately within the 
law) – and whom, as said, may prefer to save tax where possible, which is 
contrary to the remit of HMRC.  Hence the practitioner is caught between, and 
has to manage, the different consequences of the overlapping fields. 
The practitioner has a number of techniques to manage the expectation gaps.  
Their efforts are ordinarily converted into a document to provide something 
tangible for the client.  It represents a physical manifestation of the practitioner’s 
expertise which is the technical capital (knowledge) and symbolic capital 
(qualifications). This helps manage uncertainties (from both the practitioner and 
client perspective).  Interpretations of legal provisions and implications of advice 
are communicated to clients in this form to ensure their understanding or ‘buy in’. 
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A tangible document also elicits trust in the relationship and is a form of symbolic 
capital in itself.  Such documents will also help justify the fee.    
Additionally, the practitioner’s experience (habitus and professional identity) is 
drawn upon to judge whether they have the ability, resource and expertise – that 
is the relevant capitals - to undertake the work successfully and minimise risk to 
themselves, the practice and the client.  It is noted in Chapter 4 and seen in the 
findings of Chapter 5 that different participants have different capitals.  This may 
be a wide network of contacts or technical knowledge from former work 
experiences in other firms, or knowledge about HMRC as an organisation and 
the working practices within it (of those participants with former HMRC 
experience).  For instance, those with HMRC experience (I/Vs 1, 5, and 8) or 
those who specialise in a niche area (I/Vs 2, 8, 11 and 12) bring different sets of 
expertise (and thus capital) to their clients.  Experience is used to judge what is 
and is not acceptable to her/himself in terms of tax planning and this is balanced 
against a client’s desire to save tax.  The evidence in this study would suggest 
that, today, all steer away from taking part in ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance and at 
times, some may defer to HMRC’s view even if they may not agree with it (should 
the tax at stake not be deemed large enough to argue over) which is indicative of 
a shift in the power towards the bureaucratic field and away from the practitioners. 
Some participants attempt to educate their clients – be this about dubious tax 
avoidance schemes or the consequences of errors.  Hence practitioners use their 
technical capital and knowledge to protect both themselves and the client, which 
is consistent with Tomasic and Pentony (1991). The ‘expert’ practitioner as 
manifests in this situation, is different to that expected by the client – who may 
expect to be advised how to save as much tax as possible in any which way 
possible.  The practitioner thus uses their expertise and knowledge differently to 
that which may be expected and draws on the symbolic capital as a member of 
the tax profession to promote what is seen as ‘doing the right thing’.  Interestingly 
too, the ‘social implications’ of paying tax were drawn upon by some to dissuade 
clients from entering into unacceptable tax arrangements which could be likened 
to a ‘moral argument’.  These techniques narrow the ‘scope gap’. Had this 
research been undertaken a number of years ago, it would have been interesting 
to see whether similar comments would have been made then, one suspects 
perhaps not.  The dynamics have changed as a result of a shift in power over the 
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tax field.  This could be seen as an example of where narratives and discourses 
in the various different fields begin to align (that is all discourage tax avoidance).   
The above illustrates how changes in the tax field impacts upon the 
client/practitioner relationship and thus how the gaps in expectation arise. 
A closer look at the relationship with HMRC now follows. 
The research question addressed by the empirical evidence in Chapter 6 is: 
8.3.2 How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) impact upon the practices of tax practitioners? 
The main field of influence upon the practice of the smaller tax practitioner within 
this part of the discussion is that of the bureaucratic field, specifically HMRC.  It 
is acknowledged that HMRC as an organisation may be under pressure from 
other fields as it too has to cope with frequent change and complex law, which is 
influenced by the political, legal and judicial fields.  Even the journalistic field has 
impact upon HMRC, given its reporting of the organisation’s success or otherwise 
in terms of tax collection, tax avoidance, compliance and customer service 
statistics etc., hence HMRC, of course, has its own pressures to bear. This 
section however discusses the relationship between the smaller practitioner and 
the large bureaucratic organisation which is HMRC.  There is evidence of recent 
change in the tax practitioner/HMRC relationship which impacts upon tax 
practice. Underlying themes of uncertainty and trust are identified. 
Many participants in this study have many years of experience and may have 
worked for a number of organisations as seen in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. Hence 
these participants are used to working with HMRC, and have, formerly, 
understood where they stand within the tripartite relationship.  What is clear 
however, is that this former understanding – so a prior understanding of the rules 
of the game in the HMRC relationship – no longer holds.  That is, what was the 
‘norm’ in terms of this aspect of tax practice has become unsettled, and the 
participants describe finding their way around new rules of the game and a 
changed discourse.  There is a sense that practitioners are repositioning their 
former expectations and that the ground on which they are used to standing, is 
still shifting as participants continue to adjust to a new normal. This has increased 
uncertainty in the practitioner environment.   
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A number of matters have combined to create this feeling, all of which highlight 
HMRC’s increasing dominance in the tax field as discussed below.  Changes in 
the tax field thus contribute to the gaps identified in Chapter 6 between what the 
practitioners would like in terms of service or relationship from HMRC and what 
they find in practice. These are the relationship, trust, systems and knowledge 
gaps.   
The reorganisation at, and reduction of resources in, HMRC has created changes 
to working practices.  The ‘relationship’ gap has arisen as the interviewees can 
no longer access a named individual who is responsible for their client. The 
former tangible, seemingly amicable relationship (as described in Chapter 6) has 
been lost.  There is regret about the loss of contact with known individuals and 
thus the loss of access to an informal source of technical capital, as inspectors at 
HMRC may formerly have been a resource on which participants could draw for 
assistance and advice.  A “trust” gap has also developed.  Some participants 
suggest that their former relationship with staff at HMRC was based upon mutual 
trust and respect as both parties had an interest to work together to resolve 
taxpayer issues (as also suggested by Hasseldine et al., 2011; Maas, 2015).  This 
appears to be no longer the case.  Some participants report less pragmatic 
approaches to the resolution of tax audits and some (not all) HMRC staff were 
said to have pre-determined views and would not move their position no matter 
what the practitioner said, which leaves the practitioner less able to ‘call’ the 
outcome. The words “aggressive” and “bully” featured a number of times 
regarding HMRC’s attitude. Refusals to show discretion in relation to each 
taxpayer’s situation were also reported (discretionary settlements have become 
much politicised as discussed in Chapter 6 (Huber, 2013; Public Accounts 
Committee, 2011).  Additionally, weak (or surprising) arguments (in the opinion 
of the participants) have led to tax audits.  In the past, the participant’s cultural 
capital included an ability to resolve matters with their HMRC counterpart, on 
behalf of the client.  Whilst this will still be possible, it appears that the participant 
may encounter challenges in doing so.  This may weaken the capital of the 
practitioner as HMRC tries to takes more control over the outcome – it will depend 
on the situation and the practitioner (and client) appetite to take the argument 
forward.  Many referred to ‘settling’ a position rather than engaging in protracted 
argument, even if there was disagreement with HMRC.  Such action may result 
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in the payment of tax to save time and costs, but which may not actually be due 
– could that be the intention? Perhaps this works to the advantage of HMRC as 
such action brings a case to a close and the tax collected may be more than it 
might have otherwise been.  It is not uncommon for practitioners to ‘settle’, but it 
seems the power they had in the past to negotiate over such matters has 
reduced.  HMRC capital dominates that of the practitioner.   
HMRC are under pressure from other fields to collect more tax which may 
account in part for these changes, yet some interviewees felt they, as tax 
practitioners were not trusted.  This feeling was accentuated given reports that 
HMRC, on occasion, contact the client directly, rather than via the practitioner. 
The move to prioritise the taxpayer in the tripartite relationship, over and above 
their representative, is indicative of a move to an ‘enhanced relationship model’ 
by tax authorities, where the practitioner is ‘side-lined’ in the relationship (Dabner, 
2012).  This weakens the practitioner/client relationship considerably as seen in 
Chapter 6.  The advantage the practitioner once had, of being forewarned and 
being on the front foot (to reassure a client, or anticipate issues) with regards to, 
say, an audit letter, has reduced.  The practitioner is no longer in the driving seat.  
The practitioner relationship with the client must thus adjust.  Symbolic power and 
the power of authority is drawn upon by HMRC.  The approach to the taxpayer 
directly may result in some taxpayers feeling under pressure to comply with 
HMRC without question.  The advice the practitioner may provide otherwise could 
be ignored, weakening the power of the practitioner yet further.  Tax practice thus 
has to adjust to maintain the client trust in the relationship. 
An apparent reduction in trust between HMRC and the taxpayer is also notable.  
Actors within other fields may view the small business field differently to the 
practitioners. Practitioners see a commercial business, yet, HMRC, it is 
suggested see organisations which simply focus upon paying as little tax as 
possible.  There is a lack of common discourse between the professional (the 
practitioner) and bureaucratic field as it seeks to increase tax revenue.  The in-
depth understanding the tax practitioner has about their client should be a 
strength (Stephenson et al., 2017) and their knowledge of the commercial 
business of the client is likely superior to that of HMRC.  However, the knowledge 
the practitioner has about their clients – their capital – does not outweigh the 
scepticism that HMRC has about the motives behind a transaction (commercial 
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versus tax saving).  It seems difficult for practitioners to persuade them otherwise 
at times.  
HMRC reorganisation has created other frustrations. A lack of knowledge by front 
line staff was a common complaint, contributing to the ‘knowledge gap’.  Many 
interviewees avoided contacting HMRC for assistance, as the information 
received therefrom was not valuable to them for the reasons explained in Chapter 
6.  Additionally, the problems arising from delays and errors at HMRC (some of 
which arise from increasing digitisation and reduced human input, described as 
the ‘systems gap’) and the impact upon practice are explored in Chapter 6 and 
this too has implications for trust in the tripartite relationship. The bureaucratic 
field runs at a far slower pace.  HMRC appears not to value time (Maas, 2015, 
also referred to this), however in private business, time equates to money, or 
economic capital.  The time it takes to resolve a matter at HMRC appears to be 
of little consequence in that particular field, however, there are many 
consequential effects of this in other related fields, particularly on the time and 
costs which arise on the taxpayer and tax practitioner.  Clearly economic capital 
(maximisation of tax revenue) from HMRC’s perspective is important.  Time is, 
however, an expensive commodity in professional practice and HMRC delays 
have an impact upon a firm’s ability to earn fees.  There is a mismatch of capital 
at play within the tax field.  HMRC has power over the practitioner, as they have 
no control over the speed at which HMRC operates.  Practitioners must deal with 
the effects on tax practice, (such as pressure on client relationships, and fee 
problems) which flow from this.  The practitioner, for example, becomes the ‘face’ 
of the delay (rather than HMRC), and may thus be subject to client frustrations, 
and scepticism about why their tax issue remains unresolved.   
There are difficulties in this relationship which impact upon tax practice at the 
emic domain. Interestingly however, the efforts of HMRC in terms of the ‘agent 
strategy’ discussed in Chapter 2, to engage practitioners and improve aspects in 
the HMRC/agent relationship, were infrequently mentioned by participants.  
There were some references to these endeavours in Chapter 6 – such as 
reference to the ‘agent helpline’, the ‘agent portal’, an event with HMRC about 
their ‘systems’, and a Working Together meeting.  The reactions of the 
practitioners to the ‘in person’ events differed – this could be due to the nature of 
the meeting (a systems/technology event was received more positively than the 
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meeting which appeared to be based more around the traditional 
HMRC/practitioner relationship), but it is difficult to say.  However, the experience 
of the practitioners at the Working Together meeting seemed to reflect the 
narrative that HMRC’s views are inflexible which may explain this.  Agent strategy 
and practitioner engagement (and awareness) could be a subject for further 
exploration as highlighted in Section 9.4 – as this may perhaps be part of the 
solution to improved, smoother functioning relationships. 
It is important to mention the positive sides of the relationship.  Certain individuals 
were praised for their pragmatism, understanding, or helpfulness (for instance, 
the offer to write a note on the taxpayer’s file appeared to be so rare that one 
interviewee praised this behaviour).  Additionally, highly trained HMRC staff with 
expertise in a particular field were recognised to be knowledgeable, helpful and 
a valuable resource of trusted advice for the practitioner.  That is, they are a 
source of technical capital which is accessible to the practitioner. The different 
actors in the tax field work well together here, from the perspective of the 
practitioner.  Such teams will be a source of comfort to the practitioner as advice 
from specialist teams can help reduce uncertainty.  
Indeed, in general, the interviewees were sympathetic towards staff at HMRC 
and understood many of the pressures on them. Their feelings were not 
necessarily personal.  However, the current arrangement does not work smoothly 
for many practitioners, despite the work HMRC has done with regard to agent 
relationships as indicated in Chapter 2.  Tax practice has become more difficult. 
Interestingly, as Dabner (2012) describes, the shift to responsive regulation 
requires a partnership style relationship between the practitioner and HMRC, 
rather than a more traditional adversarial style.  Conversely, however the 
evidence suggests the relationship does now play out differently, but not in the 
way that Dabner (2012) describes.  The old system (of local, named tax 
inspectors who were known to the practitioner) was viewed by participants as a 
partnership, with mutual trust and a reciprocal relationship with the same aim – 
to resolve tax disputes or sort out a taxpayer’s tax position satisfactorily.  There 
is little sign of a partnership now from the perspective of the participants. There 
are signs from many that there is no relationship.  Perversely therefore changes 
in the bureaucratic field (in terms of restructure and overall approach) to elicit a 
better partnership with tax practitioners has had the opposite effect (from the 
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practitioner perspective). As Maas (2015) suggests, the relationship he desired 
was to work with, and not for, HMRC.  It would however be interesting to obtain 
HMRC views about this (see Section 9.4). 
The changes in the tax field (at the etic level) occur if the regulated (the taxpayer 
and tax practitioner at the emic level) step out of ‘sync’ with what the regulator 
(HMRC) expects, as already discussed at 8.3.1.  Stakeholders within the tax field 
vie for position within it and as a consequence, the environment changes – and 
it seems that HMRC has increasing dominance in the field. Consequently, it 
would appear that tax practitioners have lowered their expectations of their 
relationship with HMRC and the assistance that may (or may not) be forthcoming 
from the organisation.  The practitioners’ former knowledge and experience of 
how HMRC ‘worked’ has become less valuable in the current environment (this 
generalisation may not hold so strongly for those with prior HMRC work 
experience, as they may still have access to such capital in the form of previous 
experience and network connections).  Uncertainty around the provision of advice 
has increased.  Tax practice (including client relationships) has to adapt and 
adjust with the changes in the HMRC/practitioner relationship.  
Practitioners desire a flexible service, working systems, and ‘no surprises’ 
according to Dabner (2012), but whilst at times there is satisfaction in the service 
this is not consistent and it seems that there is less satisfaction now than was 
identified in research by Hasseldine et al. (2011). Nevertheless, each stakeholder 
within the tax field must find a way to function side by side, there is no choice.  
The practitioner has to manage the difficulties emitting from the different fields.   
The final findings chapter, Chapter 7, addressed the question: 
8.3.3 How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship 
with clients and HMRC?  
Chapter 7 draws together the practitioners’ views of the client and HMRC 
relationships and asks how they see their role in the middle of this tripartite 
relationship.  The ways and strategies in which the interviewees manage these 
competing relationships are also explored.  The roles adopted by the participants 
are summarised as facilitator (of tax planning and source of assistance to help 
the taxpayer navigate the complex tax system, thus playing a role in the tax 
system), translator (of legislation and tax rules generally), defender (of the client, 
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of the tax net (against error) and themselves), negotiator (on behalf of the client) 
and puzzle solver (examples are given to illustrate the nature of smaller tax 
practice and the practitioner roles therein). The techniques practitioners use to 
make sense of complex tax rules and regulations and to manage changes arising 
from the tax field are also discussed.  This Chapter provides a view of the roles 
undertaken from within the tax practice against the context of the tax field.  The 
roles are not taken in turn, as these have been highlighted in Chapter 7, rather a 
broad overview of significant findings is given. 
The findings show that practitioners are keenly aware of responsibilities to both 
clients and HMRC (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016; Oatway, 1965; Stuebs and 
Wilkinson, 2010; Tran-Nam et al., 2016, describe this as a ‘dual role’). These 
relationships are based upon different foundations, simply speaking, taxpayers 
may have different objectives to those of HMRC, hence the practitioners have 
conflicting roles (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015). Various terms were used 
by the practitioner to describe their role in the middle, including “buffer” between 
the client and HMRC and “shepherd” as explored in Chapter 7.  The ‘buffer’ role 
suggests the practitioner adopts a protection mechanism, which may face 
towards both the client and HMRC, and additionally, as the ‘shepherd,’ the 
practitioner may guide taxpayer behaviour to keep them straying from their tax 
obligations. The practitioner is seen to balance the client relationship on one hand 
and HMRC on the other (Hageman and Fisher, 2016; Niemirowski and Wearing, 
2003; Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996), however it is clear that they also take 
account of their responsibilities to other stakeholders in the field whilst doing so, 
not least to themselves and their profession (Davidson, 2016; Doyle et al., 2009b; 
Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler, 2015).  As such, professional and ethical 
obligations which derive from the professional bodies (as discussed in Chapter 
2) in the professional field have a bearing upon the practitioner’s approach to 
each relationship. 
Ethics and risk management featured frequently in the findings. Additionally, 
reference was made by some to their ‘qualified’ status and the importance of 
training and examinations.  Experience and the examinations/qualifications 
derived from a professional background form part of the habitus of the 
participants, and, simply belonging to a profession provides symbolic capital and 
status on which they can draw in client representation (Stringfellow and Shaw, 
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2009).  As formerly discussed a membership of a professional body may 
contribute to the overall professional identity of a practitioner (although of course 
not all practitioners belong to such bodies).  Despite the participants of this study 
belonging to (or working for an organisation overseen by) a professional body, 
specific reference to the interactions between participants and their professional 
body were however scarce.  Perhaps the professional environment is just seen 
as a ‘given’ and a familiar part of the participants’ social practice.  Distinction was 
made between themselves, the ‘qualified’ practitioners’ field, and those who are 
not (who operate in the separate non-qualified tax practitioner field as illustrated 
at Fig 8.3).  There was regret from some participants in the study that they may 
be perceived differently as a result of this separate field of practitioners.  That is, 
their (the interviewees’) status and professionalism may be tarnished by those 
operating outside the professional field (the unqualified practitioners).  In other 
words, some actors in this field were blamed for contributing towards the changes 
in the tax field as a whole in which the participants now find themselves.  Despite 
not belonging to a professional body, the professional identities of these 
individuals and hence their conduct and beliefs could be further researched as 
noted in Section 9.4.  However, given that findings from HMRC (2014a) indicate 
that taxpayers assume all practitioners are qualified, it would appear that this 
distinction could be responsible for some of the changes in trust, felt by the 
participants, at the HMRC/practitioner level, rather than at the client/practitioner 
level. That is, interestingly the symbolic capital of the qualified practitioners in this 
study may not have influence in the HMRC relationship – possibly, all 
practitioners (qualified or not), are treated the same.  This however may 
something to pursue with HMRC. 
As said, Chapter 7 addressed the question of how practitioners see their role in 
the tripartite relationship.  This elicited, perhaps surprisingly, a number of 
emotions. There was vivid exposition of the participants’ feelings about the 
current climate and how they are perceived as individuals (and as a profession).  
Some participants suggested the chance to speak about this was a relief or 
therapeutic and they were glad to get thoughts ‘off their chest’. The dominant 
view was one in which they and the tax profession (despite their ethical 
obligations discussed above) were seen in a negative light.  Many used 
metaphors to illustrate such feelings, such as “devil incarnate” or the “enemy”. 
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This is an added perspective to the relationship which has implications for the 
trust in the HMRC/practitioner relationship, which could, ultimately damage a 
cooperative relationship with HMRC (Bober, 2012; De Cogan, 2011; Dzienkowski 
and Peroni, 2016; Gracia and Oats, 2012a). Relatedly, participants gave many 
examples of how their assistance to the taxpayer benefited the exchequer, be 
that correction of errors, or preventing the client from entering into unacceptable 
tax arrangements.  This manifested itself as the facilitator role (helping clients 
navigate the tax system) and the defender role which helps protect the tax 
revenue net. These roles were felt to be unappreciated by HMRC and other 
stakeholders (particularly the journalistic field) and some felt this was not justified. 
In other words, the contribution to a sustainable tax system, which these roles 
bring, is not recognised, rather the dominant narrative is instead about a 
practitioner’s role in tax avoidance.  There are conflicting objectives here – saving 
tax on the one hand, but ensuring compliance and prevention of error on the 
other. There is thus tension in the relationship which derives from how the 
practitioner uses knowledge to seek an efficient tax position for the client.  This 
is illustrative, perhaps of what Baker (2014) describes as the “uniquely 
ambiguous position”.  Nevertheless, perceptions that HMRC see the practitioner 
as a problem, rather than a helpful intermediary between the organisation and 
the taxpayer, does impact upon the practitioner’s work, on client and HMRC 
relationships, and contributes to the changed environment in which the 
practitioner practices tax.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the narrative around tax 
avoidance at the international level and often targeted at the ‘Big 4’ and 
international tax lawyers, has filtered down to practitioners operating in other 
markets.  There is a perception that this negative publicity also affects the small 
tax practitioner market, despite them not being in the market to provide 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes. Practitioners are sensitive to the changed 
environment.  It would seem that their view of what is, or is not, acceptable to 
them is observant of changed narratives and indeed, many felt the need to defend 
claims for ‘run of the mill’ tax reliefs (such as a married couple allowance).  They 
are conscious that despite being legitimate claims for relief, the claim reduces the 
tax take, which seems to personify the current narrative and discourse around 
tax avoidance.  There was heightened awareness too of the social implications 
that a reduction in the tax take can bring.  One practitioner even suggested the 
job is not the most “socially useful” (compared to a doctor or nurse for example). 
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Nevertheless, it was common sentiment that the tax system would be unlikely to 
function without the help of tax practitioners (consistent with Davidson, 2016; 
Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016; Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996; Tomasic and 
Pentony, 1991).  That is the technical capital practitioners have, may be said to 
benefit the exchequer and wider society, which runs counter to the main narrative 
about tax practice currently.  Nevertheless, HMRC do acknowledge the 
importance of practitioners (see Chapter 2), but this fact did not seem to be 
appreciated by some of the interviewees in this research.  
Whilst HMRC, in the bureaucratic field, has a huge influence on tax practice other 
uncertainties arise from the legal and judicial fields particularly.  Interpretation of 
legislation is a required part of tax practice.  This must be managed from both the 
client and HMRC perspective.  The participants in this research are not trained in 
law; had they been the comments arising may have been entirely different.  
Similarly, whilst some participants had big 4 experience, others did not.  All these 
aspects affect one’s approach to researching answers to taxation queries.  
Knowledge accumulates over time and will be influenced by former experiences. 
The practitioner habitus thus has impact upon tax practice in this respect 
(Freedman and Power, 1992; Latham, 2012). Some struggled with the language 
of the law and examples were given.  Some found application of law to client 
circumstances challenging. Difficulties as to interpretation of law – should this be 
a literal, or a purposive approach was one such example. Practitioners appeared 
at times to take the lead from HMRC in this, but their approach did not appear 
consistent either, as discussed at Chapter 7 which added further uncertainty.  An 
inconsistent approach may be indicative of changes in the tax field, as one 
participant felt “interpretations of texts” were viewed in light of which route may 
obtain most tax (per Gracia and Oats, 2012a, p.314).   Anti-avoidance provisions 
also created problems, as did new law which was criticised for its wide reach. 
These problems may arise as laws are designed to protect the tax net and protect 
the capital of the state – hence they will be designed to be difficult to circumvent. 
It follows therefore, that the practitioner may turn to guidance for assistance.  This 
was however criticised as vague, not specific enough and not issued in a timely 
manner (as found by Gracia and Oats, 2012a). The examples therein did not, the 
practitioners suggest, accurately represent issues they find on their desks.  More 
likely however is that the guidance is purposely vague, to prevent practitioners 
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stepping around new law given the allegations of game playing and the role some 
practitioners played in facilitating this in the past.  As discussed in Chapter 2 such 
behaviour influences the nature of law and guidance that all practitioners (smaller 
practitioners included) must use.  The guidance does little to resolve uncertainties 
for the practitioner and in some cases the uncertainties are amplified, which 
creates additional problems in their roles as translators of the tax rules and 
regulations.  This could be seen as a form of symbolic violence in a Bourdieusian 
sense (not a physical, but an intangible concept) as in effect the practitioner is 
denied resources to help them do their job.  Additionally, the option to approach 
HMRC for advice as to how the law applies to a taxpayer transaction has 
narrowed in recent years, as already identified (see Section 7.3.2).  HMRC may 
refuse to comment, or as one practitioner remarked, they assume the question 
derives from identification of a loophole in the law (which again is indicative of the 
demands on HMRC to prevent tax avoidance).  The practitioner however may 
simply wish to resolve an uncertainty by obtaining HMRC’s perspective. These 
are further illustrations of the shift in power to HMRC and illustrates a reduction 
of the capital (and power) of the practitioner.   
At times the impacts of changes in the tax field appear to have an emotional toll 
on some, not just in terms of how they or the profession are viewed as highlighted 
above.  Some expressed feelings of frustration (perhaps because of vague 
legislation), or helplessness (whilst waiting for matters to progress at HMRC, as 
seen in Chapter 5).  Others may relish the challenge and variety that change 
brings.  Nevertheless, the roles that practitioners adopt enable them to manage 
their position in the tripartite relationship and they are guided in management of 
the relationships by their habitus and professional identities. Despite this, the 
complex, changing environment remains and practitioners recognise that 
uncertainty does not disappear, even with knowledge, training, qualifications and 
experiences.  There may not be an absolute answer to a tax problem for all the 
reasons discussed. Yet as taxpayers have transferred their uncertainties to the 
tax practitioner as suggested by Fogarty and Jones (2014) they must use their 
capitals to assist the taxpayer to comply with their obligations.  Of course, the 
practitioners do manage to carry out their roles.  They do this by drawing on a 
number of different capitals and resources at their disposal as discussed in 
Chapter 7 – be that social capital (seeking advice from colleagues, peers, or 
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network connections and obtaining advice from the ‘adviser to the adviser’), or 
technical capital (access to databases, tax legislation, tax cases and guidance), 
or economic capital (via subscription to other networks of advisers or helplines).   
The impact of changes in the tax field upon tax practice have been discussed 
throughout Chapter 8.  As actors within the fields accumulate more (or less) 
power or capital their positions within the fields change and the dynamics and 
rules of the fields also adjust and as illustrated above, HMRC, as an organisation, 
appears to have increasing power over the tax field in a number of ways.  There 
is frequent change for the reasons described. The result is that the practitioner 
from within the emic domain must manage the impacts of changes in the tax field 
in their tax practice, be that complex or vague law, a strained relationship with 
the tax authorities or challenging clients.    
8.3.4 Themes which draw the empirical findings together 
During the discussion there are many references to ‘trust’ and ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘professional identity’.  Uncertainty is woven throughout smaller tax practice, for 
the many reasons discussed – and this affects how practitioners carry out their 
roles.  Trust is also important and the gaps identified at Chapters 5 and 6 may 
have effect upon trust in a relationship.  Trust in a relationship is necessary to 
ensure tax compliance, ethical behaviour (Dzienkowski and Peroni, 2016) and a 
functioning tax system (Bober, 2012; de Cogan, 2011; Gracia and Oats, 2012a).    
In terms of the client/practitioner relationship it can be seen that the trust between 
each party may become strained in a number of respects.  Trust between HMRC 
and the practitioner also features.  Some participants feel that HMRC does not 
trust them.  A number of metaphors were used to illustrate this, and this feeling 
has intensified in recent years.  Similarly, trust in HMRC is also weakened.  There 
was evidence of resentment, and an underlying feeling that HMRC are not 
accountable for their actions in the same way as tax practitioners are. 
Practitioners are accountable to many stakeholders, including the client, their 
profession and HMRC. The evidence, illustrated at Chapter 6 particularly, 
suggests that there is poor accountability in the opposite direction, that is between 
HMRC and the practitioner (for instance in terms of repeated errors, delays and 
advice which is not tailored to the taxpayer situation, nor for computer generated 




The smaller tax practitioner context is of course also relevant as this is the context 
in which the study is set, however to summarise, briefly, various themes can be 
seen.  The broad scope and ad hoc nature of tax advice is accepted as the norm 
and the tax practice carried out is underpinned by a good knowledge of the client 
circumstances, consistent with Stephenson et al. (2017).  As evidenced however, 
there is far ‘more’ to smaller tax practice than simply tax compliance, which may 
be the general perception about what smaller tax practice does (Tomasic and 
Pentony, 1991).  The remit is extremely wide.  Consequently, there are pressures 
around technical expertise and knowledge and many may work more hours than 
they charge for (as found by Stringfellow et al., 2015), but ultimately practitioners 
have strategies to draw upon to enable management of smaller tax practice, as 
illustrated.  Interestingly, there are a variety of practitioners who work in this 
context and their capitals depend upon former experiences, backgrounds and 
specialisations, thus each may bring a different perspective to smaller tax 
practice. 
Throughout Chapters 5-7 the professional identities of the practitioners and their 
ethical obligations are also apparent.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the professional 
identity does not relate to an individual’s technical competence, but is about how 
one conducts oneself.  A number of influences help shape an individual’s 
professional identity, which may be, for example, the organisation in which they 
work, the ethical environment in which they find themselves and the accumulation 
of experiences over time as highlighted by Alvesson et al. (2015), Brouard et al. 
(2017), Caza and Creary (2016), Cooper and Robson (2006) and Suddaby et al. 
(2009).  The participants in this study also belong to (or work under the remit of) 
a professional body and/or have professional training from HMRC.  The ethical 
obligations and regulations of such organisations also impact upon one’s 
professional identity.   All tax practitioners will have a professional identity unique 
to them, depending on the circumstances and experiences described above.  The 
smaller firm context may affect this too given the nature of the client base and the 
work undertaken, as may the ethos of each organisation (which, at times, may be 
in the hands of one or two individuals which may thus reflect their own 
dispositions and beliefs).  In terms of tax avoidance, the facility to offer aggressive 
schemes may be out of the reach of the small practitioner, although the 
participants (and their organisations) in this study suggest that they would choose 
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not to participate in any case.  Hence a variety of factors influence the formation 
of an individual’s values, beliefs and morals, which combined, provide guidance 
or clues (Alvesson et al., 2015) as to how one approaches work.  These 
influences can be seen in the participants’ desires to withstand peer or client 
pressure, and in their thought processes round what is/is not acceptable tax 
planning, and in a general sense of what guides them to do what they think is 
right in the circumstances in which they may find themselves.  The impact of 
professional identity contributes in particular to the generation of the scope 
expectation gap identified in Chapter 5, in terms of advising the tax authorities 
about error or underpayments, as well as when providing advice about tax 
planning matters, but is an underlying theme throughout.  Thus, reference to 
professional identity helps explain the behaviours of the practitioners in this study. 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has situated the smaller tax practice in the wider context of the 
macro environment.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7, taken together provide the empirical 
evidence about tax practice as a whole and whilst each research question has 
been dealt with separately it should be acknowledged that each Chapter has 
overlaps (for example the HMRC relationship impacts upon the client/practitioner 
relationship) and the relationships between them can be seen at Fig. 8.1. The 
overlapping fields contribute to a complex, rather messy environment that the 
practitioner has to manage in a number of respects.  Their role in the middle of 
the tripartite relationship has consequences for the management of the client and 
their responsibilities to HMRC.  There has been a change in the dynamics in the 
tax field in recent years, with evidence of a shift in power towards HMRC in the 
bureaucratic field and away from the tax practitioner. The rules of the game have 
changed and there have been consequences for trust in the relationships 
between all three parties and increases in uncertainties as a result. The ‘currency’ 
of a field, the capital, to which practitioners have access to help them move 
through the field to positions of power, has also changed.  Consequently, the 
operation of tax practice has to adapt to the change in circumstances. The 
environment results in a number of gaps as identified in Chapters 5 and 6.  These 
include client expectation gaps (differences in what a client desires from a 
practitioner’s service and that which the practitioner can provide) and gaps 
between the type of relationship and service practitioners desire from HMRC and 
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that which they experience. The relationship with HMRC cannot however be 
divorced from the practitioner/client relationship.  There are links, and each 
affects the other.  The practitioners have a number of roles, and they draw on 
their different capitals to manage the gaps.  They are guided by their professional 
identities in carrying out tax practice.  By drawing on a Bourdieusian lens, with an 
emphasis on ‘fields’ through which to view the empirical data, greater 
understanding and explanations as to the reasons for the interviewees’ 
perspectives have been determined so linking inside tax practice (the emic) with 
the etic domain.  The impact of changes at the tax field on smaller tax practice 


















9 Conclusions and recommendations for further 
research 
9.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of this research was to achieve an 
understanding of tax practice in the UK smaller tax practitioner context by taking 
into account the tax field in which tax practice operates.  The study addresses 
the following question: 
How do changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners? 
To enable the above question to be answered, three sub questions were asked 
as below.  Each sub question was broken down into smaller objectives as per 
Chapter 4. 
How do small tax practitioners manage client relationships in a dynamic 
environment?  The objectives of which are below and were addressed in 
Chapter 5: 
 to gain insight into, and explore, the practitioners’ views on 
their relationship with clients;  
 to describe and understand the environment in which the 
practitioner works and in which the client/practitioner 
relationship operates;  
 to explore how they manage this relationship 
 
How does the shifting relationship with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
impact upon the practices of tax practitioners?  The objectives of which are 
below and were addressed in Chapter 6: 
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 the practitioners’ views on the relationship between 
themselves and HMRC; 
 the environment in which the relationship is managed; 
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 The challenges and difficulties, as well as positive aspects 
of that relationship; 
 The impact that management of this relationship has on the 
practice of the practitioner; 
 
How do the practitioners see their role in the tripartite relationship with 
clients and HMRC?  The objectives of which are below and were addressed in 
Chapter 7: 
 
To explore, gain insight into and understand: 
 How practitioners see their role ‘in between’ HMRC and the 
client; 
 The roles they play in managing both relationships; 
 What challenges and difficulties arise from their roles; 
 How these challenges are overcome; 
 How the practitioners come to understand, interpret and 
implement tax rules on the ground whilst managing their 
position in the tripartite relationship. 
 
The key findings from these chapters are included in Section 9.2 below.  
Contributions to knowledge are shown in Section 9.3 and recommendations for 
further study are shown in Section 9.4.  Finally, concluding remarks are show in 
Section 9.5. 
9.2 Findings and implications 
The study provides an in depth examination of smaller tax practice, as shown in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  These chapters taken together shine a light on smaller tax 
practice and illustrate the many challenges that arise from within the small tax 
practitioner environment at an emic (ground) level.  The environment is dynamic 
and frequently changes which creates uncertainty in tax practice.  In part this is 
due to the usual (the expected or anticipated) environment in which tax 
practitioners find themselves, which may relate to the changes in the annual 
finance act and alterations to legal provisions which happen frequently.  The 
participants anticipate receiving a variety of queries to resolve, many of which 
may be ad-hoc given the nature of the smaller tax practice as discussed.  This 
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variety and regular change in regulation are expected and form part of the ‘rules 
of the game’ at the smaller practitioner level.  This may require practitioners to 
invest time bringing knowledge up to date, and may cause difficulty or uncertainty 
when ascertaining how new rules may affect their broad range of clients, but that 
goes with the territory.  Other changes in the tax practitioner environment may be 
subtler, and cannot really be attributed to say, the latest budget update.  As 
discussed in the empirical chapters, participants reported a change in how they 
as individuals and a profession were perceived.  Changes were also observed in 
practice at HMRC, with the organisation choosing at times, to prioritise a direct 
relationship with a taxpayer, rather than via their tax practitioner in the first 
instance.  New rules and regulations, once issued appeared more difficult for 
practitioners to comprehend with regard to their application – that is, additional 
uncertainty (and potentially risk to the practitioner and client) may arise given the 
nature of the laws.  Guidance, to assist with the implementation of new law was 
often delayed and thought to be too vague to be of assistance.   Whilst these 
matters may not change the nature of the practitioners work per se, there are 
clear implications for how they manage the expectations of clients (Chapter 5), 
their relationships with HMRC (Chapter 6) and how they view their role in the 
tripartite relationship (Chapter 7) which does have impact upon their tax practice.   
To ascertain the reasons for such a dynamic environment one has to look away 
from the tax practice itself (the emic domain) to the wider environment and the 
stakeholders within it (the etic domain).  Tax practice is situated within an 
interdisciplinary, social and institutional context; an environment which may be 
thought of as the tax field.  A view of tax practice from the field level helps explain 
and increase understanding of what is going on in the smaller tax practice (by 
viewing it as a social practice and not just as a technical activity).  Additionally, 
this perspective helps attribute meaning to, and deeper explanation of, the 
empirical data, being the stories and experiences of the practitioners within the 
practice itself.   
A Bourdieusian lens with a focus upon the concept of ‘field’ as explained at 
Chapter 4, is employed to make sense of the relationship between smaller tax 
practice and the wider tax field.  The tax field is made up of many separate fields 
to which participants from a variety of disciplines belong.  These fields combine, 
or overlap (as the boundaries between fields may be fluid and difficult to 
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ascertain) to create the tax field.  Some of these are shown at Fig. 8.3 and include 
the political, legal, judicial, professional and bureaucratic fields amongst others.  
Each field has its own discourse, outlook, rules and perspectives.  These multiple 
discourses combine to create a messy, complex tax environment and participants 
in the study are seen to rationalise a number of competing discourses in their 
practice.  Additionally, events within a particular field may cause the established, 
and expected ways of how the fields operate (the rules of the game for that field, 
or the accepted norms or discourse) to shift or change, which have consequential 
effects not just within that field per se, but on others affected by that field.  As 
certain actors within them accumulate more capital, their position in the field 
changes, so giving them more power over other participants of the field (as may 
be seen in this study, as HMRC accumulates additional power over the field).  
Tax practice is thus shaped by actions and interactions within the tax field, as 
shown in more detail below.   
The key findings from the study indicate that changes at the tax field level have 
a number of implications for smaller tax practice.  The practitioner perceives 
various gaps in expectation between what the client wants from the practitioner 
and what they can, or are willing to achieve (these are the expert, scope, HMRC 
and fee expectations).  Some of the gaps arise from the nature of the smaller tax 
practitioner context, such as the nature of the client base, ad hoc queries, the 
breadth and broad scope of such tax practice; others arise as a result of the tax 
environment more generally, such as uncertain legislation, changes in 
acceptability of tax planning, problems in the HMRC ‘system’ and reorganisation 
of HMRC as an organisation.  The professional identity of the practitioners 
(including for instance their ethics, moral outlook and beliefs) plays a part in the 
behaviour of the practitioners (what they are able and willing to do for the client) 
which may also contribute to the gaps in expectation.   Further, the relationship 
the practitioner desires from HMRC is not forthcoming.  There are gaps between 
what is desired and the actual relationship (identified as the relationship, trust, 
systems and knowledge gaps).  These gaps arise owing to differences between 
the bureaucratic field and the practitioner’s position in the field, and have been 
compounded by recent changes in the tax field as discussed throughout the 
thesis.  These gaps, as identified in Chapter 5 (client relationship) and Chapter 6 
(HMRC) have effect on the practitioner role in the tripartite relationship.  Chapter 
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7 identifies the roles the practitioners undertake to carry out tax practice and to 
manage these relationships to enable them to do their job. The roles the 
practitioner adopts are identified as a facilitator (of tax planning, and, enabling 
taxpayers to meet their tax obligations); translator (of rules and regulations and 
conduit of information to clients); defender (of themselves from unacceptable 
risk), of the client (from certain practices of HMRC and to prevent them entering 
into unacceptable tax avoidance arrangements), of the exchequer (correcting 
errors and adding funds into the ‘public purse’); negotiator (between the client 
and HMRC) and generally a puzzle solver in light of the complex transactions that 
arise in their daily work.  These roles enable the practitioner to meet the diverging 
demands (and dual roles as explored in Chapters 5-7) that come from the client 
(the smaller taxpayer field) and HMRC (in the bureaucratic field).  Responsibilities 
are owed to both parties, but the demands differ.  Management of client 
expectations will be an expected part of a practitioner’s role.  A changing 
relationship with HMRC however impacts upon this aspect of the job. As 
illustrated in Fig. 8.1 each of these relationships are interlinked.  Thus the 
empirical findings of Chapters 5-7 together identify what smaller tax practice is 
and what the participants in that environment do.  An examination of the tax field 
helps explain why they do what they do. 
Changes at the tax field level have direct impact upon the tax practitioners’ work, 
roles, practice and relationships.  Exploration of these changes help explain the 
reasons for the gaps in tax practice identified above, and shed more light upon 
the tripartite relationship. The players in the tax field come from the political, 
bureaucratic, legal and judicial spectrum.  They may also be part of the 
professional field, the taxpayer field (here the smaller taxpayer field), the 
journalistic field and practitioners outside the professional field too.  The actors 
within these fields and their actions have consequence for the tax field as a whole 
which filters down to tax practice at ground level.  For instance, the role some tax 
professionals have played in facilitation of tax avoidance, in the past, has been 
strongly criticised from many within (and outside) the tax field.  Pressure has 
arisen from the political field for HMRC to maximise tax revenue and prevent tax 
avoidance.  The behaviour of some actors in the professional field, has thus 
contributed to the catalyst for change in the behaviour of other stakeholders in 
the tax field which affects all tax practitioners no matter which market they serve. 
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The professional bodies have improved ethical guidance to which the practitioner 
must adhere; HMRC has gained additional powers and various success in the 
courts in tax avoidance cases, success which was often out of reach in older tax 
avoidance cases, thus there is also change in the judicial field.  Additionally, tax 
loopholes in law have been closed, others tightened and new law, driven by the 
political will, and drafted by those in the legal field is designed to cast the tax net 
very wide, so as to assist with the objectives of raising tax revenue and reducing 
tax avoidance.  Consequently, legislation becomes more complex, or perhaps 
vaguer (according to the findings).   Competing discourses from across the 
different disciplines combine to create a complex and dynamic environment and 
HMRC as an organisation, having accumulated more capital, becomes more 
dominant in the field.  Additionally, however, HMRC must also deal with ongoing 
reorganisation and the challenges and consequences that flow from that too. 
These changes affect those who interact with the tax field in a number of ways 
as described in the thesis, not least there are consequences for the 
client/practitioner and practitioner/tax authority relationships.  Practitioners from 
within tax practice reported various impacts upon their practice. The rules of the 
game as they know them, particularly in relation to the HMRC/practitioner 
relationship, have shifted greatly.  There are fewer routes to negotiation of tax 
position; fewer discretionary rulings; indirect pressure on the taxpayer (by HMRC 
going outside the tripartite relationship); delays in the issue of guidance to the 
practitioner to assist with new law and uncertainty as to how new law should be 
implemented.  The practitioners’ expertise and competence may be challenged 
by clients, the scope for tax planning may narrow, and pressure arises on fees, 
thus contributing to the gaps identified in Chapter 5.  This arises against a 
backdrop of reorganisation, computerisation and digitalisation and change within 
HMRC as an organisation.  These changes appear to contribute to delays and 
errors and have resulted in fewer knowledgeable staff on the front line, so 
impacting on the gaps identified in Chapter 6.  The speed at which tax practice 
operates differs from the slower pace at which HMRC operates creating further 
problems.  Pressures from the different fields result in new challenges and 
frustrations at the practice level that practitioners must manage.  Uncertainties 
increase and pressure arises on trust between the practitioner and their client 
and HMRC.  
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Despite the above, some good relationships between practitioners and HMRC 
remain and many provided a defence of the challenges HMRC as an organisation 
face, but for some, there is, it seems, a feeling of ‘them and us’.  This feeling 
seems to have been compounded by the changes described. Of course, former 
experiences and interaction with HMRC may determine such a view, however, 
the relationship, as described by some could not be called a partnership (as 
desired in the tax authority/practitioner relationship under ‘responsive regulation’ 
as part of the ‘enhanced relationships’ described in Chapter 2).  Although HMRC 
does reach out to practitioners under their ‘agent strategy’ and acknowledges 
their important role in the tax system (in order for it to function) this appears to be 
unrecognised by some practitioners in this research.   The relationship today 
seems distant and inflexible and does not appear to be satisfactory from the 
perspective of the smaller tax practitioner, given the consequential effects on their 
practice.  Perhaps HMRC see all practitioners (Big 4, the smaller practitioner field 
and the non-qualified practitioner) in the same light, yet not all may be the same.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the ethos of organisations differs as do the 
professional identities of individuals.  Of course not all practitioners will do the 
right thing, but then again, not all of them will do the wrong thing, or act 
inappropriately as the professional identity guides practitioners’ behaviour. The 
HMRC view however is not obtained – this is given as a recommendation for 
further research, because views as to what makes good relationships may differ.    
Finally, it is clear that the participants feel they play an integral role in the 
operation of the tax system.  This is not just in terms of routine tax compliance 
and enabling taxpayers to meet their obligations, but encouraging take up of tax 
reliefs where appropriate; preventing the claim of such reliefs when inappropriate; 
and preventing clients overstepping the mark or making errors in their tax returns.  
This role seems to be unappreciated and unacknowledged, despite HMRC 
recognising this in their literature. Of course, the practitioners assist with tax 
planning too, but as many were keen to point out, not all practitioners are involved 
in tax avoidance.  Nevertheless, some believe they are viewed only as promoters 
of tax minimisation (hence the use of metaphors such as the ‘devil incarnate’ and 
‘the enemy’) and that the benefit they bring to the tax system in other respects 
goes unnoticed.  In other words, the use of the practitioners’ technical expertise 
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and capitals in this respect is felt to be unappreciated or unrecognised by other 
stakeholders in the field. 
An understanding of the view of the practitioner perspective on the client and 
HMRC relationships and an understanding of how they respond to field level 
changes is important.   As smaller tax practitioners play an important role in the 
smooth functioning of the tax system (given the large market they serve) the 
implications of field level changes upon ground level tax practice need to be 
understood to ensure continued cooperation from practitioners, compliance from 
the taxpayer and a functioning and sustainable tax system in general.  
By drawing on a Bourdieusian lens, with an emphasis on ‘fields’ the thesis has 
examined how changes in the tax field impact upon the practice of smaller tax 
practitioners.  Uncertainties have always existed in this environment some of 
which are unique to the smaller practitioner market.  However, changes within the 
different fields have resulted in a new form of relationship with HMRC, new types 
of law and additionally, changes in attitude towards the tax profession in general 
appear to increase uncertainties in the small practitioner environment.  Trust has 
also been highlighted as an issue, which requires effort amongst all parties of the 
tripartite relationship, to ensure continued mutual cooperation.  The rules of the 
game have changed, and the practitioners must adjust.  The tax practitioners do 
of course manage uncertainties, both old and new; they have to, in order to carry 
out their jobs and they do this by the adoption of a number of strategies as 
discussed, to enable them to manage the tripartite relationship of which they are 
part.   
9.3 Contribution 
In addition to the key findings, the thesis provides a contribution to knowledge by 
adding to the scholarly domain literature around UK tax practice.  In particular, 
the thesis offers study of tax as a social (rather than technical) practice which is 
an underrepresented field of study (Oats, 2012), and thus compliments current 
studies in this vein (Boll, 2014; Mulligan and Oats, 2016; Radcliffe et al., 2018).  
This is achieved by the examination of smaller UK tax practice against the wider 
tax field.  This approach combines exploration of the different stakeholders within 
the UK tax field, along with examination of the individual actors in the smaller 
practitioner context per se.  This has been accomplished using Bourdieu’s 
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theoretical framework, and the concept of ‘field’ in particular, to make sense of 
what is going on in the small practitioner context.  The utilisation of the framework 
enables a link between the micro level smaller tax practice and the wider macro 
environment in which it operates to analyse and explain why tax the smaller tax 
practitioners do what they do, as well as exploration of what they do.  The 
employment of the theoretical framework in this way captures complexities and 
power dynamics in the tax field by examining the relationships between the 
different disciplines and overlapping fields that form the tax field.  A Bourdieusian 
lens is not often utilised in the tax area, yet it is valuable for identifying 
complexities and relationships which may otherwise be overlooked.  This analysis 
contributes to a deeper understanding of smaller tax practice, which is an area 
scarcely represented in the academic literature.  Additionally, this approach 
contributes to a gap identified by Radcliffe et al. (2018) who suggest the focus of 
studies is more commonly upon the micro (emic) aspect alone (here, the smaller 
tax practitioner), or the macro (the etic) perspective alone (here the broader tax 
field, or environment), rather than bringing the two together, as here.  The 
activities and participants in the tax field impact upon the practitioners’ work, and 
indeed the activities of the practitioners may also shape the tax field, hence 
illustrating social practices in the tax profession. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the views, uniquely, from the smaller UK 
practitioner market have not been the focus of prior study and neither is 
examination of tax practice in a UK context widely researched.  Ad hoc 
observations have been made about this market, but there is no focus upon the 
UK market as a whole. Similarly, the practitioner voice about client and tax 
authority interactions is underrepresented in earlier studies.  The thesis 
contributes to these perspectives. In particular, the thesis responds to calls for 
more research into the tax practitioner/client interactions (Hite and McGill, 1992; 
Gupta, 2015; Oats, 2012; Stephenson et al., 2017; Van de Rijt et al., 2019 and 
Tan, 2014).     
The gaps in expectation between the practitioner, clients, and HMRC and the 
identification of key roles the practitioners play to undertake their responsibilities 
(as identified in the key findings and Chapters 5-7) further extend the scholarship 
and knowledge around tax practice.  Identification of these roles provides 
additional insight into the functions of tax practitioners, alongside the existing 
288 
 
broad classification of roles by function, activity and services offered.  This 
perspective adds knowledge to the interactions of the practitioner in their 
relationships with both the client and HMRC and serves to highlight, in particular, 
the roles they play as part of the complex tax system.  Additional insight into the 
nature of small practice is also gained; the work undertaken is extremely broad 
and varied and, at times, ad hoc and light is shone on how this is carried out.  An 
illustration of tax practice in a dynamic environment which illuminates the 
relationships and interactions between the tax practitioner, the taxpayer and 
HMRC is shown at Fig 8.1.  This illustration also highlights the different gaps 
described above, as well as the roles played by the practitioners. 
Whilst the study is not an attempt to address uncertainties in tax law, per se, 
examples of the consequences of such uncertainties (Weisbach, 2002) on the 
smaller tax practice, and how these are managed are highlighted which 
addresses, in small part, one aspect of how uncertain tax law plays out in 
practice.  The practitioner views may be of interest to policy makers in this 
respect. 
Practitioners are said to reconcile the many complexities and uncertainties of the 
practitioner environment in order to do their job (Bogenschneider, 2015; Picciotto, 
2007) which of course they do.  There is little prior research which explores how 
this takes place, hence the thesis contributes to knowledge in this particular 
aspect.  The thesis explains how changes in the tax field impact upon smaller 
practitioners, how they go about their daily work in a dynamic field in order to 
satisfy clients, themselves and HMRC and thus contributes to calls to increase 
the knowledge about how tax rules are implemented on the ground (Oats, 2012).  
Finally, the study contributes to the call for more qualitative research in the tax 
practitioner setting in order to obtain the rich detail of tax consultancy practice 
(Apostol and Pop, 2019; Baker, 2014).  The study obtains depth of detail and 
richness of description and explanation from the smaller tax practitioner 
perspective.  Such detail and richness is not obtained from studies which employ 
quantitative techniques.  This approach thus allows a deep understanding of 
smaller tax practice which enables contribution to the knowledge of tax practice 
and also provides a methodological contribution to the literature in this respect. 
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Overall the thesis contributes to existing knowledge about tax practice, and 
extends this knowledge in the UK, smaller tax practitioner context, which offers a 
novel academic perspective.  The interactions with clients and the tax authorities 
are illuminated, and the roles the practitioners play and their position within the 
tax system are highlighted.  The uncertainties emanating from the tax field are 
explored and the impact of changes in the tax field upon smaller tax practice are 
illustrated. The smaller practitioner market represents thousands of small 
businesses and taxpayers.  It is important that such businesses can claim tax 
reliefs to assist with economic incentives, and of course fulfil their tax obligations.  
The smaller practitioner market plays a key part in facilitating this.  The thesis will 
thus be of interest to the practitioner community, policymakers, the tax authorities, 
as well as the professional and academic communities.   
9.4 Recommendations for further research 
A number of areas are recommended for future research.   
 The sample from which the participants was drawn was a ‘qualified’ pool 
of individuals (those belonging to (or worked for an organisation governed 
by) a tax or accounting professional body, or were ex HMRC staff).  It was 
felt by some, that the ‘non-qualified’ practitioner market creates problems 
for those who are qualified.  This may be in respect of quality of work, poor 
reputation and so on.  Some participants have taken over work from this 
particular market, and suggested that, on occasions, it was not completed 
to a satisfactory standard or had to be ‘unravelled’, others said that the 
knowledge of such practitioners is flawed or out of date.  Research into 
this particular market (including the HMRC view) would cast some light on 
whether these perceptions are accurate, or whether they are wide of the 
mark and would tie into the current studies about registration of tax agents 
(Mayson, 2020).  An investigation into the professional identity (the beliefs, 
outlook, and approach to work) of such individuals would also be of 
interest.   
 Similarly, qualitative research in the legal field – that is with legally trained 
tax practitioners (none of whom were included in this study) would shed 
light on whether there are differences with their non-legally trained 
counterparts.   
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 Further, a separate market within tax practice has been identified, that is 
the ‘adviser to the adviser’ – some of whom feature in this research.  
Additional focus on this area may also offer interesting insights as to how 
these individuals, or groups of individuals, are employed in tax practice. 
 As this study includes a broad range of smaller practitioners, from sole 
traders to those working for organisations with a number of employees, a 
study of a more targeted market, say sole practitioners, or those working 
for ‘boutique tax firms’ may provide different insights.  Similar research 
could investigate the relationships and working practices of those working 
for the Big 4. 
 As this study provides the view of the tax practitioner only, perspectives 
from HMRC and clients could be obtained to build up a rounded view of 
tax practice from all angles.   
 HMRC view of the current practitioner/HMRC relationship would be 
beneficial to obtain, to see how the organisation perceives this.  There may 
be a different view to that of the participants. 
 It has been observed that HMRC efforts with regard to “agent 
engagement” (as discussed in Chapter 2) are infrequently mentioned by 
the participants of this study.  As these strategies are designed to improve 
relationships and understanding and make it easier for practitioners to 
work with HMRC (HMRC, 2014a), there is scope to explore this 
observation further in terms of:  practitioner awareness of such initiatives; 
the reasons for such initiatives and; the benefits these initiatives may bring 
to the practitioner/HMRC relationship which may be of interest to the 
practitioner community, tax authorities and the profession alike. 
 Given increasing digitisation and technology, and a reduction to ‘in person’ 
contact with HMRC, many now turn to the internet for assistance with tax 
affairs (including those who do have a tax practitioner).  For those who do 
not seek professional advice they enter a world of unregulated tips, tricks 
and unofficial advice.  Some of the advice may be valid, but a brief review 
by the researcher quickly reveals material that is not correct (or too simple 
to be of use, which was the criticism levied at the HMRC webpages (see 
also Todd, Treasury Sub-Committee, 2018).  This begs the question as to 
whether taxpayers act upon this incorrect (or simplistic) advice.  If they do, 
there are many consequences, not just for them, but also the exchequer if 
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tax is under (or possibly over?) paid.  In other words, do those taxpayers 
with a tax agent have better compliance? 
 A related issue, highlighted by a participant was the increased move to 
online CPD training.  Whilst this may be more accessible than face to face 
events, networks and new contacts cannot be established, and chances 
to interact with HMRC in such capacity may be reduced.  As seen in the 
thesis, the habitus of the participants contributes to the creation of 
unofficial networks of expertise which are often drawn upon to keep tax 
practice functioning.  Research into these issues may shed light upon 
changes to networks in the tax community, as well as enable exploration 
of the impacts of increasing digitalisation upon tax practice. 
 Finally, given findings by Ramirez (2009) that smaller practitioners did not 
find the attempts of ICAEW to engage them as a market particularly 
helpful, along with a subsequent drive by the ICAEW (2020e) to target this 
market again, it would be interesting to obtain the views of smaller 
practitioners about their professional bodies to see if they are happy with 
the service provided. Whilst participants mentioned the professional 
bodies on occasion during the study, they had little to say, specifically, 
about them.  It would be of interest to examine this relationship further. 
There are a number of different, but related, avenues to explore. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
The thesis has sought to understand smaller tax practice.  Little academic 
research has, to date, been undertaken into the smaller tax practitioner context 
and the thesis highlights and illuminates the activities, practice and challenges of 
this particular market.  The findings suggest that practitioners play a number of 
roles, in particular assisting taxpayers to meet their tax obligations and pay the 
right amount of tax (which may require correction of errors as appropriate).  They 
also enable taxpayers to claim available tax reliefs and structure their affairs in a 
tax efficient manner, although this is deemed by the practitioners to be a tax 
‘planning’ rather than a tax ‘avoidance’ role as has been discussed.  Smaller tax 
practice is viewed against an examination of the environment in which it operates, 
and the interplay of different disciplines and fields which exist in the broader tax 
field are highlighted to show the impact of changes in the tax field upon smaller 
practice itself.  Smaller tax practitioners are necessary to help SMEs and other 
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taxpayers fulfil their obligations within an extremely complex tax system. The 
practitioners navigate the complexities on behalf of their clients, and in doing so 
play an integral, important role within the tax system to ensure it continues to 
function. 
As highlighted in Section 9.3 above, the thesis provides an academic contribution 
to the domain literature about tax practice and adds to the scholarship and 
knowledge in this arena.   From a theoretical perspective, the use of the 
Bourdieusian framework enables analysis of the link between the micro level 
smaller tax practice and relationships in the wider, interdisciplinary tax field at the 
macro level.  The theoretical framework is a means by which the complexities 
and power issues of the overlapping fields in the tax arena are identified and 
examined and thus provides a mechanism by which a deep understanding of 
smaller tax practice (what tax practitioners do, and why they do it) is attained.  
The theoretical framework allows knowledge of the subject to be taken forward.  
To enable such a deep understanding, the views, perspectives, observations and 
experiences of the practitioners within smaller tax practice were obtained; their 
specific comments provide insight into matters which go unobserved in 
quantitative research, but which were vital to this particular study.  A qualitative 
approach provides a methodological contribution and answers calls for additional 
research to attain rich detail of tax consultancy practice (Apostol and Pop, 2019; 
Baker, 2014). 
There are a number of practical implications which derive from the thesis.  The 
findings are relevant to a number of stakeholders including the practitioner 
community, tax authorities and policy makers, the professional bodies concerned 
with taxation (such as those representing the accounting, legal and tax 
profession) and scholars.  
With regard to the smaller tax practitioner community, it is clear that the tax 
environment (the tax field) in which they work has changed hugely in recent 
years.  Some of these changes are difficult to manage, be that changes in 
regulation or legislation, or changed practices at HMRC. Of course, such changes 
affect all practitioners, and yet the smaller practitioner may have different 
requirements and characteristics to other elements of the market. Whilst ICAEW 
(2020e) have recently launched a smaller practitioner community in 
acknowledgement that requirements of smaller accountants may differ, perhaps 
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a more proactive approach from the smaller tax practitioner community itself may 
allow their voices to be heard more loudly.  This could include more active 
engagement with HMRC consultations, additional engagement with HMRC’s 
agent strategy initiatives, and possible lobbying of the appropriate professional 
body. 
In terms of the tax authority and tax policy makers there is recurrent interest 
around tax practitioners.  In particular, there is interest around the regulation of 
tax practitioners and the tax profession, the roles that intermediaries play in tax 
compliance and additionally, there have been HMRC consultations about raising 
standards in the tax advice market (2020a; 2020b).  As discussed, not all tax 
practitioners are the same, the market for tax advice is diverse, and not all tax 
practitioners fall under the remit of a professional body. Given that this study has 
particular focus upon one section of the tax advice market and provides depth of 
detail about what smaller tax practitioners do (and why), as illustrated in Fig. 8.1, 
the findings of the study may be of interest to HMRC so as to enhance 
understanding of, and provide greater insight into the market they seek to 
regulate.  Additionally, by seeking to understand why smaller tax practitioners do 
what they do, as well as what they do, viewing tax practice against the wider, 
interdisciplinary tax field enables identification of the complexities and challenges 
therein which impact upon tax practice.  The findings therefore provide additional 
context to smaller tax practice.  Examination of this context, and the findings 
illustrated in the thesis will facilitate awareness of the impacts of changes in the 
different tax fields upon this particular market and draw attention to aspects of 
the dysfunctionalities in the tax system which smaller practitioners must 
overcome on behalf of their clients. Such analysis may help inform debate about 
how to ensure a sustainable tax system.  The thesis also provides examples of 
the impact of uncertain law upon tax practice and the practitioners’ views on this 
may also be of interest to policy makers.   Further, there is a desire, in general, 
for improved relationships with HMRC which is highlighted in the thesis. Those 
participants with years of experience remember a time where they felt relations 
with HMRC were more amicable more personal and operated to mutual benefit.  
Some desired a return to the former system.  Of course, only the practitioner view 
is obtained here, and HMRC’s view on this could be obtained (as identified in 
Section 9.4 above).  However, an awareness of these matters by HMRC will 
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facilitate debate and consideration of these issues in order to help improve trust 
and understanding of both parties and so enable a smoother operation of the tax 
system in this particular respect, so as to make tax compliance more 
straightforward for both taxpayers and their advisers. 
Finally, the findings have implication for the professional bodies and scholars.  
The participants of the study feel that their qualifications, experience and 
membership of a professional body should enhance their status and capital. The 
‘non-qualified’ and thus unregulated practitioner market was frequently 
mentioned, as they were believed to have undesirable impacts upon how the 
qualified tax practitioner is perceived.  As to whether this is in fact the case, (as 
indicated at Section 9.4 above) is a potential area for additional study.  However, 
it is suggested by HMRC (2014) that taxpayers assume all tax practitioners 
belong to a professional body or are qualified.  Could more be done by the 
professional bodies to support their members in this respect and enhance their 
credibility, so as to make a distinction between the different types of tax 
practitioner?   
From the academic perspective it has already been said that the qualitative 
approach to the thesis has generated extensive detail of tax practice by 
identifying complexities and important issues in the context of smaller tax practice 
which may be glossed over by a quantitative approach.  Additionally, from a 
scholars’ perspective it should be recognised that there are both benefits and 
disadvantages which derive from the background of the researcher, a former tax 
practitioner.  A good understanding of the technical language, examples provided 
by the participants and of the environment in which tax practice is carried out 
enabled the researcher to appreciate the narratives of the tax practitioners and 
their experiences and perspectives.  Of course, the researcher in this situation 
does bring with them their own experiences which can narrow the divide between 
the participant and the researcher. 
Overall, in terms of the practical application of the thesis if examining the future 
direction of the tax system, such as, for example the impact of increasing 
digitalisation, the role of tax intermediaries or the regulation of the tax profession, 
the findings indicate that a ‘one size fits all’ policy is not necessarily the best.  Tax 
practitioners come in all shapes and sizes and as illustrated, the small practitioner 
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market has unique challenges and complexities and an understanding of this will 
assist with policy making.  From the perspective of society in general, the tax 
system and the tax revenue it generates is extremely important.  Smaller tax 
practitioners are needed to help thousands of taxpayers navigate an extremely 
complex system to help them meet their tax obligations and they play a vital role 



































10.2  Examples of breadth of work in smaller tax practice 
Examples of ‘non routine’ work were given by the participants. All are examples 
which involve practitioner research – that is, an instant answer/opinion would not 
be provided.  This is just a snapshot.  These examples illustrate the breadth and 
complexities of smaller tax practice.  
 The distinction between capital and revenue expenditure.  Need to refer to 
case law. 
 Capital allowances and the meaning of ‘plant’.  Need to refer to case law. 
 Double tax treaties.  Repeatedly mentioned as being difficult to read and 
follow  
 Status issues – employed v self-employed.  Need to refer to case law. 
 The restructure of a group and the implications for the ‘option to tax’ 
election for VAT.   
 Foreign matters in general, including residency issues and foreign income  
 Employment related securities legislation – frequently mentioned area of 
complex legislation   
 IHT – the smaller practitioners may well ‘farm’ this out to more experienced 
advisers, as this work may not regularly ‘crop up’ sufficiently for the 
practitioner to deal with it. 
 Transactions in land legislation – how do client circumstances fit? 
 Phoenix rules (liquidation of a company and starting up in business again).  
How do client circumstances fit?  Guidance poor. 
 Theatre tax relief – a relief similar to R&D, but less common 
 Interaction of taxes – various examples. Complex. 
 Goodwill – this was not described as difficult to figure out, per se, but an 
example of constant change.   
 Patent box relief.  This was described as “jammed up” (I/V22) with anti-
avoidance rules, and having “horrendous” calculations which makes it 
hardly worth the time and effort to work through all the rules. 
 R&D – some firms ‘farm out’ this type of work to specialist tax boutiques 
 Entrepreneurs’ relief.  Problems if client circumstances were unique so you 
may “never find anything the same as your situation” (I/V3).   
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 A VAT question from a client – the practitioner is waiting on the outcome 
of a VAT appeal regarding those in a similar business.  
 Option to buy a property  
This was described as working out a “reasonable position” to get to the tax 





























10.3  Information sheet – focus group (practitioner workshop) 
Tax practitioner workshop – Information sheet 
 
Understanding the mechanics and difficulties of tax practice as identified by tax practitioners from small and 
medium sized tax and accounting practices. 
Research project and invitation to participate 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for 




Background and purpose 
UK tax law is complex – it is often not clear and is open to interpretation. The workshop is part of a wider 
project which will aim to uncover the ways in which practitioners create meaningful advice from complex 
legislation. The focus is on smaller practitioners and advice provided to small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The data collected may be used in this project and potentially included within publishable work. 
 
Aims 
 To get an initial feel for the challenges that face small tax practices/firms and advisors. 
 To consider issues of tax complexity – with a potential focus on research and development tax credit 
claims or other issues as is (are) determined appropriate as a result of the discussion. 
 
The type of questions that may be asked: 
 
What are the challenges facing small tax practices in the current 
environment? What significant changes have taken place in the past 
5/10 years? 
Have clients’ expectations changed in recent 
years? How have relations with HMRC 
changed? 
What areas of the tax law are most problematic? 




6 or 7 individuals from smaller, independent practices have been asked to participate. 
 
Participation is voluntary 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this 
information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time. 
You do not have to give a reason. 
 
Time required 
The workshop will last a maximum of two hours (excluding lunch) and will be held at the University of 
Sheffield Management School. Lunch and refreshments will be provided and travel expenses will be 
reimbursed. It is anticipated that the workshop may gather preliminary data and further workshops or 
individual interviews may take place at a later date – again on a voluntary basis. 
 
Disadvantages or risk taking part None identified 
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Advantages of taking part 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that as this 
work will be grounded in the practical activities of tax practitioners, the wider research project may identify 
issues of concern to SME advisors which may be of interest to the practitioner community, the tax authority 
and policy makers. 
 
Use of the data 
The data will be used to inform the research project and may be used in subsequent outputs such as 
journal articles, copies of which can be provided. 
 
Recording of data 
There will be audio recording of the workshop. This will be used only for analysis of data to use in potential 
publications and/or illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other use will be made of them 
without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original 
recordings. No individual will be identified in the use of the recorded data. 
 
Confidentiality 
All the information that we collect about you or your firm during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. You or your firm will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications. 
 
Funding of the workshop 
This is being provided by the University of Sheffield accounting and finance research centre – Centre for 
Research into Accounting and Finance in Context (CRAFiC). 
 
Ethical approval 
This project has been ethically approved via The University of Exeter Business School Research Office. 
 
































10.4  Prompt sheet - interviews 
Interview questionnaire: Provision of tax advice to clients by the [smaller] UK tax 
practitioner 
Introduction: Brief explanation of the purpose of the research.  Explanation of the 
nature of the confidentiality/anonymity agreement plus request to record.  
The objective of the research is to investigate how the [smaller] UK tax practitioner 
provides advice to [business] clients, particularly in instances when the nature of the 
advice required may be subject to uncertainty or is not ‘straightforward’ to give. Trying 
to ascertain the interaction of the tax practitioner and the client in practice [re smaller 





 Could you tell me a little about your background? How you ended up 
here/worked elsewhere/how long worked here/position/role? Qualifications and 
membership of Professional bodies.  
 What services does the firm offer and what type of clients does the firm have? 
 Why do clients seek your services?  What type of issues do clients commonly 
seek advice for? 
 Thinking of business clients what are the size of your clients (leave free to 
describe) 
 Are there times when you prefer not to “take on” a client? If so, why? Is this 
related to the type of advice needed? Why/why not? (risk?). Who takes this 
decision 
 How perceive your position (between HMRC/client) – please explain. 
 What percentage of your time would you say you spend on researching a tax 
issue and what prompts the need for the research? (confusing language, 
readability of law, lack of knowledge etc.). Examples of this type of work? 
 Proportion of time spent on routine (easy work) v more challenging, which takes 
time to consider? (similar to above, can leave depending how conversation 
goes) 
Environment in which work (HMRC, law, other challenges) 
 How find relations with HMRC?  
 What challenges do you face (re clients (why), re HMRC (why), re law (if used 
and why?) and do you think any challenges are unique to the smaller practitioner 
firm and why? 
 Have you found HMRC ‘unsettling’ previously understood tax positions e.g. 
similar as to what happened in Arctic systems – can you explain? 
 Do clients ‘put pressure’ on the practitioner – how/why? Examples? 
 Do you consult the legislation when formulating advice to clients (why/why 
not?). 
 Any shift in attitude towards ‘tax planning’ in recent times, either by client or 
practitioner – why/why not? 
 Any comments about the tax legislation (in general)? Use by small practitioner? 




 Does the law create any certainties or uncertainties for you when providing 
advice?  How and in what respect? With what consequences? Specific 
examples? (thinking here of language/words such as reasonable, significant, 
trading and so on) 
 How do you go about interpreting the meaning of the law/provision etc (will 
depend on answers to above) 
 Do you have examples of HMRC using its guidance, in its negotiations with you 
(instead of law) 
 Thinking about business tax specifically – do you advise on business reliefs?  If 
so, which? How easy is it to provide advice on these and how easy to claim? 
Ask for examples depending on response. Any comments about the process or 
the receptiveness of clients in claiming these? 
 
How manage environment 
 
 How does the practitioner approach the provision of advice in response to tax 
matters other than the ‘run of the mill’ queries?  How arrive at a position of 
understanding? What is the process? Any examples? What resources are used? 
Can you talk me through the approach? 
 If finding it difficult to determine an answer, what would the practitioner do? 
Talk me through the process (group discussion/bounce off colleagues/take 
outside the firm – if so how/where/why?), does this influence your own 
feelings? I/E how reach a decision? 
 If doubt remains, how is it resolved – in favour of the client, or not? How 
determine support for your position, which authorities used etc? 
 What sources of help (guidance – get them to describe) are used in this respect? 
How and why and what level of reliance is placed on them?  How does this 
impact on the advice provided? Any examples? Have HMRC ever challenged 
reliance on guidance? How? Examples? 
 Do you refer to case law? If so, how and in what circumstances.  Any examples? 
How is it used? 
 If a provision in the law is ambiguous (say for example if claiming a business 
relief), how is this dealt with by the practitioner in terms of dealing with both 
HMRC and the client? How is judgment exercised? How easy is it to predict the 
consequences of a transaction? If so, examples? If not, examples? Has this 
always been the case or have any recent changes affected this? What role do 
sources outside the legislation itself help with this? 
 How does the practitioner keep up to date with changing legislation, or acquire 
knowledge needed to advise the client?  What is the general process? What 
training/CPD undertaken? Any examples?  
 How does the practitioner deal with fees for investigation/research into the tax 
‘problem’ 
 Do you always feel comfortable with the advice given?  If so, why?  If not, 
why? Any examples? 
 Any suggestions on how to improve the relations with HMRC? 
 Any suggestions on how to improve the legislation/system? 
 What would you change, if anything, to make the provision of advice easier? 
 Making tax digital?  
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